The impact of corporate governance systems, economic conditions, and target value ambiguity on bidders' gains by Barbopoulos, Leonidas
The copyright of this thesis rests with the 
author or the university to which it was 
submitted. No quotation from it, or 
information derived from it may be 
published without the prior written 
consent of the author or university, and 
any information derived from it should be 
acknowledged. 
^ IF Durham 
University 
PhD THESIS 
The Impact of Corporate Governance Systems, 
Economic Conditions, and Target Value Ambiguity on 
Bidders' Gains 
By Leonidas Barbopoulos 
Principle Supervisors: Professor Krishna Paudyal and Dr Gioia Pescetto 
Secondary Supervisor: Professor Robert Dixon 
Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Finance 
May 2009 
Durham University, United Kingdom 
'\m 2009 
In M e m o r y of my Grandparents , Georgia and Panayiotis 
The Impact of Corporate Governance Systems, Economic Conditions, and Target 
Value Ambiguity on Bidders' Gains 
By Leonidas Barbopoulos 
Abstract 
The primary objective of this thesis is to investigate the effects of takeover bid 
announcements on the value of bidders that engage in domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions. The empirical chapters focus on three major issues. They are: (a) the 
implications of international variations in corporate governance systems, (b) the roles of 
market valuations, economic conditions and exchange rate changes, and (c) the effects of 
ambiguity in the valuation of unlisted targets, on the wealth of shareholders of bidding 
firms. Evidence from all chapters, while revealing that bidders' gains vary significantly with 
several firm and transaction specific characteristics, strongly confirm the deterministic 
power of the key issues examined. Specifically, the findings discussed in chapter 3, not only 
confirm that bidders tend to enjoy higher short-run gains from acquisitions of (a) listed and 
subsidiary targets that based in civil-law countries and (b) stock financed acquisitions of 
targets that based in common-law countries, but they also suggest that bidders perform 
relatively better in the long-run when the targets are based in common-law countries. The 
results reported and discussed in chapter 4 show that bidders' shareholders enjoy higher 
announcement gains from domestic than from foreign takeovers only when the bid is 
announced during periods of low market valuation, high levels of economic growth, and 
weak effective exchange rate. On the contrary, acquisitions made during periods of high 
market valuation and strong effective exchange rate yield higher abnormal returns to 
shareholders of acquirers of foreign than domestic target firms. The results also confirm that 
whereas market valuations and the effective exchange rate have similar effects on bidders' 
post-merger performance, the effects of economic growth tend to reverse after three and 
five years following the bid announcement. Evidence discussed in the final empirical chapter 
(chapter 5) suggests that the gains of bidders engaged in acquisitions of unlisted targets are 
shaped by the degree of difficulty surrounding the valuation of these targets. Bidders' 
shareholders enjoy higher announcement gains when they acquire less value-ambiguous 
unlisted targets. Acquisitions of (a) mature and (b) large unlisted targets generate higher 
(lower) short-run (long-run) returns to shareholders of bidders. In addition, bidders of 
unlisted targets laden with intangible assets generate low short-run returns but perform 
better in the long-run. Overall, the findings of this thesis show that the gains of bidders 
based in the UK are not only affected by transaction and firm specific factors but also by the 
corporate governance system of the country in which the targets are based, the stock 
market conditions, economic situations and exchange rate movements at the time of bid 
announcement, as well as the difficulty involved in valuing the targets. 
The material contained in this thesis has not previously submitted for a degree in this 
or any other university. 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be 
published without his consent and information derived from it should be 
acknowledged. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Takeovers have been widely used by corporations as a method of restructuring and 
expanding their operations in an attempt to increase efficiency and/or market share. 
As summarised by Shen and Reuer (2004), takeovers represent "a leading cause of 
industrial change and the rationalization of business organizations in the modern 
industrial era". ' Corporate takeovers also entail significant implications, depending 
on their success, not only for firms directly involved in the transaction, but also for a 
number of other internal and external stakeholders of merger partners. In spite of 
extensive research on the effects of takeover deals, a number of issues remain 
unresolved and/or unaddressed by previous studies. This thesis aims to fill some of 
those gaps in finance literature.^ In particular, the thesis aims to address three main 
issues: (a) the impact of the legal system of the target firm's country of residence on 
the announcement and post-merger stock price behaviour of UK bidders acquired 
both domestic and foreign target firms, (b) the roles of market valuations and 
economic conditions in the source country, as well as the role of the source 
country's currency Effective Exchange Rate movements, on the announcement and 
post-merger wealth effects of UK bidders acquired both domestic and foreign target 
firms, and (c) the effect of value ambiguity (or the difficulty to value) of UK unlisted 
target firms on the announcement and post-merger gains of UK bidders' 
shareholders.^ Research outcomes on these issues should fill a number of voids in 
finance literature and enhance our understanding of the corporate takeovers 
process and their implications to various stakeholders of merger partners. 
Evidence from earlier research, while revealing that domestic mergers and 
acquisitions (hereafter M&A) continue to overpopulate the market for corporate 
^ in Pablo, A. L , and Javldan, M. 2004, 'Mergers and Acquisitions: Creating Integrative Knovi^ledge', 
Blackwell. (p. 82). 
^ The remaining of the discussion in this introduction chapter illustrates clearly the importance and 
the need of the issues examined in this thesis, the gaps in the literature, the significant endowments 
that the main outcomes of this thesis add to the literature, as weW as the implications to all 
constituents involved in the M&A transactions. 
' In this thesis I employ UK sample to test for the above research objectives. Basically, the UK market 
Is very similar to the US one in terms of corporate governance characteristics, legal protection issues 
and most importantly it has the strongest legal system as compared to continental Europe (issues 
related to the first empirical chapter, chapter 3) and also it is overpopulated by acquisitions of 
unlisted targets (almost 90% of the UK sample involves unlisted targe firms, as reported in the third 
empirical chapter, chapter 5). 
10 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
control, strongly suggests that over the last three decades the number of M&A that 
involve firms from two different countries (i.e. cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions - hereafter CBA)" has increased substantially.^ Observations have also 
suggested that although there are some common driving forces between domestic 
and cross-border deals, a number of other strategic considerations separate them. 
Some of major forces that motivate firms to engage in M&A include, among others, 
growth, technological advancements, product differentiation, consolidation, 
government policy, movements in exchange rates, desire to diversify, and political 
and economic stabilities. However, CBA tend to be much more complex, when 
compared to domestic acquisitions, since the transactions across two different 
countries are likely to give rise to differences in political and economic conditions 
(for example, the liberalization of trade, regional integration, deregulation and 
privatization), organizational structures, corporate governance mechanisms, 
cultures, traditions, tax rules, laws, investor protection regimes, as well as 
accounting standards. Furthermore, several obstacles affect all relevant parties 
involved in the M&A process within a single country (i.e. domestic M&A). These 
factors are significant and they are the likely reasons of why at least 50 percent of 
domestic M&A fail long after the bid announcement.^ It is also known that more 
complexities are faced by firms involved in CBA and this is likely to increase their 
failure rate to well over 50 percent, compared to domestic M&A.^ 
* Corporations have the following alternative ways to expand internationally: a) exporting from to 
home to foreign market, b) licensing a foreign company to produce the goods and services, c) 
Greenfield investment in production facilities in the foreign market, d) merger with, or acquisition of, 
a firm already operating in the foreign market, and e) joint venture or other strategic alliance with a 
firm operating in the foreign market. The last three ways are in general considered as Foreign Direct 
Investments (FDI). 
* Healy and Palepu (1993) suggested that around the late 1980s the UK was the leading country in 
CBA activities covering almost 30% of the entire international corporate investments. Given that the 
UK CBA activities fluctuate over time, the UK still remains one of the major participants in the global 
CBA activity. UNCTAD (2000) has also suggested that "The value of completed cross-boarder M&A 
(defined as the acquisition of more than 10 per cent equity share) rose from less then $100 billion in 
1987, to $720 billion in 1999." (p. 10). 
* Porter (1987), as discussed in Hussey (1999), suggested that over a long period after the M&A 
announcements, at least 50% of them were divested, in other words they were failures. 
' The failures could be reflected in destruction of market value, financial instability, damaged strategic 
position, organization weakness, damaged reputation, and violation of ethical norms and laws. 
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The increased CBA activities in terms of both number of deals and value of 
transactions (see footnote 3), along with the difficulties and complexities discussed 
above, have raised a set of important questions, some of which remain to be 
investigated while others call for further examination. Typical questions that deserve 
investigation include, how do CBA affect the short and the long-run wealth effects of 
shareholders of firms that are involved in the deals? What drives CBA activities over 
time? What are the roles of corporate governance mechanisms and legal system 
features on the direction and performance of firms that engage in CBA? How does 
the level of market valuations and economic conditions in the source country, as well 
as the source country's currency Effective Exchange Rate (EER) movements, affect 
the level and performance of bidders engaged in CBA? And finally, are there any 
differences between the performances of bidders involved in domestic acquisitions 
with the ones involved in CBA? In response to these questions, a voluminous 
literature has emerged which concentrates on whether CBA create superior value for 
shareholders of the acquiring firm (Doukas and Travlos, 1988; Kang, 1993; Markides 
and Ittner, 1994; Doukas, 1995; Gregory and McCorriston, 2005) while another 
group of studies in the same field of research compares the gains obtained from CBA 
with those obtained from domestic acquisitions (see for instance Moeller and 
Schlingemann, 2005 and Conn et al. 2005). 
Amongst the earlier studies that have attempted to resolve the puzzle on bidders' 
gains from domestic versus CBA, Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) attributed the 
higher gains from CBA to business diversification whilst Gregory and McCorriston 
(2005) showed that the gains from CBA are dependent on target's geographical 
region. However, evidence in this field of research is less than convincing with 
respect to the exact implications on the wealth effects resulting from domestic and 
CBA announcements. As a result, this thesis examines whether additional factors 
which have been originally proposed to constitute a fundamental role in the 
literature of corporate finance, investments, and asset pricing, are sufficient to 
determine the short and long-run gains of acquiring firms, and also consider the 
implications they may have to all stakeholders of merger partners. Accordingly, the 
main question that motivates chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis focuses on whether 
12 
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domestic and/or CBA create value to shareholders of acquiring firms by investigating 
the impact of (a) the legal system of the target firm's country of residence, and (b) 
market and economic conditions at the time of bid announcement, on domestic and 
cross-border deal activities as well as on the short and long-run gains of bidders that 
involved in these transactions. 
Previous research has also focused on whether target and/or acquiring firms' 
shareholders benefit from exclusively domestic corporate takeovers within a short 
window surrounding the takeover's announcement day. In short, the balance of 
current evidence on value creation from M&A has recorded that although target 
firms' shareholders enjoy positive and significant abnormal returns after M&A 
announcements (Bradley et al. 1983; Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000; Billett et al. 2003), 
the question on whether acquiring firms' shareholders benefit from M&A is still 
under investigation (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Asquith et al. 1983; Fuller et al. 2002; 
Draper and Paudyal, 2006).^ In particular, the announcement period gains of bidding 
firms appear more puzzling with several deals to either generate positive or negative 
abnormal returns or to breakeven in the short-run.^ Evidence has also admitted that 
the acquiring firm's performance in the short-run is a function of specific bidder, 
target, as well as transaction specific characteristics. Indeed, a rich array of studies 
has concluded that the target firm's status, the method of payment, the growth 
opportunities of the bidder at the time of the acquisition announcement (measured 
by the MTBV), the size of the bidder at the time of the bid announcement (measured 
by the market capitalization of the bidder), and the relative size of the deal are, 
among others, very important announcement returns determinants.'" More 
recently, another strand of studies have examined the sensitivity of bidders' gains on 
^ This thesis focus only on the short and the long-run gains of acquiring firms' shareholders w/hereas 
the gains to target firms' shareholders are ignored, given that the value creation to target firms' 
shareholders Is, to some extent, certain. 
* Many studies in the literature have reached the conclusion that the stock market reaction to the 
information contained in an acquisition announcement reveals the market's view for this transaction. 
Specifically, Hietala, Kaplan and Robinson (2003) proposed that the announcement of an acquisition 
reveals Information about the bidder's overpayment, the stand-alone values of the firms involved in 
the merger (bidding and the target) and finally the potential synergies arising from this combination. 
^° For studies investigate these factors, see for example Asquith et al. 1983, Myers and Majluf (1984), 
Travlos (1987), Chang (1998), Rau and Vermaelen (1998), Fuller et al. (2002), Moeller et al. (2004), 
and Draper and Paudyal (2006). 
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merger activity and it has highlighted the deterministic power of merger waves on 
the short-run gains of bidders' shareholders (Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan 2004; 
Bouwman etal . 2009). 
Along similar lines, recent extensive research on the wealth effects generated to 
shareholders of bidders when acquiring unlisted target firms, has left some 
important questions unresolved. For example, does the level of information 
availability about the target, or the level of difficulty in estimating the value of the 
target, affects the short and the long-run gains of bidders? How does the valuation 
ambiguity of the unlisted targets that creates difficulty for the bidding firms in 
correctly estimating the value of the deal, affects the announcement period and 
post-merger wealth of bidders' shareholders? And finally, what is the role of the 
method of payment in acquisitions that involve unlisted, and value uncertain targets 
firms, on the announcement and post-merger gains of bidders' shareholders? 
Accordingly, this thesis explores both the challenges and opportunities that occur in 
favour of the performance of exclusively domestic acquisitions that involve unlisted 
targets. In short, the fifth chapter of this thesis is mainly concerned with the impact 
of different levels of information availability or quality of information (i.e. different 
levels of value ambiguity) concerning the valuation of unlisted target firms, on the 
announcement and post-merger gains of domestic bidders' shareholders. 
Numerous studies have also examined the post-merger (i.e. long-run) performance 
of acquiring firms and they have admitted that, on average, bidders tend to suffer a 
loss in a period up to five years following the month of the M&A announcement 
(Agrawal et al. 1992; Loughran and Vijh, 1997; and Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000). 
Similarly, several recent studies have recorded that the well documented 
underperformance of bidding firms in the long-run is not dependent only on firm 
specific characteristics such as the size and the growth opportunities of firms 
involved in the transaction, but also on transaction specific characteristics such as 
the method of payment and the relative size of the deal (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; 
Moeller et al. 2004). More recently, other studies have investigated the effects of 
merger waves on the post-merger bidders' stock price behaviour and they have 
14 
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Strongly confirmed their deterministic power (Bouwman et al. 2009). However, in 
spite of current research evidence on bidders' post-merger returns, several 
important questions remain to be investigated. Indeed, whether the post-merger 
gains of bidders' shareholders should be captured by using a better methodology or 
whether the post-merger underperformance puzzle is related to other firm, 
transaction, market or economic specific-factors, are empirical questions that 
deserve further investigation. As a result, the chapter 3 aims to investigate the 
impact of the legal system of the target firm's country of residence on the post-
merger share price behaviour of bidders engaged in acquisitions of domestic and 
foreign targets. The legal traditions of the target firm's nation may affect the costs of 
the target firm's integration into the bidder's existing business environment which is 
therefore expected to be reflected into the bidder's long-run returns. In addition, 
while there is some evidence of the effects of market valuations on the post-merger 
gains of domestic bidders, chapter 4 seeks to uncover the long-run wealth of bidders 
engaged in domestic and foreign acquisitions at different economic and market 
conditions, as well as at different effective exchange rate levels. Market valuations 
and economic conditions at the time of the bid announcement are likely to affect the 
level of (a) competition, and (b) the investor sentiment in all countries in question, 
thereby affect bidder's post-merger returns. Lastly, chapter 5 explores the effects of 
value ambiguities related to unlisted target firms on bidder's post-merger 
performance. Whether the difficulty in estimating the value of unlisted targets 
creates different valuation effects to bidders' short and long-run share price is still an 
open question in finance literature that deserves further investigation. The majority 
of evidence derived from this thesis fills several voids in the literature related to 
bidders' post-merger share price behaviour. 
Within the overall structure of this thesis, chapter 2 provides a detailed review of the 
existing literature that is related to gains of domestic and foreign bidders' 
shareholders (as separate divisions) along with their performance determinants, 
both in the short and long-run. It also offers a discussion on their main implications 
and challenges to different stakeholders of the firms involved. The discussion here 
also reviews the literature on the gains of bidders within the framework of domestic 
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versus CBA, which is the focus of the chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis and examines the 
question of whether domestic and/or foreign acquisitions create superior value to 
UK bidding firms' shareholders. Lastly, the literature related to specific issues 
examined in each of the empirical chapters (chapters 3 to 5 in the thesis) will be 
discussed separately within the framework of each of these chapters. 
Chapter 3 investigates whether the characteristics of the legal system of the target 
firm's country of residence from all over the world are significant factors in shaping 
the short and long-run gains of acquirers of domestic versus foreign target firms. 
Academic interest on that particular nexus has concluded that the governance 
procedures and the legal environment of the country affect firm's value (see for 
example, Jensen, 1993; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny, 1997; 1998; 
2000, 2000b and 2002; and La Porta et al. 1999 and 2006). The significant impact of 
the legal provisions pertinent to corporate governance, investor protection, and 
openness of an economy is that it can affect (a) the acquisition premium/discount 
offered by bidders, and (b) the process of integration between acquirer and target, 
which in turn, should be reflected in the announcement and the long-term 
performance of the bidding firm. However, in spite of the apparent importance of 
governance systems, no prior study has directly examined the possible implications 
of the various legal systems and corporate governance mechanisms, on the gains to 
UK bidders that engage in domestic versus CBA." Therefore, the major task of 
chapter 3 is to fill this void by empirically examining the possible implications of legal 
traditions of the target firm's country of residence on the gains to bidders engaged in 
domestic and foreign acquisitions. The main conclusions derived from this chapter 
suggest that, after controlling for several firm and transaction specific 
characteristics, CBA generate higher returns than domestic deals. In the 
announcement period, bidding firms acquiring listed and subsidiary targets that 
based in civil-law countries (with lower investor protection) outperform the 
acquirers of listed and subsidiary targets that based in both the domestic market and 
Gregory and McCorriston (2005) grouped UK acquirers' targets by geographical region of countries 
in which they operate and suggested that the corporate governance system among the regions differ 
significantly. Similarly, Bris and Cabolis (2008) applied a similar context in their research. 
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in common-law countries (with higher investor protection). In addition, bidders 
acquiring targets that based in common-law countries and pay with shares generate 
higher abnormal returns than the ones acquiring targets that based in the domestic 
market and in civil-law countries with the same method of payment. Further, in the 
long-run, bidders of targets that based in common-law countries (both in the UK and 
in the foreign common-law countries) outperforming the ones of targets that based 
in civil-law countries. 
The overall task of chapter 4 is to explore whether, at aggregate level, the domestic 
and CBA activities spike with the abnormal deviations of market valuations and 
various macroeconomic variables; namely the effective exchange rate (EER), Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), Gross National Product (GNP), the Growth Index and the 
Coincidence Index (i.e. business cycle indicator). Along with the domestic and CBA 
activities, this chapter seeks to investigate the short and long-run stock price 
behaviour of bidders that engage in these deals. The work presented in this chapter 
is informed by recent evidence related to the sensitivity of the gains of bidding firms' 
shareholders on merger activity (i.e. the work by Rosen (2006) on investor 
sentiment, merger waves, and gains of bidders). Accordingly, the main conclusions 
derived from this chapter confirm that both domestic and foreign acquisition 
activities spike with market valuations (both at aggregate and industry level) and 
economic conditions in the source country, further supporting the main conclusions 
of other studies such as Bouwman et al. (2009), and Baker et al. (2009). Within the 
same context, the gains of bidders' shareholders acquiring domestic and foreign 
targets across periods of high or low M&A activity are found to vary significantly. 
Specifically, bidders of domestic targets outperform bidders of foreign targets in the 
short-run, only when the bid is made during times of low market valuations, weak 
EER, and high levels of economic growth. On the contrary, acquisitions made during 
periods of high market valuation and strong effective exchange rate generate higher 
gains to shareholders of acquirers of foreign than domestic target firms. The findings 
also show that market valuations and the EER have similar effects on the post-
merger bidders' gains, whereas the effect of economic growth reverses after three 
and five years following the M&A announcement. 
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Chapter 5 develops and empirically examines the proposition that gains of acquirers 
of unlisted targets depends upon the level of value ambiguity (or difficult to value) of 
targets. The principle motivation underpinning this empirical chapter is evidence of 
recent literature which admits that (a) the majority of bidders engage in M&A with 
unlisted target firms,' ' and (b) the sources of the positive gains to bidders of private 
or unlisted target firms, in contrast to either negative or zero gains to bidders of 
listed targets, remain largely unexplored. This chapter is also motivated by recent 
asset pricing literature which strongly suggests that if the information quality in 
relation to an asset is not reliable, then ambiguity-averse investors react more 
strongly to bad news than to good news and in general, they tend to avoid these 
assets (Epstein and Schneider, 2008). Accordingly, while estimates derived in this 
chapter are based on a selection of target firms' characteristics that cause difficulty 
in valuation, such as age, size, intangibility of assets, and investments, they strongly 
confirm that the bidding firms' gains, both during the announcement and the post-
merger period, vary significantly with the level of value-ambiguity concerning the 
unlisted target firm. In general, acquirers of large (mature) unlisted targets 
outperform the acquirers of small (young) ones in share deals during the 
announcement period. On the contrary, acquirers of small (young) unlisted targets 
perform better in the post-merger period than acquirers of large (mature) unlisted 
targets. Similarly, while share deals of unlisted targets with balance sheets laden 
with intangible assets generate low positive or negative announcement returns to 
bidders' shareholders, they perform better in the long-run. The overall findings show 
also that the methods of payment interact with the value ambiguity of unlisted 
targets in shaping the gains of acquirers. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: chapter 2 reviews and discusses 
the literature that is closely related to (bidders') common abnormal return 
determinants that applied across the chapters 3 to 5 and form the core of this thesis. 
" Faccio and Masulis (2005) showed that approximately 90% of UK (and Irish) acquisitions involve 
unlisted target firms; Draper and Paudyal (2006) reported approximately 87% of the UK acquisitions 
involved privately held targets. However, Moeller et al. (2007) showed that approximately 53% of US 
acquisitions involve unlisted targets. 
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Chapters 3 to 5 present the discussion of the main issues examined in this thesis, my 
empirical methodology and the data used, whilst they discuss the main findings of 
the econometric results. Finally, chapter 6 concludes by providing a summary of the 
main empirical results while it discusses the main implications stemming from the 
empirical investigations as reflected in the relevant constituents on the domestic and 
foreign investors. 
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2.1 Introduction 
A rich array of studies in finance literature has reported that the stock market 
reaction to the information contained in an acquisition's announcement reveals the 
market's view of this transaction.' In short, these studies have widely recognized 
that the announcement and post-merger acquiring firm's performance is a function 
of specific bidder and/or target characteristics, transaction characteristics, as well as 
other external characteristics. Specifically, several authors have individually 
concluded that (a) the target firm's status (i.e. private, public, subsidiary), (b) the 
method of payment (i.e. cash, stock, mixed/other), (c) the growth opportunities of 
the bidder at the time of the acquisition announcement as measured by the market-
to-book value (MTBV) of the bidding firm one month prior to the acquisition's 
announcement day, (d) the size of the bidder as measured by the market 
capitalization (MV) of the bidding firm one month prior to the takeover's 
announcement day, and (e) the relative size of the deal, constitute, among others,' 
very important announcement and post-merger determinants of bidding firms' stock 
performance. 
Along these lines, in this chapter I review and discuss, in great detail, only the 
literature that is closely related to common abnormal returns determinants on the 
short and long-run gains of shareholders of bidders acquiring both domestic and 
foreign targets. In the same framework, I also review the literature that attempts to 
compare the gains from domestic and cross-boarder acquisitions (CBA) whilst 
discussing specific factors that lead to any observed differential in performance. 
Findings of studies that are closely related to issues I investigate within each of the 
empirical chapters will be reviewed and discussed within the framework of each of 
the empirical chapters separately (chapters 3 to 5). I follow this structure in order to 
' Hietala, Kaplan and Robinson (2003) proposed that the announcement of an acquisition reveals 
information about the bidder's overpayment, the stand-alone values of the firms involved in the 
merger (bidding and the target) and finally the potential synergies arising from this combination. 
^ Other determinants may include the age of the merger partners, the analyst coverage of the firms 
involved in the transaction, previous experience in engaging in M&A, previous performance of bidder, 
etc. 
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avoid any overlapping amongst the sections reviewing the literature on factors 
affecting the bidding firms' performance (across all empirical chapters and the 
present one).^ This structure will also help the reader to further understand the 
importance of the issues examined in the thesis and it will clearly reflect its 
contributions in finance literature. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: in section 2.2 (2.3) I review 
and discuss the literature related to the announcement stock market reaction 
around takeovers of domestic (foreign) target firms. Moreover, in section 2.4 I 
review and discuss the studies that investigate the wealth effects of bidders' 
shareholders within the framework of domestic versus foreign acquisitions (the ones 
that examine, simultaneously bidders' gains around takeovers of domestic and 
foreign firms, as well as factors that lead to any differential in performance) whereas 
in the final section, section 2.5, I focus on studies that investigate the post-merger 
stock performance of both domestic and foreign acquirers. Finally, section 2.6 
concludes and summarizes this chapter. 
2.2 Gains from Domestic Acquisitions 
Within this section I review and discuss the literature on the impact of target firm's 
status and numerous other determinants on the bidding firm's announcement 
returns. Other determinants include the method of payment used to finance the 
deal, size of the bidding firm, relative size of the deal, bidding firm's market-to-book 
value (MTBV) ratio, bidding firm's price-to-earning (P/E) ratio, and age of the bidding 
and target firm. I focus only on the impact of pre-stated factors on the 
announcement returns of bidding firms' shareholders that engage in mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) with target firms operating in the domestic market. 
' Given the inter-disciplinary nature of this thesis, which mainly focuses on newly investigated 
determinants to bidding firms abnormal returns, the incorporation of already existing factors 
developed by earlier studies for robustness reasons appears essential, thereby the likelihood of 
repeating these studies in several points increases. 
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2.2.1 Target Firm Status 
The examination of the shareholders' wealth effects of the target firm (when the 
target firm is a listed one) and the bidding firm within a short window surrounding 
the M&A announcement day, has been one of the most widely and concurrently 
controversial researched areas in finance literature. The majority of studies for both 
the UK and the US markets, as well as for other markets across the world, have 
documented that while the shareholders of target firms enjoy positive and 
significant abnormal returns during the announcement period,"* the gains to 
shareholders of the bidding companies are to a large degree ambiguous. In fact, it 
has been extensively recorded that the short-run returns to acquiring firms are 
largely depended on the target firm's status (i.e. public, private, and subsidiary). 
Specifically, several studies have reported that acquirers bidding for listed targets 
either lose significantly (i.e. experience negative abnormal returns) or breakeven in 
the short-run (i.e. generate zero or small positive returns).^ On the other hand, the 
vast majority of studies have recorded positive and statistically significant abnormal 
returns to bidders acquiring private^ and subsidiary^ target firms.* In the following 
* For studies that have documented positive gains to target firms' shareholders, see for example: for 
the US market. Dodd and Ruback (1977), Langetieg (1978), Bradley (1980), Dennis and McConnell 
(1986), Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Lang, Stuiz and Walking (1989), 
Frank, Harris and Titman (1991), Servaes (1991), Bannerjee and Owers (1992), Conrad and Niden 
(1992) , Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992), Kaplan and Weisback (1992), Berkovitch and Narayanan 
(1993) , Smith and Kim (1994), Schwert (1996), Laughran and Vijh (1997), Maquieira, Megginson and 
Nail (1998), Leeth and Borg (2000), Mulherin and Boone (2000), Mulherin (2000), DeLong (2001), 
Houtson et al. (2001), and Billet, King and Mauer (2003), for Hong Kong, Cheung and Shum (1993), for 
the UK market. Draper and Paudyal (1999), for Canada. Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) and for European 
countries. Beitel et al. (2002), and Goergen and Ronneboog (2004). 
^ For US evidence see for example: Jensen and Ruback (1983), Ascquith (1983), Jarrell and Poulsen 
(1987a), Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), 
Acquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983), Servaes (1991), Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), Hansen and Lott 
(1996), Chang (1998), Mulherin and Boone (2000), Schwert (2000), Ang and Kohers (2001), and Fuller, 
Netter, and Stegemoller (2002). For UK evidence see for example: Firth (1980), Barnes (1984), Dodds 
and Quek (1985), Franks and Harris (1989), Limmack (1991), Sudarsanam, Holl and Salami (1996), 
Gregory (1997), Holl and Kyriazis (1997), Higson and Elliott (1998), Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003), 
Draper and Paudyal (1999 and 2006), Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes (2005), Doukas and Petmezas 
(2007), and Antonlou, Petmezas and Zhao (2007). For evidence from other countries (Australia, 
Canadian, Japanese, German) see for example: Eckbo (1986), Pettway and Yamaha (1986), Eckbo, 
Giammarino, and Heinkel (1990a), Gregory and Westheider (1992) and Da Silva Rosa, Limmack, 
Supriadi, and Woodliff (2001). 
* For UK evidence see for example: Hansen and Lott (1996), Draper and Paudyal (2006), Conn, Cosh, 
Guest, and Hughes (2005) and Alexandridis, Antoniou, and Zhao (2008). For US evidence see for 
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discussion I review evidence from studies that constitute a significant contribution in 
finance literature in terms of how the target firm's status in M&A can, to some 
degree, shape the variation of the bibbing firms' abnormal returns in the short-run. 
2.2.1.1 Gains from Acquisitions of Public Target Firms 
In this sub-section only studies that investigate the impact of acquisitions of listed 
target firms on bidders' gains are reviewed and discussed. The literature in this field 
of research is divided into three parts: (a) studies that focus on the US market, (b) 
studies that focus on the UK market and (c) studies that focus on other markets 
across the world (the Rest-of-the-World - RoW group of countries). 
US Evidence 
Almost three and half decades of evidence on M&A, following the seminal work of 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) document that acquiring firms buying public targets either 
experience significant losses or breakeven in the short-run. More specifically, the 
balance of current evidence on the bidding firm's stock market reaction around 
corporate takeovers appears puzzling, with the bidding firms breaking even (i.e. 
delivering the required rate of return to their shareholders) around successful 
mergers, while realizing small positive, and statistically significant, gains around bids 
of successful tender offers. Jensen and Ruback (1983) argued that the gains from 
takeover announcements appear to stem from other sources than market power, 
whereas the authors claimed that it is difficult to identify managerial actions that 
destroy shareholders wealth. Nevertheless, other studies within the same field of 
research have highlighted that the variation of the gains to bidding firms' 
example: Chang (1998), Ang and Kohers (2001), Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002). For evidence 
from other countries (Australia) see for example: Da Silva Rosa, Limmack, Supriadi, and Woodliff 
(2001). 
' For evidence see for example: Fuller et al. (2002), Faccio and Masulis (2005), Antoniou et al. (2007). 
^ However, these gains are strongly associated with the method of payment utilized to finance the 
M&A transaction (a more detailed analysis on the impact of method of payment will follow in section 
2.2.2.1). 
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shareholders around M&A announcements are closely associated with the method 
of payment utilized in the transaction (see for example Carleton et al. 1983).^ On the 
contrary, the review of evidence in the market for corporate control by Jensen and 
Ruback (1983) suggests that, on average, M&A create value for target firms' 
shareholders who realize large positive and significant abnormal returns around 
successful takeover announcements. 
Consistent with Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jarrell and Poulsen (1987a), as 
documented in Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988), investigated the returns to 
shareholders of acquiring companies that announced tender offers for a series of 
decades (between 1960s and 1980s). Jarrell and Poulsen (1987a) examined two 
event windows [-10 to +5 (16 days) and -10 to +20 (31 days)] across all three 
decades. For all periods (1960s to 1980s) the authors reported positive gains to 
bidders for tender offers of about 1.14% and 2.04% - although the gains to bidders 
remain positive and significant for the 1960s and 1970s, they reverse for 1980s 
where the authors found negative and insignificant gains for the bidding firms (-
1.10% for the 16 days event window and -0.04% for the 31 days event window). 
Along similar lines, Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) based on the market model, 
reported similar results for tender offers.'° In particular, the authors found that 
acquiring firms gain on average 0.97% for the entire period (1963 to 1984) whereas 
they found that the results vary significantly across the three sub-periods. 
Specifically, for 1960s bidders enjoy positive and significant gains, for 1970s enjoy 
positive although insignificant while bidders experience significant losses during 
1980s. 
Similar results have been reported by a number of other US studies. For example, 
Servaes (1991) examined the relationship between corporate takeovers' gains and q 
ratios for both targets and bidders for 704 mergers and tender offers that 
' Carleton et al. (1983) suggested that cash takeovers may be sufficiently different from non-cash 
ones and failure to distinguish between the two may lead to inappropriate conclusions. The same 
authors have also linked the cash and stock payments with a number of taxation considerations (a 
more detailed discussion on these considerations will be allowed in the section 2.2.2.1.3). 
" Consistent with Jensen and Ruback (1983), Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) reported similar results 
for both the target firm (large positive gains) and the bidding firm (either small positive or zero gains). 
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announced over the period between 1972 and 1987. Evidence from this study 
confirms the findings of the previous studies. Specifically, the author found that for 
all takeovers, bidders suffer a loss of -1.07% whereas targets enjoy a gain of 23.64% 
weighted average returns. Further classification of the deals as friendly and hostile 
conveys that although targets enjoy the highest gains from hostile transactions 
(31.77% versus 21.89%, both highly statistically significant), bidders suffer the most 
from hostile deals (-4.71% versus -0.16%). Along similar respects, Healy, Palepu, and 
Ruback (1992) examined the 50 largest US mergers in the period 1979 to 1984 and 
found that the bidding firm stock returns are positive and significant within a small 
window surrounding the M&A announcement. In addition, the authors recorded 
through regression analysis a positive and significant relationship between the cash-
flow improvements following the M&A and the announcement returns. The latter 
finding clearly indicates that, along with the efficient market hypothesis, the 
available information from the short-run analysis can predict the post-takeover 
performance. Another study that applied similar research efforts investigated by 
Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) who studied the announcement market reaction (t-5, 
t+5, where t represents the announcement day) for a sample of large acquisitions 
(MV>$100 million) that completed between 1971 and 1982. The authors recorded 
that, on average, bidders' shareholders experience significant losses whereas target 
firms' shareholders enjoy significant gains within the same event window. In 
addition, Mulherin and Boone (2000) studied the acquisition and divestiture activity 
of a sample of 1,305 firms from 59 industries during the period of 1990 and 1999. 
The authors found that both acquisitions and divestitures create value during the 
bid-announcement period. In fact, target shareholders enjoy on average 20.2% in a 
3-day event window (t-1, t+1, where t is the announcement day) around the bid 
announcement whereas bidders gain small negative and insignificant returns (-
0.37%). 
Several studies have also investigated the gains to US bidders' shareholders when 
engaged in M&A with all types of target firms (i.e. public, private, and subsidiary 
ones). In that respect, Hansen and Lott (1996) studied the wealth effects to bidders 
that acquired 101 privately held targets and 151 publicly traded ones for the period 
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between 1985 and 1990. The authors found that bidders experience significant 
losses of 0.98% when listed targets were acquired. Similarly, Chang (1998) examined 
the announcement gains to bidders that acquired 255 public target firms and 281 
private target firms between 1981 and 1992. He found that on average, bidders 
suffer a loss from acquisitions of listed targets firms whilst the bidders' gains vary 
significantly with the method of payment utilized. In the same context, Ang and 
Kohers (2001) examined the market reaction around takeovers of privately held 
targets (7,070 deals) and listed target ones (5,302 deals) that announced over the 
period between 1984 and 1996. The authors reported evidence consistent with the 
findings in other studies in finance literature in terms of the market reaction to 
acquirers bidding for listed target firms. Lastly, Fuller et al. (2002) examined the 
announcement period gains of US acquirers' shareholders that engaged in 
acquisitions with private, public and subsidiary target firms between 1990 and 2000. 
The authors reported results which on average confirm the findings of previous 
literature. In fact, the entire sample of public acquisitions (i.e. before control for the 
method of payment) generates a loss of about -1.00% to acquiring firms' 
shareholders. 
UK Evidence 
Whereas the studies reviewed above have focused exclusively on the US market, a 
strand of other studies in finance literature investigates similar research questions 
for other countries across the world. The first UK study on takeovers investigated by 
Firth (1980) where the author employed the market model with parameters 
estimated based on pre-event data and examined bidders' gains for 434 successful 
bids and 129 unsuccessful bids over the period from 1969 to 1975. The main 
conclusions derived from this study convey that although M&A generate significant 
benefits to target firms' shareholders and to acquiring firms' managers, acquiring 
firms' shareholders experience significant losses. In fact, bidding firms suffer a loss of 
about -6.30% on the announcement month for successful bids and -6.00% for 
unsuccessful ones, whereas the target firms' shareholders enjoy positive and 
significant returns of 28.10% and 31.20% respectively. Similarly, Barnes (1984) 
27 
Chapter 2: Uterature Review 
studied the market reaction for 39 mergers that announced over the period between 
1974 and 1976. The authors found that bidders experience significant losses within a 
small period around the merger announcement. Moreover, Dodds and Quek (1985) 
studied the market reaction for a sample of 70 publicly quoted and actively traded 
companies in the Industrial Sector on the London Stock Exchange for the period 
between 1974 and 1976 and further confirmed the main conclusions recorded by 
other studies in the same field of literature. In fact, the authors recorded on average 
more negative returns for the bid-announcement month in the case of merger-active 
firms than for non-merger-active firms. Similar research proposals applied by Franks 
and Harris (1989) who investigated the wealth effects of 1,898 UK target firms and 
1,058 bidders for the period between 1955 and 1985. The authors concluded that 
during the bid-month target shareholders earn significantly positive total abnormal 
returns of about 23%, whereas the bidding firms' shareholders earn small positive 
abnormal returns of about 1%. Limmack (1991) investigated the distribution of 
returns of UK firms' shareholders of 448 successful and 81 unsuccessful bids that 
announced during the period between 1977 and 1986. The author employed three 
methodologies to examine the distribution of the returns, (a) the market model 
based on the estimation of parameters with OLS regressions, (b) a model based on 
adjusted betas, and (c) an index relative model. The main conclusions derived from 
his study suggest that shareholders of bidding firms suffer significant losses while the 
target firm's shareholders enjoy positive and significant gains in both successful and 
unsuccessful bids. 
More recently, Sudarsanam, Holl and Salami (1996) examined the impact of the 
synergy between 429 bidders and targets whilst they investigated the ownership 
structures of the bidding and target firms on the returns to shareholders. Their 
results confirm that that synergies do create value to shareholders of both the target 
and the bidding firms. At the announcement day, bidders experience significant 
losses of -1.26% while target firms' shareholders enjoy positive and significant gains 
of 13.96%." In addition, the cumulative abnormal returns for the window [+1 to 
" The figures obtained by using the market model with Dimson Thin Trading Adjustment. 
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+40] are -3.56% and 5.58% for the bidder and target, while for the window [-20 to 
+40] are -4.04% and 29.18% for the bidder and target respectively. In similar 
respects, Gregory (1997) recognized the difficulty faced by researchers when 
examining M&A announcement returns with the available "event-study" 
methodologies. Basically, the author focused on the issue related to the level of the 
precision of the appropriate asset pricing model as to efficiently capture the M&A 
effect in the announcement period. In fact, following the major conclusions of a 
number of scholars in the finance literature, the choice of the appropriate asset 
pricing model can have important effects on the scale of abnormal returns in the 
short-run.'" For that reason, Gregory (1997) employed six methodologies in order to 
examine the above mentioned issues; these are the following: (1) the basic Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), (2) the Dimson-Marsh (1986) risk and size adjusted 
model (DM), (3) the simple size control portfolio (SS), (4) the multi-index model using 
equally-weighted smaller decile minus large decile returns (SML), (5) the value 
weighted multi-index model using the Hoare-Covett Index as the measure of smaller 
company performance, and (6) the Fama-French (1996) value-weighted three factor 
model. Employing a comprehensive list of 420 successful M&A (420 out of the full 
sample of 452 deals) for the UK market over the period between 1984 and 1992, the 
author concluded that in general, all methodologies are consistent, with none of 
them showing significant abnormal returns for the announcement month. 
Specifically, across most of the models, announcement returns are small negative 
and insignificant (varying from -0.30% to -0.71%), and significant only for the multi-
index SML model. Similar research efforts applied by Holl and Kyriazis (1997) who 
studied the determinants of, and the relationship between, the wealth effects and 
bid resistance for a sample of 178 successful takeovers in the UK that are announced 
within the period between 1979 and 1989. They found that while bidders experience 
significant losses during the announcement month (-1.70%), target firms' 
shareholders enjoy positive and significant gains (21.61%). 
" For relevant studies see for example, Dimson and Marsh (1986), Agrawal et al. (1992), Gregory, 
Matatko, Tonks, and Purkis (1994), and Kennedy and Limmack (1996). 
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Similar results recorded by Higson and Elliott (1998) who examined the 
announcement returns of 830 UK bidding and targets firms over the period of 1975 
and 1990, before and after controlling for size. Consistent with all the other studies 
discussed above, bidding firms' shareholders experience on average zero abnormal 
returns while target firms' shareholders enjoy positive and significant abnormal 
returns in the short run, irrespective of the size control. However, when the period is 
extended to run from the beginning of the announcement month to the end of the 
completion month, and separately for each of the bid months and the subsequent 
three months, the results vary significantly with both the acquirers and targets to 
experience small negative reruns. In the latter case, different wealth effects are 
observed between portfolios generated pre- and after-controlling for size. Within 
the same framework. Draper and Paudyal (1999) studied the wealth effects of 581 
UK target firms and 349 UK bidding firms over the period between 1996 and 1996. 
The authors examined both the total returns and the excess returns during the event 
period. Excess returns are estimated by using three different methodologies: (a) the 
mean adjusted excess return, (b) the market adjusted excess return, and (c) the 
market model excess return. Evidently, the main findings of this study confirm the 
main conclusion of the rest of the literature by reporting significant losses (gains) for 
bidders (target) firms. Cumulative abnormal returns for the same groups show 
similar results. Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) employed a sample of 519 acquirers 
over the period 1983 and 1995 in order to examine the announcement and post-
acquisition gains to bidding firms. The authors computed the buy and hold abnormal 
returns (BHAR) and by using four different methodologies (the mean-adjusted 
model, the market-adjusted model, the size-adjusted model, and the market-to-
book value adjusted model) they concluded that in the bid announcement period [-1 
to +1] the whole sample of acquirers experience statistically significant negative 
abnormal returns of about -1.40%. Lastly, Doukas and Petmezas (2007) investigated 
whether serial acquisitions announced by UK overconfident managers generate 
superior abnormal returns and whether managerial overconfidence stems from self 
attribution. As elsewhere in the relevant literature, the authors found that bidders 
experience significant losses within a small window surrounding M&A 
announcements of public targets. In particular, for the entire sample, bidders lose -
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0.90% within a 5-day event window, whereas when equity is used to finance public 
acquisitions, bidders lose the most of about -2.23% (both figures are statistically 
significant at 1% level). 
Evidence from the Rest-of-the-World (RoW) 
Studies that examine the wealth effects of bidding firms that announce takeovers of 
listed target firms in the rest-of-the-world countries record similar results with the 
ones in the US and the UK. In fact. Da Silva Rosa et al. (2004) studied 155 takeover 
bid announcements by ASX listed firms for the period between January 1990 and 
December 1998. After examining the market excess returns to acquiring companies' 
shareholders, the author found that bidders generate a gain (loss) of about 1.11% (-
0.16%) within a 5-day (21-day) window. Moreover, Eckbo (1986) examined the 
wealth effects to bidders' and targets' shareholders of a large-sample (7,559 deals) 
of Canadian mergers over the period between 1964 and 1983. The author reported 
significant gains to shareholders of both bidder (2.79% within 4-day window [-3, 0]) 
and target (9.45% within 4-day window [-3, 0]) firms. Evidence of positive gains to 
acquirers that bid for listed targets appears particularly interesting in light of extant 
evidence on the performance of both US and UK bidding firms - the finance 
literature reports that both US and UK bidders either experience significant losses or 
breakeven around takeovers of listed target firms. Thus, this finding indicates that 
the Canadian market for corporate control represents a very important role in 
promoting an optimal resource allocation. 
Moreover, Pettway and Yamada (1986) examined the gains to bidders' and targets' 
shareholders in Japan over the period between 1977 and 1984. The authors 
investigated the wealth effects to 157 bidders' shareholders that acquired 215 target 
firms (20 of which are listed firms and 195 unlisted ones) by examining the market 
reaction around both the announcement day (AD) and the effective day (ED) of the 
M&A. Their main conclusions derived from this study lie on the basis that Japanese 
bidders' and targets' share price reacts in a similar way as in the US market. In fact, 
bidding firms' shareholder wealth increases, although they exhibit statistically 
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insignificant gains. They also found that their gains vary significantly with the relative 
size of the deal, even if they display the reverse effect. On the other hand, target 
firms' shareholders enjoy positive and statistically significant announcement gains. 
Lastly, Eckbo, Giammarino and Heinkel (1990) examined 182 Canadian takeovers 
over the period between 1964 and 1982. The authors found that bidders experience 
significant positive abnormal returns during the announcement period although 
these gains are highly sensitive to the method of payment employed. In fact, the 
authors recorded 0.87% announcement period gains when cash is employed, 3.86% 
when stock is used, and 2.10% for mixed payments. 
Overall, a general view of the studies discussed above suggests that acquisitions of 
public targets generate, on average, negative or zero announcement returns to 
bidders' shareholders, irrespective of the country's origin. However, regardless of 
the large number of studies that have investigated, and others that continue to 
investigate, numerous factors affecting the performance of bidders around 
takeovers of public targets, several gaps remain unfilled. This thesis aims to fill those 
gaps by providing additional evidence and explanations for the wealth effects 
generated to bidders' shareholders around takeovers of other listed target firms. As 
a result, the chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis investigate various factors that affect the 
wealth of bidders' shareholders when acquire other listed targets in both the 
domestic and the foreign market for corporate control. Research outcomes from this 
thesis are expected to expand the current literature on the gains from public 
acquisitions, whilst to enrich our understanding of the corporate takeovers process 
and their implications to various stakeholders involved in the deal. Several 
considerations in terms of bidders' gains, and implications to all stakeholders 
involved, are discussed in great detail within the framework of the empirical 
chapters (chapters 3 and 4). 
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2.2.1.2 Gains from Acquisitions of Private Target Firms 
The unique feature of the UK and US markets for corporate control during the last 
decade is the predominance of takeovers of privately held target firms, which 
represent the largest proportion of M&A activity within both markets.'-' As a result, a 
block of voluminous literature has emerged that concentrates on whether takeovers 
of privately held target firms create value to shareholders of the acquiring firm. The 
majority of these studies have directly compared the gains of M&A involving 
privately held targets with the gains generated from acquisitions of listed target 
firms. On average, these studies have recorded that (a) acquirers of privately held 
target firms enjoy positive and significant announcement returns, (b) acquirers of 
listed targets'"* have been found to either experience significant losses or breakeven 
within a small window around the M&A announcement's day, and (c) the gains 
generated to private bidders' shareholders are to a great extent affected by the 
methods of payment used to finance the deal. Along all these respects and as it has 
been clearly stated in chapter 1, the main purpose of the fifth chapter is to 
empirically explore, and further identify, whether the level of information availability 
or the level of value ambiguity concerning unlisted target firms (i.e. stand alone firms 
and subsidiaries of other unlisted firms) constitute an extra factor in explaining the 
gains to bidders that acquire unlisted target firms. Accordingly, the rest of this 
section reviews and discusses, in great detail, evidence on bidders' gains from 
acquisition of privately held target firms. 
Along the same lines, Hansen and Lott (1996) investigated one of the most important 
studies that closely examine, both theoretically and empirically, the stock returns of 
bidders around takeovers of privately held targets firms. The authors employed an 
" For the US market, for Instance, Moeller et al. (2007) found that approximately 47% of US 
acquisitions in their sample involved listed targets and 53% private. Similarly, for the UK market for 
corporate control, Draper and Paudyal (2006) found that approximately 87% of the UK acquisitions 
involved privately held targets w/hile the rest 13% involved publicly traded ones. In addition, Faccio 
and Masulis (2005) reported that approximately 90% of UK (and Irish) acquisitions involved unlisted 
and subsidiary targets. 
" The majority of the findings for acquisitions with listed target firms have been extensively reported 
in the previous section. 
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auction theory and observations from corporate tal<eovers to test wlietlier the gains 
from acquisitions of publicly traded firms differ significantly from the gains from 
acquisitions of privately held target firms. Based on earlier research which indicates 
that bidders of listed target firms experience significant losses, the authors argued 
that in general '...the negative returns to bidders are of limited relevance to 
diversified acquiring firm shareholders, for those shareholders will also benefit from 
their holdings in the target'.'^ Indeed, diversified shareholders will be indifferent of 
how any wealth effect generated from the acquisition of listed target firm is to be 
divided. This happens only in the case where the acquiring firm shareholders hold 
shares of the target firm. Unlike the case of acquisitions of listed target firms, in the 
case of acquisitions of privately held target firms, this condition is unlikely to be met. 
Furthermore, the authors used 252 takeover deals of public (151 deals) and private 
(101 deals) firms over the period 1985 and 1990 and estimated the performance of 
the bidding firm within an event-window of 2-days [0 to +1] after the 
announcement. In fact, the authors found that bidders experience, on average, 
about two percent higher abnormal returns when they acquire privately (1.15%) 
held firms rather than publicly (-0.98%) traded ones. Based on these findings, the 
authors supported their main predictions; when a publicly traded firm acquires a 
listed target firm, diversified shareholders will be indifferent as to the direction of 
the allocation of the gains from the acquisition, since they may hold shares in both 
the target and the bidding firm (a condition which is unlikely to be met for private 
firms, which have more concentrated ownership and thus hold less diversified 
portfolios).'^ However, a successful portfolio value maximization policy will lead to a 
decline in corporate profits mainly due to high costs (i.e. managerial costs of 
assessing and internalizing externalities, greater agency costs associated with more 
managerial discretion). In the case of acquisitions of private targets, the bidder's 
shareholders will capture part of the gains of the acquisition, assuming the bid is 
value-increasing. 
" Hansen, G. R., and J. R. Lott (1996), 'Externalities and Corporate Objectives in World with Diversified 
Shareholders/Consumers' , Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 31, page 59. 
" The authors argued that fully diversified investors would prefer the manager of the firm to 
internalize the externalities that the firm have on other firms. Similarly, as long as non-diversified 
shareholders would prefer the manager of the firm to maximize its value, diversified shareholders 
would prefer the opposite. 
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Furthermore, one of the pioneering studies in the literature of M&A that examines 
the gains to bidders that acquire privately held target firms is Chang (1998). The 
author assessed the two-day event window returns (-1 to 0) of bidding firms 
acquiring 281 privately held target companies over the period between 1991 and 
1998. At the same time, the author compared the gains from private acquisitions 
with the gains to bidders that are engaged in acquisitions of 255 public target firms 
in the period between 1981 and 1988. Following the major conclusions of this study, 
no significant abnormal returns are generated to bidding firms when both the target 
status and method of payment restrictions are relaxed. However, when the target 
status and method of payment controls are applied, the returns to bidding firms vary 
significantly. In short, bidders that engage in private acquisitions and pay with 
equity, enjoy significantly positive abnormal returns (about 2.64% on average),'^ 
consistent with the studies of Asquith et al. (1983), Wruck (1989), Servaes (1991), 
and Hertzel and Smith (1993). On the contrary, when the target firm is a publicly 
traded one and the method of payment utilized is equity, bidders experienced 
significant losses (-2.46% on average). The author provided three explanations for 
the above mentioned market reaction: (a) the information hypothesis based on 
Myers and Majluf (1984) and Travlos (1987), (b) the limited competition hypothesis, 
and (c) the monitoring hypothesis. In the event of acquisitions with privately held 
target firms, the owners of the private firm have more incentives to examine the 
bidding firm's value closely thereby estimating its true value accurately and at the 
same time identifying whether the bidding firm's stock is overvalued (in the event 
that the deal is finance with s tock) .There fore , successful acquisitions of privately 
held target firms and stock financing, while conveying favourable information to 
market participants with regards the current and future performance of the bidding 
firm, they also reflect that the biddings firm's stock is, at least, not overvalued (as it 
has been examined carefully by the target firm's managers). In addition, the positive 
" In the case of a stocl< offer, the financing of tal<eovers is similar to the private placements of equity 
because target firms are owned by one or a small number of shareholders. 
" The same is also true when the target firm is listed. Listed firms have more widely spread 
shareholders than privately held firms. Therefore, in the event of acquisitions of listed target firms, 
there are more shareholders who require the benefits from the acquisition compared to the case of 
acquisitions of privately held targets. 
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performance of bidders when they bid for privately held target firms is also 
supported by the limited competition hypothesis. In a competitive market, 
acquisitions of listed target firms will be zero NPV projects (no abnormal returns for 
bidders with c a s h ) . " On the other hand, the competition in the market for privately 
held target firms is characterized as limited, which therefore increases the 
likelihood of underpayment and the likelihood of higher announcement abnormal 
returns (NPV>0). Finally, Chang (1998) suggested that the source of the positive 
gains to bidding firms that acquire private targets with stock are due to the 
monitoring hypothesis. Indeed, private firms are often controlled by a family or small 
group of partners. By using stock as a means of payment, acquirers tend to create 
outside blockholders, who therefore effectively monitor the managerial 
performance of the bidding firm closely. This may lead to positive NPV projects 
which therefore generates positive abnormal returns around the acquisition 
announcement day.^' The same author found also that on average, bidders' 
shareholders enjoy 4.96% (1.77%) announcement period cumulative abnormal 
returns if a new blockholder is created (not created). 
Similar results are also obtained by Ang and Kohers (2001) who studied the wealth 
effects to US bidders that announced 7,070 takeovers involving privately held target 
firms and 5,302 takeovers involving listed target firms over the period between 1988 
and 1996. The authors documented that bidders enjoy significant positive 
announcement gains around bids of private target firms, regardless of the method of 
payment, contrary to the wealth effects to M&A announcements of listed targets. 
Ang and Kohers also showed that the premiums paid to private targets are relatively 
higher than those paid to public targets. The authors claimed that the higher 
premiums paid to private target firms can be attributed to their strong bargaining 
power and their timing options to wait and sell (supporting the bargaining power 
" The market for acquisitions of publicly owned firms is characterized as highly competition (bidding 
contest) and the likelihood of overpayment is higher, which in turn will result into zero abnormal 
returns to bidding firms. 
^° Due to high information search cost (mainly because of the scarcity of public information on 
privately held targets) there is limited competition in the event of private acquisitions. 
On the other hand, an increase in managerial ownership can decrease a firm's value if it allows 
managerial entrenchment or makes takeovers more costly (Fama and Jensen, 1983, Stuiz, 1988 and 
Morck, Shieifer and Vishny, 1988). 
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hypothesis)." To an extent, the authors proposed two main explanations or 
interpretations for this variation in the premiums paid. Certainly, private firms have 
more concentrated ownership which removes or lowers any agency 
problems/conflict they might face (opposite of listed companies which have in 
general more scatter ownership). Similarly, acquiring firms' managers avoid any 
public pressure from outside investors, which therefore help them to cancel out any 
hubris-motivated takeover. Based on those two explanations, bidders of privately 
held target firms have the opportunity to cancel out any M&A deal with a private 
firm, when it is required for strategic reasons, without involving high 'prestige' costs. 
In addition. Fuller et al. (2002) studied the announcement period stock returns of 
3,135 US M&A deals of public, private and/or subsidiary target firms that announced 
over the period between 1990 and 2000. This study focuses mainly on serial 
acquisitions (i.e. bidders that announce five or more M&A deals within three years 
time). The authors found that on average, bidders experience significant losses when 
bidding for listed target firms (-1.00%), whereas they enjoy positive and significant 
abnormal returns when buying private (2.08%) and subsidiary (2.75%) targets. 
However, the distribution of bidders' gains varies significantly with the method of 
payment utilized. In fact, in public acquisitions, bidders realize insignificant positive 
or negative returns in cash (0.34%) or mixed of both cash and stock offers (-1.10%) 
whereas bidders suffer significant losses for shares exchanges (-1.86%).^^ On the 
other hand, in private and subsidiary acquisitions, bidders enjoy significant and 
positive abnormal returns, irrespective of the method of payment, in similar 
respects, Antoniou, Petmezas and Zhao (2007) investigated the wealth effects of UK 
frequent bidders engaged in acquisitions of private, public, and subsidiary targets 
over the period between 1987 and 2004. In the process of their investigation of the 
short-run gains generated to serial acquirers, the authors controlled for several firm 
and transaction specific characteristics including the relative size of the deal, book-
" Private firms have more concentrated ownership structure - a group of people or a family (opposite 
to listed firms which have less concentrated ownership structure). Therefore, private firms have the 
option to wait to sell without any pressure from outside owners. 
" This is consistent with Mayers and Majluf (1984), Travlos (1987), Chang (1998), and other studies in 
the finance literature. 
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to-market ratio of the bidder, industry classification and target origin. Accordingly, 
the major conclusions derived from this study convey that in the short-run, bidders 
acquiring listed targets deliver the required rate of return to their shareholders 
whereas they generate positive and significant gains to their shareholders when they 
acquire private and subsidiary target firms. In addition, Doukas and Petmezas (2007) 
found that the gains to serial acquirers are highly sensitive to managerial 
overconfidence stemming from self-attribution. Regarding private acquisitions, 
bidders enjoy 1.18% from the entire sample whereas the highest gains detected 
when equity is used to finance the deal (3.47%). A more recent study on the 
examination of the gains to serial acquirers is conducted by Draper and Paudyal 
(2008). The authors investigated the case of serial acquisitions in the UK market in 
order to examine whether the information asymmetry for the bidding firm mitigated 
after several deal announcements. In short, the authors suggested that when high 
information asymmetry between overvalued companies and investors exists, 
companies announce takeover bids in order to attract the attention of investors and 
analysts, thereby increasing the share price through revaluation. They also 
concluded that in the presence of high pre-bid information asymmetry, bidding firms 
gain the most from early bids while the gains declined with the number of takeover 
bids announced within three years, supporting their original propositions in terms of 
bidders' gains involving many M&A deals. 
Similar research questions on the wealth effects of bidders' shareholders when 
acquire private target firms are investigated for other than the US market. For 
example. Da Silva Rosa et al. (2004) examined the announcement period wealth 
effects of 155 takeover deals of private and listed target firms over the period 1990 
and 1998. The authors documented that acquisitions of privately held target firms 
generate positive and significant abnormal returns to bidders' shareholders whereas 
the opposite happens for acquisitions of listed target firms. The method of payment 
found to play a significant role for the variation of bidders' gains within the same 
context. In fact, within a 5-day window, cash-bids generate a significantly positive 
abnormal return (3.26%) while share-bids yield an insignificant positive average 
return (1.65%). Da Silva Rosa et al. (2004) claimed that the higher gains to bidders 
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from private takeovers are due to the limited competition for private targets. 
Furthermore, Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes (2005) examined the announcement 
share returns of UK firms that announce takeovers of 576 public firms and 2,628 
private firms over the period 1984 and 1998. The authors reported results consistent 
with the rest of finance literature in the same context. In fact, bidders experience 
significant losses in the short-run (-0.99%) from public acquisitions although they 
enjod significant gains from private acquisitions (1.05%). 
Moreover, Draper and Paudyal (2006) studied the announcement wealth effects to 
UK bidders that engage into acquisitions with public (1,098 deals) and privately held 
targets (7,499 deals) over the period between 1981 and 2001. Using three 
methodologies in their approach,"'* the authors reported that in general, bidders 
enjoy positive and significant abnormal returns around acquisitions of privately held 
targets. On the other hand, when bidders acquire listed target firms they experience 
significant losses in the short-run. The authors also concluded that gains to acquiring 
firms within a 3-day (t-1, t+1) window around the M&A announcement day are 
highly sensitive to the target status, the method of payment, and the relative size of 
the deal. They proposed three main explanations/interpretations in their attempt to 
explain the differentials in performance between private and public acquisitions: (a) 
the managerial motive hypothesis, (b) the liquidity hypothesis, and (c) the bargaining 
power hypothesis. Accordingly, the managerial motive hypothesis suggests that the 
higher returns to acquirers engaging in acquisitions with privately held companies, 
rather than with public targets, is due to lower (higher) premiums paid in the event 
of acquisitions of privately (publicly) held target firms.^^ The liquidity hypothesis 
suggests that, since information is more (less) available for publicly traded (privately 
" The models used are the Market Model, the CAPM, and the Fama and French (1993) three factor 
model. 
" The managerial motive hypothesis suggests that bidders would prefer to pay higher premiums for 
listed targets given that they are in general larger and better known firms. Similarly, acquisitions with 
listed targets will enhance the private benefits to the managers of the bidding firms which, among 
others, are associated with the size and the prestige of the firms they manage. On the contrary, 
private firms are smaller in size and thus bidders' managers prefer to pay lower premiums to acquire 
them, given that they will not be able to benefit from the previous mentioned personal benefits. 
However, private firms are smaller in size thereby they may be integrated more easily into the 
bidders' business environment than large listed targets. 
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held) target firms, competition is higher (lower) for public (private) firms, leading in 
turn, to lower (higher) abnormal returns for acquiring firms. Finally, the bargaining 
power hypothesis suggests that, since private firms are managed by a family or a 
small group of partners, any agency problem that may arise is reduced and in most 
cases disappears. This enables private firms' managers to choose both when they 
prefer to sell and also permits the buyer to decide to whom they prefer to be sold. In 
fact, in the case when private firms' managers are prepared to accept shares as the 
method of payment, the option to choose when to sell, and to whom, leaves them 
with a significant bargaining power. Therefore, the strong bargaining power of 
private firms' managers allows its owners to receive a higher price for the deal with a 
premium paid by the bidders to exceed the potential benefits from the merger, 
which in turn leads to a negative NPV project for the bidding firm."^ 
Faccio, McConnell, and Stolin (2006) investigated the announcement period 
abnormal returns to acquirers of listed and unlisted targets in 17 Western European 
countries over the interval 1996 and 2001. On average, the authors documented 
that bidders enjoy significant abnormal returns when unlisted firms are acquired 
(1.48%) whereas bidders experience significant losses when listed targets are 
acquired (-0.38%), consistent with the findings documented by several other studies 
for both the UK and US. This pattern holds across time and across all countries. The 
authors suggested that this market reaction to acquisitions involving listed and 
unlisted target firms is attributed to the listing effect, which remains the same 
through time and across countries. Moreover, the same pattern persist after 
controlling in the cross-section for the method of payment, the acquirer's size and 
Tobin's Q, pre-announcement leakage of information about the transaction, whether 
the acquisition created a blockholder in the acquirer's ownership structure, whether 
the acquisition was a cross-border deal, and other variables. Lastly, Alexandridis, 
Antoniou, and Zhao (2008) presented a very recent study which investigates the 
gains of UK bidders that acquired privately held target firms in the domestic market. 
In this study the authors examined whether the Miller's (1977) divergence of opinion 
Value creation in corporate takeovers is on average achieved once the present value of synergies is 
greater than the premium paid (i.e. positive NPV projects) for successful acquisition announcements. 
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'premium hypothesis' can explain gains to acquiring firms. The main conclusions that 
derived from this study suggest that there is a significant positive relationship 
between the belief asymmetry and the announcement returns to acquiring firms 
bidding for unlisted targets after accounting for various firm and deal specific 
characteristics. 
The main conclusions derived of the above studies clearly convey that when private 
target firms are acquired, bidders' shareholders benefit from the M&A during the 
announcement period. However, these gains to acquirers' shareholders are highly 
sensitive to the method of payment utilized to finance the transaction, indeed, 
bidders' shareholders breakeven for cash-deals whereas they enjoy significant 
positive returns when common equity is used to finance the deal. Regardless of the 
number of scholars who continue to study potential factors on the explanation of 
bidders' gains around private acquisitions, this thesis aims to provide a different 
approach by investigating several factors, from the target firm's edge, that have not 
been examined by previous research. Specifically, in chapters 3 to 5 of this thesis 1 
investigate the wealth effects to shareholders of bidders that acquire private firms 
both in the domestic and in the foreign market for corporate control. Chapters 3 and 
4 investigate whether the gains of bidders that acquire privately held targets, both in 
the domestic and in the foreign market, vary significantly with different economic 
conditions and market valuations in the home market, as well as different levels of 
effective exchange rate of the home currency. Within the same context, different 
corporate governance mechanisms, institutional laws, and regulations from all over 
the world are investigated. In addition, chapter 5 of this thesis focuses on the impact 
of value ambiguity (or the difficulty to value) of unlisted target firms on the 
announcement and post-merger wealth effects of bidders' shareholders acquiring 
unlisted targets. The relatively small number of studies in finance literature that 
investigate the wealth effects of bidders' shareholders around private acquisitions, 
compared to studies that investigate bidders' gains around public acquisitions, 
constitute this research particularly important. 
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2.2.1.3 Gains from Acquisitions of Subsidiary Target Firms 
A limited number of studies in the literature investigate the wealth effects of bidders 
announcing M&A deals of subsidiary target firms. Fuller et al. (2002) utilized a 
sample of 539 US bidders engaging in 3,135 M&A deals involving public, private, and 
subsidiary target firms over the period between 1990 and 2000. The authors 
recorded that when acquirers engage in M&A with subsidiary target firms they enjoy 
significant positive abnormal returns, irrespective of the method of payment 
employed. In fact, for all acquisitions with subsidiary targets, bidders enjoy 2.75% 
whereas in stock (combo) payments they enjoy 3.23% (3.33%) on average. Fuller et 
al. (2002) claimed that the main reason of the positive gains to acquisitions of 
subsidiary targets is the preference for cash of host sellers, who want to realize their 
financial and asset restructuring goals. Moeller et al. (2004) reported similar results. 
In fact, the authors documented positive abnormal announcement returns for 3,798 
acquisitions of subsidiary target firms (2.00%), consistent with the findings by Fuller 
et al. (2002). More specifically, Moeller et al. (2004) documented similar wealth 
effects for acquirers' shareholders that bid for subsidiary target firms, after 
controlling for the method of payment and the bidding firm's size. 
In addition, Faccio and Masulis (2005) studied the determinants of the M&A 
payment methods available to a large sample of European takeovers over the period 
between 1997 and 2000. The authors reported that on average, when subsidiary 
targets are involved in European M&A, cash is preferred as the method of payment. 
The authors suggested that subsidiary targets are more likely to prefer cash instead 
of stock payments, given the illiquid and more concentrated nature of their portfolio 
holdings. In addition, cash considerations may arise given that corporations are more 
likely to sell subsidiary firms when they face financial distress, which in turns leads to 
the preference of cash payments, or when they desire to restructure their core 
business, when again cash payments should be pre fer red .Overa l l , in both cases. 
" The latter point is in line with the findings of Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990) where the authors 
noted that as bidders prefer to maintain the control of the firm, cash is preferred in corporate 
takeovers deals. 
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the use of cash may be motivated by the bidders' desire, through the divestiture of 
subsidiaries, to finance new acquisitions or reduce their debt burden. 
Another recent study that examined bidders' gains when subsidiary targets are 
involved is by Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes (2005). The authors examined the 
announcement period returns of UK takeovers involving public, private, and 
subsidiary target firms over the period 1984 and 1998. They reported that on 
average bidders enjoy positive abnormal returns when subsidiary firms of other 
private and public firms are acquired (both in the domestic and in the foreign 
market). The higher gains from subsidiary acquisitions in this study are derived when 
the subsidiary firm operates in the foreign market for corporate control. Faccio, 
McConnell, and Stolin (2006) investigated the announcement period abnormal 
returns to acquirers of listed (735 deals) and unlisted (3,694 deals) targets, including 
subsidiaries of unlisted firms, in 17 Western European countries over the period 
between 1996 and 2001. The authors reported that bidders of listed targets 
generate to their shareholders an insignificant negative abnormal return of about -
0.38%, whereas bids of unlisted targets generate positive and significant abnormal 
returns of about 1.48%. More specifically, acquisitions of unlisted targets firms from 
all 17 European countries generate a positive and significant gain to bidders' 
shareholders of about 1.44%, consistent with all the other studies in finance 
literature. Lastly, a more recent study on the gains generated from subsidiary 
acquisitions investigated by Antoniou, Petmezas and Zhao (2007). The authors 
investigated the wealth effects of UK frequent bidders engaged in acquisitions of 
private, public, and subsidiary targets over the period between 1987 and 2004. 
Among their major conclusions, the authors found that bids of subsidiary targets 
generate significant wealth effects to bidders' shareholders on about 1.31%, after 
controlling for several firm and transaction specific characteristics including the 
relative size of the deal, book-to-market ratio of the bidder, industry classification 
and target origin. 
In conclusion, the above studies clearly suggest that bidders' shareholders enjoy 
positive and significant gains around takeovers involving subsidiary target firms. 
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However, the literature on the gains of bidders when subsidiary targets are acquired 
appears largely incomplete, especially in the case when the subsidiary target firm is 
operating in a foreign country (i.e. foreign target). Several conclusions have been 
also recorded in terms of the acquisitions of subsidiary targets and the method of 
payment utilized. In all these respects, the overall purpose of this thesis across 
chapters 3 and 4 is to uncover the wealth effects of bidders that acquire domestic 
and foreign subsidiary target firms, along with other factors investigated, as well as 
to examine whether the differentials between domestic and foreign bids of 
subsidiary targets appear statistically significant. Along similar lines, chapter 5 of this 
thesis examines whether the short and long-run gains to bidders that acquire 
subsidiary targets of other unlisted firms, are shaped by the various levels of value-
ambiguity that characterize unlisted firms. 
2.2.2 Other Determinants of Abnormal Returns 
Several transaction and firm-specific characteristics have been recognized by finance 
literature as major determinants of the announcement gains generated to bidders' 
shareholders. Such factors may include the method of payment utilized to finance 
the transaction, the relative size of the deal, the size of the bidder, the market-to-
book-value (MTBV) ratio and the price-to-earning ratio of the bidder, as well as the 
age of the acquiring and the target firm, at the time of the M&A announcement. 
Accordingly, this section reviews and discusses, in great detail, the literature/studies 
associated with the above factors that have a significant impact on the bidding firm's 
performance in the short-run. 
2.2.2.1 Method of Payment 
Several studies have been individually concluded that the method of payment 
utilized in M&A is closely related with the presence of information asymmetry in 
financial markets, as well as with the ownership structure and tax considerations 
44 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
related to the final entity after the completion of the M&A. in general, the methods 
of payment available to finance a takeover are cash, stock, a combination of both 
(cash and stock), and 'other' methods of payments. Earlier studies have clearly 
depicted the impact of the method of payment on the wealth effects of bidders' 
shareholders. In this respect, Asquith et al. (1983) studied the wealth effects of 343 
completed mergers over the period between 1975 and 1983. The authors found that 
bidding firm's returns are positive for cash bids (0.20%), but negative and 
significantly smaller for equity financed bids (-2.40%). Similar results are obtained by 
Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel (1990) who examined 182 Canadian takeovers over 
the period between 1964 and 1982. The authors documented 0.87% announcement 
period's gains when cash is employed, 3.86% when stock is used, and 2.10% for 
mixed payments. An overall view of the above studies, although it suggests that 
bidders' shareholders experience significant losses when they finance takeover bids 
with common equity, they breakeven (or deliver the required rate of return to their 
shareholders) when they use cash to finance the takeover bid. 
Previous research has also confirmed the impact of the methods of payment along 
with the status of the target firm on the determinations of the gains of bidders in the 
domestic market (relevant evidence have reported and discussed in the previous 
section, 2.2.1).'^* Similarly, others have found that the method of payment and the 
target status are relevant when abnormal return differentials between domestic and 
cross-border acquisitions (CBA) are investigated. In this respect. Conn et al. (2005) 
found that when UK bidders acquire domestic (foreign) listed targets with cash, they 
generate insignificant positive (insignificant negative) abnormal returns to their 
shareholders. On the contrary, acquisitions of domestic (foreign) listed targets with 
non-cash^^ instruments yield statistically significant negative (insignificant positive) 
gains to bidders' shareholders. Furthermore, bidders acquiring domestic private 
For a sample of studies that examine the impact of the method of payment along with the target 
firm status, see for example: Desai and Kim (1982); Limmack (1991); Servaes (1991); Hansen and Lott 
(1996); Sudarsanam, Holl and Salami (1996); Gregory (1997); Chang (1998); Draper and Paudyal (1999 
and 2006); Muiherin and Boone (2000); Da Silva Rosa, Limmack, Supriadi, and Woodiiff (2001); Fuller, 
Netter, and Stegemoller (2002); Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003); Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes 
(2005). 
Non-cash offers include stock offers, stock and cash offers, and other offers. 
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targets yield significantly larger abnormal returns than acquiring foreign private 
targets irrespective of the method of payment used. In general, cash transactions 
generate higher returns for domestic acquisitions rather than for CBA. The overall 
conclusion derived from this study confirms that the method of payment and the 
status of the target firm are both important determinants of the bidders' gains when 
they engage in domestic versus foreign acquisitions. 
Lastly, the choice of the means of payment that utilized to finance M&A deals is 
found to be highly sensitive to different corporate governance systems, ownership 
structures, market and institutional settings, and legal and regulatory traditions 
across several European countries. In short, Faccio and Masulis (2005) examined the 
method of payment used to finance M&A deals of European bidders of private and 
public target firms over the period between 1997 and 2000. The main conclusion 
derived from this study is that both corporate governance mechanisms and debt 
financing constrains are the main determinants of the choice of the bidders' 
payment method. The same authors concluded also, consistent with previous 
literature, that the choice of the method of payment is mainly shaped by several firm 
and deal-specific characteristics. For example, in the event of subsidiary acquisitions, 
cash is preferred as the method of payment. 
Overall, the analysis in this section clearly reflects that the target status, the target 
origin, the corporate governance under which both the bidder and the target 
operate, institutional settings, laws, and regulations, are all highly relevant in the 
determination of the method of payment used to finance M&A deals, thereby in the 
determination of abnormal returns to shareholders of the bidding firms. 
2.2.2.1.1 Information Asymmetry - Signalling Hypothesis 
Several scholars have recorded that the method of payment utilized in M&A is also 
closely related with the presence of information asymmetry in financial markets. In 
fact, it has been widely accepted that several informational asymmetries exist 
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between the management of listed firms and market participants. Hansen (1987), 
Stuiz (1988), and Fishman (1989) developed models which claim that bidders engage 
in acquisitions and pay with cash (stock) instruments when there is high information 
asymmetry about their own value (target's v a l u e ) . T h i s would suggest that the 
greater the information asymmetry in the case of cash payments the higher the 
returns (Moeller, Schlingemann, and StuIz, 2007). Accordingly, Fishman (1989), 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990) and Brown and Ryngaert (1991) concluded that in 
general cash-bids generate higher announcement gains to bidders' shareholders 
than stock-bids. 
Along similar respects, Myers and Majluf (1984) noted that in several occasions 
information asymmetries arise due to the fact that managers hold superior 
information about the firms they control thereby they consider their overvalued 
shares as the optimal mean of payment for takeover bids. Outside investors, 
recognizing the adverse selection problem, consequently revise their estimates of the 
offer's value downwards. This is a plausible explanation for the negative 
performance of stock deals. Along these lines, stock payments when listed targets 
are involved are expected to lead to negative abnormal returns in the short-run, as 
they signal to investors that the equity is overvalued.^' The negative value generated 
to bidding firms' shareholders in stock offers is further enforced by the high 
incentives of target firms' shareholders to request higher premiums in order to 
compensate for the 'lemons' problem which is associated with common stock based 
bids. In this respect, Travlos (1987) examined the impact of the methods of payment 
on the short-run share price behaviour of bidders that announce M&A over the 
period between 1972 and 1981. The authors recorded significant differentials 
between portfolios of bidders that finance acquisitions with common stock versus 
cash payments. In particular, bidders experience significant losses on the 
announcement day of about -2.09% when common stock is used, whereas the 
°^ However, only in Fishman's model, bidders have the option to pay using cash and a risky debt 
security, rather than using stock. 
" See for example: Travlos (1987), Wansley, Lane and Yang (1987), Amihud, Lev and Travlos (1990), 
Servaes (1991), Brown and Ryngaert (1991), Martin (1996), Ghosh and Ruland (1998), Draped and 
Paudyal (1999, 2006), and Fuller, Netter, Stegemoller (2002), Conn et al. (2005). 
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opposite happens for cash payment with the bidding firms' shareholders to enjoy 
small positive abnormal returns (about 0.31%). 
2.2.2.1.2 The Proposition of Managerial Ownersliip 
Numerous studies in the literature have confirmed that the choice of the method of 
payment in corporate takeovers is closely related with the managerial ownership of 
both merger parties that involved in the transaction. Accordingly, several scholars 
have individually concluded that the greater the management's share of the 
acquiring or the target firms, the more likely it is that cash financing is used as the 
optimal method of payment (see for example Stuiz, 1988; Amihud et ai. 1990; and 
Faccio and Masulis, 2005). One explanation of this strategy in M&A deals is that the 
managers of both parties offer (or accept) cash as the medium of exchange in order 
not to dilute their existing control after the acquisition. StuIz (1988) examined the 
relationship between the choice of payment methods and the managerial ownership 
of acquiring firms. His study showed that the larger the fraction of the ownership 
held by the acquiring firm, the less likely it is that an acquisition is financed by using 
shares. Under such circumstances, the management of the bidder is reluctant to 
offer shares in order to avoid diluting their original control after the acquisition. 
Amihud, Lev and Travlos (1990) used a sample of 209 US acquisitions that 
announced over the period 1981 and 1983 and documented negative returns for 
bidders that use stock financing as the method of payment as long as they have low 
managerial ownership. They found also that in cash financing deals the top five 
officers and directors of the firm hold on average about 11 percent of the company's 
shares, while in share financed deals they hold less than 7 percent. This result 
indicates that managers with relatively higher shareholdings in their firms prefer 
financing acquisitions with cash, because, as Amihud et al. (1990) noted, they do not 
want to increase the risk of losing control after the completion of the acquisition.^' 
" The same view is analyzed by Martin (1996). 
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However, given the above argument, the use of stock may signal to investors that 
the acquisition is not value decreasing. 
Finally, Faccio and Masulis (2005) argued that cash is the method of payment that 
should be preferred when preserving control. This is particularly important for 
bidders, especially under circumstances where continued corporate control is 
t h r e a t e n e d . T h e corporate control's incentives for choosing cash are likely to be 
the strongest when a target's share ownership is c o n c e n t r a t e d . O n the contrary, 
stock financing would be preferred if a shareholder had supermajority voting rights, 
because in this case the shareholder's controlled would not be threatened. 
2.2.2.1.3 Taxation Implication Proposition 
Several studies have investigated the impact of tax considerations upon the 
announcement's returns to bidders' shareholders. The majority of these studies, 
however, have linked the impact of tax considerations with the method of payment 
utilized to finance the M&A. For example, Carleton et al. (1983) suggested that cash 
deals may be sufficiently different from non-cash deals and modelling the events as 
being the same may be inappropriate. For that reason, a number of important 
considerations have been proposed in an attempt to explain the extensively high use 
of cash payments in M&A. In the 1960s, many deals were financed with convertible 
bonds since such payments were tax deductible. After 1969, however, M&A 
financing using convertible bonds have not been allowed as tax deductible expenses. 
As Carleton et al. (1983) suggested "the increased use of cash may be further 
understood by looking at current differences in the tax and accounting 
consequences of cash takeovers and security exchanges". The same study also added 
that due to the existence of different tax treatments between cash and stock 
payments, the acquirer must pay a higher premium in cash bids in order to offset the 
tax burden of the target shareholders. In the event of common equity bids, many 
" For example, see Shieifer and Vishn/s (2003) model of control benefits. 
" This Is a common feature of private companies. Financing vi/lth stock can create a new blockholder 
In the bidding firms, a fact that Is always seriously considered by managers. 
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Stock exchanges will be treated as tax-free transactions and therefore the premium 
paid to target shareholders will be lower. Along similar lines, Wansley, Lane and Yang 
(1983) concluded that targets' returns are higher in cash acquisitions (33.54% for 
cash deals versus 17.47% for stock deals) confirming the important role of tax 
differences between cash and stock payments. On the contrary, Harris, Franks and 
Mayer (1988) failed to support the previous evidence indicating that tax 
considerations are not shaping capital gains in cash acquisitions. They showed that 
over the period between 1965 and 1969 cash financing yields on average an 18.60% 
gain, whereas between 1960 and 1964 the gain is 29.20%. However, this drift 
reversed in the period between 1975 and 1979 with the proportion of cash financing 
of 33.60%. 
2.2.2.2 Size Effect 
The market capitalisation (MV) of the acquiring firm has been identified as a major 
determinant of the announcement's gains to acquiring firms' shareholders. Moeller 
et al. (2004), used a sample of 12,023 successful US takeovers that announced over 
the period between 1980 and 2001 and provided evidence supporting that small 
acquirers outperform large ones by a statistically significant margin of about 2 
percent. In fact, the authors found that while small acquirers' shareholders enjoy a 
statistically significant positive abnormal return of about 2.32%, returns to large 
acquirers are on average not statistically significantly different from zero (0.07%), 
generating a statistically significant differential of 2.24%. Deals involved private and 
subsidiary target firms generate on average positive and significant abnormal returns 
to bidders' shareholders, whereas small acquirers are found to outperform large 
ones by 1.44% and 2.18% respectively. In the event of acquisitions involved listed 
target firms, small bidders enjoy a significant positive abnormal return of about 
0.92%, whereas large bidders experience significant losses of about -1.70% (2.62% 
statistically significant differential). Across all four portfolios (entire sample and the 
three groups based on the target status), the method of payment is found to play an 
insignificant role, after controlling for the target status and the size effect. In fact. 
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irrespective of the method of payment, large bidders of listed targets experience 
significant losses (-2.45% in the event of common stock financing), whereas small 
acquirers generate significant and positive gains to bidders' shareholders, 
irrespective of the mean of financing, as in Chang (1998) and Fuller et al. (2002). This 
reflects that public acquisitions are not necessarily negative NPV projects, and clearly 
small acquirers of listed targets generate higher gains to bidders' shareholders. 
Overall, these results suggest that the magnitude of target status and payment 
method in determining the gains to acquiring firms is to a major extent shaped by 
the size of the acquirer. 
Moeller et al. (2004) offered several explanations/interpretations for the prevalent 
role of size as a main determinant of gains to acquisitions. Firstly, managerial 
overconfidence, as discussed in Malmendier and Tate (2005), is expected to be more 
of a problem with large acquirers. Managerial decisions in large firms are more likely 
to be hubris motivated since managers in such firms (a) are covered more by media, 
(b) are in general relatively more successful, and (c) have wide availability of 
resources when making investment decisions. In addition, Billett and Qian (2007) 
showed that large firms are more likely to conduct many acquisitions that reflect bad 
managerial decisions, which are value destroying. Secondly, the size effect can be 
explained by the ownership structure proposition. Small acquirers are likely to have 
less dispersed ownership and better aligned managerial incentives (Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985)). Third, it is more likely that large firms acquire large and listed firms. 
Given that it is more profitable for acquirers to acquire private, as opposed to public 
targets, then this can be a reason why small acquirers gain more. Further, large 
acquirers are more likely to be overvalued and have exhausted their growth 
opportunities thus, conveying negative signals about the acquirer's price. It is also 
less likely that arbitrageurs will take positions in small acquirers even if they believe 
they are overvalued and hence allowing potential overpricing to develop at the 
announcement and persist in the short-run. Lastly, the original structure of small 
acquirers is expected to change the most, especially when larger firms are acquired, 
thereby creating superior wealth effects to bidding firms' shareholders (due to 
relative size effect). 
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2.2.2.3 Relative Size of the Deal 
It has been widely agreed that the size of the target firm, relative to the size of the 
bidding firm, is a major factor affecting announcement's returns of the bidding firm 
(Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins, 1983; Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Jarrell and Poulsen, 
1989; Kang, 1993; and Fuller et al. 2002). The abnormal returns generated are 
expected to be more severe the larger the target firm's size relative to the bidder's 
size, and thus the more the original structure of the acquiring firm changes as a 
result of the acquisition. Along these lines, Jensen and Ruback (1983) noted that the 
bidders' returns depend on the relative size of the deal. Their main finding is that 
abnormal returns increase as the target's size increases relative to the acquirer's size 
(Asquith et al. 1983; Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989; and Kang, 1993). The same authors 
concluded that when acquisitions are wealth increasing for the bidding firms, bidder 
shareholders enjoy higher abnormal returns if the target is larger than the acquirer. 
On the contrary, Loderer and Martin (1990) claimed that large firms seem to overpay 
for their targets and large bids seem to be overpriced on average, deteriorating 
share price performance. This may be linked to the fact that the larger the size of the 
target firms the more likely it is that the acquirer uses share financing in M&A 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984; and DeAngelo et al. 1984). This in turn leads to low returns. 
Further, Ang and Kohers (2001) supported the view that abnormal returns to 
acquiring firms when bidding for public targets are significantly smaller than for 
bidders buying private targets. 
Importantly, Cakici, Hessel, and Tandon (1996) examined, among other factors, the 
role of relative size in determining CBA performance using cross sectional 
regressions for a sample of US acquisitions. The authors found that bidders' 
abnormal returns when buying foreign listed targets are inversely related to relative 
size, but this relation is not statistically significant. When the authors formed 
portfolios according to different levels of relative size, they found an insignificant 
relationship between bidder's abnormal returns and the relative size of the deal. 
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Similar conclusions have reached also by Pettway and Yamada (1986) who examined 
the wealth effects of Japanese fins that engage in domestic M&A in relation to the 
relative size of the deal. However, Brooks et al. (2000) examined the gains to US 
acquirers engaging in domestic and foreign acquisitions, and found that the gains of 
bidding firms' shareholders are positively related to the relative size of the deal, in 
addition, the cross sectional regression analysis within this study records no 
evidence of a statistically significant difference in abnormal returns to acquiring 
firms in domestic and international acquisitions, after controlling for the relative size 
of the target. 
Furthermore, Fuller et al. (2002) investigated also the role of relative size of the deal 
within the context of private versus public acquisitions. The authors reported 
evidence that as the relative size of the deal increases for public bids, the abnormal 
returns to bidding firms' shareholders increase for cash offers, decrease for equity 
offers, while they do not change much for combination of cash and equity offers. On 
the contrary, for bids of private and/or subsidiary target firms, the authors found 
that there is a positive relationship between the deal's relative size and the bidders' 
gains, in fact, the greater the deal's relative size for private bids, the higher the 
bidders' gains in common stock-bids, in contrary to cash-bids. The explanation given 
by the authors is that bidders receive a better price when they buy a non-public 
target firm. This could be the outcome of the liquidity effect, as private and 
subsidiary firms cannot be bought and sold as easily as a publicly traded firm can. 
Thus, the valuation of privately held assets reflects a liquidity discount, which in turn 
leads to higher returns for bidder's shareholders. Finally, with respect to the stock 
financing for privately held targets, the authors state that the larger returns obtained 
by bidders are due to tax considerations and monitoring. 
2.2.2.4 Market-to-Book Value and Price-to-Earnings Ratio 
Several scholars have independently confirmed that the market-to-book value 
(MTBV) of the acquiring firm is a major determinant of bidders' announcement 
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returns, as it conveys important information about the current and future bidders' 
stock returns. Accordingly, glamour bidding firms are high growth, while value 
acquirers are low growth firms, since their high market valuation may reflect the 
anticipated high growth or investment opportunities. Rau and Vermaelen (1998), 
and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) have reached the conclusion that value 
acquirers (with low MTBV) outperform glamour ones following the announcement of 
an acquisition, after controlling for the mode of payment. Glamour firms receive 
premium ratings in the form of high MTBV based on their past stock performance. 
On the contrary, undervalued acquirers (with low MTBV) may have the potential for 
subsequent wealth creation. Lastly, Conn et al. (2005) found that in domestic 
acquisitions public and private growth acquirers do worse. However, for cross-
border acquisitions value acquirers experience the worst performance in general. 
This suggests that the role of MTBV deserves further investigation when controlling 
for target origin. 
2.2.2.5 Age of the Bidding and Target Firm 
Empirical evidence suggests that the age of a firm plays a very important role in 
shaping the announcement gains to firms that engage in M&A. In general, it is likely 
for newly established firms to exhibit higher uncertainty than older firms due to 
several reasons. In general, it has been widely documented in the literature that 
markets tend to hold more information for firms with a long history (Barry and 
Brown, 1985). Mature companies tend to be commonly known by more customers, 
more suppliers, and also they tend to operate within more mature industries. 
Hannan and Freeman (1989) argued that young firms are likely to lack reliability and 
accountability in their organizational routines and performance. In terms of 
institutional constrains, young firms lack legitimacy, due to the lack of support from 
relevant organizations (Baum, 1989) and due to segmentation within the market for 
inter-organizational relationships (Carter and Manaster, 1990; Podolny, 1993). In 
similar respects, Zhang (2006) used the age of a set of US firms to proxy for 
informational uncertainties related to the same firms. In short, the author found a 
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negative relationship between information uncertainties and the cross-section of 
expected returns, further suggesting that the information quality following firms (as 
measured with the age of the firm) destroy of enhance shareholder wealth. 
Overall, the above discussion of the literature on other factors that shape short-run 
bidders' gains shows that several transaction and firm-specific characteristics are 
important determinants. In short, the method of payment, the size and growth 
opportunities of the acquiring firm, the relative size of the deal and the age of the 
bidder and target at the announcement time constitute, among others, very 
important determinants of short-run bidders' gains. However, in spite of extensive 
research on the effects of these factors on bidders' gains, several voids remain 
unfilled. The major aim of this thesis is to investigate the impact of the above-
mentioned factors, along with other performance determinants, on the domestic 
and foreign bidding firm's short-run gains. In particular, chapter 3, 4, and 5 of this 
thesis investigate factors affecting bidders' performance by including in all univariate 
and cross-section approaches the above-mentioned controls. Notably, given the 
contradicting evidence in finance literature regarding the effect of relative size on 
the gains of foreign bidders (see for example Cakici et al. 1996), chapters 3 and 4 
investigate this relationship in both univariate and cross-section approaches. 
Furthermore, chapter 5 of this thesis examines closely the gains of bidders' 
shareholders by investigating, in great detail, the impact of method of payment and 
size of the firms involved, as well as the relative size of the deal, on bidders' gains 
when buy exclusively domestic unlisted targets. 
2.3 Gains from Cross-Border Acquisitions 
This section reviews and discusses, in great detail, only studies that investigate short-
run bidders' gains from CBA. The literature in this field of research has focused on 
either the main factors that motivate firms to expose themselves internationally, or 
examine the acquiring firms' short and long-run gains. In short, previous studies on 
bidders' gains from foreign acquisitions have attributed these gains to transaction 
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and firm-specific characteristics, similarly to studies for domestic acquisitions (see 
section 2.2). As the number of UK firms involved in cross-border acquisitions (CBA)^^ 
continues to rise over time,^* the need for clear explanations regarding the trade-off 
between costs and benefits of international business environment to foreign bidders 
is increasing. Thus, the review of the literature related to the short-run gains of 
foreign bidders in this section, along with its association with key issues examined in 
chapters 3 and 4, will further allow the contribution of this thesis to become much 
more transparent. 
Previous research has focused on the investigation of the announcement gains of 
shareholders of US bidders that acquire foreign targets. These studies have 
attempted to explain the behaviour of bidder gains on various firm and transaction-
specific characteristics, as well as on factors related to economic indicators and 
governance/institutional settings. In the same way, scholars have also attempted to 
investigate the gains of shareholders of target firms that involved in CBA. Among 
others, one of the most important studies that examine the returns to bidders 
engaged In CBA is investigated by Doukas and Travlos (1988). The authors studied 
the impact of corporate multinational presence on the wealth effects of 301 US 
cross-border deals. In general, they recorded that bids do not generate any 
statistically significant abnormal returns for their shareholders on the announcement 
day (0.08%). However, the major conclusion derived from this study is that the 
multinational network of the bidding firms plays a very important role during the 
announcement period. In short, cross-border bidders' shareholders enjoy statistically 
significant positive abnormal returns on the announcement day (0.31%) only if the 
bidder is not already operating in the target firm's country. On the other hand, when 
bidders are already operating in the target firm's country, their shareholders 
" CBA are the single most Important mode of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). FDI means the 
acquisition of controlling Interest In foreign firms and businesses. Despite CBA being financed mainly 
via FDI, they account for a major portion in global FDI and more specifically In Industrial economies. 
UNCTAD (2006) suggested that "Global foreign direct Investment (FDI) flows grew substantially In 
2005 over those In 2004. As In the late 1990s, that growth was spurred by cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As)." (p. 3). In addition, Healy and Palepu (1993) have also pointed out that around 
the late 1980s the UK was the leading country In CBA, accounting for almost 30 percent of all global 
corporate Investments. Although the share of the UK on outward FDI has been volatile over the years, 
the UK remains one of the major participants in the cross-border M&A activities in the world. 
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experience insignificant losses (-0.08%). The authors also noted that shareholders of 
US firms expanding internationally for first time display insignificant positive 
abnormal returns (0.74%) on the announcement day. Particularly, when 
Multinational Corporations (MNC) diversifies across new industries and geographical 
markets, and especially when this occurs in less developed markets than the US, 
abnormal return tends to be larger. Shareholders gain the most if the expansion is in 
less developed countries and if it simultaneously diversifies across geographical and 
industrial regions/sectors. Similar research efforts have been applied by Markides 
and Ittner (1994) who used a sample of 276 US foreign acquisitions announced over 
the period between 1975 and 1988 and found that on average international 
acquisitions increase value to bidders' shareholders. More specifically, within a 
window of 2-days (-1, 0), 5-days (-1, +3), and 6-days (-2, +3) acquiring firms' 
shareholders enjoy positive and statistically significant abnormal returns of about 
0.32%, 0.54%, and 0.49% respectively. The authors proposed that factors affecting 
performance, among others, are the industry classification, and bidders' prior 
international experience given its present profitability, and finally key 
macroeconomic variables, such as tax regulations and US dollar relative strengths, 
further confirming the findings generated by Doukas and Travlos (1988). 
Along similar respects, Kiymaz and Mukherjee (2000) examined the gains of US 
targets (141) and bidders (112) involved in CBA over the period between 1982 and 
1991."'^ The authors documented positive and highly significant CAR for US targets' 
shareholders across all windows examined (varying from 2.03% to 6.55%), whereas 
US bidders are found to generate statistically insignificant wealth effects. The 
bidders' and targets' abnormal returns vary significantly with the country of origin of 
the bidder and the target firms. In fact, within a 2-day window (-1, 0) US targets 
enjoy the highest gains when the bidders operate in Australia (6.71%), Canada 
(5.71%), Japan (6.16%) and France (12.79%), whereas US bidders experience the 
lowest gains when they bid for target firms in Canada (-1.30%) and the highest for 
bids against German firms (1.45%). The authors found numerous explanatory 
" Countries in the sample include Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Switzerland, and the UK. 
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variables that describe the variation of the gains of US targets' shareholders in the 
short-run, such as the correlations between the quarterly GNP growth rates of the 
two participating countries over a five year period, the correlations between the 
month stock market returns of the two participating countries over a five year 
period, the target firm's MTBV, the dollar value of acquisitions in the US target's 
country divided by the total dollar value of all acquisitions in a given year, dummy 
variables that take the value of 1 (a) if the targets and the bidding firm are operating 
in the same industry, (b) if the payment is by cash, (c) if the whole firm is acquired, 
(d) if the bidders has previous involvement in the target's host country, (e) if the 
acquisition announcement after 1986, and (f) the acquisition takes place in an 
English-Speaking country, and 0 otherwise. In addition. Black, Games, and Jandik 
(2001 and 2002) studied the gains of shareholders of 361 US bidders that engage in 
CBA with targets operating in 17 foreign countries over the period between 1985 
and 1995.''^ The main conclusion of this study is that on average bidders enjoy 
positive and significant abnormal returns in the short-run. In fact, within 7-day (-5, 
+1) and 11-day (-5, +5) event window around the day of the announcement, bids 
generate 0.90% and 1.50% wealth effects to bidders' shareholders. 
Earlier research has also investigated the impact of the cultural distances and 
industry relatedness among countries, such as Datta and Puia (1995). The authors 
examined (a) the shareholders wealth of 112 large US bids announced between 1978 
and 1990, and (b) the impact of industry affiliation and cultural distances, on the 
explanation of the wealth effects of the above US bidders acquiring foreign targets. 
Their main results suggest that bidders generate on average statistically significant 
negative abnormal returns to their shareholders of about -0.42% and -0.72% within a 
2-day (-1, 0) and a 11-day (-5, +5) windows respectively. When the authors 
controlled for the impact of industry relatedness and cultural gaps, results convey 
the significant impact of both variables in shaping the gains to bidders' shareholders. 
In fact, in related bids, deals do not generate statistically significant abnormal 
The foreign countries include Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Hong Kong, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, and the 
United Kingdom. 
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returns to bidders' shareholders across all windows, whereas in unrelated bids 
generate significant losses to acquirers' shareholders of about -4.50%, -7.27%, and -
9.10% for the windows (-15, +15), (-20, +20), and (-30, +30) respectively. Similarly, 
when firms involved in CBA operate in countries culturally distant, bidders' 
shareholders suffer relatively large losses (between -2.58% and -5.85%), compared 
to cases when there is low cultural distance between the firms involved in the CBA. 
In the latter case, results appear not statistically significant different from zero. Datta 
and Puia claimed that the poor performance of CBA could be due to the difficulties 
of managing the post-merger performance when cultural differences make 
integration and accumulation a difficult, time consuming, and expensive process. 
Thus, the bigger the cultural gap, the greater the risks that may be faced. 
Along the same lines, other scholars have also investigated the relationship between 
the Tobin's q and bidders' gains in the framework of CBA. For example, Doukas 
(1995) used a sample of 463 US foreign acquisitions over the period between 1975 
and 1989 and found that bidders with q>l yield significant positive (0.41%) 
announcement returns within a 2-day event window (-1, 0). On the other hand, 
bidders with q<l generate insignificant negative announcement returns to their 
shareholders (-0.18%) for the same period/window. Further, the cross-section 
regressions of a 2-day CAR on cash flows for high and low q bidders conveys the 
significant impact of cash flows on the shape of bidders' CAR only for bidders with 
q<l. In fact, for negative q bidders, the coefficient of the cash flow variable appears 
negative (-0.95) and significant at the 5% significance level. The author found also 
that foreign target bidders' short-run gains are very sensitive to the degree of 
international exposure of the bidding firm, the degree of economic development of 
the target firm's country, the degree of industrial relatedness between the bidding 
and the target firm, the exchange rate regime, the method of payment, and the free 
cash flows. 
Prior research has also focused on the examination of the emergence of synergies 
for merger partners that are based in different countries. In that respect, Eun, 
Kolodny, and Scheraga (1996) studied several propositions for a sample which 
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consist of 225 foreign acquisitions of US firms (117 foreign bidding firms), 213 US 
targets (of foreign bidders) and 103 paired acquirers and targets that announced 
over the period between 1979 and 1990. The authors concluded that only Japanese 
(3.62%) and Canadian (3.18%) acquirers realize positive abnormal returns within 11-
day event windows (-5, +5), yet is statistically significant only for Japanese bids. On 
the other hand, UK and all the other foreign bidders experience significant losses 
within the same window. Moreover, the 213 US targets (of foreign bidders) yield 
high positive abnormal returns within the 11-day window. In fact, the highest gains 
realized to US target firms involved in CBA are when Japanese bidders are involved 
(48.55%), whereas on average all 213 US targets enjoy 37.02% announcement 
returns. The authors found also that foreign bidders' and targets' gains vary 
significantly with research and development variables, market value of the target's 
equity divided by the market value of the acquirer's equity, exchange rate variables, 
and dummy variables taking the value of 1 (a) if the bidder and targets are operating 
in the same line of business, (b) if there are multiple bidders, (c) if the target shares 
are tendered, and (d) if the acquirer has a US presence prior to the acquisition, and 0 
otherwise. 
Other markets, than the US one, have attracted significant research efforts by many 
scholars due to their high involvement in CBA, such as the UK market, Japanese and 
the Dutch ones. Specifically, Conn and Connell (1990) is the first study that examined 
the wealth effects to shareholders of 35 US and 38 UK acquired firms involved in CBA 
over the period between 1971 and 1980. This study used two models to measure the 
wealth effects to US and UK targets' shareholders: (a) the domestic market model 
(DMM) and (b) the international market model (IMM). The main conclusion derived 
from this study suggests that that shareholders of US target firms acquired by UK 
foreign bidders enjoy positive abnormal returns during the announcement month, 
significant for both DMM (0.40%) and IMM (0.43%). Similarly, shareholders of UK 
target firms acquired by US foreign bidders enjoy positive abnormal returns during 
the announcement month in both models (0.18% for the DMM and 0.20% for the 
IMM). Evidently, UK acquired firms (by US foreign bidders) enjoy almost half of the 
gains generated to US acquired firms (by UK foreign bidders) during the 
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announcement month. Conn and Connell claimed that the relatively lower CAR to UK 
targets is due to the fact that the UK market for corporate control is less 
competitive, given the greater agency costs and fewer regulatory/disclosure 
requirements in the UK. A more recent study that focuses on both the short-run and 
the post-merger wealth effects of UK foreign acquirers is investigated by Gregory 
and McCorriston (2005). The authors used a sample of 343 deals which consists of 
206 deals with US target firms, 98 with European targets, and 39 deals with firms in 
the Rest-of-the-World, announced over the period between 1984 and 1994.^^ In 
order to ensure that only economically significant deals were involved, the authors 
restricted their sample to only deals with target firms' sales to be equal to, or greater 
than, 5% of acquirer's sales in the financial year pre-acquisition. The announcement 
gains to UK foreign bidding firms is estimated within a 5-day window (-3, +1). 
Accordingly, for the entire sample, CAR appear negative (-0.02%) and statistically 
insignificant. In addition, although bids with US targets (0.24%) and with targets that 
operate in the Rest of the World (0.20%) group appear positive, they are again 
statistically insignificant. The greatest losses realized to UK foreign bidders' 
shareholders are from acquisitions with targets operating in Europe (-0.72%), which 
is again statistically insignificant. The cross-section analysis suggests that although 
takeovers in Europe destroy value, acquisitions in the US breakeven. Further, the 
coefficient of the dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the takeover was of a 
US company and occurred prior to the introduction of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, 
appears across all models negative and statistically significant, suggesting an 
improvement of the wealth effects with the introduction of the 1986 Tax Reform 
Act. Finally, the coefficient of the exchange rate variable and the sales in the target 
region by acquiring firm in the year prior to acquisition, appear both negative and 
statistically significant across all models, consistent with the FDI literature. Overall, 
although the main conclusions derived from this study suggests that geographic 
diversification plays a very important role in shaping the announcement gains of the 
foreign bidding firms' shareholders, the result obtained from the long-run analysis 
238 (lOS) of these foreign deals are announced with targets that operate in the same (different) 
business line of the bidder. 
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appear much more intense with regards the impact of the geographical 
diversification on the share price behaviour after the CBA announcements. 
Similar research proposals have been applied by Kang (1993) who assessed the 
valuations effects to 119 Japanese bidders (98 non-financial ones) and 102 US 
targets involved in CBA over the period between 1975 and 1988. The main 
conclusions derived from this study lie on the basis that Japanese bidders enjoy 
significant positive abnormal returns within 2-day (-1, 0) and 3-day (-1, +1) event 
window when buying foreign targets in the US, whereas US targets breakeven. More 
specifically, Japanese bidders enjoy 0.59% and 0.51% announcement gains, whereas 
US targets gain on average -0.29% and -0.10% abnormal returns respectively for the 
two windows. The differentials generated between the gains to Japanese bidders 
and US targets appear both economically and statistically significant (0.88% and 
0.61% respectively). These findings are consistent with the rest of the findings in the 
FDI literature, with the exchange-rate movements and the bidder's characteristics 
being significant explanatory variables in shaping the variation of the Japanese 
bidders' abnormal returns. Lastly, Corhay and Rad (2000) examined the wealth 
effects generated to Dutch bidders' shareholders engaged in CBA with 84 Western 
European firms, 17 US firms, and 10 Eastern European firms, over the period 
between 1990 and 1996. Various windows were used to measure the bidders' gains 
across all portfolios. In general, the authors documented weak evidence suggesting 
that CBA are value increasing projects for the bidding firms' shareholders. In fact, the 
announcement period gains created to bidders' shareholders vary across the three 
portfolios based on the target firm's country of origin: (a) bids in the Western 
European countries generate 1.44% announcement gains within a window (-5, +5) 
with no abnormal returns generations in longer windows, (b) bids in US generate a 
CAR of 4.50% in a 81-day window (-40, +40) with no favourable immediate effects 
around the M&A announcement, and (c) bids with Eastern European countries 
generate highly negative and statistically significant abnormal returns. The cross-
section analysis of Dutch acquiring firms' CAR for windows of (-1, +1) and (-10, +10) 
on (a) the FOREIGN dummy variable (1 if the ratio of foreign sales to total sales of 
the acquiring company is equal to, or higher than, 40%, and 0 otherwise), (b) the 
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INDUSTRY dummy variable (1 if the bidder and targets are operating in the same 
business line, and 0 otherwise), and (c) the SIZE dummy variable (1 if the ratio of the 
target firm's sales to the bidding firm's sales is equal to, or greater than, 10%, and 0 
otherwise) reflects that bidders' gains are negatively correlated to the FOREIGN and 
INDUSTRY dummies, and positively, although statistically insignificantly, correlated 
to the SIZE dummy, for both windows. 
Overall, the review and discussion of the literature in foreign acquisitions suggests 
that, while gains to foreign acquirers are very controversial, gains to foreign targets' 
shareholders appear always positive and highly statistically significant, irrespective 
of the bidder's and target's country of origin. Given these findings, the importance of 
the examination of the wealth effects to foreign bidders, as well as the identification 
of further determinants of the announcement abnormal returns, led to the 
emergence of several research questions. Respecting all these observations, this 
thesis aims to identify further abnormal return determinants for the gains of bidders' 
shareholders that acquire foreign target firms. More specifically, chapters 3 and 4 of 
this thesis attempt to identify more factors, other than the ones recorded in the 
literature so-far, that explain (a) the stock price behaviour around foreign acquisition 
announcements, and (b) any differential in performance detected between domestic 
and foreign acquisition deals. More specifically, chapters 3 and 4 investigate the 
impact of (a) the legal system of the target firm's country of residence and (b) the 
market valuations and economic conditions in the source country as well as the 
power of the source country's currency, on the gains of foreign bidding firms. Given 
the continuously increasing number of firms that are involved in foreign acquisitions, 
the research outcomes from this thesis should add significant value to our current 
knowledge and fill several voids in finance literature. 
2.4 Gains from Domestic versus Cross-Border Acquisitions 
In this section I only review and discuss studies that investigate the main factors 
documented in the literature which have a significant impact upon the differentials 
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detected in performance of domestic versus CBA. in the same framework, 1 further 
discuss the main features that lead to such differentials and their implications to all 
merger partners. 
A limited number of studies have directly compared the wealth effects from 
domestic versus foreign acquisitions, whilst discussing possible reasons for any 
differential in abnormal returns detected. Along these lines, Eckbo and Thorburn 
(2000) compared directly the domestic and cross-border performance of US and 
Canadian bidders both acquiring Canadian targets between 1964 and 1983. The 
1,261 domestic bidders listed in the Canadian market (TSE) experience significantly 
positive abnormal returns during the announcement month. On the contrary, the 
390 foreign bidders listed in NYSE yield insignificantly abnormal returns. The latter 
finding is somehow surprising given that US (bidders) and Canadian (targets) operate 
under the North America Foreign Trade Association (NAFTA) area. Along similar 
lines. Brooks et al. (2000) compared the gains generated between 137 bids of 
domestic listed target firms and 149 foreign ones over the period between 1981 and 
1989. The authors suggested that bidders' shareholders experience losses in both 
domestic and foreign acquisitions. However, these losses are statistically significant 
only for domestic bids. 
Further, Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) identified the market integration as a 
crucial parameter when they examine domestic versus cross-border announcement 
performance. The authors found that US bidders experience lower abnormal returns 
when buying foreign targets, rather than when buying domestic ones, after 
controlling for several factors."" In addition, Goergen and Ronneboog (2004) used a 
sample of 187 mergers and acquisitions announcements for large European firms 
(valued at least USDIOO million). By looking solely on the main findings of this study 
we may identify that bidders from any country buying domestic targets yield 
*° The authors controlled first for general transaction and bidder characteristics, which include 
method of payment, relative transaction size, and industry specification, tender offer versus merger, 
friendly versus hostile takeover, market-to-book value, and free cash flow. Second, they controlled for 
specific cross-border transaction and bidder characteristics, In simple worlds for the global and 
industrial diversification. Finally, they controlled for target country characteristics, which are trade 
policy, capital restrictions and government intervention. 
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negative, yet insignificant, abnormal returns, while acquirers buying foreign targets 
experience positive and highly significant excess returns. UK and Irish bidders 
acquiring domestic targets realise negative but insignificant abnormal returns, 
whereas bidders engaging in CBA gain positive and highly significant abnormal 
returns. 
Lastly, Conn et al. (2005) examined the interrelation between target status (private, 
public, and subsidiary) and country of origin (domestic versus cross-border) of 4,320 
takeover deals announced over the period between 1984 and 1998. In general, the 
authors found that UK bidders engaging in domestic acquisitions generate higher 
announcement gains to their shareholders than the ones engaging in foreign deals, 
after controlling for target status and the method of payment. More specifically, 
acquirers bidding for domestic (foreign) listed target firms experience significant 
losses (yield zero abnormal returns) during the announcement period. Further 
controls according for the method of payment used suggests that cash payments in 
bids of domestic (foreign) listed targets generate positive (negative) abnormal 
returns - insignificant in statistical terms though. Moreover, bidders buying domestic 
(foreign) listed targets with non-cash'*' instruments, obtain a statistically significant 
negative (insignificant positive) abnormal return. This result could be driven by the 
investor protection hypothesis, i.e. the higher the investor protection in a particular 
market, the higher the abnormal returns to the bidding firm acquiring a listed target 
using stock as the mean of payment. 
On the contrary, both domestic and foreign acquisitions of privately held target firms 
result in positive announcement abnormal returns. Further analysis based on the 
method of payment utilized suggests that the gains to bidders in the domestic versus 
CBA framework vary significantly. In fact, bidders buying domestic private targets 
using cash experience significantly larger abnormal returns than when buying foreign 
private targets with cash. This could be a result of high competition in the foreign 
market of corporate control for privately held targets when cash is used as the mean 
" Non-cash offers include stock offers, stock and cash offers, and other offers. 
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of payment, according to the limited competition hypotliesis. In several cases, 
domestic private bids yield higher abnormal returns than cross-border ones when 
non-cash instruments are used to finance the deals. Overall, the main conclusion 
from this study is that cash transactions generate higher announcement returns for 
domestic than for CBA. On the contrary, acquirers engaging in CBA with public target 
firms using non-cash means of payment do not lose, whereas non-cash private bids 
in the domestic market generate higher abnormal returns than cross-border deals. 
The overall conclusion derived from this section suggests that in the framework of 
domestic versus foreign acquisitions, the country of origin, target firm's status, and 
the method of payment in M&A are all highly relevant determinants in shaping the 
gains of bidders' shareholders, in spite of extensive research in this field and the 
several conclusions recorded by a number of other studies, numerous important 
questions remain to be investigated. As a result, the major task of chapter 3 and 4 of 
this thesis is to investigate research questions related to factors affecting bidders' 
gains in the framework of domestic versus foreign acquisitions, both in the short and 
in the long-run. For example, questions that deserve investigation include, what is 
the impact of the target firm's nation legal system or investor protection, on the 
short and long-run gains of shareholders of bidders acquiring domestic versus 
foreign target firms? How does the level of the source country's market valuations 
and economic conditions, and the level of Effective Exchange Rate of the source 
country's currency, affect domestic and CBA activities as well as the announcement 
and post-merger stock price behaviour of bidders that engage in domestic versus 
foreign acquisitions? Critical evaluations of factors that measure the effects in the 
pre-stated questions, along with their association with other determinants that have 
been recognised by earlier studies, will fill several voids in finance literature whilst 
enrich our current knowledge on the short and long-run gains of bidders acquiring 
domestic versus foreign target firms. 
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2.5 Long-Run Performance of Domestic and Cross-Border 
Acquisitions 
This section reviews and discusses only the literature that is associated with the 
post-merger gains of shareholders of bidders acquiring domestic and foreign target 
firms. In the same framework, specific factors that contribute to the interpretation 
of the gains generated to bidders' shareholders are discussed and analyzed. 
Accordingly, the balance of current evidence on the post-acquisition stock 
performance of domestic and foreign bidding firms has documented significant 
losses up to five years following M&A announcements.'*^ In this respect, several 
scholars have admitted that the negative gains to bidders' shareholders in the long-
run cancel out the positive gains generated during the announcement period 
(Andrade et al. 2001). However, despite the rich array of studies that attempt to 
resolve the puzzle on the post-merger underperformance, the question on whether 
bidding firms experience significant gains or losses is still under investigation. Several 
arguments related to this puzzle have been closely examined by a large volume of 
studies, varying through methodological issues, firm and transaction-specific 
characteristics. 
In general, the post-merger underperformance of bidders is a global phenomenon 
that it is mainly associated with the gains of bidders engaged in deals with listed 
target firms. However, a small number of studies that examine the post-merger gains 
to bidders of private targets fail to support the underperformance hypothesis, which 
is a clear indication of the major role played by the target status on the bidders' 
gains in the post-merger period. In that respect, Moeller, Schlingemann and Stuiz 
For US empirical evidence, see for example: iVlandelker (1974), Dodd and Ruback (1977), Lengetieg 
(1978), Asquith (1983), Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983), Malatesta (1983), Jensen and Ruback (1983), 
Magenheim and Mueller (1988), Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992), Loderer and Martin (1992), 
Anderson and Mandelker (1993), Loughran and Vijh (1997), Rau and Vermaelen (1998), Agrawal and 
Jaffe (2000), Pettit (2000), Ferris and Park (2001), Kohers and Kohers (2001), and Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and StuIz (2004). For UK evidence, see for example: Firth (1980), Franks and Harris 
(1989), Ummack (1991), Kennedy and Limmack (1996), Gregory (1997), Alexandridls, Antonlou, and 
Zhao (2006) and Alexandridis, Antoniou, and Petmezas (2007). For CBA evidence, see for example: 
Conn and Connell (1990), Goergen and Renneboog (2004), Gregory and McCorriston (2005), 
Francoeur (2005), Conn et al. (2005). There are, however, other studies [e.g., Bradley and Jarrell 
(1988), and Franks, Harris and Titman (1991)] that do not find significant long run underperformance. 
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(2004) examined the gains generated to unlisted target bidders' shareholders in the 
post-merger period and reported that, on average, bidders earn zero abnormal 
returns in three years following the announcement month. However, this is not the 
case in CBA for which Conn et al. (2005) reported negative gains to foreign target 
bidders' shareholders that acquire private firms. 
2.5.1 Long Long-Run Performance of Domestic Acquirers 
Malatesta (1983), Asquith (1983), and Magenheim and Muller (1988) reported losses 
(statistically significant only in Malatesta, 1983) for the bidding firm in the year 
following acquisition announcements. In fact, Malatesta (1983) observed that the 
post-merger underperformance occurred after 1970 whereas this drift was mainly 
associated for bidders with smaller equity value. Along similar lines, Agrawal, Jaffe 
and Mandelker (1992) used US acquisitions sample and report significant negative 
abnormal returns for the next 5-years after adjusting for firm size and shifts in beta 
over time. The authors hypothesized that stock prices adjust to corporate signals 
slowly although subsequently they concluded that such hypothesis is not supported 
in their study. Likewise, Andre et al. (2004) investigated the post-merger 
performance of 267 Canadian takeovers over the period between 1980 and 2000 
and found that Canadian acquirers experience significant underperformance over a 
three-year period. Their results are robust to the inclusion or not of overlapping 
cases whist they also found that both the extrapolation and the method of payment 
hypotheses can explain their results. In fact, glamour acquirers and equity-financed 
deals shape the documented underperformance, supporting the findings of several 
other studies in finance literature. 
However, a number of US studies have failed to find any evidence supporting the 
underperformance hypothesis. In fact, Langetieg (1978) and Franks et ai. (1991) used 
multifactor benchmarks and reported insignificant negative performance over a 
three-year period after acquisitions. The same authors argued that when previous 
studies reported poor performance after acquisitions, it is because of benchmark 
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portfolio errors rather than mispricing at the time of the takeover. Similar 
conclusions have been reached by Agrawal et al. (1992) who admitted that their 
results are period specific and, hence, cannot be generalised. Consistent with Franks 
et al. (1991), Loughran and Vijh (1997) reported that the five-year abnormal return 
for their entire sample is insignificantly different from zero. Lastly, Loderer and 
Martin (1992) also reported that the five-year post-merger performance is positive 
but insignificantly different from zero. 
Previous research has also examined similar research proposals for UK based firms. 
For example. Firth (1980) examined the post-merger performance of a sample of 
acquisitions over the period between 1969 and 1975 and reported that bidding firms 
experience negative abnormal returns. Similarly, Barnes (1984) examined all mergers 
undertaken by companies listed in the London Stock Exchange (LSE) from 1974 to 
1976 and reported significant losses for acquirers in the long-run. In the same 
respect, Franks and Harris (1989) used a comprehensive sample for a thirty-year 
period (between 1955 and 1985) and found that bidders experience losses in the 
post-merger period of about 13% two years after the merger. Furthermore, Limmack 
(1991) reported that on average, over the 24 months after the takeover's 
announcement bidders' shareholders experience significantly negative abnormal 
returns. 
Along similar lines, Gregory (1997) examined domestic takeovers over the period 
between 1984 and 1992 and found that, irrespective of the benchmark model used, 
the two-year post-acquisition returns are on average significantly negative. Hence, 
the author suggested that "the contribution of this paper has been to show that the 
post-takeover performance of UK companies is unambiguously negative in the 
longer term" (page 998). Gregory (1997) noted that the underperformance for 
acquiring companies in the UK seems to be more pronounced than for the US 
market. In addition, Limmack (1997, page 1,006) points out that "his conclusion is 
perhaps a little premature' since there remain at least three possible explanations 
for the results obtained in this and other studies, which are (i) the market is 
inefficient and takeovers are not, on average, in bidding shareholders' interest (ii) 
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results are time and sample specific and (iii) the models or methods selected for 
control may not be appropriate for the purpose and that there are other as yet 
unspecified but more appropriate control models or methods". Contrary to studies 
that document significantly negative abnormal returns, but consistent with Franks et 
al. (1977), Dodds and Quek (1985) examined post-acquisition performance of 
acquirers over the period between 1974 and 1976 and found that they enjoy positive 
abnormal returns. However, they observed that the positive abnormal returns that 
earned only lasted until the 25'^ month with acquirers experiencing negative 
abnormal returns thereafter. 
More recently, Alexandridis, Antoniou, and Zhao (2006) investigated the relationship 
between the degree of short sale constraints for acquiring firms' equity and post 
takeover stock performance of bidders. The authors found that as the persistence of 
institutional block-holder ownership increase, bidders' post-merger returns appear 
less negative, after controlling for size, methods of payment and growth 
opportunities of the bidder. In addition, Aiexandridis, Antoniou, and Petmezas 
(2007) investigated the relationship between divergence of opinion about the value 
of the acquiring firm in the pre-acquisition announcement period, and post-
acquisition stock returns. The main findings of this study suggest that acquirers 
subject to high divergence of opinion yield lower post-merger returns than acquirers 
subject to low divergence of opinion. It appears also that negative post-merger 
returns are only experienced by acquirers subject to high divergence of opinion 
about their value. 
It is clear from the evidence discussed above that the long-run underperformance of 
acquiring firms is by no means a universal phenomenon and cannot be generalized. 
Several authors have suggested that the negative performance detected is driven by 
several acquirer and transaction specific characteristics. Accordingly, method of 
payment, book-to-market effects and slow adjustment of prices to information 
associated with takeovers has been the most prevailing explanations for this 
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puzzle."^ Agrawal and Jaffe (2000), in assessing the literature, identified the method 
of payment, mode of acquisition and performance extrapolation as potential 
explanations of such underperformance. 
In addition, a number of other scholars examined the question of whether post-
takeover operating performance increases after M&A announcements. Evidence 
suggests (Healy, Palepu, and Ruback, 1992; Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001) 
that operating performance following M&A announcements increases in the long-
run, relative to industry benchmarks. Specifically, Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) 
examined the post-acquisition performance of the 50 largest US M&A for the period 
1979 to 1984 and found that operating cash-flows for the merged firms increase 
relative to the industry cash-flows. The same authors also measured the 
announcement returns to bidders and by employing regression analysis concluded 
that the short-run performance of the combined firms is positively and significantly 
related to cash-flow improvements in the long-run, supporting the efficient market 
hypothesis that announcement returns can predict the post-takeover 
performance.'" 
Further, Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, (2001) examined the effect of M&A on the 
post-takeover operating performance of a comprehensive sample of M&A for the 
period 1973 to 1998. The authors reported an improvement in operating 
performance by the merging firms relative to industry benchmark. Similar to Healy et 
al. (1992), Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, (2001) have concluded that the 
improvement in post-takeover cash-flow performance is related to the positive stock 
returns at the M&A announcement. Therefore, the need for further identification of 
what exactly influences this significant and persistent underperformance to bidding 
firms' stock returns in the long-run, while others report improved performance for 
the same window, is an empirical issue that calls for further examination. 
For extensive discussions on such explanations, see for example, Travlos (1987), Huang and 
Walking (1987), Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990), Agrawal, Jaffe, and IVIandelker (1992), Loughran and 
Vijh (1997), Rau and Vermaelen (1998) and Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Hong (2005). 
^ This finding is opposite to the vast majority of the literature on the post-takeover performance 
which documents a negative and persistent negative performance in the long-run. 
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2.5.2 Long-Run Performance of Foreign Target Acquirers 
Earlier research has examined the post-merger gains to bidders' shareholders up-to 
five years following CBA announcements. Conn and Connell (1990) examined the 
post-merger gains to 73 foreign acquisitions that announced over the period 1971 
and 1980 between US (35) and UK (38) companies. The main conclusions of this 
study suggest that CAR for both US and UK acquiring firms are highly sensitive to the 
period used to estimate the parameters of the econometric model. In fact, using 
data from the pre-merger period, bidders experience significantly lower CAR than 
when data from the post-merger period are used. Another study that examined the 
post-merger wealth effects of UK targets being acquired by overseas companies has 
developed by Danbolt (1995). The author used five methodologies to estimate the 
abnormal returns, namely, (a) the index model (IM), (b) the market model (MM), (c) 
the CAPM, (d) the Hoare Govett small companies index model (HGSC), and (e) the 
size deciles index model (SD). The main conclusion derived from this study suggests 
that UK targets of foreign bidders enjoy positive returns for the first two months 
following the CBA announcement (significant only in the first month), whereas they 
experience significant losses thereafter until the fifth month. Along similar lines, 
Goergen and Renneboog (2004) used a near-exhaustive sample (187 deals) of 
European bidders and targets involved in domestic and foreign acquisitions. In 
particular, 118 deals are conducted with domestic target firms, while the rest (69) 
are conducted with foreign target firms. Overall, the authors found that target firms' 
shareholders earn significant and positive abnormal returns (21.66%) within a 
window of 121 days (-60, +60) whereas bidders breakeven (-0.26%) in the same 
window. When cross-border bids only are examined, bidders' gains in the window (-
60, +60) vary significantly across European countries. Specifically, when all foreign 
acquisitions are considered, from all European countries, foreign target bidders 
deliver the expected rate of returns to their shareholders. However, foreign target 
bidders experience significant losses, in economic terms only, when the bidder is a 
German (-5.99%), or a Scandinavian (-11.31%), or a Benelux company (17.20%). On 
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the contrary, foreign French (12.68) and Southern European (5.22%) bidders' 
shareholders enjoy positive and significant gains in the same window. Lastly, UK and 
Irish foreign target bidders generate zero abnormal returns to their shareholders. 
Another study on the long-run gains from foreign acquisitions is developed by 
Gregory and McCorriston (2005). The authors used a near-exhaustive sample of UK 
companies that acquire targets firms in the US, Europe and in the rest-of-the-world. 
This is the first study of FDI decisions that employs the Lyon et al. (1999) 
"bootstrapping" method in testing for long-run abnormal returns. Accordingly, 
Gregory and McCorriston reported that while on average long-run returns are not 
significantly different from zero they show extensive variation by region. Specifically, 
firms experience significant losses following acquisition in the US, show insignificant 
returns following acquisitions in the EU, whereas bidders in the RoW groups of 
countries enjoy significant positive returns in the long-run. The authors suggested 
that the different exchange rate regimes, the US tax reforms, the industry research 
and development, the industry advertising expenditure and the industry 
classification of the acquirer and the target firm form, among others, very important 
determinants for the variation of the long-run gains to UK foreign target bidders. 
Similar research questions have also examined by Conn et al. (2005) who reported 
similar results for the long-run performance (36 months following the CBA 
announcement) of UK firms by using two methodologies, Buy-and-Hold and Calendar 
Time approaches. On average, they concluded that UK foreign target bidders 
experience significant losses in the long-run, although the losses vary with the target 
firm's status. With the Buy-and-Hold (Calendar Time) methodology, for the entire 
sample, foreign target bidders suffer a loss of -13.37% (-0.27%), whereas when the 
target firm is private bidders experience insignificant losses of -10.91% (-0.19%). In 
addition, bidders of foreign targets suffer the greatest losses when the target firm is 
listed. In fact, they lose -32.33% significant abnormal returns using the Buy-and-Hold 
and -0.71% using the Calendar Time Approach. Lastly, Francoeur (2005) used a 
sample of 847 CBA conducted by 279 Canadian acquiring firms and completed during 
the period from January 1990 to December 2000. After estimating returns using the 
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Calendar Time Approach for 12, 24, 36, 48, and 60 months, the author found that 
Canadian bidders experience negative abnormal returns in the long-run. In most of 
the cases the results appear statistically insignificant, suggesting the bidder delivers 
the required rate of return to their shareholders. However, for 24-months and 36-
months following the CBA, the results appear negative and significant at 10% level. 
In summary, and in view of the results discussed so far in this section, it appears that 
bidders of both domestic and foreign targets experience significant losses in the 
long-run or they deliver the required rate of return to their shareholders. However, 
there are only a few cases where the gains from the post-merger analysis appear 
positive. Overall, whether the gains to domestic and/or foreign bidders' 
shareholders should be captured by using a more accurate methodology or whether 
the puzzle related to the bidding firm's underperformance in the long-run can be 
explained by other factors, are empirical questions that deserve further 
investigation. Accordingly, this thesis aims to identify other factors that explain the 
long-run stock price behaviour of bidders that engage in acquisitions of domestic and 
foreign target firms. More specifically, chapter 3 and 4 attempt to identify whether 
the long-run gains to bidders' shareholders vary with various institutional laws and 
corporate governance systems from all over the world as well as with the economic 
conditions and market valuations in the source country. Lastly, chapter 5 aims to 
investigate whether the post-merger bidder gains vary with the unlisted target firm's 
level of valuation ambiguities or with the quality of available information for the 
unlisted target firm. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Overall, the literature discussed above suggests that both short and long-run 
bidders' gains vary with several firm and transaction-specific characteristics. In short, 
the listing status of target firm, the method of payment, the size and growth 
opportunities of the bidding firm, as well as the relative size of the deal and the age 
of the merger partners, constitute important determinants of short and long-run 
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abnormal returns of bidders. However, in spite of the rich array of studies that have 
recorded these conclusions, several important considerations remain to be 
investigated whilst leaving several voids unfilled in finance literature. This thesis 
seeks to investigate the impact of several factors on the gains of bidders that acquire 
both domestic and foreign target firms while it aims to fill a number of gaps in three 
important fields in the finance literature. In this attempt, chapter 3 investigates 
whether the legal system of the target firm's country of residence is an important 
factor in explaining the differences in the performance of domestic and foreign 
target bidders. Chapter 4 investigates the impact of market valuations, economic 
conditions and the effective exchange rate on the gains of bidders engaged in 
domestic and foreign acquisitions. Finally, the chapter 5 of the thesis addresses the 
question on whether the gains of unlisted target acquirers are shaped by the 
difficulty and uncertainty in valuing the targets. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed increases in foreign direct investments (hereafter FDI), 
especially in the form of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (hereafter CBA).' 
Existing research evidence suggests that foreign acquirers benefit from expanding 
internationally due to growth, technological advancements, internalization, business 
diversification", and imperfections in factor, government policy, exchange rates, 
product, and capital markets.^ Other reasons that encourage firms to engage in CBA 
include strategic, behavioural, and economic considerations.'' However, apart from 
achieving potential benefits, firms engaging in CBA face additional risks such as foreign 
exchange, political and economic risks. To an extent, firms willing to engage in CBA face 
a trade-off between costs and benefits of international business expansion. Along 
similar lines, the increased CBA activities along with the risks faced by firms when 
expanding internationally have culminated into the emergence of a block of voluminous 
literature that concentrates into whether CBA create superior value for shareholders of 
acquiring firms. These studies have admitted that the gains from CBA are dependent on 
target's geographical region (see Gregory and McCorriston, 2005) while Doukas and 
Travlos (1988) showed that acquiring target firms into new markets (or countries) 
enhance shareholders' wealth. Nevertheless, in spite of extensive research on value 
creation from CBA, numerous important questions remain unresolved. 
^ UNCTAD (2006) highlighted that "Global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows grew substantially in 2005 
over those in 2004. As in the late 1990s, that growth was spurred by cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A)" (p. 3). In addition, Healy and Palepu (1993) have also pointed out that around the late 
1980s the UK was the leading country in CBA, accounting for almost 30 percent of all global corporate 
investments. Although the share of the UK on outward FDI has been volatile over the years, it still remains 
one of the major participants in the cross-border M&A activities in the world. 
^ Seminal studies on the gains from multinationalisation suggest that investors value the benefit of 
expanding internationally (see Hughes, Logue and Sweeney, 1975 and Agmon and Lessard, 1977). This is 
particularly relevant when there are more cross-border trade barriers for investors than for firms. 
^ See Caves (1971), Hymer (1976), and Errunza and Senbet (1981), to name only a few. 
* Strategic considerations include, for example, seeking new product markets, finding new sources for raw 
materials, lowering costs associated with the goods produced and services rendered as well as with skilled 
human capital, and attempting to overcome trade barriers. 
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Whereas the majority of earlier studies have mainly concentrated on the investigation 
of various factors related to firm, transaction, economic and regional characteristics, 
others scholars have recorded that the governance procedures and the legal 
environment of a country affect firm's value (see for example. La Porta et al. 2000 and 
Bris and Cabolis, 2008). As a result, one of the major factors responsible in shaping net 
gains from CBA is the corporate governance and the legal system in host nations (i.e. 
civil-law and common-law systems).^ Indeed, legal provisions pertinent to corporate 
governance, entry and exit, investors' protection, and openness of economy can affect 
acquisition premium/discount offered by bidders and ease of integration between 
acquirer and targets which, in turn, should affect the short and long-term performance 
of acquirers.^ Despite the apparent importance of governance systems, no prior study, 
to my knowledge, has directly examined the implications of the various legal and 
governance systems on the gains earned by UK bidders engaging in CBA.^ Therefore, the 
central aim of this chapter is to fill this void by investigating the possible implications of 
legal traditions of the target firm's country of origin on the gains of bidders engaged in 
CBA.^ 
Another strand of literature in the same field of research has focused on whether any 
significant disparity exists between the gains obtained from domestic versus foreign 
acquisitions. These studies have mainly concentrated on various firm and transaction-
^ The two most important corporate governance mechanisms that have been identified within the 
literature are cited as being the internal mechanisms, which influence the structure of the board of 
directors and ownership rules, and the external mechanisms, which are concerned with the organization's 
legal framework. 
* Acquiring firms consider seriously the corporate governance mechanisms of the target firm, as well as 
the rules and regulations of the target firm's country, to assess whether the target is a worthwhile 
investment and whether it can be integrated into the acquirer's existing business environment. 
' Gregory and McCorriston (2005) grouped UK acquirers' targets by geographical region of countries in 
which they operate suggesting that the corporate governance system among the regions differs 
significantly. 
° As Bris and Cabolis (2008) stated, "An area for future research is the study of the specific characteristics 
of cross-border mergers that affect firm value. In our paper, we control for the frequency of domestic and 
cross-border acquisitions affecting a particular country and show that these ratios are significantly related 
to the market's reaction to the announcement of a cross-border merger. Exploring the factors behind 
these costs and benefits, and documenting the differences between domestic and cross-border mergers, 
deserves future work." (p. 642-647) 
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specific characteristics t l iat have been proposed to account for these differentials in 
performance between bidder gains f rom domestic and foreign acquisitions. In short, 
among the earlier studies that have at tempted to explain the reasons behind the 
differences in the gains of acquirers of domestic and foreign targets, Moeller and 
Schlingemann (2005) attr ibuted the higher gains f rom CBA to business diversification. 
However, the impact of the domestic versus CBA on the bidding f i rms' abnormal returns 
appears, to a large degree, hard to substantiate through the existing l i terature. Indeed, 
the validity of this issue stands of major importance in this field of research and merits 
additional consideration. Several factors are likely (and known) to influence the 
announcement period gains of acquirers (such as the premiums paid, the degree of 
investor protection, the corporate governance system, deal and firm-specific 
characteristics) while the same factors may affect the post-acquisition performance of 
bidders differently. 
Although the majority of studies have primarily focused on the announcement gains of 
foreign acquirers, the investigation of the post-merger gains of these acquirers remains 
largely under-theorized. In short, the announcement period gains of bidders engaged in 
CBA are likely to be f i l tered out in the post-acquisition period, as the f irm's value moves 
towards its equil ibrium level. While recent studies (see for example Gregory and 
McCorriton, 2005) have at tempted to fill this void between the short and the long-run 
performance of foreign acquirers, others have suggested that the short-run abnormal 
returns earned by bidding firms may not fully reflect the wealth effect of that particular 
event (see for example Loughran and Vijh, 1997). To an extent, the superiority of CBA 
over domestic deals (or vice versa) should be more obvious when both short and long-
run performances are analysed. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the performance 
differentials (announcement period as well as long-term ones) on gains of bidders 
acquired domestic versus foreign targets, wi th special reference to the legal tradit ion of 
the host country in which the target operates. 
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This chapter shows that the degree to which the legal system of the target f irm's 
country of residence protects the minority shareholders contains an important 
explanatory power for the abnormal returns differentials to bidding firms engaging into 
domestic acquisitions versus CBA. The chapter focuses on the incentive mechanisms 
created by the legal environment and corporate governance practices in the host 
country to explain the sources of value creation (or destruction) within the domestic 
acquisitions versus CBA framework. Specifically, the fol lowing research questions are 
addressed: (a) what are the implications of the target f irm's origin (i.e. domestic versus 
CBA) on bidder's wealth? (b) What is the role of the target f i rm nation's legal system 
(i.e. civil-law versus common-law) on bidding f irm's short and long-run abnormal 
returns? (c) What are the likely effects of f i rm and transaction-specific characteristics on 
bidders' gains in the context of domestic versus CBA? In the overall context of this 
chapter, I firstly estimate the differentials in bidders' short and long-run abnormal 
returns within the framework of domestic versus CBA. Subsequently, to identify any 
incremental effect of the legal origin, I further examine the gains of bidders by the host 
country's legal system. 
The major conclusions derived f rom this chapter reflect that both the target-origin and 
the target nation's legal-system, in which the target f irms operate, constitute very 
important roles in shaping the gains of acquirers in the short and in the long-run. More 
specifically, once the implications of various determinants of acquirers' gains are 
controlled for, CBA generate higher returns than domestic acquisition. Bidders generate 
higher announcement returns to their shareholders when they acquire foreign listed 
and subsidiary targets that based in civil-law countries wi th lower investor protection 
(than bids of listed and subsidiary targets that based in common-law (including UK) 
countries wi th higher investor protection). Further, bidders enjoy higher announcement 
returns when they use shares to finance foreign acquisitions of targets that based in 
common-law countries (than bids in the domestic market and bids in civil-law countries 
wi th the same method of payment). Finally, bidders perform relatively better in the 
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long-run when they engage in acquisitions of targets that based in common-law 
(including UK) countries than in civil-law countries. 
This chapter makes several important contributions in finance literature. Firstly, this is 
the first study that examines the impact of the corporate governance and legal systems 
of the host countries on the returns of UK bidding f irms' shareholders that engage into 
domestic versus CBA.^ Secondly, this chapter examines the impact of acquirer, target, 
and transaction specific characteristics which have received little attention in the 
literature on the gains of bidders acquired domestic versus foreign target firms. Third, 
the use of near-exhaustive sample of 6,634 acquisition deals (both domestic and CBA) 
made by UK bidders makes this chapter one of the most comprehensive studies on M&A 
activities of the UK firms. Finally, the examination of the effects of CBA deals involving 
74 different countries that operate within 5 different legal systems offers 
comprehensive and robust evidence on the gains f rom foreign target acquisitions. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 refers to the effect of 
legal systems on the f i rm value, section 3 reviews the l i terature related to the main 
issues to be examined, section 4 establishes the hypotheses and how they are derived, 
section 5 describes the data and methodologies I fol low and, lastly, sections 6 and 7 
provide discussions of the empirical findings and concluding remarks, respectively. 
' As reported in one of the surveys by Mckinsey and Co. (www.mcl<insev.com) for about 200 institutional 
investors, 75 percent of them found that board mechanisms were at least as important to them as 
financial performance when evaluating potential investments. In fact, 80 percent of those surveyed would 
pay a premium for shares in corporations exhibiting good governance practices. This is in line with the 
main findings of Rossi and Volpin (2004) where the authors noted that UK bidders pay higher premiums 
for targets operating in countries with better corporate governance systems. 
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3.2 Legal Systems and Firm Value 
The corporate governance mechanisms, the legal systems, and to an extent the degree 
to which the corporate laws protect the minority shareholders' rights vary significantly 
across countries or across groups of countries. In a series of studies. La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny (here after LLSV) (1997,1998, 2000, 2000b, and 2002) and 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Schleifer (1999 and 2006) showed that country's 
corporate laws and investors' rights depend on the nation's legal origin and the quality 
of law enforcements. '" They also showed that countries belonging to the Scandinavian 
civil-law system have the strongest law enforcement mechanisms fol lowed by countries 
belonging to the German civil-law and the common-law systems respectively. On the 
other hand, countries fol lowing the French civil-law system have the weakest law 
enforcement system. Investors receive stronger protection in the common-law 
countries (such as the UK and the US) than in countries that have the civil-law system 
(such as France and Germany). In this respect, Wurgler (2000) showed that the 
differences in investor protection against expropriation by insiders can affect the nature 
and effectiveness of capital markets and hence the value of the f i rm. In addit ion. La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Schleifer (2006) have provided strong evidence in favour of 
stock market benefits when laws mandating disclosure and facilitating private 
enforcement through liability rules, contrary to weak evidence in favour of stock market 
benefits through public enforcements. 
Earlier research has also revealed that the legal environment and corporate governance 
mechanism affect the severity of agency costs (LLSV, 2000), the type of ownership 
structure (La Porta et al. 1999), the relevance of reported earnings to firm's 
performance (Ball et al. 2000), the association between investor protection and 
takeover premiums (Rossi and Volpin, 2004), the stock market benefits (La Porta et al. 
" The authors found that that the differences in investor protection regimes, the legal environments, and 
corporate governance mechanisms across the world, affect the nature and effectiveness of capital 
markets, the size and the development of a country's capita market. 
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2006), and the level of the overall economic growth (Demirguc-Kunt and Maskimovic, 
1998; Rajan and Ziglanes, 1998; Wurgler, 2000; Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Love, 2002; 
Gianetti, 2003; Fauver, Houston and Naranjo, 2003). Other scholars have also confirmed 
the implications of the legal environment and corporate governance mechanism at the 
industry and f i rm specific level. In short, whereas Lins (2003) and LLSV (2002) 
investigated the impact of the legal system and corporate governance mechanism on 
the total value of the f i rm, Wurgler (2000) investigated both of them on the investment 
strategy fol lowed by the f irm's management. Similarly, Bris and Cabolis (2008) 
documented a strong and positive relationship between the shareholder protection and 
accounting standards in the acquiring f irm's country, wi th respect the merger premium 
paid in CBA relative to matching domestic acquisitions. 
The legal origin of a particular country and the way in which its laws are enforced may 
also affects the f irms' financial decisions and the f irm's access to capital markets. As 
shown by LLSV (1997), countries with weak investor protection have the smallest capital 
markets, compared to countries with strong investor protection that have the biggest 
capital markets worldwide. Investors' willingness to pay premium prices for risky assets 
(i.e. to accept lower expected return) depends on the level of protection they receive 
(Rossi and Volpin, 2004). This premium stems from the fact that investors recognize the 
decreased probability of the expropriation of cash flows originally directed to 
shareholders by insiders, as enforced by the better legal/investor protection provisions. 
Therefore, an announcement of CBA of a target operating in a country wi th superior 
investor protection should generate a favourable stock market reaction. However, in 
spite of the importance of corporate governance traditions and legal provisions, their 
possible implications on acquirers' gains remain largely unexamined. On the basis of the 
extensively reported importance of corporate governance systems on f i rm value and the 
theoretical reasons articulated in next section, this chapter investigates the possible 
implications of differences in the legal environment under which bidders and targets 
operate, on the gains of acquirers. 
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3.3 Literature Review 
This section compliments the main literature review chapter (Chapter 2) whilst 
concentrates on the literature that is closely related to the main issue examined in the 
present empirical chapter. To recap, the main purpose of this chapter is to empirically 
analyse the announcement period and long-run abnormal returns of bidding firms and 
their determinants when the acquirers are engaged in domestic versus foreign target 
acquisitions. Specifically, I investigate whether the host country's legal system has 
significant implications upon the short and long-run gains to bidding f irms abnormal 
returns. Therefore, the rest of this section is designed to review the literature which is 
closely related to the effect of legal system on (a) the f i rm value, (b) industry 
development, (c) financial system development, and (d) economic development (where 
appropriate, I also refer to the other characteristics of the corporate governance 
mechanism). More precisely, I focus on the literature on international corporate 
governance mechanisms whilst I briefly provide some discussion of the literature on the 
effects of corporate governance system within a single country. ' ' 
Following the comprehensive survey of studies by Denis and McConnell (2003), the 
research on the international corporate governance mechanisms worldwide can be 
divided into two broad fields (see figures 3:1 and 3:2). The first field of research focuses 
on the international corporate governance research which is basically formed after the 
US one.'^ Specifically, it focuses on corporate governance mechanisms of individual 
countries with regards to their board composition and equity ownership. The second 
A s a significant proportion of the total M&A activity has an international dimension during the last three 
decades, the corporate world has become more global and the internalization of various corporate 
governance systems a compulsory requirement. 
" In terms of the research on corporate governance for the US market, it is divided into two broad 
groups, the internal governance mechanisms (i.e. the board of directors and the ownership structure) and 
the external ones (i.e. the takeover market and the legal system). 
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field of research focuses on the impact of different legal systems, which basically 
compares the various legal systems across the wor ld. Accordingly, I firstly review the 
literature on the second field of research into the international corporate governance 
mechanisms, which is closely related to the host country's legal system thereby the key 
input of this analysis. Subsequently, I review the literature on the first f ield of research 
into the international corporate governance systems, as well as on the corporate 
governance research in a single country. 
Insert figures 3:1 and 3:2 about here 
3.3.1 The Structure of International Corporate Governance System 
This section, while focuses on the evolution and the various legal systems worldwide, 
based on evidence f rom previous research it also discusses, in great detail, the effects of 
the various legal systems on the f irm's value. In short, it reviews and discusses studies 
that examine the relationship between the legal system of a country/group of countries 
wi th (a) the protection of the minority shareholders rights, and (b) the economic 
growth. 
3.3.1.1 The Legal System 
Recently, it has been widely documented in finance literature that the structure of a 
country's legal system has important implications on (1) the investor protection of the 
minority of shareholder interests, (2) the ownership concentration of listed 
corporations, (3) the size and effectiveness of capital markets, (4) the stock markets 
benefits, (5) the access of firms to external finance, (6) dividend policies, (7) agency 
problems, (8) the economic development of a particular country, and (9) the valuation 
effects and performance of individual corporations. Within the same framework, recent 
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Studies have examined the relationship between the level of the country's investor 
protection and the takeover premiums paid in CBA, as well as the overall CBA activity. 
The major conclusions derived f rom these studies suggest that the degree to which the 
legal system protects the minority of shareholders' interests affects the premiums paid, 
the method of payment used to finance the transaction, and the overall takeover 
activity (see for example Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Bris and Cabolis, 2008). Based on the 
key findings f rom these studies, in this chapter I investigate the implications of the legal 
system in the target f irm's country of residence on the gains of UK bidders engaging in 
domestic versus CBA. Whereas the legal system constitutes one of the most important 
international corporate governance mechanisms (external one - see figures 3:1 and 
3:2), in this chapter I examine whether its influential impact is f i l tered in the 
announcement and post-merger gains of bidding firms that engage in domestic versus 
foreign target acquisitions. 
3.3.1.1.1 Legal Systems and Protection of Minority Shareholders Interest 
The various legal systems across the wor ld have developed throughout a number of 
ways, falling in the fol lowing two major categories: common-law and civil-law. The 
common-law has originated in England and it has been spread across most of the former 
English colonies, as well as a number of other countries worldwide. The common-law 
depends on decisions made by judges, which are subsequently incorporated into 
wr i t ten law by the legislature. On the other hand, the civil-law tradit ion began with the 
Roman-law and relies on statutes and comprehensive legal codes. The civil-law has been 
developed in three separated, but related ways, which are in general referred to as 
French, German, and Scandinavian civil-law. Therefore, most of the countries across the 
world fall in one of the four abovementioned categories, namely, the English common-
law, the French civil-law, the German civil-law and finally the Scandinavian civil-law 
(LLSV, 1997). 
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An important difference between the two legal systems is the role of the judge and the 
concept of fiduciary duty (see Coffee, 1999b). Under civil-law, judges are required to 
mechanically apply comprehensive codes to the cases before them. For example, if a 
new case that is not specifically covered in an existing code comes before the court, the 
judge has little discretionary power to deal wi th it, regardless of the judge's opinions on 
that matter. In contrast, common-law courts rely on the concept of fiduciary duty, which 
gives judges much greater discretion in issues involving shareholder rights. Recent 
evidence has suggested that common-law judges tend to apply this discretion in favour 
of minority shareholders rights, especially when the existing statutes do not directly 
address an issue that the judge is considering. Others have also suggested that legal 
tradit ion affects both, the explicit laws protecting minority shareholder rights, and the 
net effect of these laws on a corporation's ability to receive financing (LLSV, 1997,1998, 
2000). In particular, these studies documented that those countries with an English 
common-law heritage protect minority shareholders' rights better than those wi th civil-
law traditions. Within the civil-law countries, French civil-law provides significantly less 
protection for shareholders, while the German and Scandinavian civil-law traditions 
provide an intermediate level of protection. Lastly, better legal protections are 
associated with easier access to capital and a higher volume of external financing. 
The focus of the discussion turns now on the effects of the legal system on the value of 
the f i rm. In recent years, much attention has been directed towards the implications of 
the various legal systems on corporate valuations. The first indication of the impact of 
the legal system on corporate valuations within the market for corporate control is 
documented by Jensen (1993). He acknowledged the legal system as a corporate 
governance mechanism. However, he characterized it as being too blunt an instrument 
to deal effectively with the agency problems between managers and shareholders. 
Studies that included in their sample of interest observations f rom a single country have 
provided weak evidence f rom studying the effects of legal systems, as all observations in 
such a sample are subject to the same national legal system. In this chapter, I investigate 
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the valuation effects of bidding firms engaging in CBA with targets f rom all over the 
wor ld. Given the different features of various legal systems worldwide, I aim to uncover 
whether any gains or losses generated to shareholders of bidders of foreign targets are 
shaped by the characteristics of these legal systems. 
Along similar lines, a rich array of studies have examined the implications of the various 
legal systems and investor protection regimes across the wor ld on (a) the level of 
development, and effectiveness of capital markets, (b) the degree to which the minority 
of shareholder rights are protected, and (c) the firm's value, which to an extent stand as 
cornerstones in this field of research. These studies investigated by La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny - LLSV - (1997, 1998, 2000, 2000b, and 2002) and La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Schleifer - LLS - (1999 and 2006). Specifically, LLSV (1997) 
examined the impact of the legal system and investor protection on the level and size of 
the capital markets' development. Their main conclusions suggest that the extent to 
which a country's laws protect the minority of investors' rights and the extent to which 
those laws are enforced, are very important determinants for the development of the 
capital market, corporate governance, and corporate finance within a particular 
country. Regarding the association between the legal system and the size of capital 
markets, LLSV (1997) found also that countries with weak investor protections have the 
smaller and narrower capital markets, in contrast wi th countries under the common-law 
legal system with the biggest capital markets. A more recent study by LLS (2006) 
reached similar conclusions in the same context. Particularly, the authors investigated 
the implications of security laws on the stock market development across 49 countries. 
Their results indicate that security laws matter for the stock market development but 
market forces alone are not able enough to enforce development across the financial 
market. 
Extensive research has also been applied in terms of the differences in ownership 
concentration of listed corporations around the world (LLS, 1999), differences in capital 
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markets (LLSV, 1997), dividend policies and agencies problems (LLSV, 2000), and the 
availability of external finance to firms (LLSV, 1997). In the same context, LLSV (2000b) 
investigated the relationship between inventor protection and corporate governance. 
Specifically, LLSV (2000b) examined whether the legal system is a fundamentally 
important corporate governance mechanism and they admitted that the differences 
described above are closely related wi th the degree to which corporate shareholders 
are protected by law. The authors found also that the extent to which a country's laws 
protect the minority of investor rights (both shareholders and creditors), and the extent 
to which those laws are enforced, are the most fundamental determinants of the ways 
in which the corporate governance develop/expand in a particular country. Further, 
they suggested that the best way to fully understand the corporate governance 
mechanism of a particular country is through its legal system, and not through the usual 
distinction between bank-oriented and market-oriented corporate governance system. 
Another study by LLSV (2000) assessed the agency problems and dividend policies 
subject to different levels of protection of shareholder interests worldwide. The authors 
employed 4,000 large companies across 33 countries worldwide in order to test their 
two agency models of dividends - the common model and the substitute model. The 
authors reported that the distribution of dividends "are an outcome of effective legal 
protect ion" of minority of shareholders rights, thereby investors have the power to 
request f rom corporate insiders to "disgorge cash", supporting their first proposition. 
On the other hand, the distribution of dividends are a "substitute for effective legal 
protect ion" of the minority of shareholder rights, thereby give firms of "unprotective" 
systems the power " to establish reputations for good treatment of investors through 
dividend policies", consistent wi th their second propositions. LLSV (2000) found also 
that corporations based in countries w i th stronger investor protections to minority of 
shareholders rights pay higher dividends whereas investors based in countries with 
weak investor protection accept any amount of dividends that the corporations are 
prepared to pay, irrespective of the corporations' investment opportunit ies. In addition. 
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fast growth firms in strong investor protection countries pay lower dividends than slow 
growth firms, supporting the view that when the minority of shareholder interest are 
protected the most, investors are prepared to wait and request their dividends in the 
future along with fast growth opportunit ies. 
Along similar respects, LLSV (2002) employed a sample of 539 large corporations f rom 
27 wealthy economies worldwide in order to investigate the relationship between the 
level of investor protection on minority shareholders and the cash-flow ownership by a 
controll ing shareholder, w i th respect t o f irm's valuation. The authors concluded that 
there is positive relationship between the f irm's valuation and the level of investor 
protection of minority shareholder rights. Indeed, firms in countries with stronger 
investor protection, and higher cash-flow ownership by controll ing shareholders, are 
valued higher. Similarly, they concluded that weak investor protection is associated wi th 
lower f irms' valuations while higher cash-flow ownership by controll ing shareholders 
improves valuation. 
Numerous recent studies have reported similar results. For instance, Wrugler (2000) 
examined the allocation of capital within financial markets and found that if the legal 
protections accorded minority investors are inadequate, corporate insiders are free to 
invest in projects that do not necessarily increase value. Indeed, better protection leads 
to more valuable firms (see also LLSV, 2002) and more profitable investment programs 
initiated by firm's management. More importantly, LLSV (2002) stated that value 
creation in the cross-border investment decision-making should be directly related to 
the degree of shareholders' rights, creditors' rights, and the legal environment of the 
participating firms. In this respect, Rossi and Volpin (2004) investigated the 
determinants of M&A for 49 countries across the world and found that the volume of 
M&A is significantly larger in countries with better accounting standards and stronger 
shareholder rights. They also found that in CBA, targets are typically f rom countries wi th 
lower investor protection than their acquirers' countries. Those patterns seem to 
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suggest that CBA play a key role in corporate governance in terms of improving the 
degree of investor protection within the target f irms' countries (see also Starks and Wei , 
2004). Better investor protection is associated with the greater use of stock as the 
method of payment, as well as higher takeover premiums. In all these respects, this 
finding indicates that UK bidders are paying higher premiums to countries wi th stronger 
investors' protection (i.e. US targets) and lower ones for targets in countries wi th 
weaker investors' protection (i.e. countries belonging to the French civil-law). 
Several important considerations related to the announcement and post-merger gains 
of foreign bidders may emerge f rom the above discussion. Depending on the host 
country's legal system, CBA activity is likely to increase (decrease), bidders are likely to 
face higher (lower) levels of competit ion when approach target f irms operating in 
common-law (civil-law) countries, which therefore is likely to increase (decrease) the 
premium required and thus decrease (increase) the likelihood of value creation f rom the 
takeover.'^ The use of stock to finance foreign bids in countries that protect the 
minority of shareholders rights the most (i.e. common-law countries) is also likely to 
increase, which is therefore expected to allow for more profitable investments in this 
group of countries during the announcement period. Indeed the use of shares to finance 
private bids in the Anglo-Saxon legal group is expected to create outside blockholders 
which is likely to deliver higher gains in the short and in the long-run due to better, and 
similar wi th the UK, corporate governance practices. Among others, these 
considerations help in setting the hypotheses for this chapter. 
3.3.1.1.2 Legal System and Economic Growth 
Several considerations regarding the impact of the legal system on the level of a 
country's economic growrth have been investigated in a similar way by several scholars 
" Value creation through mergers and acquisition is mainly delivered once the PV of the synergy exceeds 
the premiums paid. 
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in finance literature. In short, the main argument in this respect lies under the effect of 
legal system on (a) the growth levels in the economy, and (b) the growth levels of 
individual companies, and deals mainly wi th the availability of external finance. LLSV 
(1997) examined whether better legal protection enforce investors to use more external 
finance. The main conclusions derived f rom this study suggest that the external finance 
is the highest in common-law countries (with the strongest investor protection) whilst 
the lowest one is found for the French civil-law countries (with the weaker investor 
protection). In the same respect, Rajan and Zingales (1998) found that industrial sectors 
that need more external finance develop much faster in countries with the strongest 
investor protection and the more developed financial markets. On this very issue, 
Wurgler (2000) noted that f irms in countries with developed financial sectors (common-
law countries) increase investments more in growing industries whilst decrease them in 
declining industries. Demirguc-Kunt and Maskimovic (2002) stated also that the 
development of a country's legal system predicts f irms' access to external finance, after 
they incorporate into their sample of interest 40 countries. Lastly, Johnson, Boone, 
Breach, and Friedman (2000) claimed that the degree of a country's investor protection 
affects the way in which that economy's capital market responds to adversity. They 
particularly found a negative relationship between the magnitude of decline in the stock 
market, as well as the degree of depreciation on the exchange rate, and the degree of 
investor protection in that country. 
Prior research has also investigated the impact of legal system on creditor rights. In 
particular, Giannetti (2003) examined the effect of creditor rights on the availability and 
the use of debt within f irms across 8 European countries. The author documented a 
positive relationship between the ability of firms to obtain loans for investment in 
intangible assets and the level of protection of creditor rights. Finally, Giannetti (2003) 
also found that this positive relationship holds true when (a) the degree to which these 
rights enforcements is higher, and (b) firms operating in sectors wi th highly volatile 
fundamentals access long-term debt. 
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Overall, this discussion suggests that a country's legal system is an important 
determinant of its economic development, and the size of its financial system. In fact, 
countries wi th strong (weak) investor protection rights experience high (low) rates of 
economic growth and have the largest (smallest) capital markets. This may have 
important implications to UK bidders that acquire foreign targets in common-law (civil-
law) countries due to the level of competi t ion they face in the bidding contest. In this 
respect, common-law countries are expected to experience higher competit ion levels 
among the winning bidders (relative to civil-law countries), which in turn should be 
expected to decrease the likelihood of value creation during the announcement period. 
However, in the long-run, acquisitions of foreign targets in common-law countries may 
generate higher returns as high levels of economic development usually spike with 
technological advancements and innovations, features that are likely to increase the 
likelihood of the post-merger success (as the potential synergies increase, the PV of the 
synergy is expected to be higher than the premiums required to finance the deal). 
3.3.2 Other International Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
In this section I very briefly refer to the rest of the internal and external corporate 
governance mechanisms whilst I review the literature associated with the key issues 
examined in this chapter. The internal mechanism consists of the board of directors and 
the ownership structure and control. In fact the board of directors consist the board 
composition, the board size, the CEO turnover, the Poison Pills, and the executive 
compensation (see figure 3:2). Similarly, the ownership structure and control divided 
into the ownership concentration into the US and the ownership concentration across 
the world (see figure 3:2). On the other hand, the external mechanisms consist the 
takeover market and the legal system (see figure 3:2 and the discussion in section 
3.3.1.1). From both the internal and the external mechanisms, I review only the 
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l i terature on the ownership structure and control, as several aspects f rom this field of 
research are utilized for the development of the theoretical framework in this chapter. '" 
In short, the ownership structure and control may have significant implications on the 
competit ion that bidders face within the international market for corporate control, as 
well as on the likelihood of outside blockholder creation in the event of foreign private 
acquisitions financed wi th shares. 
3.3.2.1 Ownership Structure and Control 
For any corporate governance system, the ownership and control provide, among 
others, two of its most fundamental mechanisms. Research on this field goes back to 
work of Jensen and Meckiing (1976). Whereas the authors tested the agency theory on 
the modern corporation, they have specifically modelled the agency costs of outside 
equity. Among their major conclusions, the authors have suggested that when the 
ownership and control in corporations are not fully aligned, it is very likely for conflicts 
of interest between owners and controllers, to emerge.'^ In other words, shareholder 
wealth maximization in a world where ownership and control are distributed to 
dif ferent groups of people is, to some degree, unrealistic. 
In general, the ownership and control are very rarely completely separated for any 
corporation. There are several cases where the controllers hold a large proport ion of the 
f irm's equity and, other cases where the owners effectively apply control over the 
company they own (due to the size of the f irm's equity they hold). Evidence show that 
for a large number of firms, the CEO, the directors, and other senior managers own 
shares of the company, and they are responsible to increase its value. Accordingly, since 
a large proportion of their income is delivered through the firm's potential gains which 
" Recent evidence documented the significant impact of legal system on the ownership structure across 
the world. See for example La Porta et al. (1999). 
" However, the traditional model of the firm assumes that the main objective of a firm is to maximize its 
profits, its market value and thus its shareholder wealth. 
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in fact emerge from the return of the firm's equity, they have strong incentives to 
maximizing shareholder wealth. Therefore, the main objective of the owners of the 
company's shares will be the maximization of shareholder wealth, as they will benefit 
simultaneously. In that respect. Cosh and Hughes (1987) found that in the US, 33 
percent of executive directors and 21 percent of all directors are controlling assets in 
their own companies that worth more than one million dollars. As a result, even though 
in some cases there is a gap between the ownership and control, there is a very 
important group of individuals who are both shareholders and senior managers that 
bridge the gap between ownership and control. 
Ownership Structure and the Impact of Blockholders 
In several cases, the gap between ownership and control is bridged by the additional 
pressure or control which is applied by the emergence of inside and outside 
blockholders. With respect to that, several studies have reached the conclusion that 
insiders own on average 20% of a randomly selected exchange-listed corporation in the 
US market (see for example, Mikkelson and Partsh, 1989; Holderness, Kroszner, and 
Sheehan, 1999; Holderness, 2003). Along similar lines, Morck, Shieifer, and Vishny 
(1988), and McConnell and Sevaers (1990) documented that, although the firm's value 
increase when managerial stock ownership increase up to 5%, the firm's value 
decreases when the managerial stock ownership is between 5% and 25%. Further, for 
over 25% managerial ownership the firm value tends to increase slightly. Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) in an examination for only large firms reported on average ownership of 
only 1%. In addition, Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1999) also found that the average CEO 
ownership is 7.2% for a random selected sample. On the other hand, Himmelberg, 
Hubbard, and Palia (1999) claimed that changes in managerial ownership seem to affect 
neither the value of the firm nor the firm's performance. 
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Furthermore, in the case where a number of outside shareholders become blockholders 
of the corporation, they can serve better monitoring to the firm's management and 
therefore they may be able to control them having their attention on the maximization 
of the shareholder wealth. Indeed, Mehran (1995) found that 56 percent of the firms in 
a sample of randomly selected manufacturing firms have outside blockholders. 
However, a few cases exist where the outside blockholders act in their own benefit by 
trying to extract very useful information from the firm's management. There are also 
cases where the government is a significant blockholder of a corporations' equity. In this 
case, the ownership concentration is characterized as highly significant as the 
government can apply too much control and therefore influence significantly the 
valuation of the corporation (as this ownership is funded with money that belongs to 
the state). However, the impact of the transfer from state to private ownership provides 
some very useful incentives, which affect significantly the firm's value. 
Along similar lines, Holderness (2003) reported that block ownership is motivated by 
both, share benefits of control and, private benefits of control. More precisely, the 
blockholders have the incentive and the opportunity to increase the expected cash-
flows of the firms that accrue to all shareholders due to share benefits of control. 
Empirical evidences of the existence of such benefits come from several sources. For 
instance, Mikkelson and Ruback (1985) indicated that the structure of blocks is closely 
associated with the rise of abnormal stock prices, whereas Barclay and Holderness (1991 
and 1992) found evidence supporting that the trading activity of large blocks is 
associated with increase of stock performance. In addition, Barclay and Holderness 
(1989) is the first study that reports evidence with regards the private benefits for a 
large shareholders portfolio by testing the pricing of trading activity of large proportion 
of stock. In this particular case, the blockholders have the incentive and the opportunity 
to consume corporate benefits to the exclusion of smaller shareholders. Additional 
evidence for the private benefits provided by Mikkelson and Regasha (1991) and Chang 
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and Myers (1995) confirmed that block trades are in general priced at a premium to an 
exchange price (9.2% and 13.6% for both studies correspondingly). 
Ownership Concentration across the World 
Earlier research has also investigated the ownership concentration worldwide. In short, 
the US market is characterized as the one with the most widely dispersed ownership. 
Similarly, the equity ownership in the UK has been characterized much like the US one. 
In the US, individual shareholders own very small proportions of a corporation's shares 
and therefore they have very little or no incentive (or power) to apply much effort in 
order to monitor the management or even to influence the management's decisions (as 
it will cost them significant amounts of resources). In addition, the free-rider problem 
decreases the incentives of shareholders within these widely share ownership markets. 
On the other hand, individual shareholders (institutional shareholders) within the same 
framework, with higher level of ownership, have greater incentives to expend resources 
in order to monitor and influence corporate insiders' decisions and therefore corporate 
valuations. 
Accordingly, there are cases where the shareholders, other than the management of the 
firm, can influence the decisions taken by the management. This is more likely to 
happen in markets where the share ownership is more concentrated, such as the 
German and the Japanese one. The equity ownership in Germany has been more 
concentrated than in the US and UK with the banks to play a key role in the corporate 
governance. Studies that concentrate on the abovementioned corporate governance 
systems as well as the differences occurred among them, are reviewed and discussed in 
this section. In fact, Prowse (1992) concluded that in the bank oriented Japanese market 
the financial institutions are the most common blockholders. One would also expect the 
same for the German market since it has been grouped in the same category. 
Nevertheless, Franks and Mayer (2002) have pointed out that in the German market 
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Other companies are the most common blockholders, such as families. However, the 
majority of evidence in finance literature suggests that financial institutions have 
significant control over the firms in Germany and Japan. 
Further, there is a considerable large amount of studies that focus specifically on the 
relation between the ownership structure and firm's performance in Germany and 
Japan. Along the same lines, Kang and Shivdasani (1995) pointed out that the 
blockholders have superior power in Japanese firms' restructuring. More specifically, 
the authors noted that, Japanese firms with blockholders restructure more quickly 
following poor performance, in contrast with Japanese firms without blockholders. 
However, they stated that this response it is faster in US than in Japan. Regarding the 
relationship between the firm's performance and the concentrated equity ownership in 
Germany, Gorton and Schmid (2000) have confirmed that there is a positive relationship 
between the two. However, Kaplan (1994) documented a negative relationship between 
ownership structure and management turnover, using a sample of German companies. 
Moreover, an examination of Czech companies regarding the relationship between (a) 
firm profitability and (b) labour productivity, with ownership concentration, Claessens 
and Djankov (1999) documented a positive relationship between them. 
Although most studies discussed above focused explicitly in these four big countries (US, 
UK, Germany and Japan) and their corporate governance systems' characteristics 
(ownership structure), a large amount of studies in the literature of corporate finance 
and investment concentrates in other economies. Along these lines, Faccio and Lang 
(2002) using a sample of western European economies found that most of the listed 
companies are either, widely held (UK and Ireland), or they are family owed. The latter 
is more likely in continental European economies. Xu and Wang (1997) found also that 
in China the ownership concentration is, to some degree, very high. This ownership is, in 
fact, separated equally between the government, institutions, and domestic individuals. 
A study that focuses on the Israel economy by Blass, Yafen, and Yosha (1998) found that 
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the ownership concentration is very high. Within this economy, banks and institutional 
investors are the most significant outside equity holders of the Israelis companies. 
Finally, Valadares and Leal (2000) noted that the ownership concentration is very high in 
Brazil. Indeed, the majority of the biockholders are corporations and individuals. 
Ownership Structure and the Legal System 
Regarding the relationship between the legal system and the ownership structure and 
control, LLSV (1998) examined the legal origins of 49 countries across the world and 
showed that countries with weak investor protection (i.e. the French civil-law countries) 
have, in general, the highest concentration of equity ownership in the largest public 
companies. They also have suggested that diversified shareholders are very unlikely to 
be important in countries that protect the interests of corporate shareholders the least. 
In terms of the impact of the legal system on the ownership structure, LL5 (1999) 
examined the ownership structure of large corporations within 27 wealthy economics 
worldwide. The authors showed that, opposite to Berle and Means's ownership 
structure of the modern firm, a rather small number of firms are widely held. Indeed, 
their findings supported their prediction for firms mainly based on economies with not 
"very good shareholder protection". Specifically, LLS (1999) concluded that these firms 
are controlled by families or the state. Concluding, from both studies (LLSV, 1998 and 
LLS, 1999), it is clear that there exists a negative relationship between the degree to 
which a country's legal rules protect the minority of shareholder interests and the level 
on equity ownership on large corporations. In short, in countries with weaker investor 
protection, a larger number of corporations are closely followed or held by families and 
the state (i.e. more concentrated ownership structure). In similar respects, Himmelberg, 
Hubbard, and Love (2002) examined whether the lack of investor protection strength 
the company's insiders to hold higher amounts of the equity of the firms they manage. 
The authors found a negative relationship between the degree of investor protection 
and the amount of equity held by insiders. 
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Clearly, depending on the variation of the level of investor protection regimes, which 
therefore affect the levels of concentration of ownership and control worldwide, several 
important implications to foreign bidders' gains, may arise. Specifically, a less (more) 
concentrated ownership structure may decrease (increase) the likelihood of outside 
blockholder creation in the event of private firm acquisitions. Likewise, the level of 
concentration of ownership and control may also affect the pressure of outside 
shareholders in the event of bids with listed firms in the foreign country, which may 
either enforce (or not) the option to 'wait and sell', a fact that may increase (or 
decrease) the premiums paid. 
3.4 Hypotheses Development 
The central theme of this empirical chapter rests on the fact that firms acquiring foreign 
targets are exposed to different financial, legal and corporate governance environment 
which may have significant implications on their value. To test for this, this chapter 
examines the propositions summarized below. 
3.4.1 Domestic versus Foreign Acquisitions 
Despite extensive research on takeovers the issue of whether CBA are superior to 
domestic acquisitions remains inconclusive. The acquirers derive benefit from the 
acquisition of foreign targets. For example, they may gain better access to product 
markets, obtain relatively stable cash flows owning to reduced exposure to macro-
economic risk, have access to local resources and technology that may reduce 
production cost, and access to foreign capital markets which contribute to lowering the 
firm's cost of capital. Multinational firms also enjoy more investment opportunities than 
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domestic firms, as they open up their business to foreign markets while maintaining the 
opportunities available in their home market. Such benefits suggest that the acquisition 
of a foreign target should not only increase the value of the bidder but also the gains 
from CBA should also be higher than the gains from domestic target acquisitions. One 
should also note that foreign target acquisitions may increase the risk of acquirer and 
thus the required rate of return because the acquisition of a foreign target exposes the 
firm to a wider range of transactions and translations risks which may result in higher 
volatility in cash flows, earnings, and net assets measured in domestic currency. 
Additionally, it also exposes the acquirer to political risks in the form of nationalization 
by the host government or changes in host government's economic policy towards 
foreign investment that may affect bidder's cash-flow adversely, while differences in 
legal and cultural factors is likely to increase the agency cost of managing a foreign 
subsidiary relative to that of a domestic subsidiary. These factors are likely to increase 
the cost of capital which, in turn, reduces the value of the bidder, suggesting therefore 
that bidders of domestic targets which are not exposed to these risks should perform 
better than bidders engaged in CBA. Thus whether CBA are superior to domestic 
acquisitions remains an empirical issue that should be addressed, which leads to the 
first testable proposition that: 
HI: 'CBA are superior to domestic acquisitions'. 
See for example, (i) the effect of dollarlzation in Ecuador, and (ii) the Foreign Investment Protection in 
Uruguay regarding the Botnia Case. In terms of the effect of dollarization in Ecuador, Rafferty (2003) 
stated that "Dollarisation was adopted to try to restore monetary stability and confidence in the 
Ecuadorian economy, thus attracting FDI into the country whilst also stemming capital outflows. It was 
hoped that inflation would fall to levels compatible with price stability and thus rid Ecuador of the harmful 
effects of hyperinflation. Lower inflation and a stable currency could furthermore encourage saving and 
private investment and lead to a lower rate of interest. In short, it was intended that dollarisation would 
provide a platform for the economy to return to growth." (page 169). Further, the Botnia investment in 
Uruguay represents the largest FDI ever made in Uruguay and concurrently it represents the largest 
project ever made by a Finish company outside Finland (with an estimate of US$ 1.200.000.000). Along 
these lines, Andres Duran Hareau reported that the level of investor protection constitutes the most 
important role in this FDI decision (www.mondaq .com) . In addition, the same author stated that "Uruguay 
has traditionally been considered as a country with a friendly legal environment for foreign investments. 
Strong public policies have been implemented in order to attract additional foreign investments into the 
country, and evidence indicates that FDl's rates have been consistently growing during the last years." 
(page 1) 
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3.4.2 Investors' Protection and Foreign Acquisitions 
LLSV (1997) showed that investors in common-law countries (also known as the Anglo-
Saxon legal system) receive the highest level of protection whereas investors in civil-law 
countries (also known as French, German, and Scandinavian legal systems) receive the 
least protection.'^ In spite to this, Rossi and Volpin (2004) noted that investors are 
prepared to offer higher premium (i.e. accept low returns) in countries with stronger 
investor protection (i.e. they report a strong positive association between takeover 
premiums and investor protection) than in nations with weaker protection, which is 
possible since higher protection reduces the investors' required rate of return thereby 
causing higher competition among potential acquirers, leaving therefore the winning 
bidder to pay a higher premium. In the same context, Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar (2006) 
highlighted the importance of competition in the bidding contest by reporting higher 
gains to acquirers when they prefer to engage in foreign acquisitions of targets that 
operate in emerging markets (due to lower competition).^^ Furthermore, countries with 
higher investor protection are characterized with diffused ownership which, in turn, 
exacerbates the free-rider problem by forcing the acquirer to pay a higher premium 
than otherwise (Grossman and Hart, 1980). Thus, given the higher takeover premium, 
the net gain to bidders will be lower when they acquire targets in common-law 
countries. On the other hand, when targets are based in countries with weaker investor 
protection (i.e. civil-law countries), bidders are expected to pay a lower premium which, 
in turn, should generate higher gains to acquirers. 
" In Appendix A I categorise the countries into 5 major groups (and an unclassified category) by their legal 
traditions. 
The majority of the emerging markets are under the civil-law group (according to the lists of emerging 
and developed markets that provided by economist and financial times; www.economis t . com and 
w w w . f t . c o m ) . 
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Along these lines, LLSV (2002) highlighted that value creation from foreign investments 
should be closely associated to the degree of shareholder's rights, creditor's rights, and 
the legal environment in which the participating firms operate. It is also possible that 
target owners operating in countries with lower investor protection to be prepared to 
sell their firms at a discount generating positive gains to bidders.'^ In addition, Wurgler 
(2000) found that when the investor protection in a country is weak, managers engage 
in projects that do not increase value. Therefore, it is expected that acquisitions in civil-
law countries are value-increasing for the UK bidding companies for the following 
reasons a) the deal could be able to take place with targets undervalued as the 
managers in this region engage into transactions without the value-increase being their 
main aim, and b) bidders are also likely to face lower competition to acquire targets in 
low investor protection nations than in countries with higher investor protection, which 
in tern leads to the second testable proposition that: 
H2: 'Firms bidding for targets in low investor protection countries gain more than the 
bidders opting for targets in high investor protection nations'. 
3.4.3 Legal Systems, Share Deals and Bidders' Gains 
Previous research suggests that the biddings firm's performance in the short-run is 
highly sensitive on the outside biockholding creation in the event of private acquisitions 
with stock financing (Chang, 1998; Fuller et al. 2002; Draper and Paudyal, 2006; Faccio 
et al. 2006). This empirical investigation aims to examine for this effect within the 
" According to the main conclusions of Rossi and Volpin (2004), in cross-border deals, targets are typically 
from countries with poorer investor protection than their acquirers' countries, suggesting that cross-
border transactions play a key role in terms of corporate governance by improving the degree of investor 
protection wth'm target firms (and their respective countries). Similar results have reached by two more 
recent studies by Bris and Cabolis (2008) and Bris, Brisley, and Cabolis (2008). This implies that target 
firms' managers would be prepared to sell the firms they manage to a firm that is operating under strong 
investor protection regimes and corporate governance practices (i.e. operating in the UK) in an attempt to 
become ex-ante part of the new entity. 
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framework of domestic versus foreign acquisitions. Specifically, in the case of CBA, the 
complexities and information asymmetries tend to be higher than in the case of 
domestic M&A and thus an accurate proxy to account for this problem is needed. To an 
extent, acquisitions of private target firms in the foreign market should be subject to 
higher complexities given their obscure information environment. 
In general, the incorporation of an acquired target into the existing business 
environment of the acquirer is one of the major challenges in corporate takeovers and 
hence it has important implications on value creation through mergers. In the event of 
CBA the problem, among others, arises from the existence of any cultural gap between 
the bidding and target firm's home country (see also Datta and Puia (1995) for similar 
results), differences in corporate governance traditions of the two merger partners, and 
differences in the legal environment under which they operate, thereby the 
incorporation of the acquired target in the acquirers existing business becomes even 
more severe."" In fact, the process of incorporation of the acquired target firm becomes 
more costly and complex in the case of foreign acquisitions than in the case of domestic 
acquisitions. 
Given that traditions of managers, corporate governance mechanisms, and the legal 
environment in common-law countries are similar with the ones in the UK, I should 
expect higher abnormal returns from takeover announcements in common-law 
countries, than in civil-law ones, due to the mitigation of the aforementioned problems. 
Specifically, the use of shares to finance private acquisitions in common-law countries 
°^ For instance, the acquisitions of Columbia Pictures by Sony Corporation and the Best foods by Unilever 
highlight the importance of legal and cultural gaps (i.e. both national and industrial) between the bidding 
and the target firm country. Specifically, while the legal and cultural gaps between the bidding and the 
target firm's country are narrow for the acquisition of Best foods by Unilever (Unilever has an Anglo-
Dutch legacy, which is closer to American one), for the acquisition of Columbia Pictures by Sony 
Corporation the differences are enormous (legal, cultural, and ethnographical differences from Japan to 
United States would be rather far). Along these lines, the Unilever acquired a firm in its own industry 
reflecting that managers have the ability to understand and assess each other's potential and 
performance with less error. On the other hand, Sony Corporation acquired Columbia Pictures, a company 
operating in a different industry sector. 
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should generate higher returns to bidders than the use of shares to finance private 
acquisitions of targets in civil-law countries, due to the similarities between the bidding 
(the UK) and the target firm's country legal traditions, corporate governance traditions, 
and cultural features, thereby signalling better news to market participants.-' Similarly, 
the outside blockholder creation with firms under similar corporate governance and 
legal traditions should be interpreted as good news and investors are expected to take 
long position for the bidders' stock." Moreover, the use of equity in private acquisitions 
may lead to (or may be motivated by) the retention of the target firm's board of 
directors or management."^ For acquisitions in common-law countries, the retained 
managers will be people under the same traditions with the ones in the UK, which 
therefore contributes in mitigating information asymmetries and lowering any 
complexity exists thereby lowering the cost of incorporation of the target firm into the 
existing acquiring firm's business environment. Therefore, this leads to another testable 
proposition (the third one) which states that: 
H3: 'UK bidders acquiring private targets that based on common-law traditions with 
shares should benefit more than the bidders acquiring private targets that based on 
civil-law countries with shares'. 
Accordingly, Rossi and Volpin (2004) found that the volume of M&A activity is significantly larger in 
countries with better accounting standards and stronger shareholder protection. The probability of an all-
cash bid decreases with the level of shareholder protection in the acquirer country. This might implies 
that bidding firms based in common-law countries engaging into CBA with targets into common-law 
countries to utilize more stock-swaps due to the similarities that exist between the two systems thereby 
the cost of integration between the two to be less than otherwise. 
" See for example Chang (1998). Also, Faccio and Masulis (2005) observed that in general stock offers are 
less likely to be used for unlisted targets due to bidder aversion to create a new blockholder. Similarly, 
Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990) suggested that in M&A the bidding firms' managers try to avoid stock 
offers thus minimizing the likelihood of loosing control of the firms they manage. In CBA this is expected 
to be more obvious in deals of targets in civil-law countries as the likelihood of blockholding creation will 
be much higher due to higher equity ownership concentration (i.e. La Porta et al. 1999). 
" The value of the target firm after the M&A announcement may be conditional to the retention of its 
pre-bid management or 'human capital'. In principle, target firm managers with long 
experience/knowledge in the firm's operations will be specialized on the success of the business (i.e. in 
terms of production functions, corporate relationships with customers, suppliers, creditors, and 
competitors, marketing, and distribution functions). Therefore, the transfer of the target firm's 
management may provide significant value on the final entity after the M&A completion. 
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3.4.4 Investors' Protection and Long-Run Performance 
Following the background motivation of the previous hypothesis (hypothesis 3), the 
incorporation of the target firm into the existing business environment of the acquirer 
plays a very important role for the synergy in M&A. In fact, the long-run performance of 
the bidding firm is expected to filter out the level and effectiveness of the incorporation 
of the target firm into the bidding firm's business environment,"'' which is expected to 
be depended on the host country's legal system. It is therefore likely that the bidder and 
the target firms are operating under the same or different corporate governance 
traditions and legal systems, which will further affect the costs of integration and also 
the timing/process of the incorporation of the target firm into the existing business 
environment of the bidding firm. Indeed, the host country's legal system will reflect the 
wealth effects of the combination of the two firms into the final entity. Accordingly, 
M&A of target firms that based in common-law countries with similar to UK corporate 
governance systems and legal traditions are expected to take place with lower costs of 
integration and also the incorporation of the target firms into the existing business 
environment of the bidder to be much faster. Thus this leads to the next testable 
proposition (the fourth) that: 
H4: 'In the long-run, successful acquisitions involving targets in countries with high 
investor protection outperform the deals that involve targets in countries with low 
investor protections'. 
" Loughran and Vijh (1997) noted that the announcement returns generated to bidders' shareholders 
may not fully reflect the wealth effect of that event and therefore the examination of the bidders returns 
in the long-run to represent a necessary task. Similarly, regarding the main task of this chapter, the long-
run analysis of the domestic and foreign bidders' gains will better reflect the impact of the legal system in 
the target firm country on the gains to bidding firms' shareholders. 
106 
Chapter 3: Host Country Legal System and Acquirers' Gains 
3.5 Data and Methodology 
This section refers to the data used for this empirical investigation whilst it describes the 
methodologies applied for this research. The sample description and sample features 
are also analyzed and discussed in the same framework. 
3.5.1 Sample Description 
The sample comprises of takeover bids announced by UK firms between 01/01/1986 
and 31/12/2005 and recorded by the Security Data Corporation (SDC). The choice of 
sample period is guided by the comprehensiveness of records in SDC and available at 
the time of data collection. SDC records 51,714 cases of M&A deals involving UK bidders 
within the sample period. For a deal to remain in the sample it should meet several 
criteria: 
• The acquirer is a UK company traded in the London Stock Exchange (LSE). 
• Targets of all status (public, private, and subsidiary^^) and domicile (domestic 
and foreign) are included. 
• The deal value is at least £1 million (excluding fees and expenses). 
• The market value of the acquirer a month prior to the announcement of the deal 
is at least £1 million.^* 
• The sample is restricted when the acquirer aims to obtain more than 50% of the 
target firm. 
^ All subsidiary targets are not listed in any stock exchange according to the Target Public Mid Code in 
SDC. 
I follow Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002), Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stuiz (2004), and Moeller 
and Schlingemann (2005) and employ a one million pounds cut-off to avoid results being driven by very 
small deals. 
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• Acquisitions involving financial, utility, government and agencies and healthcare 
firms as either the bidding or the target company are excluded. 
• To avoid the implications of multiple bids multiple deals announced within 5 
days (t-2, t+2) surrounding a bid are excluded. 
• Deals with no return to index (Rl), market capitalization (MV), and market-to-
book value (MTBV) data available from Thomson Financial DataStream database 
and deals with negative MTBV, and negative or MV (as in Lyon et al. 1999) are 
excluded. 
I finally obtain a sample of 6,634 UK acquisitions deals survive the criteria. This sample 
comprises of 4,262 domestic and 2,372 cross-border bids. 
3.5.2 The Sample Features 
The annual distribution of sample deals (figure 3:3) shows that two major M&A waves 
occurred within the sample period, the first in the late 1980s and the second a decade 
later.^^ This is consistent with the finding of Healy and Palepu (1993) that in the late 
1980s the UK became the leading nation in CBA. Goergen and Reneboog (2004) 
suggested that the technological progress in biomechanics and electronics, as well as 
the development of new financial innovations and markets, was behind the merger 
wave between 1983 and 1989. Such financial innovations facilitated the financing of 
acquisitions and produced an unparalleled high level of hostile bids. It also appears that 
since the mid 1990s CBA have increased significantly (figure 3:3). This rapid increase can 
" Both M&A waves are characterized by both domestic and CBA. Specifically for CBA, from the mid-1980s 
onwards, the wave of privatizations in former state-owned industries such as telecommunication, utilities, 
chemical, petroleum and gas, and finally the oil industry, has accounted for much of the overall CBA 
activity which basically attracts multinational companies that intend to expand into new markets and 
countries and search for opportunities of wealth maximization. This rapid increase is also attributed on 
several other factors, including the liberalization of trade and investment, globalization, deregulation of 
services, relaxation of controls and market integration. As UK companies expand internationally, they 
seek to capture the accruing benefits following such investments. It also appears that since the mid 1990s, 
global CBA have increased significantly. 
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be attributed to several factors, such as the liberalization of trade and investment, 
deregulation of services, privatization of state-owned enterprises, relaxation of controls 
regarding capital mobility across countries as well as and integration of international 
financial markets. Goergen and Reneboog (2004) have also pointed out that the period 
between 1993 and 2000 was fuelled by the sustained economic expansion, the 
development of new European stock exchanges (such as the European New Markets 
and EASDAQ), and the growth of the internet and telecommunications industries. In 
2001, the collapse of consumer confidence in these industries, as well as the 
overcapacity in traditional sectors, caused an unexpected reduction in merger activity. 
This trend was reinforced by the fact that many analysts at that time had anticipated a 
bleak macroeconomic outlook owing to the previous un-sustained economic euphoria. 
Insert figure 3:3 about here 
Along these lines, figures 3:4 and 3:5 present the annual distributions of CBA into 
different legal system groups. Figures 3:4 and 3:5 reflect very important information 
regarding the main scope of this empirical chapter which is to examine whether the host 
country legal system appear important in shaping the bidding firms' gains. Overall, the 
CBA activity appears similar across the common-law and civil-law countries (figure 3:4 
and table 3:1). In percentages, common-law countries reflect almost the 53% of the 
entire CBA activity while almost 47% reflected by civil-law countries. Similarly, within 
the CBA activity within the civil-law countries group, the larger proportion of 
acquisitions conducted with targets firms operating in the French legal system, opposite 
to German and Scandinavian legal systems (figure 3:5). These figures are in line with the 
findings of Rossi and Volpin (2004) where the authors suggested that the CBA activity in 
significantly higher into strong protected countries, relative to weak protected 
countries. 
Insert figures 3:4 and 3:5 about here 
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Table 3:1 shows that more than one in three deals announced by UK bidders involve 
foreign targets. Among the CBA about half of the targets are based in countries with the 
Anglo-Saxon legal traditions (table 3:1 and figure 3:5). Deals involving targets from the 
socialist nations are only a few but increasing (figure 3:5). This is possibly because 
acquiring targets by western firms in these countries have been feasible only in recent 
years and started only in the mid-1990s. Table 3:2 shows that the majority of 
acquisitions involve private targets (54.3%) followed by subsidiaries (34.4%). This 
pattern holds for domestic as well as CBA deals and for all categories of legal systems. 
Cash payments are the most preferred medium of payment (58.2%) while stock 
transactions are the least favoured (5.4%). Among the CBA, only 2.82% of deals are 
settled in shares. The preferred method of payment in subsidiary acquisitions is cash 
irrespective of targets' domicile and the nation's legal tradition. This is in line with (a) 
Gaughan (2002), who highlights that until very recently, foreign takeovers by UK 
companies almost universally involved cash, as the targets were frequently unwilling to 
accept foreign equity, and (b) Faccio and Masulis (2005) where the authors stated that 
when an acquisition takes place with the target being a subsidiary firm, cash is preferred 
since corporations selling subsidiaries are often motivated by financial distress concerns 
or a desire to restructure towards their core business. 
Insert table 3:1 about here 
Further analysis of the sample reveals that acquirers engaged in CBA are more mature 
(measured by the bidder age) than bidders of domestic targets. In addition, mature 
bidders prefer targets from countries with the Anglo-Saxon and the German legal 
traditions. Bidders engaged in CBA are much larger (about 4.6 times in market 
capitalization) than bidders engaged in domestic deals. Similarly, the average deal value 
of CBA (£78.40 million) is more than double of domestic deals (£35.21 million). Amongst 
the CBA, the deals involving targets based in countries with the Anglo-Saxon legal 
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systems are larger (£87 .40 million) than the acquisitions involving targets based 
e lsewhere . This may be a reflection of the fact that firms based in these countries are 
relatively larger than the f irms based e lsewhere . In addition, bidders of domest ic targets 
are usually value firms (measured with the mor/cet-to-boo/c value), while those engaged 
in CBA tend to be glamour firms. Finally, among CBA deals value bidders acquire more 
targets domiciled in countries with the socialist legal systems, while growth acquirers 
tend to engage in acquisitions of targets operating in the Anglo-Saxon and the French 
legal systems. 
Insert table 3:2 about here 
3.5.3 Methodologies 
The measurements of the announcement post-acquisition period gains are discussed in 
this sect ion. The statistical tests are also discussed in great detail in the s a m e 
framework. 
3.5.3.1 Event Studies 
The event studies are mainly introduced by Fama et al. (1969). Event studies investigate 
how stock prices respond to information flow at different t ime periods. After the 
introduction of event studies by Fama et al. (1969) several scholars have examined the 
implications of various announcements (i.e. M&A, stock splits, dividend, spin-off) on the 
stock returns of the firm within a short window surrounding the announcement of the 
event. There exist a number of event study methodologies which are consistent among 
each other when they measure the effect of a specific event on the returns of the firm 
(i.e. Gregory, 1997). Similarly, Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) referred to short-
run analysis around M&A as: "The most statistically reliable evidence on whether 
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mergers create value for shareholders" (page 109). On the other hand, a number of 
studies in the corporate and investment f inance literature noted that, in the short-run, 
the choice of benchmark used is not so important (in contrast to long-run studies) for 
the measurement of abnormal returns (Gregory, 1997). 
A major concern in the theory of f inance focus on whether the market is efficient and 
whether prices adjust quickly to information attach the markets. Basically, the short-run 
analysis of any corporate event provides a direct measure of any value creation or 
destruction while it provides a forward-looking performance measure . In theory, stock 
prices are the present value of expected future cash flows. However, this requires 
significant assumptions"^ about the functioning of stock markets: efficiency, rationality, 
and absence of restrictions on arbitrage. Research suggests that for most stocks these 
are not unreasonable assumptions, on average and over t ime. Similarly, evidence can be 
assembled supporting the market efficiency argument. If markets were not efficient 
they would adjust slowly (or not at all) to new information. Results from over 100 
studies carefully documented by Elton and Gruber (1987) showed that the market 
responds rapidly to new information. In fact, the typical result in event studies using 
daily data is that, on average, stock prices s e e m to adjust within a day to event 
announcements . As Jensen (1988) noted, "Although the evidence is not literally 100 
percent in support of the efficient market hypothesis, no proposition in any of the 
sciences is better documented" (page 26). Thus, there is ample evidence for the market 
efficiency assumption underlying event study methodology. 
3.5.3.2 Measurement of Announcement Excess Returns 
I analyse bidders' announcement period as wel l as long-term excess returns to examine 
whether bidders' gains are dependent on corporate governance and legal traditions 
°^ The basic assumption in studies that focus on short return windows is that any lag in the response of 
prices to an event is short-lived. 
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under which targets operate. Given that the sample includes multiple bidders, use of 
asset pricing models that require a long t ime series of pre-event period returns that is 
free from the influence of the event under investigation, cannot be applied. However, 
Brown and Warner (1980) contain that that adjustment of the firm's risk (beta) does not 
improve the precision of short period abnormal returns calculations. Therefore, I 
measure the announcement period abnormal return as market adjusted return 
(equation 1). For the same reason several recent studies used this method (see, for 
example. Fuller et al . 2002, Faccio et al. 2006). 
AR,,=R„-R„_, (1) 
Where ARj/\s the excess return of bidder i o n day t; is the return of bidder / on 
day / measured as the percentage change in return index (inclusive of dividends) of 
bidder i; R„,\s the market return defined as the percentage change in FT-AII Share 
index (value weighted) on day / . The announcement period cumulative excess returns 
(CARi) is the sum of the abnormal returns of 5 days (-2 to +2) surrounding the day of the 
announcement of the bid as defined in equation (2). R. and R^are defined in equation 
(1). 
CAR^='t{R.-K), (2) 
3.5.3.3 Test of Significance of Average Gain 
T-statistics are used to test the null hypothesis that the mean CAR is equal to zero for a 
sample of n firms is as follows: 
f ri=nr4R ^ / _ ^ (3) 
n 
a 
V 
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W h e r e CAR., denotes the sample average, and a(CAR.,) denotes the cross-sectional 
sample standard deviations of abnormal returns for the sample of n firms. 
3.5.3.4 Long Run Performance 
To assess the long-run performance of bidders I est imate one, three and five year 
holding period excess returns after controlling for known risk factors identified in Fama 
and French (1996). Average monthly post-merger excess returns for 12, 36 and 60-
months are est imated under a calendar t ime portfolio regression (CTPR) framework. The 
CTPR accounts for the cross-sectional dependence of stock returns caused by the lack of 
independence among observations. This problem arises from overlapping returns and 
the non-random timing of acquisit ions." ' In my data set this of particular importance 
because of frequent acquirers in the sample. For each calendar month in the sample 
period, from January 1986 to December 2005, excess returns of all bidders that 
announced domest ic bids and /or CBA during the previous 12, 36 and 60 months are 
calculated. The calendar-t ime portfolio excess returns are est imated with equation (4): 
( ^ p . , - Rf. ) = oc,+P, [K., - Rf, ) + 5 , 5 M 5 , + h^HML, + s, (4) 
In equation (4), the intercept (a^) measures the monthly average risk adjusted excess 
return of bidders after controlling for the effects of 3 risk factors. The dependent 
variable , - ^ ^ , ) i s the monthly excess return of the calendar-t ime portfolio of 
bidders over risk free rate; is the excess return of market portfolio; S M B 
(Small minus Big) is the excess return of a portfolio of small firms (value weighted) over 
a portfolio of large firms; and HML (High minus Low) is the excess return of a portfolio of 
value firms (value weighted) over glamour firms. SMB and HML est imated using the 
method outlined in Fama and French (1996). The standard errors are corrected for 
A detailed explanation of the CTPR method can be found in Lyon et al. (1999). 
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possible heteroscedasticity induced by the variation in the number of firms in monthly 
portfolios. ^° 
3.5.4 Control Factors 
I also control for other potential determinants of bidders' gains such as bidders' age, 
size (market capitalization), relative size of the deals, market to book value (MTBV) 
ratio, and diversifying versus focused deals. Barry and Brown (1985) and Zhang (2006) 
showed that firms with a long history have more information in the market and are 
likely to belong to mature industries. Therefore, I control for the age of the acquirer in 
my analysis. Moeller et al . (2004) documented a statistically significant abnormal return 
of acquirers that bid for small f irms. Further, the evidence also shows that the abnormal 
returns are expected to be larger in larger deals. Hence, my model controls for the size 
of the acquirer as well as the relative size of the deals (deal size to market value of the 
bidder ratio). Sudarshanam and Mahate (2003) and Conn et al . (2005) showed that 
value acquirers (i.e. bidders with low MTBV ratio) outperform the glamour ones (i.e. 
bidders with high MTBV ratio) both in the short-run and the long-run. Therefore, my 
analysis controls for the growth opportunities of acquirers. If target and bidder belong 
to the s a m e industry sector the integration of firms should to be easier and synergy 
gains higher. Such deals should also benefit from the experience of bidder managers in 
managing the line of business and hence generate higher returns. On the other hand, 
firms acquiring targets that operate in an unrelated business may gain from 
diversification causing a reduction in the volatility of cash flow of the combined firm. 
Therefore , I also control for this feature, while comparing the gains from bids involving 
targets from various nations. 
To check for the reliability of estimates and control for heteroscedasticity I apply a weighted regression 
method of estimation. In the model the weights are the reciprocal of the square root of the number of 
sample deals in each month. Only portfolios with a minimum of five deals are included in the estimation. 
The results based on weighted least squares regressions are qualitatively similar to those of the main 
model. 
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3.5.5 Grouping of Targets' Nations by their Legal Traditions 
Follow the series of papers by LLSV (1997, 1998, 2000, 2000b and 2002) and La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Schleifer (1999 and 2006) I sort portfolios according to the target 
firm's level of investor protection (i.e. the target f irm's country legal system) . Therefore, 
initially I form portfolios for my cross-border sample divided either into the common-
law or into the civil-law. In addition, the civil-law system is further divided into portfolios 
subject to the French legal system, the German , and the Scandinavian ones. The 
remainder of my sample is grouped into the Socialist legal system (see Appendix A). 
3.6 Empirical Findings 
The main purpose of this chapter is to investigate the implications of the host country 's 
legal system on the short and long-run differentials in abnormal returns between 
acquirers engaging in domest ics versus CBA. Accordingly, the following discussion is 
designed upon the basis of the aforement ioned framework, initially, i report abnormal 
returns, and the differentials generated from them, for acquirers engaging into 
domestic versus CBA after controlling for target status and method of payment. 
Following to that, the discussion concentrates on the abnormal returns, and their 
differentials, for acquirers engaging into solely CBA in countries belonging to various 
legal systems (i.e. common- law, civil-law, French legal system, German legal system, 
Scandinavian legal system, and the Socialist legal system). Differentials in returns will be 
reported in each case between (a) portfolios of domestic acquisitions and CBA, (b) 
portfolios of domest ic acquisitions and each of the legal system individually, and (c) 
bidders engage only into foreign acquisitions with targets operating under different 
legal systems. Finally, the subsequent examination will follow the abovement ioned 
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Structure but the analysis will focus upon the acquisitions conducted with targets 
operating in both the same and in different industries, relative size of the deal , bidder 
size, bidder age, and bidder growth opportunities measure by the market-to-book value 
(MTBV). 
3.6.1 Announcement Period Gains 
Tables 3:3 to 3:6 present Cumulat ive Abnormal Returns (hereafter CAR) using 5-day 
event window (-2 to +2) for acquisit ions (all cases , both domestic and cross-border) 
divided into portfolios according to the target status (private, public or subsidiary), 
alternative methods of financing (cash, stock, and mixed/other) , and the various legal 
families (common-law, civil-law, French, G e r m a n , Scandinavian, and Socialist legal 
systems) . Abnormal returns differentials between domestic and CBA and to an extent 
for all acquisitions engaging in countries belonging to various legal systems (or legal 
families) are reported in each case . 
3.6.1.1 Domestic versus Cross-Border Acquisitions 
The est imates in table 3:3 (panel A) show that during 5-days surrounding the 
announcement of bids acquirers gain a significant positive excess return (1.23%). 
However , the gain is target status dependent . Acquirers of private and subsidiary targets 
earn significant positive returns while bidders of public targets breakeven. The 
est imates further show that acquirers of both domestic and foreign targets earn 
significant positive returns (1.22% and 1.24% respectively) but difference in their gains is 
not statistically significant. However, there are significant differences in the gains of 
foreign and domestic target bidders by their target status. Among bidders of listed 
targets, acquirers of domestic firms suffer a significant loss (-0.72%) while acquirers of 
foreign targets breakeven, generating a negative and significant differential of about -
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1.12%. On the other hand, acquisit ions of domest ic private targets generate significantly 
higher return (1.61%) than CBA of private targets (1.15%) with a positive and significant 
differential of 0.46%. On the other hand, acquiring a foreign subsidiary is superior to 
taking-over a domestic subsidiary. Overal l , the univariate est imates that are not 
controlled for other deal features and bidder specific characteristics confirm that there 
is no significant difference in the average gains to acquirers of domestic and foreign 
targets, but the gains are target status dependent.^' 
3.6.1.2 Legal Origin of Host Country 
Table 3:3 records the gains to acquirers of foreign targets by the legal origin of targets' 
nation. The est imates show that acquirers of targets based in the socialist systems gain 
the most (2.77%) followed by the acquisitions of targets based in the German traditions 
(1.77%). On the other hand, acquiring targets based in the French legal system is least 
attractive (1.05%). Such high gains from the acquisitions of targets based in countries 
with the socialist legal system may be a reflection of growth opportunities in targets' 
nations that are characterised with high economic growth."'" The attention then is 
turned into the impact of the host country's legal system (i.e. common- law and civil-law) 
on the bidding firm abnormal returns. 
Overall , the est imates confirm that there are significant differences in the gains to 
acquirers of domestic and foreign targets by the legal origin of the country in which the 
target is based. On average, acquirers of targets based in civil-law countries gain more 
than acquirers of targets based in common- law countries; however it is dependent on 
the listing status of targets. This looks counter intuitive as in the sample acquirers 
operate under common- law systems and hence acquiring targets in similar markets 
Later findings indicate that announcement returns of foreign targets outperform the ones for domestic 
targets (multivariate analysis). 
For example, China is recognized as one of the fastest growing countries during the last decade (see Bai 
et al. 2002). 
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should be more beneficial from the perspective of post-merger integration. However, 
such a pattern is possible for two reasons: (a) bidders face less competit ion in civil-law 
countries to acquiring a target and hence do not have to pay high premium, and (b) due 
to lower investor protection in civil-law countries owners / investors of targets are 
prepared to accept relatively low value for their holdings in an anticipation of achieving 
better protection as the bidder operates in higher investor protection environment (in 
line with the findings reported in Rossi and Volpin, 2004). Consequently, bidders are left 
with higher share of synergy gains from such acquisitions. On the other hand, bidders 
attempting to acquire targets based in economies where disciplining management 
through corporate restructuring are c o m m o n and shareholders enjoy extensive rights 
and protections (the common- law countries) face more competition and require paying 
higher premium. Hence, the gains from acquiring targets in such markets are limited. In 
fact, results show that bidders gain on average more around acquisitions of targets 
operating into civil-law countries versus the ones in the domestic market or the ones 
into common- law countries. Evidently, bidders enjoy higher gains acquiring listed and 
subsidiary target firms into civil-law countries while they enjoy higher returns acquiring 
private targets into the domestic market or into common- law countries.^^'^'' These 
findings clearly support the second and the third hypotheses that bidders enjoy higher 
returns by acquiring targets in civil-law countries than in common- law countries while 
others gain more from acquiring targets in countries with similar legal traditions. 
Insert table 3:3 about here 
Further analysis supports the above conclusions. Table 3:4 indicates that bidders opting 
for listed target firms into the civil-law countries outperform the ones into common- law 
countries (with a significant return differential of -1.48%). On the other hand, bidders 
" The multivariate analysis within that context generates similar results. 
" The later finding, of higher gains around takeovers of private target firms into the domestic market or 
into common-law countries support the third hypothesis which is related to the integration of the target 
firm into the bidding firm's environment. 
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gain higher returns when acquiring unlisted targets into common- law countries 
suggesting that the possibility of creating outside blockholders into countries with 
similar corporate laws and investor protection generates higher gains to bidders. 
Insert table 3:4 about here 
Further univariate analysis shows that the gains from CBA and domestic acquisitions are 
also dependent on whether targets and bidders operate in the s a m e industry group (i.e. 
target and acquirer have the s a m e 2-digit SIC), host country's legal system, target status 
and method of payment . 
Insert tables 3:5 and 3:6 about here 
3.6.1.3 Methods of Payment 
The method of payment, one of the major determinants of acquirers' gains, has been 
known to interact with target status. Est imates reported in table 3:3 (panel B) show that 
although all methods of payment generate significant positive gains to acquirers there 
exists a substantial variation in announcement period gains. Deals settled in mixed 
mode generate the highest (1.53%) return to bidders while cash deals generate the 
lowest (1.06%). Further analysis confirms the findings of Draper and Paudyal (2006) that 
the method of payment interacts with target status in determining bidders' gains (table 
3:4). On average, acquirers of listed target suffer a significant loss (-2.14%) in share 
deals. This is consistent with the prediction of information asymmetry hypothesis 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984) applied to takeovers. On the other hand, the share payment in 
private and subsidiary targets acquisitions generate positive gains (3.46% and 3.27% 
respectively). As argued by Draper and Paudyal (2006) such positive gains are possible 
due to anticipated reduction in agency costs through creation of blockholders w h e n 
unlisted targets are acquired. Further analysis shows that w h e n the proportion of stock 
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is more than 50% acquirers of foreign targets gain more and the differences between 
domest ic and foreign acquisitions become even larger when the proportion of stock is 
75% or higher (table 3:3, panel D). Such differentials are mainly driven by acquisitions 
into common- law countries, thereby strongly support the third hypothesis (legal system 
and integration of target). Along the same lines, bids of private targets into common- law 
countries utilizing stock as the method of payment generate positive abnormal returns 
(7.81%), opposite to bids with the s a m e target status and mean of financing into the 
French and German legal system countries (1.49% and 0.11% insignificant abnormal 
returns respectively), further supporting the third hypothesis. 
Bidders acquiring domestic targets in cash gain significantly more (1.11%) than bidders 
acquiring targets based in common- law nations (0.92%) and countries with the French 
legal traditions (0.68%). Cash acquisitions of targets based in Scandinavian systems are 
the most profitable (1.94%). CBA settled in stocks generate much higher return (4.82%) 
than domestic share deals. This differential is clearly driven by deals with targets based 
into the common- law countries (5.40%).^^ 
Overall , the results suggest that although there is no significant difference in average 
gains from domest ic and foreign acquisitions there are significant differences in 
acquisition gains by target status, methods of payment, legal origin of target's nation, 
and the level of investor protection where the targets operate. Bidders' gains are lower 
when targets are based in countries that have Anglo-Saxon systems with higher investor 
protection. Shareholders of targets based in such countries demand high takeover 
premium, consequently acquirer shareholders gain the least. This is consistent with the 
view of Rossi and Volpin (2004) that higher investor protection leads to higher takeover 
premium, which in turn, reduces the gains to bidders. On the other hand, acquirers 
bidding for targets based in countries belonging to non-Anglo-Saxon traditions with 
lower investor protection gain the most. This is possible because when acquiring targets 
Although an estimate in table shows that share acquisition in socialist systems seems to generate the 
highest return, but it is based on only one deal. Hence, no firm conclusion could be drawn. 
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based in countries with weaker investor protection bidders are not required to pay high 
takeover premiums resulting in higher gains to shareholders of acquirers. Thus, the 
results confirm that gains to acquirers from CBA depend upon the legal origin and the 
level of investors' protection in targets' country. 
3.6.2 Deal Features and Gains from Acquisitions 
In addition to target status and methods of payment, other factors that are known to 
influence acquirers' gains include relative size of the deals, bidders' growth 
opportunit ies, bidders' age, and the industry affiliation of bidder and target. I estimate 
excess returns to bidders after controlling for the effects of these factors in both 
univariate and multivariate f rameworks. Although the results from univariate analysis 
are revealing, they do not account for simultaneous effects of multiple factors on 
acquirers' gains. To overcome such limitations I regress announcement period (5-days) 
excess returns of bidders against a set of explanatory variables that are likely to be 
responsible in shaping the gains of acquirers from domestic and CBA (equation 5). 
CAR,=a + f^X,+€, (5) 
In equation 5, the intercept, (a) , measures the excess return to bidders after accounting 
for the effects of all explanatory variables. The vector of explanatory variables, 'X', 
includes acquirer 's age on the day of bid announcement (log), acquirer's market value 
one month prior to the announcement of deal (log), relative size of the deal measured 
as the deal value divided by acquirer 's market value, bidder's growth opportunity (ratio 
of market to book value of equity of acquirer one month prior to the acquisition 
announcement ) , and deal value (log). Dummy variables, that take the value of one and 
zero otherwise, are included to represent cross-border deals, diversifying deals (i.e. 
target and acquirer do not have the s a m e 2-digit SIC), private targets, listed targets, and 
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cash only and stock only deals. Further, dummies representing the legal origin of 
targets' nation are also included where appropriate. The model is est imated for the 
separately for the entire sample, domestic deals, and cross-border deals. The model is 
est imated with various combinations of explanatory variables and results presented in 
table 3:8. Although the F-statistics confirm the significance of ail models, the results 
should be v iewed with caution as the explanatory power of the models, as indicated by 
adjusted R-Squared. 
To examine the role of the relative size (defined as the deal value divided by the market 
capitalization of bidder a month before the announcement of bid) of the deals I split the 
sample deals into three categories. The est imates (table 3:7, panel A) show that bidders' 
gains increase monotonically with the increase in relative size of the deals. Although, all 
three categories of deals generate significant positive gains to acquirers, high relative 
size deals generate significantly higher return (1.96%) than low relative size deals 
(0.58%). This is not surprising as the monetary value of synergy from larger deals is likely 
to be higher than the value of synergy gains from smaller deals. This evidence is 
consistent with the findings of Fuller et al. (2002) for the US and Draper and Paudyal 
(2006) for the UK. This pattern of returns holds for acquirers of both domestic and cross-
border targets. Returns generated by CBA involving targets operating in the Anglo-Saxon 
and the French systems display similar patterns. However, the gains from the 
acquisitions of targets operating in the German , the Scandinavian, and the Socialist legal 
systems display a similar pattern, in economic terms, but the differences in gains across 
the relative size groups are not statistically significant. The positive and highly significant 
coefficient of the relative size of the deals in models (1-10) (table 3:8, panel A : l ) 
confirms the suggestion of univariate analysis that bidders' gains increase with the deal 
size. However, its role is relatively weaker in the cases of domestic deals (table 3:8, 
panel B) than in the cases of CBA (table 3:8, panel B). 
123 
Chapter 3: Host Country Legal System and Acquirers' Gains 
The market capitalisation of the bidding firms is examined within the same context. To 
examine the effect of market capitalization on the bidding firm abnormal returns I 
divide the sample into three portfolios. Results suggest that, bidding firms' abnormal 
returns decrease monotonically from the portfolio subject to small bidders (2.06%) to 
the one subject to big bidders (0.65%) with a statistically significant margin in most of 
the groups (table 3:7, panel B). This pattern holds form almost all groups apart the ones 
for bids into common- law countries, countries operating under the French legal system, 
Scandinavian, and the Socialist legal system. This finding is consistent with the findings 
of Moeller, Schl ingemann, and Stuiz (2004) where the authors reported higher returns 
for small bidders. Big bidding firms are normally offer higher premiums than small f irms. 
Similarly, the insignificant differential between small and big bidding firms' abnormal 
returns may be due to the high premiums paid in general for acquisitions into common-
law countries (Rossi and Volpin, 2004) . As indicated by the negative coefficient of 
market capitalisation (table 3:8, panel A:2) larger acquirers gain less from acquisitions. 
This pattern holds for the acquirers of both domestic (table 3:8, panel B) as well as 
foreign targets (table 3:8, panel B). The est imates further reveal that larger bidders 
acquiring public targets gain less while the acquisitions of unlisted targets have positive 
effect on returns to bidders (table 3:8, panel A:2). 
Insert tables 3:7 and 3:8 about here 
Extant literature suggests that bidders' gain depends upon acquirers' growth 
opportunities. To control for its possibility I divide the sample deals on bidders' growth 
opportunity measured by their market value to book value ratio. The est imates (table 
3:7, panel C) reveal that value bidders (low market to book value ratio bidders) earn 
higher announcement period gains (1.69%) than glamour bidders (1.09%), as in 
Sudaranam and Mahate (2003). This pattern holds for bidders of both domestic as well 
as cross-border targets. Amongst the CBA deals, if targets are based in common- law 
countr ies, value bidders earn less than glamour bidders do. The multivariate analysis 
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(table 3:8, panel A : l and A:2) suggests that on average acquirers' growth opportunity 
does not affect their announcement period gains. However, such insignificant effect 
s e e m s to be driven by the experience of domestic target bidders only (table 3:8, panel 
B). Acquirers of foreign targets experience a significant positive relation between the 
announcement period gains and their own pre-bid growth opportunities implying that 
glamour bidders gain more than value bidders (table 3:8, panel B). 
In this analysis I also control for the effect of the age of the bidder on the 
announcement gains generated to bidding firm's shareholders around domestic and 
foreign acquisitions' announcements . Evidently, the est imates reported in table 3:7, 
panel D, conveys the deterministic power of the age of the bidder on the announcement 
gains generated to bidding firm's shareholders. More specifically, my evidence suggests 
that there is a negative relationship between the age of the bidder and the 
announcement gains to bidders' shareholders. This pattern is further confirmed by the 
coefficients of the multivariate analysis in table 3:8, panel A : l only. The remaining of the 
panels of the multivariate analysis (table 3:8, panels A:2, 8:1, B:2, and panel C) suggest 
that the gains to bidders increase with the age of the bidder, which is basically 
consistent with the results reported by the majority of studies in the finance literature. 
The est imates (table 3:7, panel E) show that bidders' gains do not depend on industry 
affiliation of bidder and target (see also tables 3:5 and 3:6). Both diversifying as well as 
focused deals generate similar gains from domestic deals. Among the CBA, although 
bidders' gains from focused deals are economically higher (1.38%) than the gains from 
diversifying deals (1.08%) they are not significantly different from each other. It is also 
noteworthy that this pattern holds irrespective of legal origin of target's nation. A 
similar conclusion, i.e. no significant effect of industry affiliation, is revealed by 
multivariate analysis (table 3:8, panels A, B and C). Overall , the evidence shows that 
bidder's gain is not affected by industry affiliation of bidders and targets. 
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The evidence from univariate analysis that methods of payment interacts with target 
status in shaping the gains to acquirers is also confirmed by the evidence from 
multivariate analysis. Once the effects of target status are controlled in the model , the 
implications of the methods of payment (both cash and shares) on the gains of average 
acquirer as well as bidders of domestic targets remain inclusive (table 3:8, panels A and 
B). However , acquirers of foreign targets breakeven in cash deals and earn significant 
positive gain from shares deals (table 3:8, panel C) . 
Further, the coefficients of dummies representing acquisitions into foreign nations are 
positive and statistically significant after controlling for bidders' size and other factors 
(table 3:8, panel A:2) show a positive and significant role of CBA dummy confirming that 
when the effects of other deal features are controlled for, acquirers of cross-border 
targets gain more than bidders of domest ic targets. Evidently, these results support the 
first hypothesis of this empirical investigation which states that bids of foreign targets 
outperform the ones for domestic target firms. 
The est imates for full sample as well as for acquirers of domestic targets (table 3:8, 
panels A and B) show that on average bidders earn a significant positive return on the 
announcement of bid even after controlling for the implications of var ious determinants 
of acquirer 's gain. Although acquirers of foreign targets gain significant positive returns, 
their gains are sensitive to model specification. More specifically, the models that 
control for bidders' size show that acquirers of foreign target earn significant positive 
gains. The est imates (table 3:8, panel C) reveal that acquisitions of targets based in 
common- law countries breakeven whi le, on the other hand, the acquisitions of targets 
based in civil-law countries and countries under the Socialist legal system add value to 
shareholders ' weal th , consistent with the first h y p o t h e s i s . M o r e o v e r , it appears that 
^ Additional analysis indicates that acquisitions of target firms with shares into common-law countries 
generate higher returns to bidding firms, suggesting that the difficulty of the integration of the target firm 
into the acquiring firm business environment reflects the market view for that deal thereby supporting 
the second hypothesis. 
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the bidding firm's size (log), growth opportunities, and deal value (log) always explain 
the bidding firm's excess returns. These estimates show that the announcement period 
gains of cross-border target bidders depend on the legal origin of the country in which 
the target operates. 
3.6.3 Long-run Performance 
Evidence from the analysis of announcement period gains confirms that targets' 
domicile, listing status, and methods of payment interact with the legal origin of targets' 
nation in shaping the gains to acquirers. Acquisitions of unlisted targets based in 
common-law countries generate the highest gains when paid in shares while the overall 
gains are higher if targets are based in countries with low investor protection, in the 
absence of efficient stock market the observed differential in announcement period 
gains may not hold in the long-run. This section deals with analysis of (a) whether 
acquisitions of domestic targets are superior to acquisitions of cross-border targets in 
the long-run, and (b) the influence of the legal origin of target's nation on bidders' gains. 
Excess returns are measured by calendar-time regression intercepts (equation 4). The 
estimates of excess returns that are controlled for known risk factors (table 9, panel A) 
show that bidders of domestic targets gain monthly 0.38 for 12 and 60 months following 
acquisition announcements. This pattern holds for acquirers of all types of domestic and 
foreign targets - private, public, and subsidiary as well as for all methods of payment -
cash, stock, and mixed payments. Evidence also indicates that acquirers engaged in 
domestic acquisitions outperform the bidders of foreign targets in the long-run. 
Specifically, for the overall sample, domestic bidders outperform the foreign ones by 
0.31% per calendar month (table 3:9, panel A). In addition, when the sample is further 
restricted according to the target firm's status and the method of payment, domestic 
bidders of private (table 3:9, panel B), public (table 3:9, panel C), and cash payments 
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(table 3:9, panel E) found to outperform the foreign ones (of the same target status and 
method of payment) by 0.36%, 0.74% and 0.30% respectively. 
Insert table 3:9 about here 
Further analysis of long-term gains from CBA by the legal system of targets' nation 
(table 3:9, panels A to H) reveals that acquirers gain the most from the acquisitions of 
targets operating in common-law/ countries. However, bidders that acquire targets that 
based in countries with the French, the German, the Scandinavian and the socialist legal 
systems break even in the long-run (up to 5 years). The results clearly convey that this is 
target status and method of payment dependent. More specifically, UK bidders 
acquiring foreign targets under the common-law system generate positive gains to 
bidders whereas when they acquire targets in civil-law countries suffer a loss. This is 
more intense when the target firm is a listed one and the method of payment that 
employed to finance the deal is common stock. 
Overall, the evidence shows that the pattern of long-run performance of bidders differs 
from the pattern of announcement period gains. Specifically, UK acquirers bidding for 
targets located in the civil-law countries (the French, the German, and the Scandinavian 
legal systems) appear to have significantly lower abnormal returns than acquiring of 
targets located in the common-law countries, strongly supporting the fourth hypothesis 
which states that the host country's legal system plays a significant role in shaping the 
bidding firms' long-run returns. This supports the view that long-run performance of 
bidders engaged in acquisitions of targets located in countries with similar corporate 
governance mechanism and the legal systems gain the most and hence the legal origin 
of nations in which targets operate matter significantly for British acquirers. Once again, 
the results confirm that the performance of acquirers from CBA depends upon the legal 
origin and the level of investors' protection in targets' country. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter analyses the gains of UK acquirers that bid for domestic and foreign targets 
and exannines the implications of legal traditions of target firms' nations on bidders' 
gains. To achieve this objective short and long-run share price performance of UK 
bidders engaged in both CBA and domestic deals are analyzed. Several conclusions 
emerge. 
Overall, once the possible implications of various determinants of acquirers' gains are 
controlled, the acquirers of foreign targets gain more than the acquirers of domestic 
targets do. Further analysis indicates that gains to acquirers are highly sensitive to the 
legal system of the nation in w/hich target firms operate. In short, the market reacts 
more favourably to the announcement of acquisitions of targets operating in the civil-
law countries than to acquisitions of targets based in common-law countries. More 
detailed analysis conveys that this is more likely to occur only around bids of listed and 
subsidiary foreign target firms. This is possibly because (a) acquirers face less 
competition in acquiring targets in such countries and thus they are required to pay 
lower premium (further supporting the findings of Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar (2006) 
where the authors highlighted the importance of competition in the bidding contest by 
reporting higher gains to acquirers when they prefer to engage in foreign acquisitions of 
targets that operate in emerging markets (due to lower competition)), and (b) the 
increased likelihood of blockholders creation due to their higher equity ownership 
concentration (in countries of weak investor protection - LLSV 1998 and LLS 1999). 
Along similar lines, evidence suggests that bidders of foreign targets in common-law 
countries enjoy higher gains than bidders opting for domestic and civil-law targets only 
when the financing method is by common equity. This market behaviour reflects the 
investors' view for this type of deals (in common-law countries and stock financing) who 
consider those deals as positive NPV projects. This is possible due to the similar 
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managerial traditions, corporate governance mechanisms and investor protection 
regimes between the bidder country (UK) and the rest of common-lavir nations. The 
above findings confirm that the target status and the methods of payment interact with 
the level of investor protection in target firm's nation to shape announcement period 
returns of acquirers. Clearly, these findings confirm evidence documented elsewhere in 
the literature which depicts the influential impact of firm and deal specific 
characteristics such as target status, method of payment, deal's relative size, size and 
growth opportunities of acquirers, on shareholders gains of bidders targeting domestic 
versus foreign firms. 
Finally, the long-run analysis records several important findings. Firms acquiring targets 
in countries that have the common-law traditions (high investor protection) outperform 
bidders that acquire targets based in countries which follow the traditions of civil-laws 
(low investor protection). This is possible due to the similarities that exist between the 
UK country and other common-law countries in terms of managerial traditions, 
corporate governance systems and investor protection regimes, which are likely to 
minimize any Integration costs of the target firm in the acquiring firm's existing business 
environment. Overall, the main findings that derived from this empirical chapter 
contributes to the M&A literature by presenting strong evidence that the legal system of 
the target firm's country of residence provide additional explanations of the valuation 
effects to bidders acquiring domestic versus foreign target firms. 
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3.8 Figures and Tables 
Figure 3:1 - The International Corporate Governance System (I) 
The figure represents the structure of the international corporate governance system (as discussed in 
Denis and McConnell, 2003). 
I. Research for the US Market 
A. Internal Governance 
Mechanisms 
B. Extemal Governance 
Mechanisms 
1. Board of Directors 2. Ownership Structure 1. The Takeover Market 2. The Legal System 
II. R r s t Generat ion - International Corporate Governance 
C. Extemal Control Market A Board of Directors 
1. Board Composition 2. Executive Compensation 
B. Ownership and Control 
1. Ownership Concentration around 
theWorid 3. The Private Benefits of Control 
2. Ownership Change via Privatization 
III. Second Generat ion International Corporate Governance Research 
A. Legal Protection and Economic Growth B. Control vs Ownership: The Private Benafits 
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Figure 3:2 - The International Corporate Governance System (II) 
The figure represents the structure of the international corporate governance system (as discussed in Denis and McConnell, 2003). 
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Figure 3:3 - Annual Distribution of M&A Activity by Country of Origin 
The figure presents graphically the M&A activity in the domestic and in the foreign market for corporate 
control for each year over the period between 1986 and 2005. 
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Figure 3:4 - Annual Distribution of CBA Activity by Legal Family (Common-Law and Civil-Law Groups of 
Countries) 
The figure presents graphically the M&A activity into Common-law and Civil-law groups of countries for 
each year over the period between 1986 and 2005. 
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Figure 3:5 - Annual Distribution of CBA by Legal System (French, German, Scandinavian, and Socialist 
Legal Systems) 
The figure presents graphically the M&A activity into countries under the French, German, Scandinavian, 
and the Socialist legal system. 
Years 
—•—French - B - G e r m a n —£•—Scandinavian —^Social ist 
Table 3:1 - Distribution of Sample Deals by Year, Country of Origin, and Legal System of Target Firm 
Nation 
The distribution of sample deals announced by UK bidders betw/een 1986 and 2005 by year and legal 
origin of targets' nation is presented. Acquirers are UK firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
Targets are either private, listed or subsidiaries, both from home and foreign markets. 
Year All Domestic Cross-Border Acaulsltions (CBA) 
AH Comniorv4aw I OviMaw 1 French German Scandinavian Sodalbt Un-Spedfled 
19S6 52 38 14 13 1 1 0 0 0 0 
1987 160 117 43 25 16 11 4 1 0 2 
1988 357 243 114 56 58 51 6 1 0 0 
. 1989 337 220 117 69 48 32 13 3 0 0 
1990' 242 138 104 55 49 36 9 4 0 0 
1991 203 138 55 31 34 18 12 4 0 0 
1992 190 127 63 25 38 26 7 5 0 0 
1993 216 144 72 32 40 22 10 8 0 0 
1994 329 224 105 44 60 39 12 9 1 0 
1995 320 203 117 62 53 30 19 4 2 0 
199S 354 225 129 72 54 36 13 5 3 0 
1997 443 299 144 66 75 56 13 6 2 1 
1998 534 354 ISO 85 90 63 14 13 4 1 
1999 536 330 206 104 92 50 31 11 10 0 
2000 626 384 242 138 99 64 26 9 3 2 
200rr 426 250 176 99 72 41 21 10 3 2 
2002 . 320 201 119 61 so 32 10 8 4 4 
. 2003 294 185 109 49 57 36 16 5 2 1 
• 20040 348 237 111 60 39 22 13 4 11 1 
2005" 346 204 142 66 57 36 17 4 16 3 
- TotaF. 6,634 4,262 2472 U 1 2 1,082 702 266 114 61 17 
• M - (100) (64.24) (35.76) Iia27) (16J1) (10 JS) {Am) (1.72) (0.92J (0J6) 
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Table 3:2 - Summary Statistics of the Sample 
A summary of distribution of sample by target status (panel A) and methods of payment (panel B), bidder and deal features (panel C) are provided for all, 
domestic and cross-border (including their legal origin) acquisitions. 'Cash' and 'shares' indicate cash and share only deals. 'Mixed' includes all deals financed 
by a combination of cash and stock and/or methods classified as "other" In SDC. Panel C summarizes acquirer and deal features. The sample Is restricted to 
deals equal to or over one million Pounds Sterilng. Age measure the number of years between the announcement day and the date of acquirer's birth. 
Relative size is the ratio of deal value to market value of acquirer one month prior to the acquisition announcement. MV is the market value of the acquirer 
one month prior to the acquisition announcement and MTBV represents the market-to-book value of equity one month prior to the announcement of deal. 
All Domestic Cross-Border Common Civil French German Scand. Socialist 
Panel A: Distribution of deals by target Status 
Private 3,600 2,312 1,288 625 628 427 149 52 28 
Public 755 494 261 169 86 56 19 11 6 
Subsidiary 2,279 1,456 823 418 368 219 98 51 27 
Panel B: Distribution of deals by methods of payment 
Cash 
% of cash > 0% 6,026 3,780 2,246 1,146 1,025 667 250 108 60 
% of cash i 25% 5,539 3,395 2,144 1,088 986 643 242 101 58 
% of cash > 50% 5,040 3,041 1,999 1,017 918 601 223 94 54 
% of cash > 75% 4,434 2,633 1,801 918 822 532 205 85 53 
% of cash = 100% 3,862 2,265 1,597 808 733 476 183 74 49 
Stock 
% of stock > 0% 1,621 1,268 353 183 158 101 32 25 5 
% of stock a 25% 1,093 861 232 128 95 60 21 14 3 
% of stock 2 50% 776 610 166 100 59 39 14 6 3 
% of stock > 75% 518 411 107 63 40 28 8 4 1 
% of stock = 100% 355 288 67 38 26 16 8 2 1 
Mixed/Other 
Mixed/Other 2,418 1,709 709 367 323 210 75 28 11 
Panel C; Major features of bidder and deal characteristics 
Age (Years) 18.81 15.55 19.06 19.48 18.47 18.12 19.25 18.81 18.56 
Deal Value (£ mill) 50.65 35.21 78.40 87.39 69.73 71.15 74.34 50.29 71.09 
Relative Size 0.18 0.22 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.27 
MV(£ mill) 1289 559 2601 2051 3161 2791 4783 1639 4133 
MTBV Ratio 4.662 4.187 5.515 5.557 5.568 6.371 3.917 4.507 3.429 
135 
Chapter 3: Host Country Legal System and Acquirers' Gains 
Table 3:3 - Short-run Excess Returns of Bidders by Target Status, Payment Method and Legal Family of Target Firm Nation 
5-day (-2, +2) announcement period cumulative abnormal returns, in percentage, of sample acquirers are presented. Abnormal returns (AR) are calculated 
using a modified market-adjusted model: 
AR,,^R,,-R„,, 
Where , is the return of bidder / at time / a n d i ^ , is the market index (FT-AII Share) at time / . Acquirers are publicly traded firms listed in the London 
Stock Exchange and targets are public, private, and subsidiary firms that operate in the domestic and in the foreign market for corporate control. Panel A 
shows the gains to acquirers of the entire sample, private targets only, public targets only and subsidiary targets only from different groups of nations as 
classified by the legal system of the target firm's country of residence. Pane! B shows acquirers' gains by methods of payment. 'Cash' indicates cash deals only 
and 'stock' refers to shares deals only. 'Mixed/Other' includes all other transactions financed with a combination of both cash and stock or more methods of 
payment (i.e. 'Other' as classified by SDC). Panel C reports acquirers' gains for the entire sample for 'Cash' payment that used to finance the deal as well as for 
different proportions of the cash payment (less than 50%, greater than or equal to 50%, greater than or equal to 75%, and equal to 100%). Pane! D reports 
acquirers' gains for the entire sample for 'Stock' payment that used to finance the deal as well as for different proportions for the stock payment (less than 
50%, greater than or equal to 50%, greater than or equal to 75%, and equal to 100%). Differentials are reported between domestic bids and the ones in each 
legal systems group for all panes described above. T-statistics testing for the mean equal to zero versus not equal to zero are reported in parentheses below 
the mean. The sample size, n, for each group is reported bellow T-statistic. a, b, and c denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respeaively. 
All Domestic Cross-Border Commom Civil French German Sandinavian Socialist Domestic vs. Domestic vs. Domestic vs. Common vs. 
Cros -^Borrfpr rnmmnn riuil riu;i 
Panel A: Announcement Returns by Target Status 
All Mean 1.23%' 1.22%" 1.24%' 1.11%' 1.30%' 1.05%' 1.77%' 1.67%' 2.77%' -0.02% 0.11% -0.08% -0.20% 
N 6,634 4,262 2,372 1,212 1,082 702 266 114 61 
Private Mean 1.44%' 1.61%" 1.15%' 1.37%' 0.85%' 0 .51%' 1.68%' 1.27% 3.00% 0.46%' 0.24% 0.76%' 0.51% 
Targets N 3,600 2,312 1,288 625 628 427 149 52 28 
Public Mean .0.34% -0.72%' 0.40% 0.13% 0.85% 0.98% 1.23% -0.45% 1.53% •1.12%' -0.90% -1.60%' -0.70% 
Targets N 755 494 261 169 86 56 19 11 6 
Subsidiary Mean 1.41%* 1.27%' 1.67%' 1.13%' 2.16%' 2.13%' 2.03%' 2.53%' 2.80%' -0.40% 0.14% -0.90%* -1.00%' 
Targets N 2,279 1,456 823 418 368 219 98 51 27 
F-Stat 19.54' 2 1 . 2 1 ' 3.13' 1.90 3.75' 3.04' 0.16 1.10 0.06 
Panel B: Announcement Returns by Method of Payment 
All Mean 1.23%' 1.22%' 1.24%' 1.11%' 1.30%' 1.05%' 1.77%* 1.67%' 2.77%' -0.02% 0 .11% -0.08% -0.20% 
N 6,634 4,262 2,372 1,212 1,082 702 266 114 61 
Cash Mean 1.06%' 1.11%' 0.98%' 0.92%' 1.03%' 0.68%' 1.55%' 1.94%' 1.15%' 0.13% 0.19% 0.08% -0.10% 
N 3,862 2,265 1,597 808 733 476 183 74 49 
Stock Mean 1.08%' 0.17% 4.98%' 5.58%' 1.78% 0.37% 5.32%' -1.10%' 62.13% -4.82%' -5.40%' -1.60% 3.80% 
N 355 288 67 38 26 16 8 2 1 
Mixed or Mean 1.53%' 1.55%' 1.49%' 1.06%' 1.87%' 1.95%' 1.94%' 1.28% 4.57% 0.06% 0.49% -0.30% -0.80% 
Other N 2,418 1,709 709 367 323 201 75 38 11 
f-Stat 3.17' 5.02' 9.89' 7.67' 1.48 1.93 1.36 0.31 55.18' 
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Table 3 : 3 - C o n t i n u e d 
All Domestic Cross-Border Commom Civil French German Sandinavian Socialist 
Domestic vs. 
Cross-Border 
Domestic vs. 
Common 
Domestic vs. 
Civil 
Common vs. 
Civil 
Panel C: Announcement Returns by Different Levels of Cash 
% of cash > Mean 1.30%' 1.38%' 1.16%' 1.02%' 1.29%' 1.03%' 1.72%' 1.86%' 1.78%' 0.22% 0.36%' 0.09% -0.30% 
0% N 6,026 3,780 2,246 1,146 1,025 667 250 108 60 
% of cash i Mean 1.28%' 1.34%' 1.20%' 1.03%' 1.32%* 1.10%' 1.76%' 1.71%' 1.89%' 0.14% 0.30% 0 .01% -0.30% 
25% N 5,539 3,395 2,144 1,088 986 643 242 101 58 
% of cash i Mean 1.25%" 1.32%' 1.16%' 0.97%* 1.33%' 1.09%' 1.75%' 1.85%* 1.54%' 0.16% 0.34% -0 .01% -0.40% 
50% N 5,040 3,041 1,999 1,017 918 601 223 94 54 
% of cash 2 Mean 1.19%' 1.28%' 1.07%' 0.98%' 1.15%' 0.79%' 1.71%' 2.05%* 1.44%° 0.21% 0.30% 0.13% -0.20% 
75% N 4,434 2,633 1,801 918 822 532 205 85 53 
% of cash = Mean 1.06%" 1.11%' 0.98%' 0.92%' 1.03%' 0.68%' 1.55%' 1.94%* 1.15%' 0.13% 0.19% 0.08% -0.10% 
100% N 3,862 2,265 1,597 808 733 476 183 74 49 
Panel D: Announcement Returns by Different Levels of Stock 
% of stock > Mean 1.51%' 1.31%' 2.25%* 2.03%' 1.84%' 1.90% 2.13% 1.24% 21.97% .0.90%' -0.70% -0.50% 0.19% 
0% IV 1,621 1,268 353 183 158 101 32 25 5 
% of stock 2 Mean 1.05%' 0.62%' 2.64%' 2.22%' 2.16% 3.25% 0.69% -0.29% 32.70% -2.00%' -1.60%' -1.50% 0.06% 
25% N 1,093 861 232 128 95 60 21 14 3 
% of stock 2 Mean 0.70%' 0 .21% 2.49%' 1.78% 1.90% 2.49% 2.15% •2.54% 32.70% -2.30%' -1.60% -1.70% -0.10% 
50% N 776 610 166 100 59 39 14 6 3 
% of stock 2 Mean 0.71% 0 .05% 3 .61%' 3.67%° 2.03% 1.50% 5.32%' .0.82% 62.13% .3.70%" -3.70%' -2.10% 1.63% 
75% N 518 411 107 63 40 28 8 4 1 
% of stock = Mean 1.08%' 0.17% 4.98%' 5.58%' 1.78% 0.37% 5.32%' -1.14%° 62.13% -4.80K* -S.«0%" -1.60% 3.80% 
100% N 355 288 67 38 26 16 8 2 1 
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Table 3:4 - CAR by Target Status, Payment Method and Legal System of Target Firm Nation 
This table presents S-day (-2,+2) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) for all deals announced between 
1986 and 2005. Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified market-adjusted model as in Fuller et al. 
(2002): ARi,=ri, - rm_, where is the return of the acquiring firm i in time period t and where r„^t is the 
value-weighted market index return (FT-AII Share) in the period t. Acquirers are publicly traded firms 
listed in the London Stock Exchange. Targets are private, listed or subsidiaries, both domestic and foreign 
ones. The sample is divided according to the legal system of the target firm's country. In each type 
portfolios are further divided by the method of payment. 'Cash' includes transactions made by cash only. 
Stock offers are defined as transactions made by stock only. 'Mixed/Other' includes all other transactions 
financed with both cash and stock and/or methods classified as "other" by SDC. Panels A to D displays the 
mean of portfolios' CAR as classified by the legal system of the target firm's nation, whereas panels E to H 
display the differentials between these portfolios. T-statistics are reported in parentheses below each 
estimate. The sample size, N for each group is reported bellows the t-statistic. a, b, and c denotes 
significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
All Dom CBA 1 AS (Inc. UK) 1 AS French German 1 Scandinavian | SodaDst 
Panel A: All Targets 
Mean 1.23%' 1.22%' 1.24%' 1.20%' 1.11%' 1.05%' 1.77%' 1.67%' 2.77%' 
Al l t-stat (13.66) (10.98) (8.13) (12.17) (5.28) (3.52) (4.51) (2.70) (2.23) 
N 6,634 4,262 2,372 5,474 1,212 702 266 114 61 
Mean 1.06%' 1.11%' 0.98%' 1.06%' 0.92%' 0.58%' 1.55%' 1.94%' 1.15%' 
Cash t-5tat (11.29) (9.21) (6.61) (10.07) (4.29) (2.65) (3.51) (2.70) (1.82) 
N 3,862 2,265 1,597 3,073 808 476 183 74 49 
Mean 1.08%' 0.17% 4.98%' 0.80% 5.58%' 0.37% 5.32%' -1.10%' 62.13% 
Stock t-stat (1.60) (0.24) (2.55) (1.17) (2.16) (0.10) (2.60) (-20.95) 
N 355 188 67 326 38 16 8 2 1 
M h e d / 
Other 
Mean 1.53%' 1.55%' 1.49%' 1.46%' 1.06%' 1.95%' 1.94%' 1.28% 4.57% 
t-stat (8.99) (7.92) (4.38) (822) (2.47) (2.56) (2.27) (1.04) (1.52) 
M 2,418 1,709 709 2,076 367 201 75 38 11 
Panel B: Private Targets 
Mean 1.44%' 1.61%' 1.15%' 1.56%' 1.37%' 0 .51%' 1.68%' 1.27% 3.00% 
All t-stat (11.41) (10.07) (5.55) (10.81) (4.13) (1.83) (2.93) (1.46) (1.30) 
N 3,600 2,312 1,288 2,937 625 427 149 52 28 
Mean 1.00%' 1.14%' 0.83%' 1.13%' 1.11%' 0.22% 1.36%' 1.35% 0.64% 
Cash t-stat (6.89) (5.92) (3.73) (6.66) (3.12) (0.64) (2.08) (1.35) (0.73) 
N 1,737 975 762 1,327 352 258 96 31 21 
Mean 3.46%' 2.08% 7.62%' 3.18%' 7 .81%' 1.49% a i i % 62.13% 
Stock t-stat (2.73) (1.58) (2.46) (2.51) (2.25) (0.28) (0.07) 
N 140 105 35 130 25 6 3 1 
Ml>ed / 
Other 
Mean 1.72%' 1.94%' 1.18%' 1.80%' 1.08%' 0.95%' 2.39%' 1.15% 1.42% 
t-stat (8.91) (8.36) (3.39) (8.38) (1.96) (2.01) (2.06) (0.72) (0.77) 
M 1,723 1,232 491 1,480 248 163 50 21 6 
Panel C; Public Targets 
Mean -0.34% -0.72%° 0.40% -0 .51%' 0.13% 0.98% 1.23% -0.45% 1.53% 
All t-stat (-1.32) (-2.18) (1.05) (-1.84) (0.27) (1.28) (0.87) (-0.19) (0.82) 
N 755 494 261 663 169 56 19 11 6 
Mean 0.50%' 0.43% 0.58% 0.40% 0.36% 0 6 8 % 1.67% 1.04% 1.53% 
Cash t-stat (1.76) (1.05) (1.47) (1.28) (0.72) (0.85) (1.13) (0.35) (0.82) 
M 444 237 207 370 133 45 15 8 6 
Mean -2.14%' -2.36%' 0 1 7 % -2.37%* -2.49% 6.70% 6.70% -1.20% 
Stock t-stat (-2.98) (-3.13) (0.07) (-3.24) (-0.78) (1.01) (4.43) 
M 149 136 13 144 8 2 2 1 
M i x e d / 
Other 
Mean -0.96%' -1.13%' -0.45% -0.95% -0.20% 1.20% -5.77% -6.05% 
t-stat (-1.66) (-1.69) (-0.39) (-1.58) (-0.15) (0.51) (-0.84) (-0.99) 
N 163 121 42 150 29 9 2 2 
Panel O'. Subsidiary Targets 
Mean 1.41%' 1.27%' 1.67%' 1.24%' 1.13%' 2.13%' 2.03%' 2.53%' 2.80%' 
Al l t-stat (9.67) (7.56) (6.08) (8.44) (3.75) (2.80) (3.63) (2.75) (1.94) 
N 2,279 1,456 823 1,874 418 219 98 51 27 
Mean 1.26%' 1.24%' 1.29%' 1.17%' 0.95%' 1.38%' 1.79%' 2.67%° 1.53% 
Cash t-stat (9.39) (7.49) (5.66) (8.01) (3.04) (3.05) (2.75) (2.53) (1.46) 
N 1,681 1,053 628 1,376 323 173 72 35 22 
Mean 3.27%' 3.21%' 3.42% 3.50%' 7.34% •2.04% 10.78%' -1.09% 
stock t-stat (2.01) (1.74) (1.01) (2.04) (1.12) (-0.31) (4.00) 
N 66 47 19 52 5 8 3 1 
M b i o d / 
Other 
Mean 1.66%' 1.09%' 2.82%' 1.16%' 1.41%' 6.44%' 1.62% 2.43% 8.36% 
t-stat (4.02) (2.63) (3.06) (3.18) (1.89) (1.79) (1.61) (1.23) (1.35) 
N 532 356 176 446 90 38 23 15 5 
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Chapter 3: Host Country Legal System and Acquirers' Gains 
Table 3:5 - CAR by Target Status, Payment Method and Legal System of Target Firm Nation (Bidder and 
Target are in the Same Industry) 
This table presents 5-day (-2,+2) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) for all deals announced between 
1986 and 2005. Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified market-adjusted model as in Fuller et al. 
(2002): >4/?(,t=r;,t - r„,f where is the return of the acquiring firm i in time period t and where rn,t is the 
value-weighted market index return (FT-AII Share) in the period t. Acquirers are publicly traded firms 
listed in the London Stock Exchange. Targets are private, listed or subsidiaries, both domestic and foreign 
ones. Bidders and targets are in the same industry. The sample is divided according to the legal system of 
the target firm's country. In each type portfolios are further divided by the method of payment. 'Cash' 
includes transactions made by cash only. Stock offers are defined as transactions made by stock only. 
'Mixed/Other' includes all other transactions financed with both cash and stock and/or methods classified 
as "other" by SDC. Panels A to D displays the mean of portfolios' CAR as classified by the legal system of 
the target firm's nation, whereas panels E to H display the differentials between these portfolios. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses below each estimate. The sample size, N, for each group is reported 
bellows the t-statistic. a, b, and c denotes significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
All Dom CBA 1 AS (Inc. UK) 1 AS French German 1 Scandinavian 1 SodaUst 
Panel A: All Targets 
Mean 1.27%* 1.21%* 1.38%* 1.23%' 1.29%' 1.10%* 1.98%' 1.92%° 2.28%' 
Al l t-stat (10.28) (7.52) (7.17) (8.72) (4.45) (3.43) (3.30) (2.18) (2.55) 
N 3,465 2,177 1,288 2,800 623 413 128 63 48 
Mean 1.13%* 1.11%* 1.14%* 1.13%' 1.17%' 0.97%* 1.19%' 1.69%' l.SO%° 
Cash t-stat (8.56) (6.47) (5.60) (7.49) (3.77) (2.78) (1.89) (1.75) (2.05) 
N 2,019 1,173 846 1,567 394 282 89 38 38 
Stock 
Mean 0.75% -0.08% 3.64%' 0.59% 4.74%' -0.29% 10.78%' -1.10%° 0.75% 
t-stat (0.88) (-0.08) (1.90) (0.67) (2.06) (-0.06) (4.00) (-20.95) (0.88) 
N 184 143 41 166 23 11 3 2 184 
Other 
Mean 1.59%* 1.56%' 1.64%' 1.48%' 1.13%° 1.53%° 3.22%° 2.56% 5.27% 
t-stat (6.70) (5.30) (4.16) (5.62) (1.93) (2.60) (2.33) (1.41) (1.63) 
N 1,263 861 402 1,068 207 120 36 23 10 
Panel B: Private Targets 
Mean 1.46%' 1.63%' 1.16%' 1.60%' 1.51%* 0.45% 1.77%' 1.77% 1.18% 
Al l t-stat (8.27) (7.07) (4.30) (7.85) (3.42) (1.19) (2.00) (1.26) (1.29) 
N 1,885 1,191 694 1,512 321 241 75 30 21 
Mean 0.96%' 1.14%' 0.72%' 1.13%' 1.11%' 0.14% 0.99% 1.16% 0.87% 
Cash t-stat (4.62) (4.01) (2.40) (4.62) (2.30) (0.31) (1.04) (0.70) (0.83) 
N 910 512 398 679 167 146 49 17 16 
Stock 
Mean 3.15%' 1.92% 7.14%' 3 . 2 1 % ' 8.36%' 1.87% -
t-stat (2.36) (1.34) (2.30) (232) (2.31) (0.35) -
N 68 52 16 65 13 3 
M b e d / 
Other 
Mean 1.83%' 2.00%' 1.45%' 1.88%* 1.35%' 0.88% 3.23%' 2.55% 2.18% 
t-stat (6.46) (5.71) (3.03) (5.94) (1.82) (1.38) (1.79) (1.03) (1.05) 
N 907 627 280 768 141 92 26 13 S 
Panel C; Public Targets 
All 
Mean -0.56% -1.41%* 0.80% -0.89%' 0.42% 1.71%' 1.18% -0.04% 1.53% 
t-stat (-1.49) (-2.S4) (1.49) (-2.16) (0.57) (1.78) (0.47) (-0.02) (0.82) 
W 371 227 144 313 9 1 35 7 5 6 
Cash 
Mean 0.51% -0.03% 1.01%' 0.28% 0.76% 1.54% 1.18% 0.32% 1.53% 
t-stat (1.27) (-0.05) (1.78) (0.62) (0.97) (1.53) (0.47) (0.12) (0.82) 
N 223 108 l i s 178 70 29 7 3 6 
Mean -2.64%' -3.14%* 1.32% -2.87%' -0.03% 13.31% 1.20% -
Stock t-stat (-2.50) (-2.75) (0.56) (-2.69) (-0.01) -
N 80 71 9 78 7 1 1 
M b e d / 
Other 
Mean -1.57%' -1.98%' -0.63% -1.75%' -1.01% 0.38% 0.07% -
t-St3t (-1.88) (-2.07) (-0.38) (-1.96) (-0.45) (0.15) 
N 69 48 21 63 15 5 1 
Panel D: Subsidiary Targets 
Mean 1.55%' 1.35%" 1.90%' 1.34%' 1.32%* 2.08%' 2.46%' 2.42%' 3.60%° 
All t-stat (8.08) (5.56) (6.02) (6.37) (3.13) (3.21) (3.14) (1.90) (2.06) 
N 1,209 759 4S0 970 211 137 46 28 21 
Mean 1.45%* 1.31%* 1.69%' 1.33%' 1.40%* 1.94%' 1.48%' 2 .41%' 2.11% 
Cash t-stat (7.87) (5.79) (5.33) (6.53) (3.01) (3.24) (1.821 (1.87) (1.70) 
N 886 553 333 710 157 107 33 18 16 
Mean 3.76% 5.61% 1.44% 4.90% 0.19% -3.16% 10.78%° -
Stock t - s a t (1.53) (1.63) (0.41) (1.63) (0.22) (-0.42) (4.00) -
N 36 20 16 23 3 7 3 . 
M h e d / 
Other 
Mean 1.58%* 0.99% 2.65%* 1.02%' 1.12% 4.34%' 3.19%' 2.84% 8.36% 
t-stat (3.25) (1.60) (3.47) (1.92) (1.13) (2.93) (1.80) (0.91) (1.35) 
N 287 186 101 237 51 23 10 9 5 
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Table 3:5 (Continued) - Differentials 
Domestic AS (All) vs. AS (All) vs. AS (All) vs. AS (CB) vs. AS (CB) vs. AS(CB)vs. AS (CB) vs. French vs. French vs. French vs. 
vs. CBA AS(CB) French German French German Scandin. Socialist German Scandin. Socialist 
Panel E: All Targets 
All Mean 
•0.17% -0.06% 0.13% -0.75% 0.19% -0.70% •0.63% •0.99% •0.89% -0.82% •1.19% 
t-stat (-0.66) (-0.18) (0.38) (.1.22) (0.44) (-1.04) (-0.68) (.1.06) (-1.30) (-0.88) (-1.25) 
Cash Mean 
-0.03% -0.04% 0.16% -0.06% 0.20% •0.02% -0.52% -0.33% -0.22% -0.72% -0.53% 
t . i ta t (-0.10) (-0.11) (0.42) (-0.09) (0.43) (0.03) (-0.51) (-0.42) (-0.30) (-0.70) (-0.65) 
Stock Mean -3.72%' -4.15%' 0.88% -10.19%' 5.03% -6.04% 5.88%' -11.07%' 0.85% 
t-stat (-1.74) (-1.69) (0.17) (-3.59) (0.91) 1-1.70) (5.26) (-1.94) (0.17) 
Mixed Mean -0.08% 0.35% -0.05% -1.74% -0.40% •2.09% •1.43% -4.14% -1.69% -1.03% -3.74% 
/Other t-stat (-0.16) (0.54) (-0.07) (-1.24) (-0.48) (-1.39) (-0.75) (1.26) (-1.13) (-0.54) (1.14) 
Panel F: Private Targets 
All Mean 0.47% 0.09% 1.16%' -0.16% 1.07%' -0.25% -0.25% 0.34% -1.32% -1.32% -0.73% 
t-stat (1.31) (0.18) (2.71) (-1.18) (1.84) (-0.25) (-0.17) (0.33) (-1.38) (0.91) (0.74) 
Cash Mean 0.42% 0.02% 0.99%' 0.14% 0.97% 0.12% -0.05% 0.24% -0.85% -1.02% -0.72% 
t-stat (1.01) (0.04) (1.90) (0.15) (1.45) (0.11) (-0.03) (0.21) (0.80) (-0.60) (0.64) 
Slock Mean -5.22% -5.15% 
1.34% 6.48% 
t-stat (-1.53) (-1.33) (0.24) (1.01) 
Mixed Mean 0.55% 0.52% 1.00% -1.34% 0.48% -1.87% -1.19% -0.82% •2.34% -1.67% -1.29% 
/Other t-5tat (0.93) (0.64) (1.40) (-0.73) (0.48) (0.95) (-0.46) (-0.37) (-1.22) (0.65) (-0.60) 
Panel G: Public Targets 
All Mean -2.21%' -1.31% -2.60%' -2.07% •1.30% -0.76% 0.45% -1.12% 0.54% 1.75% 0.18% 
t-stat (-3.03) (-1.56) 1-2.49) (-0.81) (-1.08) (-0.29) (0.27) (-0.59) (0.20) (0.97) (0.09) 
Cash Mean -1.04% -0.48% -1.26% -0.89% •0.78% -0.41% 0.45% -0.77% 0.37% 1.23% 0.01% 
t-stat (-1.30) (-0.53) (-1.13) (-0.35) (-0.61) (-0.16) (0.16) (-0.38) (0.13) (0.42) (0.01) 
Stock 
Mean -4.47%' -2.84% -
t-stat (-1.71) (1.10) 
Mixed Mean -1.35% -0.74% -2.12% -1.38% 
/Other t-stat (-0.70) (-0.31) (-0.79) (-0.41) 
Panel H: Subsidiarv Targets 
All Mean 
-0.55% 0.02% -0.74% •1.12% -0.76% -1.14% -1.11% -2.28% -0.38% -0.34% •1.52% 
t-stat (-1.38) (0.05) (-1.09) (-1.38) (-0.99) (1.28) (-0.82) (-1.27) (-0.37) (-0.24) (-0.81) 
Cash Mean •0.38% -0.07% -0.61% -0.15% -0.53% -0.08% -1.01% -0.71% 0.46% -0.47% •0.17% 
t-stat (-0.97) (•0.14) (-0.96) (0 .18) (0.70) (-0.08) (-0.74) (-0.53) (0.45) (-0.33) (-0.12) 
Stock Mean 4.16% 4.71% 8.06% -5.88% 3.35% -10.58%' -13.94% 
t-stat (0.85) (1-51) (l.OO) (-1.46) (0.45) (•3.73) (-1.75) 
Mixed Mean •1.66%' -0.10% •3.32%' -2.17% -3.22%' •2.07% -1.72% -7.24% 1.15% 1.50% -4.01% 
/Other t-stat (-1.69) (-0.09) (-2.11) (1.17) (-1.81) (-1.02) (-0.52) (-1.16) (0.50) (0.43) (-0.63) 
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Table 3:6 - CAR by Target Status, Payment Method and Legal System of Target Firm Nation (Bidder and 
Target are in Different Industries) 
This table presents 5-day (-2,+2) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) for all deals announced betwreen 
1986 and 2005. Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified market-adjusted model as in Fuller et al. 
(2002): ARir=ri ,- where r^ f is the return of the acquiring firm 1 in time period t and where /•„ ( is the 
value-w/eighted market index return (FT-All Share) in the period t. Acquirers are publicly traded firms 
listed in the London Stock Exchange. Targets are private, listed or subsidiaries, both domestic and foreign 
ones. Bidders and targets are irt different industries. The sample is divided according to the legal system of 
the target firm's country. In each type portfolios are further divided by the method of payment. 'Cash' 
includes transactions made by cash only. Stock offers are defined as transactions made by stock only. 
'Mixed/Other' includes all other transactions financed with both cash and stock and/or methods classified 
as "other" by SDC. Panels A to D displays the mean of portfolios' CAR as classified by the legal system of 
the target firm's nation, whereas panels E to H display the differentials between these portfolios. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses below each estimate. The sample size, N, for each group is reported 
bellows the t-statistic. a, b, and c denotes significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
AH Dom CBA 1 AS (Inc. UK) 1 AS French German 1 Scandinavian | Socialist 
Panel A: All Targets 
Mean 1.18%' 1.23%' 1.09%' 1.16%' 0.93%' 0.99%' 1.58%' 1.36% 4.56% 
All t-stat (9.02) (8.05) (4.43) (8.49) (3.01) (1.75) (3.07) (1.58) (0.93) 
N 3,169 2,085 1,084 2,674 589 289 138 51 13 
Mean 0.98%' 1.11%' 0.80%' 0.99%' 0.69%' 0.27% 1.90%' 2 .21%' -0.05% 
Cash t-stat (7.37) (6.57) (3.70) (6.73) (2.31) (0.71) (3.04) (2.05) (-0.04) 
N 1,843 1,092 751 1,506 414 194 94 36 11 
Mean 1.4296 0.41% 7.10%' 1.01% 6.87% 1.84% 2.04% 62.13% 
Stock t-stat (1.3S) (0.41) (1.75) (0.97) (1.22) (0.32) (1.32) 
M 171 145 26 160 15 5 5 1 
M i x e d / 
o the r 
Mean 1.47%* 1.53%' 1.29%' 1.44%' 0.97% 2.52% 0.75% -0.69% -2.35% 
t-stat (5.99) (5.99) (2.18) (6.08) (1.54) (1.58) (0.75) (-0.54) 
N 1,155 848 307 1,008 160 90 39 15 1 
Panel B: Private Targets 
Mean 1.43%* 1.59%' 1.13%' 1.51%' 1.21% 0.50% 1.59% 0.60% 8.48% 
All t-stat (7.87) (7.19) (3.54) (7.42) (2.45) (1.42) (2.17) (0.76) (0.94) 
M 1,715 1,121 594 1,425 304 186 74 22 7 
Mean 1.05%' 1.13%' 0.94%' 1.12%' 1.11%' 0.31% 1.74%' 1.58% -0.09% 
Cash t-stat (5.18) (4.46) (2.87) (4.81) (2.13) (0.64) (1.93) (1.57) (-0.05) 
N 827 483 364 648 185 112 47 14 5 
Mean 3.76%' 2.23% 8.02% 3.15% 7.22% 1.10% 0.11% 62.13% 
Stock t-stat (1.77) (1.01) (1.55) (1.48) (1.15) (0.11) (0.07) 
N 72 53 19 65 12 3 3 1 
M U e d / 
Other 
Mean 1.60%' 1.88%' 0.82% 1.70%' 0.71% 1.03% 1.48% -1.12% -2.35% 
t-stat (6.17) (6.19) (1.63) (5.96) (0.87) (1.48) (1.04) (-1.09) -
N 816 605 211 712 107 71 24 8 1 
Panel C: Public Targets 
Mean -0.12% -0.14% •0.10% -0.15% -0 .21% -0.25% 1.26% -0.80% 
All t-stat (-0.36) (-0.31) (-0.18) (-0.41) (-0.34) (-0.20) (0.71) (-0.18) 
N 384 267 117 345 78 21 12 6 
Mean 0.49% 0.80% 0.05% 0.51% -0.09% -0.89% 2.09% 1.47% 
Cash t-stat (1.22) (1.41) (0.09) (1.19) (-0.15) (-0.73) (1.15) (0.31) 
N 221 129 92 192 63 16 8 5 
Mean -1.56%' -1.51% -2.44% -1.79%' -19.71% 0.09% 4.94% 
Stock t-stat (-1.63) (-1.56) (-0.41) (-1.80) (4.43) 
N 69 65 4 66 1 1 2 
M i x e d / 
Other 
Mean -0 .51% -0.58% -0.27% -0.38% 0.66% 2.22% -5.77% -
t-stat (-0.64) (-0.63) (-0.17) (-0.47) (0.40) (0.48) (-0.84) - -
M 94 73 21 87 14 4 2 - -
Panel D: Subsidiary Targets 
Mean 1.26%' 1.18%' 1.39%' 1.13%' 0.94%' 2.21% 1.64%' 2.66%' -0.01% 
Al l t-stat (5.63) (5.11) (2.95) (5.53) (2.17) (1.28) (2.06) (1.96) (-0.01) 
M 1,070 697 373 904 207 82 52 23 6 
Mean 1.05%' 1.16%' 0.85%' 1.01%' 0.53% 0.47% 2.05%' 2.95%' -0.01% 
Cash t-stat (5.35) (4.79) (2.57) (4.77) (1.25) (0.70) (2.06) (1.70) (-0.01) 
N 795 500 295 666 166 66 39 17 6 
Mean 2.68% 1.43% 13.98% 2.58% 18.10% 0.09% 
Stock t-stat (1.31) (0.73) (1.43) (1.21) (1.17) 
N 30 27 3 29 2 1 
M U e d / 
Other 
Mean 1.76%' 1.20%' 3.03% 1.31%' 1.79% 9.64% 0.42% 1.81% 
t-stat (2.53) (2.20) (1.59) (2.67) (1.56) (1.08) (0.38) (0.95) 
N 245 170 75 209 39 15 13 6 
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Table 3:6 (Continued) - Differentials 
Domestic AS (All) vs. AS (All) vs. AS (All) vs. AS (CB) vs. AS (C8) vs. AS(CB)vs. AS(CB) vs. French vs. French vs. French vs. 
vs. CBA AS(CB) French German French German Scandln. Socialist German Scandin. 
Panel E: All Targets 
All Mean 0.1S% 0.24% 0.17% -0.42% -0.07% 0.66% -0.44% 3.63% -0.59% -0.37% -3.57% 
t-stat (0.50) (0.71) (0.29) (-0.78) (-0.11) (-1,09) (-0.48) (-0.74) (-0.77) (-0.36) (-0.72) 
Cash Mean 0.31% 0.30% 0.73%' -0.91% 0.43% -1.21%' -1.52% 0.74% -1.63%' -1.95%' 0.31% 
t-stat (1.14) (0.90) (1.80) (-1.41) (0.89) (-1.74) (1.36) (0.57) (-2.J4) (-1.70) (0.23) 
Stock Mean -6.69%' -5.86% -0.83% 1.03% 5.03% 4.83% -0.20% 
t-stat (-1.71) (-1.02) (0.14) (-0.55) (0.62) (0.83) - (-0.03) 
Mixed Mean 0.25% 0.47% -1.07% 0.69% -1.55% 0.21% 1.65% 1.76% 3.20% 
/Other t-stat (0.38) (0.70) (-0.67) (0.66) (-0.90) (0.18) (1.17) (0.93) (1-57) 
Panel F; Private Targets 
All Mean 0.46% 0.30% 0.91%' -0.09% 0.61% -0.38% 0.61% -7.27% 0.99% 0.00% 7.88% 
t-stat (1.19) (0.56) (1.95) (-0.11) (0.94) (-0.43) (0.66) (-0.80) (-1.17) (0.00) (-0.87) 
Cash Mean 0.19% 0.02% 0.81% -0.62% 0.80% -0.63% -0.47% 1.19% -1.43% -1.27% 0.40% 
t-stat (0.45) (0.03) (1.50) (0.66) (1.12) (0.61) (-0.42) (0.66) (-1.39) (-1.13) (0.22) 
Stock Mean -5.79% -4.06% 2.00% 3.04% 6.10% 7.10% 1.00% 
t-ltat (1.03) (-0.61) (0.19) (1.11) (0.50) (1.09) (0.09) 
Mixed Mean 1.06%° 1.00% 0.68% 0.22% -0.32% -0.78% 1.83% -0.46% 2.15%' 
/Other t-stat (1.81) (1.15) (0.90) (0.15) (-0.30) (-0.47) (1.39) (-0.29) (1.73) 
Panel G: Public Targets 
All Mean -0.04% 0.05% 0.10% -1.41% 0.05% -1.46% 0.60% •1.51% 0.55% 
t-stat (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (-0.78) (0.03) (0.78) (0.13) (-0.70) (0.12) 
Cash Mean 0.76% 0.60% 1.40% -1.58% 0.80% -2.18% -1.56% -2.99% -2.36% 
t-stat (0.97) (0.83) (1.08) (-0.84) (0.59) (-1.14) (-0.33) (1.36) (-0.48) 
Stock Mean 0.93% -6.73%' 
t-stat (0.16) (-4.51) 
Mixed Mean -0.31% •1.03% 2.60% 5.39% -1.57% 6.42% 7.99% 
/Other t-stat (-0.17) (-0.56) (-0.55) (0.78) (-0.32) (0.91) (0.97) 
Panel H; Subsidiary Targets 
All Mean .0.21% 0.19% -1.08% -0.52% -1.27% -0.71% -1.72% 0.95% 0.57% -0.45% 2.22% 
l-stat (-0.40) (0.40) (-0.62) (0.63) (-0.72) (-0.78) (-1.21) (0.47) (0.30) (-0.20) -0.85 
Cash Mean 0.32% 0.48% 0.54% -1.05% 0.06% 1.52% -2.43% 0.54% -1.58% -2.49% 0.48% 
t-stat (0.78) (1.01) (0.77) (-1.03) (0.08) (-1.41) (-1.36) (0.27) (-1.32) (-1.34) (0.23) 
Stock Mean -12.55% -15.50% 
t-stal (-1.26) (-1.00) -
Mixed Mean -1.84% -0.49% -8.34% 0.89% -7.85% 1.38% -0.02% 9.23% 7.83% 
/Other t-stat (0.93) (-0.39) (-0.93) (0.75) (-0.87) (0.87) (-0.01) (1.02) (0.86) 
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Table 3:7 - Announcement Period Gains of Bidders by the Legal Family, Legal System, and Deal Features 
The table presents 5-day (-2, +2) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (in percent) of sample bidders by relative size of the deal which is the ratio of the deal value divided by 
the market value of acquirer one month prior to the announcement of deal (panel A), size of the bidder one month prior to the announcement of the deal (panel B), 
growth opportunities of bidders which is the MTBV as estimated by dividing the market value of acquirer by its book value one month prior to the deal announcement 
(panel C), age of the bidder as calculated as the number of days between the announcement day and the bidding firm's birth (panel D), and industry affiliation of 
bidder and target which is defined by using two-digit SIC codes of bidders and acquirers (panel E). The gains are reported by the legal family and legal system of target 
firm's nation. Abnormal returns (AR) are calculated using a modified market-adjusted model: 
AR,,=R,,-R„, 
Where , is the return of bidder/ at t ime/ a n d / ^ , , is the market index (FT-AII Share) at t i m e / , a, b, c denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels respectively. N denotes the number of deals in each portfolio. The final columns in the panel show the differentials in the gains from acquisitions of domestic 
and cross-border targets as well as of portfolios of domestic and each of the legal families of target firms (i.e. civil-law and common-law). F-statistics in the last row of 
each panel test the null of all means are equal against the alternative of at least one is different. 
All Domestic Cross-Border Commom Civil French German Sandinavian Socialist 
Domestic vs. 
Cross-Border 
Domestic vs. 
Common 
Domestic vs. 
Civil 
Common vs. 
Civil 
Panel A; Relative Size of the deal 
Low 0.5896' 0.52%' 0.47%' 0.58%' 0.10% -0.23% 1.28%' 0.34% 1.39%' 0.05% -0.06% 0.42% 0.48% 
N 2,211 1,420 790 404 360 234 88 38 20 
Medium 1.14%* 1.27%' 1.06%' 1.04%' 1.36%' 1.30%' 1.27%' 2.51%' 0.66% 0.21% 0.22% -0.10% -0.30% 
N 2,212 1,421 791 404 361 234 89 38 21 
High 1.96%* 1.88%' 2.20%' 1.71%' 2.42%' 2.09%* 2.79%' 2.15%' 6.35%' -0.30% 0.17% -0.50% -0.70% 
N 2,211 1,421 791 404 361 234 89 38 20 
F-sutlstic 19.94" 12.48' 11.07* 2.45' 8.94* 5.26' 1.68 1.18 2.14 
Panel B: Size of the bidding firm 
Low 2.06%' 2.00%' 1.98%' 1.45%" 2.10%' 1.69%' 2.89%' 2.83%' 4.88% 0.02% 0.55% -0.10% -0.60% 
Al 2,212 1,420 790 404 360 233 88 38 20 
Medium 0.89%' 1.19%' 0.98%' 1.20%" 0.78%' 0.82%' 0.87% 1.32% 2.72%' 0.21% •0.01% 0.41% 0.42% 
N 2,210 1,421 791 404 361 235 89 38 21 
High 0.65%' 0.47%' 0.78%' 0.68%" 1.01%* 0.65%' 1.58%' 0.85% 0.70% -0.30% -0.20% -0.50%' -0.30% 
N 2,212 1,421 791 404 361 234 89 38 20 
F-statlstIc 22.38' 15.87' 5.90' 1.16 3.23° 1.15 2.29' 0.93 0.92 
Panel C: MTBV of the bidding firm 
Low 1.69%' 1.57%* 1.70%' 1.25%' 1.84%* 1.78%' 1.99%' 2.85%' 6.13%' -0.10% 0.32% -0.30% -0.60% 
N 2,204 1,419 791 403 359 234 86 37 20 
Medium Q.92%' 1.02%' 0.93%' 0.63%' 1.30%* 0.85%' 1.36%' 1.93%' 1.33% 0.08% 0.39% -0.30% -0.70% 
N 2,224 1,424 792 404 363 235 92 39 21 
High 1.09%' 1.08%' 1.10%' 1.46%" 0.74%' 0.53% 1.99%° 0.25% 0.91% -0.02% -0.40% 0.33% 0.71% 
N 2,206 1,419 789 405 360 233 88 38 20 
F-statistic 6.70' 2.48' 2.33' 1.39 1.95 1.57 0.28 1.52 1.85 
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All Domestic Cross-Border Commom Civil Frencil German Sandinavian Socialist Domestic vs. Domestic vs. Domestic vs. Common vs. 
Cro^^.Hnrripr rnminftn riuil 
Panel D: Age of the bidding firm 
Low 1.34%" 1.16%* 1.65%' 1.33%" 1.68%' 1.26%' 2.97%' 1.34% 5.21% -0.50% -0.17% -0.50% -0.40% 
N 2,211 1,420 790 404 360 234 88 38 20 
Medium 1.365t' 1.63%" 1.04%' 1.10%" 1.02%' 1.05%' 0.36% 2.31%' 2.13% 0.60%' 0.50% 0.61% 0.08% 
N 2,211 1,422 790 404 361 234 89 38 21 
High 0.99%' 0.88%' 1.04%' 0.90%' 1.18%' 0.85%' 2.00%' 1.35% 1.00% -0.20% -0.03% -0.30% -0.30% 
N 2.212 1,420 790 404 361 234 89 38 20 
F-statistIc 1.79 3.92' 1.80 0.34 0.78 0.16 3.82' 0.27 1.01 
Panel E: Industry afftliation of bidder and target 
Focused 1.27%° 1.21%' 1.38%' 1.29%' 1.40%' 1.10%' 1.98%' 1.92%' 2.28%' -0.20% -0.07% -0.20% -0.08% 
N 3,465 2,177 1,288 623 604 413 128 63 48 
Diversifying 1.18%' 1.23%' 1.08%' 0.92%' 1.20%' 0.99%' 1.58%' 1.36% 5.46% 0.15% 0.31% 0.03% -0.30% 
N 3,169 2,085 1,084 589 478 289 138 51 13 
Differential 0.09% -0.02% 0.29% 0.36% 0.17% 0.10% 0.40% 0.55% -2,30% 
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Table 3:8 - Determinants of Announcement Period Gains of Bidders: Cross Section Analysis 
Estimates of cross-section determinants of announcement period gains of acquirers are reported. Announcement period (5-days) excess returns of bidders are 
regressed against a set of explanatory variables. Equation (3) is estimated using ordinary least square and standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. 
CAR,=a + f^X,+e, (3) 
The intercept (a) measures the excess return to bidders after accounting for the effects of all explanatory variables. The vector of explanatory variables 'X' includes 
acquirer's age on the day of bid announcement (log), acquirer's market value one month prior to the announcement of deal (log), relative size of the deal measured as 
the deal value divided by acquirer's marlcet value, bidder's growth opportunity (ratio of marlcet to book value of equity of acquirer one month prior to the acquisition 
announcement), and deal value (log). Dummy variables, that take the value of one and zero otherwise, are included to represent cross-border deals, diversifying deals 
(i.e. target and acquirer do not have the same 2-digit SIC), target status and cash only and stock only deals. Further, dummies representing the legal origin of targets' 
nation are also included where appropriate. The model is estimated for the entire sample (panels A : l - using the relative size variable and A:2 - using the size of the 
bidder and the deal value independently), domestic deals only (panel B:l) and cross-border deals only (panel B:2). Panel C report also estimates for acquisitions 
conducted with solely foreign target firms although in this panel I conduct further analysis as to examine the influence of the various legal traditions across the world 
on the bidding firm's CAR (I include in my models dummy variables, where necessary, classified by the legal origin of the target firm's nation), a indicates significance 
at 1% level, b indicates significance at 5% level, while c indicates significance at 10% level. 
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Table 3:8 (Continued) - Panel A : l 
Dependent Variable: CAR Modell Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Models Model9 ModellO 
Intercept 0.0187' (2.84) 
0.0138° 
(2.03) 
0.0174' 
(2.65) 
0.0184' 
(2.78) 
0.0189' 
(2.87) 
0.0208' 
(3.13) 
0.0176' 
(2.55) 
0,0160° 
(2.33) 
0.0194' 
(2.92) 
0.0185' 
(2.80) 
Log (Age) -0.0011 (-1.34) 
-0.0008 
(-1.01) 
-0.0007 
(-0.84) 
-0.0012 
(-1.44) 
-0.0014' 
(-1.77) 
-0.0012 
(-1.53) 
-0.0008 
(-1.04) 
-0.0010 
(-1.21) 
-0.0006 
(-0.73) 
-0.0008 
(-0,96) 
Acquiror's MTBV 0.0000 
(0.64) 
0.0000 
(0.58) 
0.0000 
(0.59) 
0.0000 
(0.66) 
0.0000 
(0.58) 
0.0000 
(0.66) 
0.0000 
(0.54) 
0.0000 
(0.60) 
0.0000 
(0.53) 
0,0000 
(0.60) 
Relative Size 0.0106' 
(6.60) 
0.0109' 
(6.79) 
0.0117' 
(7.29) 
0.0106' 
(6.59) 
0.0104' 
(6.44) 
0.0111' 
(6.88) 
0.0112' 
(6.90) 
0.0114' 
(7,04) 
0.0118' 
(7.26) 
0.0120' 
(7,39) 
Dummy=l (foreign target) 0.0017 (0.87) 
0.0016 
(0.85) 
0.0016 
(0.82) 
0.0017 
(0.88) 
0.0020 
(1.03) 
0.0013 
(0.68) 
0.0016 
(0.85) 
0.0013 
(0.67) 
0.0017 
(0.91) 
0.0014 
(0.72) 
Dumniy=l (diff industry) -0.0005 
(-0.29) 
-0.0006 
(-0.33) 
-0.0004 
(-0.21) 
-0.0005 
(-0.26) 
-0.0006 
(-0.32) 
-0.0005 
(-0.28) 
-0.0006 
(-0.34) 
-0.0006 
(-0.32) 
-0.0004 
(-0.24) 
-0.0004 
(-0.21) 
Dummy=l (private target) 0.0052' 
(2.85) 
0.0041" 
(2.17) 
0.0049' 
(2.71) 
Dumniy=l (public target) -0.0195' 
(-6.86) 
-0.0182' 
(-6.28) 
-0.0187' 
(-6.45) 
Dummy=l (subsidiary 0.0030' 
target) (1.68) 
Dummy=l (payment witii -0.0055' -0.0037' -0.0039° 
cash) (-2.97) (-1.84) (-1.99) 
Dummy=l (payment with -0.0092' -0.0109' -0.0087' -0.0071" -0.0047 
stock) (-2.70) (-3.03) (-2.55) (-1.98) (-1.37) 
F-Statisric 9.58' 9.35' 15.88' 8.40' 8.34' 9.21' 8.26' 8.95' 12.65' 13.88' 
R-Square (in percent) 0.72% 0.84% 1.42% 0.75% 0.75% 0.83% 0.99% 0.94% 1.50% 1.45% 
N 6,634 6,634 6,634 6,634 6,634 6,634 6,634 6,634 6,634 6,634 
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Table 3:8 (Continued) - Panel A:2 
Dependent Variable: CAR Modell Model2 Modei3 Model4 Models Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 ModellO 
Intercept 0.0281' 0.0247' 0.0271' 0.0277' 0.0281' 0.0307' 0.0281' 0.0274- 0.0289' 0.0286' (4.31) (3.65) (4.16) (4.24) (4.31) (4.65) (4.09) (4.01) (4.38) (4.35) 
Log (Age) O.OOOS 0.0006 0.0006 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 
(0.61) (0.70) (0.68) (0.52) (0.64) (0.45) (0.60) (0.54) (0.65) (0.59) 
Log (Acquiror's Size) -O.OOSO" -0.0049- -0.0050' -0.0050' -0.0049' -0.00S2' -0.0050- -0.0051' -0.0050' -0.0051' 
(-7.94) (-7.89) (-8.07) (-8.01) (-7.67) (-8.22) (-7.85) (-8.15) (-7.90) (-8.20) 
Log (Deal Value) 0.0019- 0.0022- 0.0033- 0.0019- 0.0019- 0.0021- 0.0023- 0.0024- 0.0033- 0.0033' 
(2.75) (3.12) (4.54) (2.67) (2.67) (3.03) (3.15) (3.36) (4.44) (4.60) 
Acquiror's MTBV 0.0000 
(0.99) 
0.0000 
(0.93) 
0.0000 
(0.89) 
0.0000 
(1.03) 
0.0000 
(0.97) 
0.0000 
(1.02) 
0.0000 
(0.92) 
0.0000 
(0.96) 
0.0000 
(0.87) 
0.0000 
(0.91) 
Dummy=l (foreign target) 0.0051' 
(2.58) 
0.0049° 
(2.46) 
0.0044° 
(2.20) 
0.0052' 
(2.63) 
0.0052' 
(2.60) 
0.0048° 
(2.43) 
0.0047° 
(2.38) 
0.0046° 
(2.32) 
0.0043° 
(2.18) 
0.0042° 
(2.14) 
Dummy=l (same industry) -0.0012 (-0.64) 
-0.0011 
(-0.62) 
-0.0007 
(-0.39) 
-0.0011 
(-0.61) 
-0.0012 
(-0.64) 
-0.0011 
(-0.62) 
-0.0011 
(-0.62) 
-0.0011 
(-0.60) 
-0.0007 
(-0.40) 
-0.0007 
(-0.39) 
Dummy=l (private target) 0.0036' 
(1.91) 
0.0029' 
(1.67) 
0.0033' 
(1.77) 
Dummy=l (public target) -0.0187- -0.0175' -0.0177' 
(-6.24) (-5.70) (-5.79) 
Dummy=l (subsidiary 0.0038° 
target) (2.01) 
Dummy=l (payment with -0.0034' -0.0019 -0.0017 
cash) (-1.77) (-0.90) (-0.85) 
Dummy=l (payment with -0.0094' -0.0102' -0.0091' -0.0064' -0.0054' 
stock) (-2.78) (-2.83) (-2.69) (-1.75) (-1.66) 
F-Statisric 11.49" 10.37- 15.46' 10.43' 9.87' 10.96' 8.97- 9.99- 12.38' 13.83-
R-Square (In percent] 1.03% 1.08% 1.61% 1.09% 1.03% 1.14% 1.20% 1.19% 1.65% 1.64% 
N 6,634 6,634 6,634 6,634 6,634 6,634 6,634 6,634 6,634 6,634 
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Table 3:8 (Continued) - Panel B 
Panel B:l - Domestic Deals Panel B:2 - Cross-Border Deals 
Dependent Variable: CAR Modell Model2 Models IVIodel4 Models Model6 Model7 ModelB Model9 ModellO Modem Modell2 
Intercept 0.0255' 0.0297' 0.0324' 0.0191' 0.0237' 0.0262' 0.0346' 0.0293" 0.0296' 0.0043 0.0021 0.0028 
(3.09) (3.78) (4.11) (2.30) (2.99) (3.30) (2.72) (2.39) (2.41) (0.35) (0.17) (0.23) 
Log (Age) 0.0006 0.0006 0.0004 -0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0012 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0003 0.0006 0.0002 
(0.59) (0.63) (0.43) (-1.00) (-0.82) (-1.29) (0.53) (0.50) (0.50) (0.22) (0.41) (0.16) 
Log (Acquiror's Size) -0.0048' 
(-6.11) 
-0.0050' 
(-6.26) 
-0.0047' 
(-5.95) 
-0.0058' 
(-5.37) 
-0.0056' 
(-5.18) 
-0.0057' 
(-5.32) 
Log (Deal Value) 0.0017' 
(1.88) 
0.0028' 
(2.92) 
0.0010 
(1.12) 
0.0033' 
(2.82) 
0.0041' 
(3.47) 
0.0035' 
(2.99) 
Acquiror's MTBV -0.0001 
(-0.70) 
-0.0001 
(-0.62) 
-0.0001 
(-0.60) 
-0.0001 
(-1.08) 
-0.0001 
(-1.00) 
-0.0001 
(-0.98) 
0.0002'" 
(2.31) 
0.0002" 
(2.24) 
0.0002" 
(2.26) 
0.0002" 
(2.28) 
0.0002" 
(2.25) 
0.0002" 
(2.24) 
Relative Size 0.0028' 
(1.61) 
0.0033' 
(1.88) 
0.0023 
(1.33) 
0.0595° 
(14.62) 
0.0601' 
(14.78) 
0.0594' 
(14.62) 
Dummy=l (same industry) 0.0001 
(0.06) 
0.0007 
(0.29) 
0.0000 
(0.02) 
0.0006 
(0.26) 
0.0009 
(0.40) 
0.0006 
(0.27) 
-0.0025 
(-0.82) 
-0.0024 
(-0.78) 
-0.0025 
(-0.80) 
-0.0028 
(-0-93) 
-0.0029 
(-0.98) 
-0.0027 
(-0.91) 
Dummy=l (private target) 0.0068° 
(2.79) 
0.0070' 
(2.99) 
-0.0043 
(-1.30) 
-0.0010 
(-0.33) 
Dummy=l (public target) -0.0207' 
(-5.36) 
-0.0199' 
(-5.47) 
-0.0083' 
(-1.61) 
-0.0120' 
(-2.55) 
Dummy=l (subsidiary 
target) 
0.0014 
(0.57) 
0.0013 
(0.54) 
0.0075" 
(2.31) 
0.0063" 
(2.02) 
Dummy=l (payment with -0.0010 -0.0022 -0.0034 -0.0035 -0.0048'' -0.0059"" -0.0017 -0.0002 -0.0019 -0.0008 0.0003 -0.0015 
cash) (-0.41) (-0.90) (-1.37) (-1.40) (-1.99) (-2.38) (-0.47) (-0.05) (-0.53) (-0.23) (0.08) (-0.44) 
Dummy=l (payment with -0.0171' -0.0128° -0.0188' -0.0163' -0.0121' -0.0183' 0.0187" 0.0202' 0.0189" 1.01% 1.12% 0.98% 
stock) (-4.21) (-3.07) (-4.70) (-4.00) (-2.89) (-4.55) (2.42) (2.62) (2.45) (1.35) (1.50) (1.31) 
F-Statisric 8.75' 11.41' 7.82' 4.87' 7.89' 3.63' 6.14' 6.26' 6.61' 33.69' 34.69' 34.31' 
R-Square (in percent) 1.62% 2.10% 1.45% 0.80% 1.28% 0.59% 2.04% 2.07% 2.19% 9.07% 9.32% 9.22% 
N 4,262 4,262 4,262 4,262 4,262 4,262 2,372 2,372 2,372 2,372 2,372 2,372 
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Table 3:8 (Continued) - Panel C 
Dependent Variable: CAR IVIodell MDdel2 Models Model4 Models Models Model7 Models Models 
Intercept 0,0240' 0.0267* 0.0272' 0.0241* 0.0267* 0.0272' 0.0236* 0.0264* 0.0269* 
(3.53) (4.07) (4.16) (3.56) (4.06) (4.16) (3.48) (4.03) (4.11) 
Log (Agel 
0,0007 0.0006 O00O6 0.0007 0.0006 0.0005 0.0007 0.0O06 0.0006 
(0,73) 10.72) (0.62) (0.73) (072I (0.62) (0.78) (0.77) (0.67) 
Log (Acquiror's Size) 
-0.0046' 
(-7.37) 
-0.0047* 
(-7.73) 
.0.0045' 
(-7.26) 
-0.0O47* 
(-7.51) 
.0.0048* 
(-7.82) 
-0.0046* 
(-7.41) 
-0.0046* 
(-7.47) 
-0.0048* 
(-7.85) 
0.0046* 
(-7.35) 
Log (Deal Value) 
0.0023* 
(3.09) 
0.0033' 
(4,53) 
0.0017* 
(2.48) 
0.0023* 
(3.16) 
0.0033* 
(4.59) 
0.0018* 
(2.59) 
0.0023' 
(3.19) 
0.0034* 
(4.62) 
0.0018* 
(2.58) 
Acquiror's MTBV 
0.0001 0,0001 0.0001 OOOOl 0.0001 0.0001 O.OCOl 0.0001 OOOOl 
(0.96) (0.91) (1.03) (0.96) (0.91) (1.02) 11.01) (0.95) (1.07) 
Dummysl (same industry) 
-0.0012 
(-0.68) 
-0.0001 
(-0.44) 
-0.0013 
(-0.69) 
-0.0011 
(-0.62) 
-0.0OO7 
(0.41) 
0.0011 
(0.62) 
-0.0011 
1-0.56) 
O0006 
(-0.33) 
-0.0011 
(-0.57) 
Oummyai (tlie target operates in 0.0018 0.0018 0.0021 
tile common law system) (0.74) (0.76) (0.87) 
Oummysl (tiie target operates in 0.0041' 0.0033 0.0O45' 
the CIvfi law system) (1.71) (1.34) (1.82) 
Dummysl (the target operates In 0.0213' 0 .020/ 0.0210' 
the Socialist legal system) (2.26) (2.21) (2.22) 
Oummysl (private target) 0.0041' 
(2.04) 
0.0038' 
11.95) 
0.0041' 
(2.08) 
Dummy=l (public target) 0.0191' 
(•6.22) 
-0.0189* 
(•6.13) 
0.0191' 
(-6.21) 
Dummycl (subsidiary target) 
0.0041' 
(2.07) 
0.0041' 
(209) 
0.0039' 
(2.02) 
Oummysl (payment with cash) 
0.0083 
(021) 
-0.0014 
(-0.71) 
0.0003 
(015) 
-0.0015 
(-0.76) 
00004 
(0.19) 
-0.0014 
(0.72) 
Dummysl (payment with stock) 
0.0002 
(O04) 
0.0002 
(0.05) 
0.0001 
(0.03) 
F-Stat 8.39' 12.98* 8.40* 8.65* 13.14' 8.72' 8.96* 13.53* 8.93* 
R-Square (In percent) 1.00% 1.54% 1.00% 1.03% 1.56% 1.04% 1.07% 1.61% 1.07% 
N 6,634 6,634 6,634 6,634 6,634 6,634 6,634 6,634 6,634 
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Table 3:9 - Long-term Performance of Acquirers 
This table reports OLS estimates of monthly abnormal returns (in percent), measured by alpha of equation (2), from portfolios comprising of all acquisitions for 1-year, 
3 years, and 5-years post event holding periods. Excess returns are estimated using calendar time regressions for each portfolio. Acquirers enter the portfolio on the 
month following the announcement and remain for 12, 36 or 60 months. This table contains 8 panels. Panels A to D represents post-merger gains of acquisitions of 
targets (entire sample, private, public, and subsidiary acquisitions only) operating within the domestic and in cross-border market across countries subject to different 
legal systems. Panels E to G reports post-merger gains of acquisitions financed with cash, stock, and mixed methods of payments. Lastly, panel H reports gains from 
acquisitions in the socialist legal system. In each panel, differences in post-acquisition gains from domestic deals and CBA, domestic vs. common-law, domestic vs. civil-
law, and domestic vs. socialist countries are reported. Portfolios are rebalanced each month to include firms that just announced a deal. The monthly abnormal 
returns are measured by intercepts in equation (2): 
+ W„,,-R,,) + s^SMB,+h^HML, +£^, (2) 
The monthly abnormal return differentials are intercepts in equation (2A): 
where Rp,, is the calendar time portfolio return, Rf,, is the return on a one month T-bill during month t, SMB is the difference in returns of value weighted portfolios of 
small firms and big firms during month t, HML is the return differential of value weighted portfolios of high and low book-to-market firms in month t, Pp, Sp and hp are 
regression parameters specific to the portfolio and ep,, is the error term. Heteroscedasticity is corrected by using the Heteroscedasticity Consistent Standard Errors, a, 
b, or c indicate significance at the 1,5,10 percent level respectively. 
l Y ear 3 Y e a n 
Emtira 
Oom CBA 
Common 
lavt^ 
OviHaw 
Oom. V i 
—£Bfi_ 
Dom. V> Dom. Vs 
Ovll 
Emtfra 
Samttle 
Oom CBA 
Com/no IV 
l l B 
O v i H a K Dom. Vt 
m a 
Dom. V> 
Connnn i 
Oom.Vt 
Ovtl 
DOIII .VI Dom.Vs Dom.Vs 
g f l I CBmnim I oni rml A: Entire 
0.0038* 0.0062' 0.0031' 0.0038' 0.0032 0.0031' 0.0023 
78.05X 83.02K 73.77% 72.80K ee.49K 13.G8K 6.07% 
251 251 250 250 240 
.^.£25 1121 2,327 U89 Lg62 
0.0034' 
9 .19« 
O0045' 0.0052' 0 0 0 4 2 ' 0.0049" 0.0042* 0.0009 OOOOl 0.0014 
81.58)1 8 6 . 3 9 * 77 .69* 8 0 . 9 8 * 6 9 . 8 7 * 11 .98* 6 . 9 7 * 7 . 7 9 * 
25 1 25 1 250 250 240 
_ L 6 5 1 3,637 2,014 imt 934 
o.x3a' 
83.05* 
251 
0.0042" 
8 6 . 2 9 * 
251 
3.142 
0.0037* 
7 8 . 3 8 * 
250 
1.728 
0.0045" 0.0032' 
8 2 . 6 2 * 7 0 . 5 1 * 
250 240 
» " 803 
O.0OO4 
12 .20* 
.0.0004 
10 .64* 
0.0014 
9 . 3 8 * 
Panel B: Privata Tametl Only 
O0O48* 0.0068" 0 . X 3 4 ' 0.0042° 0.0054' 
7 4 . 8 2 * 76 .17* 6 6 . 8 5 * 68 .14 * 5 6 . 7 0 * 
251 251 245 245 240 
-iSZi 521 as— 
0.0036" 
6 . 2 7 * 
0.0029 
2 . 0 2 * 
0.0017 
3 .80 * 
0.0053" 
8 0 . 2 1 * 
3.062 
0.0061" 0.0050* 0.0064" 0.0040' 0.0O14 
82 .14 * 7 5 . 0 8 * 76 .93 * 6 2 . 5 7 * 11 .02 * 
251 245 245 240 
--L2S2 L121 529 551 
* 0 0 0 1 
5 . 0 7 * 
0.0024 
7 . 8 7 * 
0.0047" 
8 1 . 9 6 * 
251 
_ i 6 2 4 _ 
0.0O49" 
8 2 . 7 6 * 
251 
1.670 
0.0049" 
7 4 . 7 5 * 
245 
_ _ 9 5 4 
0.0055" 0.0O4O" 
76 .58* 6 3 . 8 6 * 
245 240 
<S8 480 
0.0002 
9 . 0 2 * 
4 .0004 0.0O12 
5 . 1 1 * 8 . 6 7 * 
0.0028 0.0076" 0 . 0 X 2 0.M37 ^).0063' 0.M74* 0 X 3 9 0.0140" 
6 5 . 6 6 * 6 3 . 1 2 * 54 .59* 50 .74 * 3 9 . 5 8 * 11 .67* 5 . 6 3 * 7 .10 * 
247 247 247 239 217 
Panel C PuMlt T a i n e a Onry 
R-Square 
670 __432 238 154 
0.0041* 0 .X70" 0.ra29" 0 . X 5 3 " ^ ) .X17 
7 4 . 8 8 * 6 6 . 6 8 * 6 8 . 6 1 * 7 0 . 2 9 * 4 2 . 0 8 * 
247 245 247 247 221 
— 5 S 381 207 133 71 
0.0042 
1 5 . 0 7 * 
0 . X 1 8 
11.74* 
0.0086* 
9 . 7 6 * 
0 X 2 2 
7 6 . 3 1 * 
247 
512 
0 . X 6 4 " 
6 9 . 1 7 * 
247 
342 
O . X l l 
7 0 . 1 0 * 
247 
no 
0.0030" ^.0017 
72S7% 4 9 . 4 8 * 
247 218 
114 54 
0 . X 5 3 ' 
12 .82 * 
0 . X 3 4 
8 . 7 5 * 
O.X87* 
11 .78* 
Panal 0: Suteldlary Ta igcB omy 
R-Sauar< 
0.0040* 0.0056" O . X 3 7 ' 0.0059* 0 . X 2 6 0.M19 .0.0004 0 . X 3 4 
7 6 . 4 8 * 78 .67* 69 .53 * 6 2 . 5 1 * 6 3 . 7 5 * 7 .30* 3 . 2 7 * 4 . 2 1 * 
250 242 250 250 239 
L « 5 807 412 358 
0.0040" 0.0045" 0 .m37* 0.0061" 0 X 3 6 ' 0.0008 
8 1 . 7 9 * 8 5 . 8 5 * 75 .61* 71 .24 * 7 2 . 2 1 * 10 .66* 
250 242 250 250 239 
2 . X 1 1.295 706 374 312 
ji.oon 
6 . 3 5 * 
0 . X 1 3 
8 . 5 3 * 
O .X35° 
8 1 . 6 1 * 
250 
1.734 
0 . X 3 3 * 
8 3 . 9 1 * 
242 
1.130 
0 . X 3 6 ' 
7 6 . 1 6 * 
250 
604 
0.0042* 0 . X 3 3 ' 
7 3 . 8 3 * 72 .84 * 
250 239 
321 269 
^J.0004 
12 .92 * 
.0.0009 
11 .59* 
0 . 0 X 3 
10 .51* 
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Table 3:9 (Continued) 
Samaln Dom CBA 
Common CMI-law Oofn.V» Dom. Vs 
!"«• CBA Comin J U L 
Emtlre 
Snmntff 
Doin CBA Cominon- CIvlNpw Dom. Vs Dom. Vi 
lau " A 
Panel E: Cash Payments Only 
Dom. VI 
Chfll 
Emtire Dom CBA Common- avll-lav» Oom. Vt 
a& 
Dom. V* 
Common 
Dom. VI 
_ Q d l _ 
0.0032" 0.0055" 0.0024 0,0032° 0 0028 0.M30' O.W22 0.0031 
77 .72* 83.17% 73.18% 71.67% M.89% 11 .33* 5 .MX 6 .03* 
251 251 247 247 240 
.2.222 i m L5M 793 Zl l 
0.0042" 
8 1 . 1 0 * 
251 
3.289 
O.0O50" 
8 6 . 5 6 * 
251 
1.926 
0.0038 
76 .51* 
247 
1.363 
0.0046" 
8 1 . 0 0 * 
247 
69B 
0.0040" 0.0011 
6 8 . 2 0 * 9 . 8 5 * 
240 
633 
0.0003 
5 . 2 7 * 
0.0014 
5.62X 
0.0036* 0.0039" 0.0035* 0.0043" 0,0031* 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0012 
82.67% 8 5 . 3 9 * 78 .22 * 82 .24 * 6 9 . 9 1 * 11 .76* 11 .42 * 7 .56* 
251 251 247 247 240 
_1822 LMO LIZS 604 541 
Pan«l F: Stock Paymenll Only 
Cil. Months 
0.0121' 0.0075' 0,0202 
4 4 , 8 6 * 4 7 . 9 5 * 6 . 3 3 * 
245 245 211 
" 2 266 66 
0.0072 
2 8 . 6 3 * 
178 
37 
0.0096 
18 .93 * 
157 
26 
-0.0131 
4 . 4 8 * 
0.0004 
3 .40* 
0.0015 
4 . 4 6 * 
O.0O78' 
58 .52 * 
247 
297 
0,0080' 
5 5 . 6 8 * 
245 
243 
0,0138' 0.0171' 
28 ,52 * 2 7 , 9 3 * 
228 222 
0,0061 -0,0085 
6 .26 * 5 ,59* 
218 
-0.0085 
9 .14 * 
-0.0001 
2 . 1 4 * 
0.0086' 0.0077* 0.0135" 0.0202* -0,0029 -0,0045 
6 1 , 2 7 * 5 4 , 8 8 * 4 0 , 5 3 * 3 4 , 9 7 * 2 0 , 9 2 * 4 . 0 9 * 
247 247 221 212 220 
254 212 42 24 17 
•€.0116° 
7 . 9 1 * 
0 . 0 U 9 ' 
2 . 9 3 * 
Panel C: MIxed/otlier Mettiods ol Payment Only 
R-Souare 
O.0O54' 0.0068* 0.0042' 0.0063* 0,0006 
69 ,85 * 6 9 . 4 6 * 6 0 . 5 7 * 57 .66* 4 9 , 0 0 * 
250 246 250 250 224 
2.376 1,677 699 361 319 
0,0022 
6.82% 
0.0007 
1.98* 
0.0064' 
2 . 9 4 * 
0.0060" 
74 .88* 
250 
2.067 
0.0046* 
75 .67* 
246 
1.468 
0.0070" 0,0075' 
6 7 . 8 6 * 6 5 , 7 5 * 
250 250 
_ 5 2 9 311 
0,0040" -0.0029 
61 .74 * 7.30% 
224 
279 
-0.0034 
3 .59* 
0.0007 
8 . 6 5 * 
0.0050" 0.0O37* 0.0054* 0.0064" 0.0025 -0.0020 -0.0030 0.0014 
7 6 . 0 8 * 7 7 . 1 6 * 6 8 . 7 7 * 6 9 . 5 0 * 6 0 . 9 5 * 7.88% 4 . 4 7 * 8 . 9 3 * 
250 246 250 249 224 
-Lm L222 S2» 267 245 
Table 3:9 (Continued) 
l Y e a r 3 Years 5 Years 
Emtire 
Samii le 
Dom CBA Socialist 
Dom. Vs 
CBA 
Dom. Vs 
Socialist 
Emtire 
Sample 
Dom Socialist 
D o m . Vs Dom. V s 
Socialist 
Emtire 
Sample 
Dom CBA Socialist 
D o m . V s 
CBA 
Dom. V s 
Socialist 
Panel H: Targets from the Socialist Legal Group Only 
Constant 
R-Square 
Cal . Months 
0 .0038° 0 .0062 ' 0.0031° 0.0050 
78.05% 83.02% 73.77% 13.54% 
251 251 250 148 
6,498 4,171 2.327 59 
0.0031' 
13.68% 
0.0016 
6.25% 
0.0045" 0 .0052' 
81.98% 86.39% 
251 251 
5,651 3,637 
0 .0042° 
77.69% 
250 
2,014 
0.0062" 
25.84% 
150 
31 
0.0009 
11.98% 
0.0008 
24.18% 
0.0038' 0 .0042 ' 
83.05% 86.29% 
251 251 
4,870 3,142 
0 .0037 ' 
78.38% 
250 
1,728 
0.0067' 
24.83% 
145 
24 
0.0004 
12.20% 
-0.0002 
21.62% 
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Appendix A: Distribution of number of deals by the legal origin of target's nation 
Anglo-Saxon German 
Australia 112 Austria 17 
Bermuda 2 Germany 184 
Canada 69 Japan 18 
Gibraltar 2 South Korea 10 
Hong Kong 17 Switzerland 31 
India 14 Taiwan 6 
Ireland-Rep 71 Total 266 
Israel 7 Scandinavian 
Jamaica 2 Denmark 30 
Malaysia 7 Finland 12 
New Zealand 12 Iceland 1 
Nigeria 2 Norway 20 
Pakistan 1 Sweden 51 
Singapore 11 Total 114 
South Africa 36 Socialist 
United Kingdom 4,262 China 12 
United States 842 Croatia 2 
Utd Arab Em 1 Czech Republic 12 
Thailand 4 Kazakhstan 3 
Total 5,474 Poland 13 
French Romania 3 
Argentina 10 Russian Fed 7 
Belgium 49 Slovak Rep 2 
Brazil 15 Ukraine 2 
Chile 3 Vietnam 1 
Colombia 2 Hungary 4 
Costa Rica 1 Total 61 
Egypt 3 Un-Specified 
France 241 Angola 1 
Greece 11 Antigua 2 
Honduras 2 Bahamas 1 
Indonesia 3 Guernsey 3 
Iran 1 Isle of Man 1 
Italy 69 Jersey 2 
Luxembourg 3 Kyrgyzstan 1 
Mexico 12 Liechtenstein 1 
Monaco 6 Mauritius 1 
Netherlands 166 Tajikistan 2 
Oman 1 Unknown 2 
Peru 2 Total 17 
Philippines 7 
Portugal 13 Domestic 4,262 
Spain 66 Cross-Border 2,372 
Turkey 14 Total 6,634 
Venezuela 2 
Total 702 
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Chapter 4: Economic Conditions, Market Valuations, and Gains from Domestic versus CBA 
4.1 Introduction 
Extant literature records that an increasing number of firms seek to expand their 
operations by diversifying across different industry sectors and/or countries via 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A).' As a result, a block voluminous literature has 
emerged on whether domestic and cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBA) 
create value to acquiring firms' shareholders. Earlier studies have also attempted to 
uncover whether bidders acquiring domestic versus foreign targets yield different 
wealth effects to their shareholders (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005)." More 
recently, another strand of studies has highlighted the deterministic power of 
market valuation condition or the stage of the merger wave at the time of the bid 
announcement on the short and long-run gains of domestic bidding firms (Bouwman 
et al. 2009).^ In the same context, Rosen (2006) have also noted that the gains of 
bidders that announce takeovers bids at different stages of the merger wave, are 
highly sensitive to the optimistic view of investors about the future prospects of the 
M&A (i.e. investor's sentiment). On the other hand, although Baker et al. (2009) 
showed that foreign direct investment (FDl) flows are a function of the source 
country's stock market performance, supporting the 'cheap financial capital' 
hypothesis, very little is known about the effect of the market valuation condition 
and investor's sentiment on the wealth of shareholders of firms acquiring foreign 
targets. This chapter addresses this issue and further explores the impact of market 
^ Motives that force firms to diversify across markets and industry sectors are the deregulation of a 
number of industries, the constantly increasing competition within markets and industries, and the 
globalization of financial markets (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Mulherin and Boone, 2000; Andrade, 
et al. 2001). In addition, several other studies, such as Gregory and McCorriston (2005) and UNCTAD 
(2006), reported that the number for cross-border acquisitions has increased substantially within the 
last decade due to the deregulation of financial markets. 
^ Previous research has mainly been concentrated on the sensitivity of bidding firms' gains to deal and 
firm-specific characteristics, such as target status (Chang, 1998; Fuller et al. 2002; Draper and Paudyal, 
2006), method of payment (Myers and Mjluf, 1984; Travlos, 1987; Asquith et al. 1983; Draper and 
Paudyal, 1999 and 2006; Fuller et al. 2002), size of the bidding firm (Moeller et al. 2004), relative size 
of the deal (Asquith et al. 1983), and growrth opportunities of the bidding firm (Rau and Vermaelen, 
1998; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003). Other studies have examined the wealth effects to bidders of 
operating in the foreign market for corporate control. For example, Doukas and Travlos (1988) 
examined the impact of the bidding firm's previous operations in the target firm's country, while 
Gregory and McCorriston (2005) examined the impact of geographical diversification on bidder gains. 
' Several scholars have individually concluded that the merger activity clusters over time (Weston, 
1953; Gort, 1969; Chung and Weaton, 1982; Andrade et al. 2001). 
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valuations, economic conditions, and investor's sentiment in the source country, on 
the determination of the short and long-run gains of shareholders of bidders 
acquiring foreign targets. In similar respects, no previous study has examined the 
impact of market valuation condition and the stage of business cycle on (a) the 
merger activities, and (b) the wealth effects of shareholders of firms acquiring 
domestic versus foreign targets. In this chapter, I also aim to fill this void in the 
literature by comparing the short and long-run gains of bidders engaged in domestic 
and CBA at times of booming or depressed market and economic conditions.'* More 
specifically, in this chapter I argue that the market and economic conditions in all 
countries in question affect (a) the competition in the bidding contest, and (b) the 
level of investor's sentiment at the time of the M&A announcement, which is 
therefore expected to be reflected in the UK takeover activities and hence in the 
short and long-run gains of bidders acquiring domestic and foreign targets. 
Whereas earlier research has confirmed that the domestic takeover activity clusters 
over time,^ several theories have emerged to explain this behaviour, such as the 
neoclassical theory of mergers, the strategic theory, and the behavioural approach. 
The neoclassical theory of mergers is associated with the work of Gort (1969)^ and is 
based on efficient or rational explanations of merger waves, which posits that the 
M&A activity spikes with technological, economic, and regulatory shocks within 
industries {Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Mulherin and Boone, 2000; Andrade et al. 
2001; and Harford, 2005). On the contrary, the behavioural approach argues that the 
observed clustering in takeover activity is largely driven by stock market mis-
valuations.^ Dong et al. (2006), Shieifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2004) developed models which suggest that merger activity spikes 
* Loughran and Vijh (1997) argued that the announcement returns generated to bidders' shareholders 
may not fully reflect the wealth effect of that event and therefore the examination of the bidders 
returns in the post-merger period represent a necessary task. 
^ See for example, Golbe and White (1993), Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001), Maksimovic and Phillips 
(2001), Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004), Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005), and 
Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009). 
^ Similarly, Coase (1937) supported that technological changes mainly affect merger waves 
throughout the industrial shocks. 
^ This theory has been empirically supported by Nelson (1959), Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), 
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001), Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005), Dong et al. (2006), 
and Ang and Cheng (2006). 
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with stock market valuations.^ These studies claimed that stock price deviations 
from their fundamentals (i.e. mis-valuations) motivate rational managers to 
arbitrage by engaging in M&A during such times.^ They also revealed a positive 
correlation between takeover activity and stock market's performance that derived 
from firm's and industry's specific mis-valuation components. In similar respects, 
other scholars have concluded that merger activity clusters with the level of 
economic performance, measured for example by GNP, or economic growth, and the 
stage of business cycle.'" On this very issue, Rosen (2006) investigated the 
relationship between market valuation and the returns of bidders' shareholders, and 
concluded that investor's sentiment about takeovers at the time of the 
announcement is reflected in the market's reaction. In particular, Rosen (2006) 
claimed that the bidding firms' performance in the sort-run is a function of investors' 
optimism regarding the general future prospects of M&A, and posits that merger 
momentum may be also driven by the optimistic view of a group of investors, in 
other words, the timing of M&A announcements is crucial in driving short-term 
share price movements. Accordingly, in this chapter, based on the Rosen's (2006) 
theory i argue that during low (high) market valuation periods bidders should show a 
strong preference for domestic (foreign) targets firms. These preferences are mainly 
driven by the low (high) levels of investor's sentiment regarding the nature and the 
value creation from a takeover bid at a specific time, which is therefore expected to 
be reflected on the gains generated to bidding firms' shareholders. 
Along similar lines, both theoretical and empirical research records some connection 
between CBA activity and market valuation conditions. Indeed, Baker et al. (2009) 
noted that FDl increase significantly with the level of stock market valuation in 
source-countries. These findings, however, become much stronger with (a) the 
component of valuation that is expected to revert in the subsequent year, and (b) 
* However, this theory contradicts Roll's (1986) prediction that financial markets are strong-form 
efficient whereas bidders' managers are infected by hubris when making merger decisions. 
' One of the most famous examples of this is the Aol - Time Warner merger in January 2001. More 
specifically, Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) decomposed the mis-valuation effect into two 
specific factors, the firm specific and the market/industry specific components. 
^° See for example. Nelson (1959), Gort (1969), Steiner (1975), Chung and Weston (1982), Melicher, 
Ledolter and D'Antionio (1983), Becketti (1986), Golbe and White (1993), Mitchell and Mulherin 
(1996), Mulherin and Boone (2000), Andrade et al. (2001), and Lambrecth (2004). 
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the existence of capital account restrictions that prevent other mechanisms of cross-
country arbitrage. Di Giovanni (2005) examined the role of macroeconomic and 
financial variables on the firm's decision to engage in FDI and concluded that 
financial and other institutional variables play a significant role in CBA flows with the 
most important among others, being the size of financial markets. Other scholars, 
such as Vasconcellos and Kish (1996), suggested that bond yields and stock prices are 
good explanatory variables of CBA trends over time. They also noted that CBA occur 
more frequently when bond yields in the bidding firm's country are higher than 
those in the target firm's country. In addition, when the host country's stock market 
is depressed relative to the home countries' market, CBA activity increases. Other 
macroeconomic variables are also found to contribute towards the explanation of 
the overall CBA activity (Vasconcellos et al. 1990; Kish and Vasconcellos, 1993). 
Despite the rich array of studies that have attempted to resolve the puzzle on the 
clustering of domestic and CBA activities, there still remain several important 
questions that deserve investigation." This chapter examines whether, at the 
aggregate level, the clustering of domestic and CBA activities are significantly 
affected by various macroeconomic indicators, such as effective exchange rate (EER), 
gross national product (GNP), a Coincident Index that depicts the stage of the 
business cycle, and the Growth Index for the UK economy).' ' Along with 
macroeconomic indicators, the chapter also empirically examines whether the 
aggregate stock market performance (as measured with the deviation of the overall 
market and industry P/E ratios) invites or discourages firms to engage in domestic or 
CBA activities. It is also expected that investors' sentiment (which spikes with market 
valuations) at the time of the M&A announcement to significantly influence the 
bidders' announcement and long-run performance subject to the takeover bid 
announcement. As a result, the bidding firm's short and long-run performance is 
examined within the framework of domestic versus CBA at across booming or 
Rossi and Volpin (2004) examined the impact of the various laws, corporate governance systems 
and regulations across the w^orld on the cross-border market for corporate control. Di Giovanni (2005) 
examined w/orldwide CBA flows by using the gravity model. 
" The Effective Exchange Rate (EER) is provided by the Bank of England, www.bankDfenKland.co.uk. 
The Coincident Index and the Growth Index are provided by the Economic Cycle Research Institute 
(ECRI), www.businesscvcle.com. 
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depressed times. In the same framework, I also investigate the roles of other 
transaction and firm-specific characteristics, such as the target firm's status, the 
method of payment used, the deal's relative size, the bidder's size, and the bidder's 
growth opportunities, during periods of high or low M&A activity. This chapter, to 
the best of my knowledge, examines for the first time in finance literature the 
determinants of CBA waves in the UK market by taking into account the following 
factors: (a) market valuation conditions, (b) economic conditions by looking at the 
different stages of the business cycle, and (c) the impact of the UK currency's EER. It 
is also the first study that examines the impact of the pre-stated factors on the gains 
of bidders' shareholders acquired domestic versus foreign target firms. 
The overall conclusions derived from this chapter suggest that domestic and CBA 
activities are highly sensitive to abnormal deviations of market valuations, economic 
conditions, and the EER. Specifically, when the de-trended P/E ratio, at both 
aggregate and industry level, is above (below) its normal values, M&A activity tends 
to be high (low) in terms of number of bids. Similarly, when the various 
macroeconomic indicators and EER deviate significantly from their fundamental 
values, both domestic M&A and CBA activity is significantly affected. The findings 
also suggest that the wealth effects of bidding firms' shareholders in the short and 
long-run quickly adjust to absorb the either good or bad news subject to the timing 
of the takeover bid announcement. In fact, both univariate and cross-section 
analyses convey that in the short-run, domestic bidders realize higher abnormal 
returns than foreign bidders only when the takeovers is announced during periods of 
low market valuation, weak EER, and high levels of economic growth. On the other 
hand, bidders' shareholders enjoy higher gains from foreign than from domestic bids 
only when takeover announcement is made during periods of high market valuation 
and strong EER. Overall, the target firm's domicile, the level of M&A activity, and 
other transaction and firm-specific characteristics shape bidders' gains in the short-
run with bidders acquiring domestic targets to outperform the ones bidding for 
foreign targets in general, though it should be noted that this is not always the case. 
On the other hand, in the long-run, bidders tend to enjoy positive abnormal returns 
or experience significant losses depending on the market valuation conditions, the 
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stage of business cycle, and the power of EER at the time of the bid announcement. 
These results, while consistent with the findings of the majority of studies in this 
field of research, add significant value to our existing knowledge. This is due to the 
unique nature of this research to investigate for the first time the interaction 
between market valuations, economic conditions, EER, and the level of investors' 
sentiment in the source country, on the gains of bidders' shareholders engaged in 
domestic versus foreign acquisitions. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 focuses on the 
history of merger waves between the early part of last century and more recent 
times, including their likely drivers and implications, section 3 refers to studies that 
are closely associated with the main questions addressed in this chapter, section 4 
discusses the main controls and further considerations, section 5 develops the 
testable hypotheses, section 6 describes the data, summary statistics, and the 
methodologies followed, and section 7 reports, interprets and discuss the empirical 
findings generated from the application of my testing procedure. Finally, section 8 
summarizes and concludes this chapter. 
4.2 The History of Merger Waves" 
Although corporate takeovers continue to represent the most universal corporate 
restructuring strategy, the empirical evidence suggests that the M&A activities come 
in waves (i.e. merger activity clusters at both aggregate and industry level). The 
purpose of the present section is to highlight the presence of merger waves since the 
early part of the last century to more recent times. Specific characteristics that 
contribute to the emergence of each particular merger wave are reported and 
discussed in great detail. Although the different characteristics of each merger wave 
are not mutually exclusive, every merger wave is driven by a particular number/type 
of forces that are closely related to the function of the economy or industry. Thus, 
See figures 4:1 and 4:3 fortlie history of merger waves diagrammatically. 
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the various merger waves do not emerge (only) by any random managerial incentive 
but are instead, motivated by the dynamics of specific economic or industrial forces. 
In this respect, Shughart and Tollison (1984) examined the existence of merger 
waves between 1895 and 1979 and failed to reject the hypothesis that merger levels 
are characterized by a white-noise process or by a stable first-order autoregressive 
process. 
Insert figures 4:1 and 4:3 about here 
With respect to merger waves in the US and UK, it is observed that the US has the 
longest history of M&A activity, which dates from the early twentieth century, while 
the UK merger experience have been observed from the early 1960s (see figure 4:3). 
When other countries are considered, it is observed that across Europe (i.e. 
continental Europe) similar patterns of M&A activity have been recorded. 
Furthermore, while the majority of M&A occurs between firms operating in the 
same country (i.e. domestic acquisitions), almost 40 percent of M&A announced 
during the last twenty years have involved firms operating in foreign countries (i.e. 
CBA). Thus, given the focus of the present chapter, this section commences by 
discussing the earlier merger waves since it will offer a direct perspective on the 
importance of the issue at hand as well as the need for further investigation. Thus 
the discussion in this section is shaped by the factors or the characteristics that give 
rise to various merger waves across several time periods. 
4.2.1 Horizontal Mergers or Merging for Monopoly 
It is well known that the US economy experienced its first major merger wave 
between the period 1890 and 1904. This merger wave was motivated by 
simultaneous consolidation''* of products within industries, which characterized such 
" In consolidations ail the companies combined stop their operations and become part of a newly 
developed company. Consolidations are often formed when either companies, or all companies 
combined, have approximately the same size. 
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merger wave as a 'horizontal consolidation' wave - commonly referred to as the 
'merging for monopoly' wave (Stigler, 1950). This wave also coincided with high 
levels of economic growth. One of the main features characterizing this merger wave 
was the emergence of several consolidations such as the merger of a number of 
firms into one entity. For example, many giants in the US, including General Electric, 
Eastman Kodak, American Can, DuPont, Standard Oil, American Tobacco and US 
Steel, were formed during that merger wave through consolidation. It is also 
important to note that the third US merger wave which occurred over the period 
1965 and 1970 was restricted owing to the imposition of antitrust legislation which 
limited horizontal'^ takeovers, resulting in an increase in conglomerate'^ forms of 
M&A. With respect to UK merger waves, the first peak occurred in 1968 and the 
second in 1972, all of which were motivated by horizontal mergers. In 1964 the UK 
Labor Government adopted a new industrial policy which was designed to strength 
and thus turn UK companies into national champions. This policy was implemented 
via the Industrial Reorganization Corporation (IRC) which was created in order to 
revolutionize the UK corporate policy. Over the period 1965 and 1969 the IRC 
sponsored about 50 horizontal mergers, include among others GEC, AEI, English 
Electric and British Leyland. The main feature of the second merger wave was again 
horizontal mergers, but they were slightly less than in the first merger wave even 
though at the time there existed several conglomerate mergers. 
4.2.2 Vertical Mergers or Merging for Oligopoly 
Over the period 1925 to 1929 the US economy experienced its second major merger 
wave which was motivated by vertical'^ mergers. Stigler (1950) defined this merger 
In horizontal M&A both the bidder and the target firm are in the same business line. Companies 
usually engaged into horizontal M&A in an attempt to further pursuit economies of scale. 
" In conglomerate merger the bidding and the target company operate under different types of 
business; in other words when the bidding firm acquires a target firm that is unrelated to its core 
business, this transaction is usually called conglomerate merger. 
" Vertical M&A initiated by firms at different stages of production; in other words the bidder acquires 
another company in the same production line although at a different stage (i.e. the bidder buys a 
supplier or a distributor). Companies usually involved in vertical M&A in an attempt to achieve cost 
savings through diversification. 
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wave as a period for merging for oligopoly, in the main, vertical forms of acquisitions 
had only very limited impact on merger waves and was not considered by corporate 
managers to be an effective strategy with which to grow corporations. 
4.2.3 Market Power, Economic and Industrial Forces 
Merger waves have been motivated not only by specific factors such as, for example, 
horizontal, vertical, conglomerates, and consolidation types of M&A activity but also 
other factors related to the overall performance of the economy and the stock 
market. Indeed, almost all mergers waves in the history of merger activity have been 
inspired by high rates of economic growth, low rates of interest and high levels of 
stock prices in the economy. Almost all US merger waves, including the merger 
waves of the 1980s and 1990s in the UK and EU, have coincided with periods of 
economic expansion and high stock prices. These types of merger waves commenced 
following a period of sharp economic decline, with a low interest rates and during 
stock market bubbles. However, for most countries, the merger wave that occurred 
during the 1990s was characterized by technological advancements and innovations 
which dominated the industrial landscape of that period. In particular, deregulation 
in the banking sector, health care and utilities industry gave rise to increased M&A 
activity, while the defense industry also witnessed substantial M&A activity which 
was largely driven by advancements in technological innovations. Also new 
supranational trading blocs such as the creation of the European Single Market, the 
North Atlantic Free Trade Association (NAFTA), and the creation of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) helped, not only to reduce the level of trading barriers and 
capital mobility, but also to increase opportunities for corporate growth. 
4.2.3.1 Government and Central Bank Policy 
The Government's and Central Bank's policy have either a direct or an indirect effect 
on the state of the economy which therefore may have a significant influence on the 
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level and direction of domestic and CBA activities. Several scholars have studied the 
implications of the fiscal policy and monetary policy on the M&A activity over time 
(see for example Grefory and McCorriston, 2005; Kiymaz, 2004). Both fiscal and 
monetary policies are two of the most important tools that the Governments and 
Central Banks utilize in order to adjust the economic activity. Any government 
through its fiscal policy can adjust the Government spending over time which may 
have significant effects on a number of industry sectors. To an extent, some 
industries may become more attractive than others after the implementation of a 
Government's policy to increase for example, the Government spending, or to 
decrease the taxation on an input that is very important for the cost of prpduction in 
these particular industries. Along these lines, an adjustment of the fiscal policy is 
very likely to affect the M&A activity both within industry and country level. 
The Central Bank through the monetary policy committee can apply an expansionary 
or a contractionary policy in the economy, which will influence significantly the 
interest rates, inflation expectations, exchange rates, and the trading volumes. In 
fact, expectations of high inflation in the economy are very likely to destabilize 
competition and increase the uncertainty in terms of the future expected cash flows 
and discount rates of corporations. Similarly, a change in interest rates, following the 
Central Bank's policy, is very likely to affect corporate valuations within the economy 
and thus increase uncertainty in terms of target firm's valuation. Along these lines. 
Central Banks through monetary policy can cause exchange rate volatility which is 
very likely to alter competition in the market for corporate control. For example, 
when the home currency becomes weak against a foreign currency, home firms face 
a disadvantage in going abroad and acquiring other firms. On the other hand, firms 
from abroad have an advantage to enter into the home market, thereby intensifying 
the competition in the home market for corporate control (see Kiymaz, 2004). 
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4.2.3.2 Industrial Shocks 
Extant literature in the field of corporate and investment finance has explicitly linked 
the association between M&A waves over time with the impact of certain industrial 
effects (i.e. technological advancements, innovations, deregulations, barriers to 
entry). The literature in this field of research dates back to Nelson (1959), and Eis 
(1969), where both authors concluded that M&A cluster at both market and industry 
level. More recent studies reported similar results in terms of the effect of various 
industrial effects on M&A activity. For example, Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), 
Mulherin and Boone (2000), and Andrade et al. (2001) have admitted that M&A 
waves are mainly driven by economic, regulatory and industrial shocks. A more 
detailed association between industrial effects and M&A waves is discussed in the 
next section of this empirical chapter where I focus on the domestic M&A waves 
experience subject to market valuations. 
4.2.4 Managerial Motives and Merger Waves 
From the above discussion it becomes clear that M&A activity spikes with different 
factors related to the type of the deal and the economic or market condition. 
However, regardless the explanations that have been provided so far in terms of 
what drives M&A activity, the question of why M&A cluster periodically is still under 
investigation. More specifically, what are the likely factors that help markets and 
industries to become either 'attractive' or 'non-attractive' for a set of firms, while 
not for other firms? And what constitutes the corporate/economic environment as 
more favourable for a set of firms to engage in domestic and/or CBA, while not for 
others? The following discussion refers to a number of possible managerial motives 
that influence M&A activity throughout a number of decades. 
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4.2.4.1 Hubris 
Evidence suggests that M&A activity varies over time as a result of hubris (Roll, 1986) 
- 'hubris hypothesis'. Indeed, bidding firms' managers consider their own 
estimations in valuing target firms as superior, opposite to the market makers' 
valuation estimations. As a result, the likelihood for the acquiring company to 
overpay for the target firm increases due to the managers' over-optimism when 
value potential synergies that is likely to arise through M&A. Moreover, the 
competition among potential bidders is likely to result to the winning bidder to 
overpay for the target because of hubris, even if a number of important synergies 
are available for both the bidding and target firm.'^ In fact, managers and members 
of the Board of Directors tend to be very competitive while in many cases self-
important." As a result, 'hubris hypothesis' can be recognized as the most important 
determinant of the very high percentage of unsuccessful M&A (approximately 70%) 
within a period of three years following M&A announcements. 
4.2.4.2 Market Manias 
Following the behavioural finance school of thought, several theories have been 
developed that have, to a large extent, been able to explain the M&A activity over 
the course of several decades. In principle, the role of mass behaviour which is the 
source of several market crashes and bubbles can be attributed as one of the M&A 
activity determinants. A set of studies have linked the theory of mass behaviour with 
the M&A activity. Specifically, Kelly (1994) investigated the relationship between 
market movements and swarms of bees and flock of geese (i.e. herding behaviour). 
Gleick (1998) and others applied the chaos theory to explain the market's behaviour 
over time. Along these lines, Shiller (1998) examined the impact of several market 
" In general, value creation through M&A is achieved once the PV of the potential synergies exist the 
premium paid to finance the deal. 
Hubris is also one of the most important factors that contribute on the winner's curse. 
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time trends on the M&A activity and concluded that both, group behaviour and 
gambling, are closely correlated with M&A trends over time. 
4.2.4.3 Overvaluation of Stocks and Asymmetric Information 
Nelson (1959) argued that the development of a previously undeveloped market 
may increase M&A activity whereas Golbe and While (1988) noted that M&A activity 
increases (decreases) by the availability (unavailability) of bargains. Indeed, Golbe 
and While highlighted that M&A activity increases (decreases) with a low (high) 
Tobin's Q. Others suggested that the stock prices increase/decrease the level of FDI 
(Vasconcellos, Madura, and Kish, 1990; Vasconcellos and Kish, 1998; and Baker, 
Foley, and Wurgler, 2009). Previous research has also examined the impact of 
market timing, overvaluation of stocks, and M&A activity. For example, Shieifer and 
Vishny (2003), and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) and Rhodes-Kropf, 
Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) documented evidence in line with the 
information hypothesis of Myers and Majluf (1984). In fact, the authors noted that 
while managers have better knowledge in terms of the intrinsic value of their own 
companies, they have higher decision power in terms of the timing to sell. In fact, 
when outside shareholders' valuation estimates exceed the insider's (i.e. managers') 
ones, rational managers take advantage of that situation, thereby selling stock which 
further enhances the wealth of their current shareholders. 
In summary, and in view of what has just been discussed, merger waves would seem 
as a universal phenomenon of the 20*'' century which not only benefitted the largest 
economies but also several economies much smaller in size to the developed 
countries mentioned above. This is due in part to the fact that M&A corporate 
restructuring strategy tends to spread worldwide, with perhaps the US, the UK, 
Canada, Japan, and a few other EU countries maintaining their superiority of M&A 
activity over time. However, the question of what has driven M&A waves over time 
is still under investigation. The weak explanations for the wealth effects created to 
bidding firms that engage in M&A within the framework of domestic versus foreign 
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acquisitions across booming or depressed time periods, deserve further 
investigation. Similar questions will be addressed over the course of the subsequent 
sections and answers to these questions will be provided within the same 
framework. 
4.3 Literature Review 
The majority of studies that focus on the relationship between the M&A activity and 
bidders' gains have mainly focused on acquisitions conducted in the domestic 
market for corporate control. In spite of the relatively large number of studies in the 
literature that attempt to resolve the puzzle on (a) why domestic M&A activity 
clusters over time, and (b) what are the likely effects of M&A waves on the bidding 
firm's short and long-run wealth effects, still several voids remain unfilled and 
several questions unanswered. This chapter attempts to fill those voids and answer 
those questions. However, before the testable hypotheses for this chapter will be 
established, it is very important for the reader to be aware of the main findings in 
this field of research thereby allow the contribution of this chapter to become much 
more transparent. Following the main research question which investigated in this 
chapter, this section reviews the literature on the implications of (a) the aggregate 
market and industry performance, and (b) the various economic indicators on (i) the 
domestic and CBA activities, and (ii) the bidding firm's announcement and post-
merger abnormal returns. More specifically, in this section I review only the 
literature that is related to key issues I examine in this empirical chapter whilst the 
literature related to common controls I apply across this analysis is reviewed and 
discussed, in great detail, in the chapter two of the thesis. Studies that examine the 
wealth effects to bidding firms engaging in domestic versus CBA are also reviewed in 
chapter two. Therefore, as the main question examined is concerned, I will divide 
this section into two broad categories, (a) the studies that focus only on the 
domestic M&A waves and bidders' gains and (b) the studies that focus only on the 
foreign acquisitions waves and bidders' gains. 
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4.3.1 Domestic M&A Activity and Bidder Gains 
Previous research on whether M&A activity clusters over time includes a wide range 
of studies, some of which date back to 1950s, with some others being very recent. In 
fact, numerous studies in this field of research have concentrated on the effects of 
market valuations and security prices on the M&A activities throughout time. 
Similarly, another strand of studies records the impact of macroeconomic conditions 
on the level and direction of domestic acquisitions. Whereas the majority of these 
studies investigate the behaviour of merger waves over time, others attempt to 
explain, along with the behaviour of the mergers waves, the stock market reaction in 
the short and in the long-run, subject to the timing of the M&A announcement. 
Accordingly, the rest of this sub-section will be divided into two parts; the first one 
review only studies that investigate only determinants of various merger waves 
whilst the second one review only studies that concentrate on both the explanation 
of merger waves and bidders' gains. 
4.3.1.1 Domestic Mergers Waves 
Numerous conclusions have been recorded in finance literature in terms of the 
behaviour of merger activity throughout time, in short, both theoretical and 
empirical research has explicitly documented that the domestic M&A activity 
clusters over time at both aggregate and industry level. In general, M&A activity 
tends to be high (low) during periods of high (low) rates of economic growth, low 
(high) or decreasing (increasing) rates of interests, and when the stock market is, on 
average, above (bellow) its normal level/values.^° Concerning the blocks of studies in 
finance literature that investigate various factors affecting merger waves over time, 
the most common ones can be categorized into the ones that focus on industrial 
shocks while others focus on the impact of economic growth and stock prices. 
°^ See for example, Weston, 1953; Nelson, 1959; Eis, 1969; Gort, 1969; Steiner, 1975; Beckenstein, 
1979; Chung and Weston, 1982; Mellcher, Ledolter and D' Antonio, 1983; Shughart and Tollison, 
1984; Guerard, 1985; Beckett!, 1986; and Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001. 
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Industrial Shocks 
Although important economic shocks have been significantly affected the overall 
economic performance over time and hence provide a favourable environment for 
many firms to engage in M&A, certain improvements in specific industries (i.e. 
technological advancements, innovations) still maintain the level and direction of 
many M&A transactions (see for example, Gort, 1969; and Mutchell and Mulherin, 
1996). In that respect, one of the most important theories that attempt to explain 
the behaviour of M&A activity is the neoclassical theory of mergers. This theory 
supports the view that the state of the economy and its regulatory framework 
provide some clear explanations of the observed M&A patterns. Gort (1969), 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Mulherin and Boone (2000), and Andrade, Mitchell, 
and Stafford (2001) noted that M&A waves are mainly driven by economic, 
regulatory and industrial shocks. Given these shocks, M&A are utilized by many 
corporations as the most effective corporate restructuring strategy/vehicle in order 
to adjust their operations into the new economic and possibly competitive, 
environment. In fact, Gort (1969) developed the economic disturbance theory of 
merger waves. The author has incorporated in his theoretical framework the 
aggregate level of equilibrium in product markets and suggests that a rise in general 
economic activity causes disequilibria in product markets thereby affecting merger 
waves. Evidently, Gort's theory is consistent with the emergence of several merger 
waves during periods of high economic growth and rising stock market performance 
in the US, UK and E U . ' ' In addition, Gort's theory enabled the existence of some 
room for error in his model, as the author recognized that different industries may 
be affected differently by the forces affecting M&A activity over time, and he 
reported evidence in favour of the industry clustering of merger activity from the 
1950s merger wave. Similarly, Eis (1969) used a sample of 3,000 merger transactions 
during the period between 1919 and 1930 and across 25 different industries. He 
" However, the existence of several cross effects between merger waves and economic activity is 
very likely in this case. 
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recorded similar results in terms of the industry clustering of M&A. Indeed, he 
concluded that five industries account for 67.5% of the overall merger activity. 
More recent studies, such as Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) investigated the impact 
of industrial shocks on M&A activity over the period between 1982 and 1989. Using 
a sample of 381 firms operating in 51 industries the authors concluded that the 
majority of the firms in their sample of interest are experiencing major corporate 
restructuring. In particular, the authors concluded that various industrial shocks 
affected significantly the M&A activity during the 1980s (i.e. the banking and 
broadcasting by deregulation, textiles by liberalized trade policy, energy by oil 
changes, food processing by a demographic shift or the low population growth). 
They also observed significant differences in the rate and timing of M&A activity 
across industries. In short, almost 50% of the M&A deals in one industry announced 
within the 25% of the entire time period studied. Schoenberg and Reeves (1999) 
found also that between the period 1990 and 1995 and among 200 industrial 
sectors, M&A activity clusters by industry. The same authors identify that (a) the 
exposure to deregulation is the most important determinant that explicitly 
influences high and low M&A activity, (b) the industry growth rate plays a very 
important role too (higher growth increase the M&A activity in that sector) and (c) 
the industry concentration influences M&A activity significantly (lower concentration 
influence positively M&A activity over time). In addition, Mulherin and Boone (2000) 
recorded that M&A activity clusters by various industrial characteristics whilst they 
recognized that the deregulation of a certain number of industries is the most 
important factor influencing M&A activity over time. Along similar respects, 
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001) pointed also out that there exists a positive and 
significant relationship between large technological changes and M&A activity. 
Specifically, the authors studied two merger waves; one between 1890 and 1930 and 
another between 1971 and 2001. They concluded that the first merger wave was 
mainly driven by the diffusion of electricity while the second one was driven by the 
diffusion of information technology. 
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A more recent study investigated by Lambrecth (2004) who expanded the industry 
theory in a real option framework. The author noted that most corporations would 
prefer to acquire others instead of growing organically. Indeed, positive shocks 
would increase the volatility of the firms' asset values thereby they would raise the 
value of the merger option which therefore would result to a rise in M&A activity. He 
also investigated the question on whether mergers are motivated by economies of 
scale and found that firms have an extra incentive to engage in M&A in periods of 
economic expansion. The same author further concluded that, by relaxing the 
assumption that firms are price takers, market power further encourage firms' 
motivations to merge and accelerates merger activity on average. Lastly, Harford 
(2005) investigated the question of what originally affected industrial level merger 
waves within the past two decades. He presented evidence supporting that the 
market timing has little explanatory power in merger waves whereas he confirmed 
the neoclassical theory of mergers. In fact, he found that industrial, technological, 
and regulatory shocks drive merger activity over the course of several decades. 
The Impact of Economic Growth and Stock Prices 
Prior studies have explicitly investigated the impact of growth levels in the economy, 
stock prices, and bond yields, on the level and direction of merger activity. Weston 
(1953) employed a multiple regression analysis framework to analyze annual merger 
data for the period between the First and the Second World War (1918 and 1939). 
The author concluded that the mergers are highly positively sensitive to security 
prices and to the wholesale commodity prices whereas they are not sensitive to 
industrial production levels. Similar findings reported from other studies. For 
example. Nelson (1959) investigated whether the US merger activity for the period 
between 1895 and 1956, with some primary focus on the period between 1895 and 
1920. He found that in general M&A activity is sensitive to the development of the 
security markets in the US, industrial production, growth rates in the US economy, 
and transportation costs. Initially, for the analysis between 1895 and 1920 the 
author found evidence against the proposition that mergers are affected by (a) the 
slowdown of growth in the US economy, and (b) the decrease of the transportation 
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costs. However, Nelson (1959) concluded that both the development of the US 
security markets and the market power are significantly encouraged merger activity. 
In addition, although he found a highly significant positive relationship between 
quarterly merger data and the level of security prices, he also found an insignificant 
relationship between merger activity and industrial production. When the author 
extended his analysis for the period between 1895 and 1954, he found similar results 
with the merger activity being highly sensitive to security prices although he still 
found no relationship between merger activity and industrial production. 
Along similar lines, Steiner (1975) explained the annual merger activity, in terms of 
both number and value, for the period between 1949 and early 1970s. By utilizing 
multiple regression models, the author found that both the GNP and the change in 
the level of security prices had a positive and significant influence on the merger 
activity. Beckenstein (1979) examined possible factors that affect merger activity 
(both in terms of number and value) between 1949 and 1975 and by using a similar 
approach with Steiner (1975) he supported the importance of the nominal level of 
security prices and the nominal rate of interest on the explanation of merger activity. 
Earlier studies have also examined the relationship between merger activity and 
corporate bonds. In short, Chung and Weston (1982) utilized a multiple regression 
framework in their attempt to identify factors that significantly affect the annual 
number of large conglomerate mergers over time. The authors found that the 
activity of conglomerate mergers is positive and significant with (a) a proxy 
calculated by the difference between yields on lower and higher grade corporate 
bonds, (b) the ratio of short to long-term bond yields, and (c) the rate of growth of 
GNP. On the other hand, Chung and Weston (1982) found a negative relationship 
between the activity of conglomerate mergers and the rate of return on corporate 
bonds. 
In addition, Melicher, Ledolter, and D'Antionio (1983) investigated the determinants 
of quarterly merger data between 1947 and 1977. By employing the so called 
"prewhitened" logarithmic first difference transformations methodology, the 
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authors found (a) a positive and significant relationship between merger activities 
and lagged stock prices, (b) a negative and significant relationship between merger 
activity and lagged bond yields, and (c) no relationship between merger activity and 
industrial activity or business failure levels. Similarly, Guerard (1985) employed a 
similar methodology with Melicher, Ledolter, and D'Antionio (1983), and found 
evidence supporting that the quarterly merger data between 1895 and 1950 are 
positively related to lagged stock prices and lagged bond yields whilst they are 
unrelated to the level of industrial production. On the other hand, Shugart and 
Tollison (1984) examined annual merger data for the periods between (a) 1895 and 
1920, and (b) 1947 and 1979, and found evidence against the characterization of the 
merger data as occurring in waves. In fact, the authors concluded that the annual 
mergers time series follow a "white-noise process with possible drift" or by a "stable 
first order autoregressive scheme". In respect to that, Golbe and White (1993) 
investigated the hypothesis that the US merger activity has occurred in waves by 
utilizing a direct time series analysis. The authors found evidence supporting that the 
M&A activity comes in waves, which is in contrast with the main findings of Shugart 
and Tollison's (1984) paper. Golbe and White criticized the work by Shugart and 
Toiiison by asking, "Why did Shugart and Tollison's (1984) indirect test apparently fail 
to find waves? Their autoregressive models imply that these merger series can be 
described as random walks with drift..." (see footnote 15, Golbe and White, 1993). 
Lastly, Becketti (1986) investigated the determinants of the M&A activity over the 
period between 1960 and 1985 using quarterly merger data. The author employed 
simple OLS regression analysis and having lagged values on the explanatory variables 
he concluded that the M&A activity was affected positively by (a) the security prices, 
(b) the general level of debt in the economy, and (c) the level of capital utilization. 
Conversely, the author found that the M&A activity for the same period was affected 
negatively by (a) the real interest rates, and (b) the real GNP. Several other studies, 
more recent ones, have provided numerous of evidence in terms of the effects of 
industrial shocks, economic growth, and stock prices, on the level and direction of 
M&A activities. However, the majority of these studies have been reviewed and 
174 
Chapter 4: Economic Conditions, Market Valuations, and Gains from Domestic versus CBA 
discussed, in great detail, in the introduction part, where the l<ey motivations, and 
the main research question examined in this chapter, are formed/established. 
4.3.1.2 Domestic Mergers Waves and Bidder Gains 
Based on the above findings, which clearly confirm the existence of merger waves 
throughout time, several scholars have attempted to identify the connection 
between the merger waves and the announcement and post-merger wealth effects 
of bidders' and targets' shareholders. Several conclusions have been recorded by a 
rich array of studies in this field of research. In short, several scholars have noted 
that periods of low (high) M&A activity correlate with periods of low (high) market 
valuations while the latter is clearly positively correlated with the use of cash (stock) 
as the method of financing in the transaction (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001; 
Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2001; and Ang and Cheng, 2006). Recent studies examined 
whether the bidding firms' stock returns around the M&A announcement and in the 
long-run are sensitive with the quality of merger announcement (Bouwman et al. 
2009). Indeed, the authors proxy for the quality of the merger announcement based 
on the level of market valuations at the time of the bid announcement (i.e. whether 
the M&A is announced during a depressed or a booming time period). To an extent, 
this one of the most important studies that examines the long-run wealth effects to 
bidding firms that engage in M&A across depressed and/or booming periods. The 
authors found that in the short-run bidders enjoy higher (lower) abnormal returns 
when they engage in M&A during high-valuation (low-valuation) periods. The 
situation however reverses in the long-run with the bidding firms acquiring targets 
during low-valuation periods to outperform the ones bidding for targets during high-
valuation periods. Similarly, bidders acquiring targets during low-valuation periods 
experience higher operating performance than the ones bidding for targets during 
high-valuation periods. The authors claimed that this market reaction in the short 
and in the long-run is consistent with the managerial herding hypothesis. 
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Overall, the review of the above studies suggests that merger activity is not only a 
random behaviour of managerial incentives but it spikes w]t\r\ industrial shocks, 
economic growth, and the stock market's performance over time. Another strand of 
studies has also confirmed that bidders' short and long-run gains are significantly 
influenced by merger activity. In spite of the numerous research outcomes in this 
field of research, several research questions remain to be investigated. This chapter 
aims to address a number of those questions as the principle motivation 
underpinning this chapter is to compare the short and long-run bidders' gains from 
domestic versus foreign acquisitions at different market and economic conditions. 
4.3.2 CBA Activity and Bidder Gains 
In general, studies investigating the level and direction of CBA appear relatively 
fewer, compared to the ones that examine the level and direction of domestic 
M&A." However, in spite of the volume of studies in this area, several important 
conclusions have been recorded regarding the significant factors that influence CBA 
activity over time. Along these lines, the majority of studies suggest that there is a 
significant relationship between the level of the various macroeconomic indicators 
and the FDI activity. On the other hand, very little is known about the implication of 
market timing on CBA activity (i.e. market valuations and industry valuations). In the 
forthcoming discussion, I review studies on (a) the market valuations and (b) the 
economic conditions, on the level and direction of CBA activity whilst I review the 
literature on the wealth effects generated to bidding firms engaging in CBA, subject 
to foreign merger waves. 
Although very little is known about the impact of market valuations on the level and 
direction of CBA activity, Vasconcellos, Madura, and Kish (1990) found that stock 
" At this point it is worth mentioning that the CBA activity stared to rise significantly within the last 
two decades (i.e. from the second half of 1980s) implying that the cross-border merger waves started 
to appear more often by that time. Further, the majority of the studies in the literature that attempt 
to discuss possible determents of the CBA waves over t ime appear at early-mid 1990s thereby they do 
not account for the biggest M&A wave that took place by late 1990s which was mainly overpopulated 
by CBA deals. 
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prices in the US were significantly affected the IVI&A activity in favour of UK 
companies between 1979 and 1987. Similarly, Vasconcellos and Kish (1998) utilized 
both logit and multiple regression models to investigate the implications of bond 
yields, exchange rates, and stock prices, on the CBA activity between US and 
Germany, Italy, UK, and France for the period between 1982 and 1994. The authors 
found through regression analysis that stock prices influence significantly both the 
number and direction of CBA between firms in the US and each of the European 
markets. Specifically, the authors pointed out that when the US market is depressed 
relative to foreign stock markets (the four European ones), foreign bidders are 
encouraged more in acquiring US target firms. In the same respect, a more recent 
study investigated by Baker, Foley, and Wurgler (2009) examined the role of cross-
border arbitrage by multinationals. The authors provided evidence consistent with 
multinational arbitrage as a determinant of foreign direct investment (FDI) patterns. 
Indeed, their results clearly indicate that FDI activity increase sharply with source-
country stock market valuations. Their results further suggest the existence of a 
cheap financial capital channel in which FDI flows reflect, in part, the use of relatively 
low-cost capital available to overvalued parents in the source country.'^ 
In addition, Di Giovanni (2005) addressed the question of whether a set of 
macroeconomic and financial variables encourage FDI decisions over time by using a 
simple 'gravity model'. In fact, the author recorded that the size of the financial 
markets (measured by the stock market capitalization over the GDP ratio) is 
positively associated with the ability of firms to invest abroad, whereas the taxes 
have a negative effect on the level of CBA. The same author found also that proxies 
related to, (1) distance between the two firms in the transaction, (2) telephone 
traffic, (3) language of the target and bidding firm's domicile, (4) regional trade,''* (5) 
real exchange rates, (6) nominal exchange rate volatility, (7) economic size, and (8) 
" In this study I examine the same hypothesis for the UK market. See hypothesis development section 
for more clarification. 
The regional trade has a significant impact on CBA activity with the type of trade agreement to play 
a significant role (e.g. custom unions and free trade agreement have a negative effect on CBA while 
service agreements have a positive effect). 
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wage differential, have all a significant impact on the level and direction of foreign 
acquisitions. 
Overall, while the above studies suggest that there is a strong relationship between 
CBA activities and market or economic conditions, very little is known about the 
relationship between CBA activities and bidders' short and long-run gains. The 
present chapter aims to fill this void in finance literature. Furthermore, this chapter 
aims to study the gains generated to shareholders of bidders of domestic versus 
foreign targets that announced during different economic and market conditions. 
4.4 Main Controls and Further Considerations 
This chapter investigates the question on whether there is a fundamental difference 
on the wealth effects to bidding firms that engage in domestic versus CBA across 
booming and/or depressed time periods. To classify the periods as booming and/or 
depressed ones, or to classify the market or economic condition for UK firms as 
favourable, or more favourable than others, to engage in domestic and/or foreign 
acquisitions, I employ three proxies: (a) both aggregate stock market and industry 
performance (FTSE All Share) - i.e. the market valuations proxy, (b) the state of the 
UK economy measured by the GNP, GDP, the Coincidence Index, and the Growth 
Index - the UK macroeconomic indicators, and (c) the EER of the British Starling 
(GBP). 
4.4.1 Market Valuations 
Several studies in the M&A literature have investigated the implications of market 
valuations on the performance and direction of corporate takeovers over the course 
of several decades (see for example Andrade et al. 2001; Harford, 2005; Bouwman et 
al. 2009). Within the same framework, several theories have been developed in an 
attempt to explain the M&A patterns over time. Among others, the neoclassical 
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theory of mergers and the behavioural approach are the most commonly accepted 
o n e s . " Along similar respects, in this chapter I control for the market valuations in 
the source country by utilizing both the P/E for the aggregate stock market 
performance and the P/E of the 10 industry Classification as indicated by Fama and 
French (1993). More specifically, in order to classify the periods as high-neutral-low, I 
de-trend the P/E time series for the FTSE All Share (figure 4:4) and the 10 industries 
thereby I classify the periods as in Bouwman et al. (2009) (a detailed discussion of 
this approach is referred in the Data and Methodology, section 4.6.3). 
Insert figure 4:4 about here 
4.4.2 Macroeconomic Indicators 
In addition to market valuations, this chapter aims to control for the economic 
conditions in the source country. The macroeconomic indicators that are utilized to 
classify the period as favourable versus non-favourable for UK firms that engage in 
domestic M&A and in CBA, are the GDP, the GNP, the Coincidence Index and the 
Growth Index. The stage of the economy at the time of the acquisitions' 
announcement may affect significantly the short and long-run wealth effects 
generated to bidding firms. Specifically, from the deal-characteristics point of view, 
the stage of the economy may affect the method of payment used to finance the 
transaction, the premiums paid, and hence the transaction's value, which are all 
expected to reflected on bidding firm's short and long-run gains. 
" For related studies, see for example, Nelson (1959), Gort (1969), Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), 
Mulherin and Boone (2000), Shieifer and Vishny (2003), and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004). 
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4.4.2.1 Stage of the Business Cycle 
The economic performance or the stage of the business cycle at different times 
(specified by leading, coincidence, and lagging indicators)"^ reflects very important 
information with regards to the current and future wealth effects to both acquiring 
and target firms, as well as the combined entity. The Business cycle is basically 
defined as the long-term pattern of booms and recessions in the economy. In 
general, a business cycle is characterized by four major stages: recession, depression, 
normal growth, and booming cycles, not necessarily in that order. Specifically, the 
business cycle moves between periods of relatively rapid growth of output (recovery 
and prosperity), and periods of relative decline (recession). The real"^ gross domestic 
product (GDP) is one of the main measures of business cycles. Further, employment 
levels, retail sales, and industrial productivity are some other economic indicators 
that show whether a business cycle is shifting from one stage to another, in my 
analysis, the states of business cycle (booming and recession periods) are obtained 
from the Economic Cycle Research institute (www.businesscvcle.com). The 
coincidence index that used to depict the four stages of the business cycle 
(recession, depression, normal growth, and booming cycles) needs to be de-trended 
(a detailed discussion of this approach is referred in the Data and Methodology, 
" Leading Economic Indicator, it depicts the business cycle's peaks and troughs three to twelve 
months before they actually occur. This indicator is basically estimated by employing ten measures, 
which are: (1) manufacturers' new orders for consumer goods and materials, (2) an index of vendor 
performance, (3) manufacturers' new orders for non defense capital goods, (4) the Standard & Poor's 
500 index of stock prices, (5) new building permits for private housing, (6) the interest rate spread 
between U.S. Treasury bonds and Federal Funds, (7) the M2 real money supply, (8) average workweek 
in manufacturing, (9) an index of consumer expectations, and (10) average weekly initial claims for 
unemployment insurance. Coincident Economic Indicators: it depicts the business cycle's peaks and 
troughs at the time they actually occur. This indicator is basically estimated by employing four 
measures, which are: (1) the number of employees on nonagricultural payrolls, (2) industrial 
production, (3) real personal income (after subtracting transfer payments), and (4) real manufacturing 
and trade sales. The coincident economic indicator is the primary source of information used to 
document the "official" business cycle turning points. Finally, Laaaina Economic Indicators: it depicts 
the business cycle's peaks and troughs three to twelve months after they actually occur. This indicator 
is basically estimated by employing seven measures, which are: (1) labor cost per unit of output in 
manufacturing, (2) the average prime interest rate, (3) the amount of outstanding commercial and 
industrial debt, (4) the Consumer Price Index for services, (5) consumer credit as a fraction of personal 
income, (6) the average duration of unemployment, and (7) the ratio of inventories to sales for 
manufacturing and trade. 
" In economics, the nominal values of an indicator are its money values across different t ime periods. 
Alternatively, real values, adjust for differences in the price level in those years. 
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section 4.6.3) to enable the identification of the different stages (figure 4:5). 
Previous studies have applied similar research efforts. For example, Becketti (1986) 
examined the relationship between the aggregate cyclical fluctuations and M&A 
activity. Among other variables that are considered, the changes in real interest rates 
affect significantly the M&A activity over time. Specifically, the author noted also 
that this may reflect the dependence of acquiring firm on dept financing. 
Insert figure 4:5 about here 
4.4.2.2 GNP and its Growth Index 
The GNP and the rate of growth of the GNP reflect the most influential determinants 
of most of corporate investment decisions. Several studies in previous research have 
individually concluded that the M&A activity is highly sensitive to the level of GNP.^^ 
In this study, apart from the de-trended GNP and GDP (a detailed discussion of this 
approach is referred in the Data and Methodology, section 4.6.3), 1 use the growth 
index of the UK economy (figures 4:6, 4:7, and 4:8) over the period between 1986 
and 2007 as provided by the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI), 
www.businesscvcle.com. 
Insert figure 4:6,4:7, and 4:8 about here 
4.4.3 Effective Exchange Rate (EER) 
A set of studies in the corporate and investment finance literature investigate 
whether there is a significant relationship between the level of the exchange rate"' 
For related studies, see for example, Weston (1953), Gort (1969), Steiner (1975), Chung and 
Weston (1982), Melicher et al. (1983), Becketti (1986), Golbe and White (1993), Andrade et al. (2001), 
and Lambrecth (2004). 
" In general, the exchange rate (ER) is the price of one currency in terms of another. The ER of the 
pound sterling is therefore defined as the number of units of currency X that is required to buy one 
pound sterling on the foreign exchange market. Likewise, it is referred as the number of units of the 
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of one currency against another and the level or direction of CBA throughout time. In 
short, firms operating in countries with overvalued currencies have a comparative 
advantage to the ones operating in countries with undervalued currency. 
Furthermore, several scholars have reached to the conclusion that M&A activity 
varies significantly with the volatility of the exchange rate of the US dollar and other 
currencies over time. In other words, in periods where the dollar value is much 
higher against other currencies, the CBA activity for US target firms appears very low 
while the opposite occurs when the value of the US dollar is low against other 
currencies. 
The exchange rate volatility has significant implications on the direction and 
magnitude of CBA. Theoretical and empirical work investigated by Cushman (1985), 
Froot and Stein (1991), and Blonigen (1997) provided evidence explaining why US 
dollar depreciation might have boosted the inflow of foreign capital into the US 
during the 1980s. In general, exchange rate depreciation leads to increase FDI 
inflows into the depreciating country. In addition, Cushman (1985) and Goldberg and 
Kolstad (1995) examined the impact of exchange rate volatility on FDI with both of 
the papers to suggest that exchange rate volatility should positively affect FDI flows. 
The authors further suggested that their conclusion is conditional on different 
behavioural assumptions and on the types of shock that hit the economy over time. 
In addition, the effect of exchange rate volatility on M&A flows is still ambiguous for 
a number of reasons. When exchange rate volatility is high (meaning more 
uncertainty and higher risk), firms will more likely delay their acquisitions. Bidding 
firms may also delay (or even cancel) their intent to acquire a target company 
depending on how its cash flows correlate with those of the potential target 
company's cash flows, if there is a strong correlation in cash flows (for any reason), 
then exchange rate volatility is a cause for concern. Exchange rate risk may offset a 
target company's cash flows before they reach the target company. 
domestic currency that is required to buy one unit of the foreign currency. Basically, the ER of a 
currency may influence the price (and hence the quantity) of a country's exports, which to an extent 
determine the level of output and the level of employment or unemployment in the domestic 
economy (specifically, in the exporting industries and companies) . 
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For the main purpose of this chapter I employ the Effective Exchange Rate (EER) of 
the UK Sterling (see figure 4:9). This type of exchange rate is essentially used so as to 
take into account the variability of the pound sterling against a basket of other 
currencies, some of which are more important than others in UK's trading 
relationship. The ERR is computed as a trade weighted average of the individual or 
bilateral rates, and is expressed as an index number relative to the base year. 
Therefore, the ERR is a multilateral trade weighted exchange rate. The Effective 
Exchange Rate (EER) is provided by the Bank of England, www.bankofengland.co.uk. 
Insert figure 4:9 about here 
4.5 Hypothesis Development 
The main objective of this section is to address the implications on the wealth effects 
of acquiring firms' shareholders that engage in domestic and/or foreign acquisitions 
and guided by market and economic conditions, and the level of the EER. In so doing, 
this chapter not only compares the wealth effects of domestic and CBA that occur 
across booming or depressed economic conditions, but it also identifies additional 
factors that lead to differential (if any) in performance. For example, when stock 
market valuations in the bidding firm's country are high (low), or when the bidding 
firm's country's business cycle is at the peak (trough), or when the EER of the bidding 
firm's country is strong (week), the takeover activity is expected to be high (low), 
which may have several implications on the bidding firms' announcement and post-
takeover valuation effects. To test for this, in this chapter I examine several 
propositions which are summarized below. 
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4.5.1 Merger Waves'" 
This chapter's analysis starts with an investigation of whether domestic and CBA 
activity clusters over time, i.e. comes in waves. Further, it investigates whether the 
short and long-run gains to the acquirers of domestic and foreign targets are 
sensitive to market valuation conditions, economic conditions, and the level of the 
EER at the time of bid announcement and whether there is a fundamental difference 
between the gains obtained to bidders' shareholders from domestic deals with those 
obtained by cross-border deals. 
Merger Activity in General 
The neoclassical theory of mergers argues that bidding firm's managers engage only 
in positive NPV projects. Most of the literature in this field of research investigates 
whether M&A activity is affected by economic and industrial shocks,^' both in 
qualitative and quantitative terms, and concludes that periods of low (high) M&A 
activity are highly correlated with periods of low (high) market valuations. Market 
valuation conditions also affect the choice of the method of financing the 
transaction.^- In addition, the size and direction of CBA activity is affected by various 
macroeconomic indicators such as the exchange rate regime, bond yields, the 
business cycle and economic g r o w t h . F u r t h e r evidence suggests that there is a 
significant relationship between the source-country stock market valuation 
conditions and the FDI activity.^"* Indeed, Baker et al. (2009) examined the sensitivity 
of FDI flows on market valuation and concluded that FDI activity increased sharply 
with source-country stock market valuations. In response to this observation, in this 
In this edge I discuss and hypothesize based on possible merger wave determinants the likely 
outcomes of merger activity across all sample groups (i.e. domestic, CBA, and all subsamples of CBA). 
" See for example Nelson, 1969; Gort , 1969; Eis, 1969; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Mulherin and 
Boone, 2000; Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001; and Schoenberg and Reeves, 1999. 
" For related studies see for example, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001); Jovanovic and Rousseau 
(2001); Shieifer and Vishny (2003); and Ang and Cheng (2006). 
" See for example, Weston, 1953; Nelson, 1959; Gort, 1969; Steiner, 1975; Chung and Weston, 1982; 
Golbe and White, 1993; Andrade et al. 2001; and Kiymaz, 2004. 
^ See for example, Vasconcellos et al. 1990; Vasconcellos and Kish, 1998; Kiymaz, 2004; and Gregory 
and McCorriston, 2005. 
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chapter I test whether the stock market valuations in the bidding firm's country 
influence CBA activities as well as whether they influence domestic acquisitions 
activities in different ways. 
The above discussion indicates that domestic and CBA activity is highly sensitive to 
(a) the stock market performance at both aggregate and industry level, and (b) the 
state of the economy at the time of the M&A announcement. All things equal, I 
would expect that the UK's market, industrial, and macroeconomic dynamics to 
positively affect the number of both domestic and foreign acquisitions initiated by 
UK bidders.'^ Arguably, macroeconomic indicators that reflect economic expansion, 
such as the level of GDP, GNP, coincidence index, the growth index, and market 
conditions such as the equilibrium level of the FTSE All Share Index in the UK, are the 
most influential determinants for most of corporate investment decisions. 
Accordingly, it may be argued that, during periods of economic expansion and high 
market valuations, companies would much prefer to take advantage of the overall 
market and macroeconomic conditions in order to grow and maintain shareholder's 
wealth maximization as an objective. This discussion gives rise to the first testable 
hypothesis: 
HI: Takeover activity is expected to be higher during periods of high market 
valuations and economic expansion than during periods of low market valuation 
and economic contraction, irrespective of the target firm's domicile'. 
Merger Activity in the Foreign Market 
This section explains the main reasons that motivate the split/division of CBA sample 
in two groups. The first group of CBA contains only takeovers that occur with target 
firms operating in the group of six countries (G6=G7-UK), whereas the second group 
contains only transactions that occur with target firms operating in the rest-of-the-
world (RoW=World-G7) group of countries. The division of CBA sample into two 
" This chapter leaves open the question of whether in the foreign market, industrial, institutional, 
and macroeconomic conditions of the target's country affect merger waves differently. 
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groups is based on the likelihood that the economic activity and stock market 
performance of the six most wealthy countries across the world (US, Canada, 
Germany, France, Italy, and Japan) would be more integrated than for countries in 
the rest of the world (Hornstein, 2000; Jensen and Stokman, 2004). Moreover, 
evidence suggests that the national stock market indices for these six countries (G6) 
are co-integrated (Chou, Ng, and Pi, 1994). 
Given that M&A activity is highly correlated with the performance of the stock 
market at both aggregate and industry level, the M&A activity in the G6 countries is 
expected to rise during times of high stock market valuation (in the UK). It is also 
likely that, on average, technologies and innovations developed in the more 
industrialized or more advanced countries would lead to an industrial effect, 
suggesting therefore that UK bidders would have an extra incentive to engage in CBA 
in G6 countries during these times (or they might prefer to stay in the domestic 
market during those times). 
Previous literature states also that periods of high economic growth accommodate 
several industrial shocks, giving rise to new developments and innovations in certain 
industries. Bidding firms are expected to attempt to take advantage of these 
technologies and innovation by involving themselves in M&A, since M&A represent 
the most widely accepted method of reallocation of capital, which is expected to be 
higher during periods of market overvaluations, economic shocks, and industrial 
innovations. This leads to the second testable hypothesis: 
H2: 'In periods subject to high market valuations and economic expansion in the 
UK, CBA activity in 66 countries is expected to be higher than CBA activity in the 
RoW countries'. 
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4.5.2 Market Valuations, Economic Conditions, and Bidder Gains^^ 
Earlier studies suggest that merger waves represent an ordinary phenomenon for 
several markets across the world as well as their valuation effects (both short and 
long-run) to bidders during those times appear very important (Bouwman et al. 
2009). In principle, M&A represent one of the most widely accepted ways of 
reallocation of capital (i.e. (skilled) human capital, intangible assets, patents, etc). 
The potential synergies to bidders from M&A announced during periods of high 
market valuations, industrial shocks, and economic expansion are expected to be 
more valuable than in periods of low valuation and recession. Thus, deals announced 
during times of expansion are expected to reflect higher future cash flows and thus 
higher NPV, which in turn are expected to be interpreted by investors as good news. 
This leads to positive abnormal returns to bidding firms in the short-run. Moreover, 
during periods of major technological advancements and innovations, firms that 
have otherwise limited access to such opportunities would rather prefer to adopt 
these technologies and innovations through M&A, instead of pursuing them through 
organic growth. This argument supports the neoclassical theory of mergers, and 
provides the setting for the third testable hypothesis: 
H3: 'M&A announcements during high market valuation periods and economic 
expansion generate higher abnormal returns than deals announced during low 
market valuation periods and economic contraction, both in the short and in the 
long-run, irrespective of the target firm's domicile'. 
Investors' Sentiment, Market Valuations, and Domestic versus Foreign Bidder Gains 
Rosen (2006) noted that the short-run bidding firm's performance is a function of 
the investors' optimism regarding the M&A future prospect. Rosen also showed that 
merger momentum may be driven by the optimistic view of a group of investors who 
time the market, since during high (low) market valuation periods investor's 
in this edge I argue and discuss all possible factors that are likely to affect acquiring firms' 
performance from domestic and foreign bids. 
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optimism is expected to be higher (lower). In addition, Shieifer and Vishny (2003) 
and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) suggested that firms during high market 
valuations tend to curry overvalued stock, and they tend to overpay for target firms. 
This may have significant implications on the bidding firm's performance. 
Specifically, during periods of high (low) market valuations investors will interpret 
acquisitions with foreign target firms as good (bad) news. Thus, investors would 
prefer to take long (short) positions in the stock of bidders that prefer to stay in the 
domestic market during low (high) valuation periods, due to investor's optimism 
about the M&A announcement. This leads to the fourth testable hypothesis: 
H4: 'Bidding firms engaging in domestic (foreign) acquisitions during low (high) 
market valuation periods outperform those bidding for foreign (domestic) target 
firms during the same time periods'. 
Economic Activity and Domestic versus Foreign Bidder Gains 
Earlier studies showed that M&A activity clusters at both aggregate and industry 
levels and attributes that to technological, economic, and/or regulatory shocks." 
Thus M&A deals during times of great technological and regulatory shocks would be 
interpreted by market participants as positive NPV projects. 
Following the main research question that are addressed in this chapter, which rests 
on the fact that UK bidding firms choose to engage in domestic and or foreign 
acquisitions only when market valuations, economic conditions, and the level of 
exchange rate is in favour of such decision making, I would expect that UK bidders to 
choose to invest in the home market during periods of economic and regulatory 
shocks. This implies that when the variables employed to capture the level of 
economic performance in the UK (i.e. GNP, GDP, Coincidence Index, and the Growth 
Index) are above their equilibrium levels, domestic investments would increase the 
PV of potential synergies which further increase the likelihood of positive NPV 
" For a related discussion see for example Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Mulherin and Boone (2000), 
Andrade et al. (2001), and Harford (2005). 
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project (as high growth periods spike with technological advancements and 
innovations). Therefore, this leads to the fifth testable hypothesis: 
H5: 'Bidding firms engaging in domestic (foreign) acquisitions during expansion 
(contraction) periods outperform firms bidding for foreign (domestic) target firms 
during the same periods'. 
Market Valuations and Bidder Gains by Foreign Country Groupings 
The following discussion is designed to investigate whether any gains or losses 
realized by bidding firms' shareholders from domestic versus foreign acquisitions are 
mainly driven by deals of foreign target firms in a particular group of countries.^^ The 
investigation is following several arguments that developed previously in this 
section. The possible co-movements of the business cycle among the G7 countries as 
well as the possible co-integration of the main stock market indices among the G7 
countries suggest that different country groupings should be investigated (Hornstein, 
2000; Jensen and Stokman, 2004; Chou, Ng, and Pi, 1994). To an extent, the above 
evidence further decreases the likelihood of the co-movement of (a) the business 
cycles and (b) the main stock market indices, between the G6 countries and the RoW 
ones. 
According to Rosen (2006) and the main argument raised above regarding the 
relationship between the market valuations, investor's sentiment and bidders' 
decision to invest either domestically or internationally, during low market valuation 
periods investors would try to avoid further risks by investing in the domestic rather 
than foreign market. This would lead to higher abnormal returns to domestic bids 
versus bids that target foreign firms. The higher gains to domestic bidders' 
shareholders sustain not only for the entire sample of CBA but also for both sub-
in the overall context of this chapter, I firstly estimate the differentials in bidders' short and long-
run abnormal returns within the framework of domestic versus CBA. Subsequently, to identify any 
incremental effect of legal origin, I further examine the gains of bidders by the foreign country 
groupings. The same procedure is applied for the entire sample, as well as for samples comprised by 
deals announced only during depressed or during booming periods. 
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groups of the CBA sample, the G6 and the RoW one. In the first case (UK bidders 
acquiring G6 targets), a low market valuation period in the UK would coincide to a 
similarly low valuation period in the G6 countries, and thus low premiums for both 
domestic and foreign bids (due to low competition). However, bids with foreign 
targets are associated with the bidder's exposure into additional foreign market's 
risks (i.e. political risks, exchange rate ones, economic ones, government policy ones, 
central bank policy ones, etc), and thus bids targeted to domestic firms during low 
market valuation periods are likely to generate higher gains compared to bids 
targeted to foreign firms. On the contrary, low market valuation periods in the UK 
may coincide with high market valuations in the RoW countries. In this case, M&A 
activity would be high in the RoW countries, and thus higher premiums are required 
for bidding in these markets. Therefore, domestic bids should generate higher gains 
than targeting foreign companies, in addition, when considering CBA only, bids for 
firms in the G6 countries should outperform bids for firms in the RoW countries, due 
to lower competition levels and lower premiums paid in the G6 countries as well as 
due to likely expectations about higher future values. Overall, from the above 
discussion, UK firms acquiring domestic targets during low market valuations are 
expected to outperform CBA in both the G6 and in the RoW countries. 
The expected outcome changes in high market valuation periods. In this case, 
investors would more likely prefer foreign target firms since bidders would choose to 
invest in foreign markets during times of optimistic investors' sentiment (Rosen, 
2006). During high market valuation periods in the UK, market valuations in the G6 
(RoW) countries are likely to be high (low), which leads to high (low) M&A activity in 
G6 (RoW) and higher (lower) premiums paid for bids in the G6 (RoW). This would 
have a direct effect on the benefits from CBA and generate higher gains from bids of 
firms in the RoW countries. In addition, UK bidders during those times would rather 
prefer to invest in the domestic and or G6 countries rather than in the RoW ones,^^ 
in order to take advantage of the new technologies and innovations which spike with 
One might expect higher gains from bids in the G6 countries although in this case I argue that any 
synergetic benefit generated due to the acquisition of new technologies and innovations 
(technologies and innovations spike with the high market valuations) - PV of the synergy - would be 
cancelled out by the high premiums paid. 
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high market v a l u a t i o n s / " Lastly, acquisi t ions of target f irms operat ing in countr ies 
with similar market and e c o n o m i c status with the UK (i.e. the G 6 ones) will be more 
likely to sustain better synergies and better e c o n o m i e s of sca le in the long-run. On 
the other hand, the lower p r e m i u m s paid for targets in the RoW group of countr ies 
during booming per iods al low for higher short - run gains to these b idders . W h e t h e r 
the bidders enjoy higher gains f rom deals in the G 6 countr ies (with better synergies) 
or f rom deals in the R o W countr ies (with lower premiums) , is an open quest ion that 
d e s e r v e s further investigation. In this chapter , I argue that bidders acquir ing targets 
in the RoW group during booming periods (with lower p remiums) to outper form 
bidders acquiring targets in both domest ic and G 6 group (with higher premiums) . 
Therefore , this a l lows for the sett ing of the last testable hypothesis of this chapter 
w h i c h s ta tes that : 
H6: 'During low market valuations periods domestic (G6) acquisitions outperform 
both G6 and RoW {RoW) groups although during high market valuation periods 
acquisitions of targets in the RoW outperform the ones in the domestic market and 
the ones in the G6 markets'. 
4.5.3 Control Variables 
Factors that are known to affect bidders ' gains are also control led in the analysis. 
Bidders' size: Moel ler , Sch l ingemann, and Stuiz (2004) reported that larger acquirers 
earn about 2 % less than smal ler acquirers . There fore , to al low for this effect I control 
for the size of the bidder. The size of the bidder is m e a s u r e d by their pre-bid market 
capitalization (MV) . 
*° One might expect higher gains from domestic bids as wel l . However, given that investors prefer 
foreign bidders during those times, It is more plausible for the gains from CBA to outperform the 
domestic ones. 
To an extent, in the general context that M&A create value w h e n the PV of the synergy exceeds the 
premiums required to finance the deal, I argue that the benefit from the premium component 
outperforms the one related to the PV of the synergy (in this case it is obvious that the higher PV of 
synergy is delivered from domestic or G6 bids). 
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Growth opportunities of the bidder: It has also been documented that the growth 
opportunit ies of bidding f irms af fects their gains. S u d a r s h a n a m a n d Mahate (2003) 
and Conn et a l . (2005) s h o w e d that va lue acquirers (with low MTBV) outperform 
g lamour bidders both in the shor t and long-run. Thus , I control for growth 
opportunit ies of the bidding f irm. I m e a s u r e the growth opportunity of the bidder 
with their market- to-book value (MTBV) ratio and the pr ice-to-earnings (P /E ) ratio 
one month prior to the a n n o u n c e m e n t of the deal . 
Age of the bidder: I a lso control for the age of the bidding f irm. This is because f i rms 
with a long trading history have more information available in public domain (Barry 
a n d B r o w n , 1985; Zhang, 2006) . Ma ture f i rms are more likely to be in more m a t u r e 
industr ies, whi le f i rm's age may also capture the underlying volatility at the industry 
level . I measure the age of the firm wi th the n u m b e r of days that the firm has been 
recorded in DataSt ream. 
Relative size of the deal: Several authors have concluded that the bidding f i rm's 
abnormal returns within a smal l w i n d o w surrounding the acquisit ion 
a n n o u n c e m e n t ' s day increases as the target size increases relative to acquirer size 
(Asquith et al . 1983; Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989; Kang, 1993 ; 
Fuller e t al . 2002 , and Draper and Paudyai , 2006) . This is due to the fact that the 
larger the target f irm's size relative to the bidder, the more the original structure of 
the acquir ing firm changes as a result of the acquisit ion. ' '" 
Tlie relative size is measured by the ratio of the bidder's market capitalization (MV) and the 
transaction value of the deal (DV), MV/TV. 
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4.6 Data and Methodology 
4.6.1 Sample Description 
T h e information on the deal a n n o u n c e m e n t s is extracted from Securi t ies Data 
Corporat ions (SDC). The sample compr ises of bids a n n o u n c e d by UK f irms be tween 
0 1 / 0 1 / 1 9 8 6 and 3 1 / 1 2 / 2 0 0 7 . SDC records 59 ,051 dea ls a n n o u n c e m e n t s by UK f irms 
during this per iod. T h e final sample m e e t s the fol lowing cri ter ia. 
• The acquirer is a UK c o m p a n y t raded in the London Stock Exchange (LSE) . 
• T h e target is a private, a public, or a subsidiary domest ic and cross-border 
firm. 
• The sample is restr icted w h e n the acquirer a ims to obtain more than 5 0 % 
of the target f irm. 
• The deal value is equal to or greater than £ 1 million. 
• The market value of the acquirer is greater than £ 1 million (one month 
prior to the a n n o u n c e m e n t of the deal ) . 
• Acquir ing firms are not involved in other bids within 5-days (-2 to + 2) 
around the a n n o u n c e m e n t of the deal . 
• Data for the acquirer is available f rom DataSt ream. 
Finally, 7,633 acquisit ions m e e t the above criteria. 
For the purpose of classif ication of the t ime periods (i.e. months and quarterly) as 
d e p r e s s e d , neutral , and booming, a set of t ime ser ies is required. The t ime ser ies 
under considerat ion are avai lable f rom the fol lowing s o u r c e s : 
• The monthly P / E ratio for the FTSE All Share and the 10 monthly P / E 
ratios for the 10 industr ies according to F a m a a n d French 4 8 industry 
classif ication are col lected f rom T h o m s o n Financial DataSt ream. 
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• The quarterly Gross National Product (GNP) and Gross Domest ic Product 
(GDP) are col lected f rom T h o m s o n Financial DataSt ream. 
• The monthly Coincidence Index and the monthly G r o w t h Index are 
provided f rom the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI). '* ' 
• The monthly EER for the UK currency is provided from the Central Bank of 
England.**^ 
4.6.2 The Sample Features 
Figure and table 4:1 represent the annual distribution of the M&A deals a n n o u n c e d 
by UK bidders b e t w e e n 0 1 / 0 1 / 1 9 8 6 and 3 1 / 1 2 / 2 0 0 7 . Figure 4:1 clearly s h o w s the 
two major UK mergers w a v e s in my sample , the first during late 1980s and the 
second during late 1990s. Moreover , the s a m e figure and table depicts the third 
merger wave in my sample , which has started in 2004 and it is still ongoing.''^ A more 
detai led examinat ion of the table s h o w s that w h e r e a s the domest ic M&A activity 
decl ines after 2006 , the entire CBA activity, as well as the activity in G6 and in the 
RoW countr ies , cont inues to increase after 2006 . Among others , s o m e of the main 
drivers for the last three major M&A w a v e s in the UK market are , (a) the economic 
expansion of the late 1990s, (b) the technological a d v a n c e m e n t s , (c) the 
improvement in the information d isseminat ion across the word (i.e. internet) , (d) the 
European 's Union format ion, (e) the m a c r o e c o n o m i c (i.e. government ) policy of a 
large n u m b e r of countr ies across the world and (f) the stock market m o v e m e n t s over 
t ime. 
Insert table 4:1 and figure 4:1 about here 
The Coincident Index and the Growth Index are provided by the Economic Cycle Research Institute 
(ECRI), wwvt/ .buslnesscvcle.com 
The Effective Exchange Rate (EER) is provided by the Bank of England, w/w^w.bankofeneland.co.uk 
Although in my sample there is small and insignificant decline of the M&A activity after 2006 (this is 
due to sample eliminations caused by the limited availability of data from other data sources), the 
third M&A wave is still ongoing. 
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Fur thermore , according to table 4:2, panel A, all s a m p l e s (i.e. the entire group, the 
domest ic , CBA, G6 , and RoW ones) are overpopulated by acquisit ions of privately 
held target f irms (they represent approximately the 5 0 % of the entire sample across 
all groups) , wi th the portfolio of subsidiary targets to be the next largest one (it 
accounts of a lmost 30% of the ent ire sample across ail groups) and the portfolio of 
deals with listed target f irms to account for the smal les t proportion (a lmost 2 0 % in 
e a c h group correspondingly) . T h e s e pa tents conf i rm the findings of Faccio and 
Massul is (2005) for 13 European countr ies and Draper and Paudyal (2006) for the UK 
market . The distribution of sample according to the var ious m e t h o d s of payment 
(table 4:2, pane l B) ref lect that the bidders prefer to f inance the majority of M&A 
deals wi th c a s h (almost 5 5 % of the entire sample in all groups) , following with a 
combinat ion of both c a s h and stock and other payments (almost 3 5 % of the entire 
sample in e a c h group) thereby leaving the smal ler proport ion for deals f inanced with 
stock (almost 10% of the ent ire sample across all groups correspondingly) . 
Insert table 4:2 about here 
Table 4:2, panel C, summar izes the s u m m a r y statistics of the sample . Specifically, the 
bidding f irms prefer to pay higher deal value or transaction value for targets in the 
foreign market ( £160 .67 millions on average) as opposite to the ones in the domest ic 
market (£86 .36 millions on average) . In fact, among the targets bought in the foreign 
market for corporate control , the highest deal va lues are paid for targets that 
operate in the rest of the world (RoW) group ( £ 1 6 7 . 5 8 millions on average) . The 
bidding firm's age analysis s h o w s that relatively more mature bidders c h o s e to invest 
in the foreign market (6 ,315 days on average) c o m p a r e d to bidders that c h o s e to 
invest in the domest ic market (4,978 days o n average) . A m o n g the bidders that 
invest in the foreign market , similar mature bidders t e n d to enter in the G 6 group of 
countr ies and in the R o W group of countr ies (6,410 d a y s and 6 ,168 days on average 
respect ively) . Further analysis regarding the bidders' size depicts that smal l b idders 
prefer to acquire targets in the domest ic market ( £ 6 5 1 . 8 3 mill ions on average) as 
opposite to the large o n e s which prefer to exposure themse lves in the foreign 
market ( £ 1 3 , 8 9 9 . 7 1 millions on average) . A m o n g the o n e s that bid for target f irms in 
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the foreign market , the largest ones prefer to acquire target in countr ies under the 
rest of the world (RoW) group (£29 ,789 .24 mill ions on average) contrary to the ones 
that bid for target in countr ies under the G 6 group ( £ 3 , 6 3 1 . 7 8 mill ions on average) . 
Regarding the relative size of the dea l , P/E ratio, and MTBV ratio the average 
deviat ion a m o n g all sample groups appear very smal l , thereby do not al low for any 
further analysis. 
4.6.3 Classification of the Market and Economic Condition as 
Depressed (Low), Neutral, and Booming (High) 
For the purpose of this study, which is to examine the valuat ion effects to bidding 
f irms that acquire domest ic versus foreign target f irms across depressed a n d / o r 
booming per iods, the classif ication of the period a s d e p r e s s e d , neutral , and 
booming, according to the UK stock market 's per formance and the stage of the UK 
economy, compr ises a very important part that requires very careful considerat ion. 
In fact, the methodology employed to de- t rend the var ious t ime ser ies under 
considerat ion may lead to spur ious cycles - i.e. to depict the peak, contract ion, 
trough, and expansion stages of the cycle (see Canova , 1993b; King and Rebel lo, 
1993; and O s b o r n , 1995) . 
For the purpose of this examinat ion, I de - t rend the t ime ser ies under investigation 
by consider ing the following three steps: Firstly, I de - t rend the market and the 
Industry P / E ratios. Coinc idence Index, GNP, and GDP by removing the best straight-
line fit f rom the P / E , Coincidence Index, GNP, and GDP of the month in quest ion and 
the five preceding years . In the next s tep , e a c h m o n t h (or quarter) is categor ized as 
above (below) average if the de- t rended market P / E , Coinc idence Index, GDP, and 
GNP of the month /quar te r in the quest ion is above (below) this past f ive-year 
average. Next, the top half of the above-average months /quar te rs are classified as 
booming per iods and the bot tom half of the be low-average m o n t h s / q u a r t e r s are 
classified as depressed periods. All other m o n t h s / q u a r t e r s are classified as neutral 
periods. This approach leaves the mid-50 percent of the months /quar te rs in the 
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quest ion to lie within the neutral -period w h e r e a s both the booming and depressed 
month /quar te r period to represent the other 50 percent . 
4.6.4 Summary Statistics Based on the M&A Activity 
This sect ion presents the s u m m a r y statistics related to the M&A activity during 
depressed and or booming t ime periods. Specifically, in this sect ion I investigate 
w h e t h e r the M&A activity varies with the (a) market valuat ions at both aggregate 
and industry level and (b) the average deviat ion of a se t of m a c r o e c o n o m i c var iables 
such as the coincidence index, the GDP, GNP and its growth index in the UK 
economy. Figure 4:2 s h o w s the distribution of the M&A activity over t ime subject to 
the above ment ioned proxies. Clearly, both the market and the industry P /E ratios 
indicate that the M&A activity increases during per iods of high market valuat ions, 
regardless the target f i rm's domici le (i.e. al l , domest ic , CBA) . The results o n the M&A 
activity subject to m a c r o e c o n o m i c indicators show that the M&A activity increases 
substantial ly f rom periods of e c o n o m i c contract ion to per iods of economic 
expansion. Indeed, the co inc idence index, the GNP and the G D P s h o w the highest 
d i f ferences b e t w e e n the low and high M&A activity periods. Overal l , figure 4:2 
explicitly conveys that the M&A activity clusters over t ime regardless the target 
f irm's domici le. This supports the first and the second hypotheses of this 
investigation w h i c h further a l lows the investigation of the rest of the hypotheses 
(given that both domest ic and CBA activity clusters over t ime) . 
Insert figure 4:2 about here 
4.6.5 Announcement Period (Short-Run) Gains 
For the short -run analysis , th is chapter fol lows the tradition event study methods as 
summar i zed in Brown and W a r n e r (1985). Cumulat ive Average Returns (CAR) for 5-
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days [-2, to +2] surrounding the a n n o u n c e m e n t day (day 0) are es t imated . The 
abnormal return of acquirer is est imated using equat ion (3). 
ARu=K-K.. (3) 
W h e r e : 
ARf ^ = The abnormal return for security i in t ime period / ; 
R,. , = The return for the securi ty / in t ime period / , ; and 
^ m . , = return for the market (the FT-AII Share m e a s u r e d as the percentage 
dif ference of the Market Index) equally weighted index in t ime p e r i o d / . 
Finally, equat ion (4) es t imates the Cumulat ive Abnormal Returns (CAR) for the five-
days around the a n n o u n c e m e n t day (t). 
CA]^='f,{R,-Rj, (4) 
r= -2 
4.6.6 Long Run Performance 
To a s s e s s the post-acquisit ion per formance of bidders I est imate one , three and five 
year holding period excess returns after controll ing for known risk factors identified 
in Fama and French (1996) . Average monthly post -merger excess returns for 12, 36 , 
and 60 m o n t h s are es t imated under a ca lendar t ime portfolio regression (CTPR) 
f ramework. The CTPR accounts for the cross-sect ional d e p e n d e n c e of stock returns, 
particularly due to the inclusion of f requent acquirers , caused by the lack of 
independence a m o n g observat ions. This problem ar ises f rom over lapping returns 
and the non- random timing of acquisitions.'*^ For e a c h ca lendar month in the period 
from January 1986 to D e c e m b e r 2007, excess returns are calculated for all sample 
' For a detailed explanation of the CTPR method see Lyon et al. (1999). 
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f i rms that a n n o u n c e d bids wi th unl isted target f i rms during the previous 12, 36 and 
60 months . The calendar- t ime portfolio excess returns are est imated with equat ion 
(5): 
(5) 
In equat ion (5), the intercept (a^) m e a s u r e s the monthly average excess return of 
bidders after controll ing for the effects of three risk factors. The dependent variable 
- 7 ? ^ , ) i s the monthly excess return of the ca lendar- t ime portfolio of bidders 
over risk free rate; , - ^ ^ , ) is the excess return of market portfolio; S M B (Small 
minus Big) is the excess return of a portfolio of small f irms (value weighted) over a 
portfolio of large f irms; and HML (High minus Low) is the excess return of a portfolio 
of value f irms (value weighted) over g lamour f irms. S M B and HML are est imated 
using the method outl ined in Fama and French (1996) . 
4.7 Empirical Findings 
This sect ion reports and interprets the findings f rom this empir ical chapter . Initially, 
it focuses only on the analysis of the short - run and the cross-sect ion results w h e r e a s 
it concent ra tes o n the analys is of the post-acquisi t ion findings t o w a r d s the end of 
this sect ion. The main research quest ion that is addressed in this chapter is to 
uncover per formance differentials f rom domest ic versus CBA in the short and in the 
long-run across per iods of different e c o n o m i c condit ions and market valuat ions. 
Accordingly, portfolios are formed based on specif ic proxies chosen to capture the 
level of market va luat ions and e c o n o m i c condit ions throughout t ime. Abnormal 
returns differentials are also uncovered in e a c h case be tween portfolios of domest ic 
bidders versus foreign o n e s (and domest ic versus the sub-groups of foreign o n e s 
only) for all per iods as wel l as across per iods subject to high or low market 
valuat ions, high or low e c o n o m i c condit ions and strong or weak EER. 
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4.7.1 Announcenfient Period (Short-Run) Gains 
Bidding f irms' a n n o u n c e m e n t period (short-run) cumulat ive abnormal returns 
(hereaf ter CAR) are only reported in this sub-sect ion . They are reported in a two-
d imension f ramework: initially CAR is reported (vertically) for the ent ire sample of 
acquisi t ions, fol lowing sub-portfol ios of only domest ic acquisi t ions, foreign 
acquisi t ions, and the foreign acquisi t ions' sub-groups (i.e. G 6 countr ies and the RoW 
countr ies) . *^ The s a m e portfolios, as stated above , will be reported for acquisi t ions 
that occur during low-neutral -high market valuat ions or low-neutral -high e c o n o m i c 
condit ions or weak-neutra l -s t rong EER (horizontally). Accordingly, differentials will 
be uncovered b e t w e e n portfolios of domest ic bidders versus foreign ones , in order 
to further explore the source of any significant differential de tected in per formance 
in the f ramework of domest ic versus CBA, further differentials a re est imated for 
b idders investing in the f ramework of domest ic versus G 6 countr ies , domest ic versus 
R o W , and finally for the G 6 versus R o W groups of countr ies . Along with the main 
research quest ion of this chapter , differentials for the s a m e portfolios as above will 
be recorder but only for bids that occurred ei ther during low or high market 
valuat ions, low or high economic condit ions, and weak or strong E E R . In the s a m e 
context , results will be reported based on their further division according to target 
status (i.e. private, public, and subsidiary) and method of payment (i.e. c a s h , stock, 
and mixed /o ther ) . All tables are divided in 3 panels which include the ent ire sample 
(panel A) and panels according to the target firm status (panel B: private, public, 
subsidiary) and the method of payment (panel C: cash , stock, mixed /o ther ) . 
The results are reported initially according to market valuat ions' proxies. The FTSE 
All Share P / E ratio is used to capture the aggregate's market valuat ion whi le the 10 
industry classification P /E ratios are used to capture the industr ies' market 
valuat ions in the UK market . Next, results are reported accord ing to proxies that 
capture the e c o n o m i c condit ion in the UK market . This sub-sect ion starts with the 
*' \Nhere G6=G7-UK and RoW=World-G7, as discussed extensively in previous sections. 
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business cycle indicators and fol lows with the GNP and its growth rate index in the 
UK market . Finally, the short - run results are reported according to the EER of the UK 
Sterl ing Pound. In addit ion, along with the univariate analysis, the results based on 
the cross-sect ion analysis fol lows. 
4.7.1.1 Announcement Gains Subject to Market Valuations 
Tab les 4:3 and 4:4 record CAR for UK acquirers sor ted according to the de - t rended 
FTSE All Share 's P /E index and the 10 industry classif ication P / E ratios for the UK 
market respectively. Panels A of both tables report CAR for the ent ire sample . 
Accordingly, the CAR for the entire sample is 1.32% and highly significant w h e r e a s 
this figure is clearly dr iven by bids of public target f i rms (2.29%) a n d for bids f inanced 
with cash (1.67%). Further, the CAR for bidders engaging in M&A with domest ic 
targets f irms (1.47%), foreign ones (0.98%), and f irms operat ing in the foreign 
marke t in the G 6 (0.80%) and in the R o W countr ies (1.26%) are similarly all dr iven by 
the results subject to targets f irms status and the var ious methods of payment 
utilized (panels B to C of both tables 4:3 and 4:4). 
Along similar lines, for the ent ire sample (i.e. all periods) bidding firms acquir ing 
targets that operate in the domest ic market outper form the ones buying targets 
operat ing in the foreign market by a highly statistically significant margin of 0.49%. 
Further analysis conveys that acquir ing f irms bidding for domest ic targets f i rms (a) 
outper form the ones bidding for targets in the G 6 group of countr ies with 0 .67% 
(highly statistically significant) and (b) yield similar CAR with the ones buying targets 
in the R o W group of count r ies (0 .22% statistically insignificant higher CAR for 
domest ic bidders) . Moreover , within the f ramework of CBA only, bidders enjoy 
0 .50% higher CAR w h e n acquir ing targets in the R o W group of countr ies than in the 
G 6 one . W h e t h e r t h e s e gains to bidders in the f ramework of domest ic v e r s u s CBA 
are driven by the dynamics of market valuat ions and economic condit ions over t ime 
is an empir ical quest ion that will be addressed in the next few sect ions. 
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Insert tables 4:3 and 4:4 about here 
T h e discussion is n o w concentrat ing on the results obtained according to market 
valuat ions over t ime; it appears that w h e n moving from the portfolio subject to low 
market valuat ions to the one subject to high market valuat ions bidder gains increase 
geometr ical ly . Indeed, according to panel A of table 4:3 (4:4), for the ent ire sample , 
the gains to bidders increase geometr ical ly from 0.61% (0.79%) during low market 
valuat ion per iods to 1.50% (1.75%) during high market valuat ion per iods (these 
findings are similar wi th the o n e s repor ted by B o u w m a n e t al . 2009) . T h e s a m e 
pattern holds for all portfolios according to target f irm's domici le . T h e s e results 
clearly support the third hypothesis w h i c h further supports the neoclassical theory 
of mergers (Nelson, 1969; Gort , 1969; Eis, 1969; Mitchell and Mulher in , 1996; 
Mulher in and Boone, 2000; Andrade et a l . 2001) . Further analysis in t e r m s of the 
per formance to bidding f irms acquir ing targets in the domest ic versus foreign market 
suggest that the market valuat ions const i tute a very important role in the 
explanat ion of bidder gains. In short , b idders earn higher returns w h e n they invest in 
the h o m e (foreign) market during low (high) market valuat ions per iods. In genera l , 
t h e univariate analysis suggests that b idders enjoy on average 0 .83% (significant at 
5% level) higher gains by investing in the domest ic market during low market 
valuat ions than investing in the foreign market . Further , w h e n taking into account 
o ther deal and f irm-specif ic character ist ics (in cross-sect ion analysis) the findings 
confirm the above pattern. Indeed, bidders enjoy higher gains from domest ic 
(foreign) bids during low (high) market valuat ion periods of 0 .72% and 0 .65% (0.47% 
and 0.25%) - s e e table 4:8, panel D. Th is is the first indication for the determinist ic 
power of market valuat ions on the gains to domest ic versus foreign bidders' 
shareho lders . This finding conf irm the forth hypothesis of this chapter wh ich is also 
consistent wi th the findings recorded by R o s e n (2006). 
In order to derive the source of this o u t c o m e , further investigation according to 
target f i rms' domici le and market va luat ions is required. The findings indicate that 
bidders enjoy the highest gain (1.26%) f rom acquisi t ions in the domest ic market than 
the acquisi t ions in the G6 group of countr ies during low market valuat ions. In 
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addit ion, during low market valuat ions, bidders enjoy the highest gain w h e n 
investing the RoW group of countr ies rather than in the G 6 o n e (1 .10% o n average) . 
The s a m e pattern holds w h e n the 10 industry classif ication P / E ratio is used (table 
4:4, panel A) . Whi le these findings provide a n s w e r s to the main quest ions that are 
a d d r e s s e d in this chapter and further support the sixth hypothesis of this study, they 
also add significant value to our existing knowledge in te rms of the weal th effects to 
b idders acquir ing domest ic v e r s u s foreign target f i rms across dif ferent market 
valuat ion condit ions. 
Having investigate and provide clear a n s w e r s with regards the impact of market 
valuat ions (i.e. both at the aggregate and industry level) on the stock price reaction 
around d o m e s t i c and foreign mergers , the next considerat ion is to investigate t h e 
deal and f irm-specif ic character ist ics that may have a significant impact on such 
stock price reaction around M&A a n n o u n c e m e n t s (similar d iscussion will be 
provided in the cross-sect ion analysis) . Basically, f rom both tables 4:3 and 4:4, the 
higher gains to bidders acquiring domest ic target f irms versus foreign ones a re 
clearly dr iven by bids of privately held targets f i rms and f rom bids that f inanced wi th 
cash p a y m e n t s (see panels B and C) . Indeed, during low market valuat ions, bidders 
acquir ing domest ic private target f irms earn on average higher CAR than foreign 
bidders of private target f irms of 1.73%, 2.12%, and 1.13% (similarly 1.13%, 1.05%, 
and 1.28% for the 10 industry classif ication P / E ratios). Along t h e s e lines, during low 
market valuat ions, domest ic b idders f inancing acquisi t ions wi th cash p a y m e n t s 
outper form the ones acquiring foreign targets with the s a m e m e a n of payment by 
1.55% and 2 .19% (similarly 1.02% and 1.30% for the 10 industry classification P / E 
ratios). Overal l , it appears that acquir ing f irms' shareholders are taking long posit ions 
in bidders ' stock that prefer to acquire in the domest ic market during low market 
valuat ion per iods whi le it has a lso b e e n found that the target s ta tus and the method 
of payment play a significant role in the s a m e f ramework . Similarly, UK investors 
s h o w a strong preference on bidders ' stock that avoid expanding internationally 
during t imes w h e r e the source market exper ience low market valuat ions. To an 
extent , the market valuations along with the target status and the method of 
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p a y m e n t in M & A represent very important determinants for any short - run gains or 
losses real ized by bidders acquiring domest ic versus foreign targets f i rms. 
4.7.1.2 Announcement Gains Subject to Economic Conditions 
The e c o n o m i c condit ion in the h o m e market at the t ime of an M&A a n n o u n c e m e n t 
is expec ted to play a significant role in shaping the acquir ing f i rm's a n n o u n c e m e n t 
returns. To an extent , in c a s e s of the acquir ing f irm's exposure in the foreign market , 
the e c o n o m i c condit ion of both the h o m e and the host market a re likely to affect 
b idders ' gains."** Tab les 4:5 to 4:7 record the CAR for portfolios of UK acquirers 
sorted according to the e c o n o m i c condit ion in the UK e c o n o m y at the t ime of the 
M&A a n n o u n c e m e n t , wh ich therefore is expected to inf luence the M&A activity and 
thus p remiums paid to f inance the deals thereby the a n n o u n c e m e n t gains displayed 
to bidders ' shareho lders . Across ail th ree tables, results convey that bidding f i rms 
gains d e c r e a s e as w e move f rom the portfolio subject to low rates of economic 
growth to the one subject to high rates of e c o n o m i c growth. This is likely to happen 
as during per iods of high rates of e c o n o m i c growth the M&A activity increase 
significantly (compared wi th the one a t low rates of e c o n o m i c growth - s e e sect ion 
4.6.4 - S u m m a r y Statistics Based on the M&A Activity - for more information related 
to the inf luence of the rates of e c o n o m i c growth on M&A activity), implying that the 
compet i t ion a m o n g bidders is higher, the premiums paid by the winning bidder 
during those per iods are higher than o therwise , and thus the gains ea rned by 
bidding firm d e c r e a s e . However , during different levels of economic growth bidders 
acquir ing domest ic and or foreign targets e i ther earn higher gains or exper ience 
significant losses . T h e fol lowing t w o sub-sect ions investigate the impact (likely 
impact) of the e c o n o m i c condit ion in the source 's (host 's) country, as m e a s u r e d by 
(a) the co inc idence index and (b) the GNP and the growth index, on the stock price 
react ion a round merger a n n o u n c e m e n t s of domest ic versus foreign target f irms. 
This chapter investigates the impact of the likely growth level in the foreign market on bidders' 
gains. 
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4.7.1.2.1 Business Cycle Conditions 
Accordingly, table 4:5 reports results based on the de - t rended co inc idence index 
wh ich captures the UK's stage of the business cycle over the course of several 
d e c a d e s . W h e n the ent ire sample is c o n c e r n e d (panel A), differentials genera ted 
f rom bids of domest ic versus foreign target f irms are on average higher during t imes 
w h e n the business cycle is at its though stage, rather than its peak one (they appear 
0 .64% and 0 .45% respect ively for the though and the peak stage of the business 
cyc le ) . T h e s e findings are clearly driven by t h e differentials genera ted f rom bids in 
the context of domest ic v e r s u s G 6 markets.'*^ On the other hand, not only the 
differentials b e t w e e n domest ic and the RoW group appear negative, but the 
differentials b e t w e e n the G 6 and the RoW groups appear negative and significant in 
both statistic and economic te rms. Overal l , these findings suggest that domest ic bids 
a lways outper form the ones in the foreign market , i rrespective of the stage of the 
bus iness cycle at the t ime of the M&A a n n o u n c e m e n t , partially support ing the fifth 
testable hypothesis of this study. 
Insert table 4:5 about here 
However , w h e n other firm and transact ion-speci f ic character ist ics are c o n c e r n e d , 
domest ic bids during the peak stage of the business cycle outperform foreign ones . 
In fact, w h e n private or subsidiary f i rms are acqui red , and w h e n the m e t h o d of 
payment utilized is c o m m o n stock, domest ic bids dur ing the peak stage of the 
business cycle genera te higher gains than the foreign o n e s . Clearly, this finding fully 
support the fifth hypothesis of this chapter wh ich predicts higher gains to domest ic 
bidders, rather than to foreign ones , during periods subject to high levels of 
Accepting the argument that the business cycles betw/een the UK market and the G6 ones are 
moving together over time, the M&A activity in the 6 6 countries is expected to be high as w/ell. This 
implies that the premiums required for UK firms to enter the G6 ones are high, which therefore 
constitute M&A in the G6 countries as either zero or negative NPV projects (i.e. the PV of synergy <= 
premium paid). 
^° However, when I control for simultaneous effects in the cross-section analysis, I fully support this 
hypothesis. In fact, cross-section analysis suggests that domestic acquisitions during the periods of 
high economic activity (when the business cycle is at the peak) bidders enjoy on average 0.68% higher 
gains than foreign target firms bidders. 
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e c o n o m i c growth. This o u t c o m e is mainly dr iven by the fact that investors dislike 
f irms that exposure themse lves in the foreign market (especially in the G 6 countr ies) 
during periods of high e c o n o m i c growth in the h o m e market . This is as bidding f irms 
(a) face high compet i t ion in the foreign market dur ing t h e s e t imes (especial ly in the 
G 6 countr ies) which in turn decrease the abnormal returns to bidders' shareho lders , 
and (b) bidders do not prefer to stay in the h o m e market by taking advantage f rom 
avai lable domest ic opportunit ies during these t imes.^ ' 
Overal l , the above analysis s h o w s that the stage of the UK business cycle provides 
important information regarding the shape of the M&A activity over t ime and thus 
the gains genera ted to bidders in the f ramework of d o m e s t i c versus C B A . It h a s a lso 
been suggested that the fundamenta l role of the target status and the method of 
payment in the gains to bidders acquiring domest ic versus foreign target f irms during 
high and or low levels of e c o n o m i c growth is very important . Similar f indings will be 
reported in a s u b s e q u e n t sect ion w h e r e I interpret my findings from the cross -
sect ion analysis . 
4.7.1.2.2 Gross National Product (GNP) and the Growth Index 
Tables 4:6 and 4:7 record results based on the de - t rended Gross National Product 
(GNP) and the levels of e c o n o m i c growth in the UK. T h e s e proxies are employed to 
capture the e c o n o m i c condit ions in the UK at the t ime of the acquisi t ion's 
a n n o u n c e m e n t and to generate information regarding the M&A activity during those 
t imes thereby about the bidders ' gains. Accordingly, for the entire sample (panels A 
f rom both tables) , bidders acquiring domest ic target f irms outper form the o n e s 
bidding for foreign targets f i rms during per iods sub jec t to high e c o n o m i c growth. 
Indeed, panel A (table 4:6) indicates that UK bidders gain on average 0 .61% higher 
gains from domest ic bids rather than f rom bids of foreign target f i rms. The gain 
Periods of high economic performance spike with several technological improvements and 
innovations. Therefore, domestic investments during these times should generate positive NPV 
investments (PV of synergy > Premium paid). On the other hand, investments in the G5 countries they 
can still generate positive PV of synergies, although these gains may cancel out due to high premiums 
will be paid out (i.e. the PV of synergies <= premium paid). 
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generated to domestic versus the G6 bidders (0.92% and 0.59%) confirms the above 
finding. These findings are in line with my fifth hypothesis which clearly suggests that 
domestic bidders should outperform foreign ones during periods of high economic 
activity.^^ Moreover, the portfolio of bidders acquiring targets in the RoW group of 
countries outperform the one of bidders acquiring targets in the G6 countries during 
periods of high economic activity/performance, suggesting that the target firm's 
domicile along with the level of economic performance at the time of the M&A 
announcement shape the bidding firm's gains. Furthermore, these gains are mainly 
driven by acquisitions of listed targets and acquisitions financed with cash payments, 
indicating the important of transaction- and firm-specific characteristics in the same 
framework. 
Insert table 4:6 and 4:7 about here 
Some explanations for the above mentioned bidders' performance are discussed 
bellow. It is very likely that the business cycles of the G7 economies (including the 
UK) to move together over time. In addition, it is very likely that periods subject high 
economic performance to curry high M&A activity as well (Weston, 1953; Nelson, 
1959; Gort, 1969; Steiner, 1975; Chung and Weston, 1982; Golbe and White, 1993; 
and Andrade et al. 2001). Thus, when economic performance and the M&A activity 
in the UK are in high levels, the economic performance and the M&A activity of the 
other G6 countries are very likely to reach high levels too. This may have two 
important implications of the above results. First, the higher gains to domestic 
bidders versus the foreign ones and also the higher gains to domestic bidders versus 
the ones investing in the G6 group of countries are mainly driven by (a) the limited 
premiums required to be paid by bidders when buying domestic target firms 
(comparing with the ones acquiring foreign targets firms), and (b) the bidder's 
prevention of face that additional foreign market's risks (i.e. political risks, exchange 
rate ones, economic ones, government policy ones, central bank policy ones, etc). 
" Similar findings are reported from the cross-section analysis. In fact, when I control for 
simultaneous effects in the cross-section analysis it appear clear that during periods of high economic 
growth, domestic bidders enjoy higher gains than foreign ones of about 0.51%. 
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The former is very likely to happen as the high competition in the G6 countries will 
eventually increase the premiums required from the bidder to enter these markets 
{by forcing the winning bidders to overpay for that deal generating thereby a 
negative NPV for that project as the initial investment is higher than all discounted 
future cash flows). In addition, the business cycles of the RoW countries are very 
unlikely to move closely with the business cycles of the G6 ones, implying that the 
gains to bidders acquiring in the RoW countries to be higher than the gains to 
bidders acquiring in the G6 countries (due to lower premiums required to enter 
these markets during such times). The above two arguments provide some 
explanations on the wealth effects generated to bidders acquiring domestic versus 
foreign targets, domestic versus targets in the G6 countries and acquisitions in the 
G6 countries versus the RoW ones. 
Overall, it appears from the above discussion that both the de-trended UK's GNP and 
the growth index can provide further explanations for the wealth effects generated 
to UK bidders when acquire domestic versus foreign target firms. It appears also that 
the gains to bidders within the same framework are a function of deal and firm-
specific characteristics. Similar findings will be reported in a subsequent section 
where it interprets the findings from the cross-section analysis. 
1.6.3.1 Cross-Section Analysis 
Although the results from univariate analysis focus (individually) on the impact of 
market valuations, the stage of the economy, the targets status and method of 
payment, they cannot account for simultaneous effects of multiple factors and allow 
for interaction between various determinants of acquirer's gains. To overcome such 
limitations, announcement period (5-days) excess returns (CAR) of bidders are 
regressed against a set of explanatory variables that are likely to be responsible in 
shaping the gains of acquirers engaging in acquisitions with domestic and foreign 
target firms. 
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CAR.=a + Y,X,+e, (6) 
The intercept, (a) in equation (6), measures the excess return to bidders after 
accounting for the effects of all explanatory variables, while the vector of 
explanatory variables, 'X', includes variables likely to explain the CAR of bidding 
firms. The vector of explanatory variables, 'X', includes acquirer's age on the day of 
bid announcement (log), acquirer's market value one month prior to the 
announcement of deal (log), relative size of the deal measured as the deal value 
divided by acquirer's market value, bidder's growth opportunity (ratio of market to 
book value of equity and price to earnings of acquirer one month prior to the 
acquisition announcement), and deal value (log). Dummy variables that take the 
value of one and zero otherwise, are included to represent cross-border deals, 
private targets, listed targets, and cash only and stock only deals. Further, constant 
and slope dummies representing the low and high market valuation period, low and 
high economic condition, and weak and strong EER are also included where 
appropriate. Table 4:8 presents the results from my multivariate analysis. 
Insert table 4:8 about here 
Following the table 4:8, empirical findings display that the impact of market 
valuations and economic conditions over time along with firm and transaction-
specific characteristics appear, simultaneously, very important factors in shaping the 
bidding firms' CAR. Initially, models 1 to 12 (table 4:8, panel A) depict only the 
importance of deal and firm-specific characteristics on the explanation of the 
bidders' CAR. In fact, I find that the bidders' abnormal returns are very sensitive to 
the bidding firms' age, which further supports the findings of Zhang (2006) with 
regards the level of the information uncertainty in the bidding firm's business 
environment at the time of the deal announcement. In addition, I find across all 
models a negative and statistically significant relationship between CAR and bidders' 
size, consistent with the findings of Moeller et al. (2004). On the other hand, the 
relative size coefficients appear positive and highly statistically significant across ail 
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models. This in line with several studies that have proposed that the bidding firm's 
abnormal returns within a small window surrounding the acquisition 
announcement's day increase as the target size increases relative to acquirer size 
(Asquith et al. 1983; Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Jarreil and Poulsen, 1989; Kang, 1993; 
and Fuller et al. 2002). This relationship implies that the larger the target firm's size 
relative to the bidder, the more the original structure of the acquiring firm changes 
as a result of the acquisition. 
Furthermore, the relationship between the CAR and the MTBV ratio is negative and 
significant across most models. This finding implies that bidders with higher growth 
opportunities during the pre-bid period yield higher CAR within a small window 
surrounding the time of the M&A announcement (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; 
Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003). Along similar lines, this analysis depicts that a 
positive and significant relationship between (a) the CAR and the P/E ratio as well as 
(b) the value of the deal. Further analysis shows that bidders acquiring target firms in 
the foreign market for corporate control experience significant losses in the short-
run (models 6 to 12, panel A). Indeed, model 12 indicates that on average when UK 
bidders acquiring foreign target firms experience significant losses of about -0.69%. 
Lastly, panel A further shows that the target status and method of payment in M&A 
plays a very important role in the determination of the bidding firms' CAR. 
Consistent with several studies in the literature, bidders enjoy significant gains when 
they acquire private and listed targets with cash, although they experience 
significant losses when they utilize their equity to finance their projects. 
Panels B and C depict the sensitivity of bidders' gains on the market valuations and 
the stage of the UK economy over time. Clearly, models 13 to 20 show the impact of 
market valuations (at both industry and aggregate terms) on the bidders' CAR; 
bidders enjoy positive and significant abnormal returns in the short-run when M&A 
are announced during high market valuations (0.55% and 0.51% on average) 
" For related studies see for example, Myers and Mjluf (1984), Travlos (1987), Chang (1998), Draper 
and Paudyal (1999), Fuller et al. (2002), Draper and Paudyal (2006), Antoniou, Petmezas, and Zhao 
(2007), and Alexandridis, Antoniou, and Zhao (2006 and 2008). 
210 
Chapter 4: Economic Conditions, Marl<et Valuations, and Gains from Domestic versus CBA 
whereas they lose significantly when the M&A occurs during periods of low market 
valuation (-0.96% and -0.71% on average). These findings are clearly support the 
third testable hypothesis of this study and the neoclassical theory of mergers 
(Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Andrade, et al. 2001; Bouwman, et al. 2009). Along 
similar lines, proxies that capture the stage of the UK economy at the time of the 
M&A announcement indicate that the coincidence index, the growth index as well as 
the de-trended GNP, influence bidders' gains in the short-run (models 21 to 32). In 
fact, all three proxies suggests that on average bidders enjoy the highest gains when 
acquire target firms during periods of low economic activity. Lastly, the EER shapes 
the bidders gains in the same framework (models 33 to 36). The coefficients of the 
EER suggest that bidders enjoy positive and significant abnormal returns during 
strong EER periods whereas when the EER is weak the coefficients appear negative 
and highly significant.^'' 
The answer to the question on whether the gains to bidders from domestic versus 
CBA are function to market valuations, the economic condition and the power of the 
EER over time is provided from the results in panel D (models 37 to 50). These 
records clearly display that market valuation shape to a great extent the gains to 
bidders from domestic versus CBA (models 37 to 40). Bidders enjoy positive and 
significant gains from domestic acquisitions during low market valuation (0.72% and 
0.65%) whereas they experience significant gains when they acquire foreign targets 
during high market valuation periods (0.47% and 0.25%). These findings fully support 
the forth hypothesis of this study. Concerning the macroeconomic indicators 
(models 41 to 48), bidders always enjoy higher gains when they chose to invest in 
the domestic market during periods of high economic growth and when the business 
cycle in at the peak stage (i.e. booming periods). Similarly, these findings support the 
fifth hypothesis of this chapter which suggests that bidders prefer to stay in the 
domestic market when the economy experiences high levels of economic growth. 
Lastly, models 49 and 50 suggest that domestic bidders yield higher abnormal 
This could be due to the fact that the majority of M&A deals in the sample are domestic ones. 
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returns when the EER is weak (0.64%) whereas foreign bidders yield higher (or 
generate zero) wealth effects during periods of high EER. 
In general, the cross-section analysis depicts the importance of market valuations 
and the stage of the UK economy at the time of the M&A announcement, along with 
the significant impact of several deal and firm-characteristics, on the overall view of 
this examination. Specifically, research outcomes from this analysis add significant 
value on our existing knowledge on the explanation of gains of acquirers in the 
context of domestic versus CBA by suggesting the influential impact of (a) the market 
valuations, (b) growth levels in the UK economy, and (c) the movements of the 
Pound Sterling EER at the time of the bid announcement, as additional factors 
affecting short and long-run performance. 
4.7.2 Long-Run Analysis 
The findings based on the short-run analysis (both univariate and cross-section one) 
confirm that market valuations, economic conditions, and the power of the UK 
Sterling at the time of the M&A announcement, are significant determinants of the 
domestic versus foreign bidding firm's short-run performance. The question on 
whether the long-run gains to domestic bidders versus foreign bidders are shaped by 
the pre-stated proxies is still an open question in the M&A literature. However, the 
main discussion and interpretation of the long-run results of this chapter add 
significant value to our existing knowledge. Excess returns are measured by using the 
calendar-time portfolio regression (CTPR) market adjusted returns and calendar-time 
regression intercepts, and alphas. The Fama and French (1996) three factor model is 
used. 
Table 4:9, panels A, B, C, D and E represent results for all deals, deals with only 
domestic target firms, deals with only foreign target firms, deals with targets in the 
G6 countries and deals with targets in the rest-of-the-world (RoW) countries 
respectively. Panel A shows that, on average, UK bidders gain positive post-merger 
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monthly returns (i.e. 0.67% within a window of 60 months following the M&A 
announcement) irrespective of the event window whereas this finding is clearly 
driven by domestic deals. In addition, results for the entire sample indicate that 
bidders enjoy higher gains in the long-run when they announce bids during high 
market valuation periods. This finding remains the same across all portfolios subject 
to target firm's domicile. The latter finding clearly supports the neoclassical theory of 
mergers while it supports recent studies in the finance literature (see for example 
Bouwman et al. 2009). Clearly, the long-run analysis in this study's framework 
suggests that market valuations shape the bidder gains after 1, 3, and 5 years 
following the M&A announcement. 
Insert table 4:9 about here 
Further analysis suggests that bidders' returns in the long-run are affected by the 
stage of the UK economy at the time of the M&A announcement. In fact, bidders 
enjoy positive and significant gains in the long-run when the M&A deal is announced 
during periods of high growth rates or during the peak of the business cycle. These 
findings are observed for domestic M&A announcements whereas for foreign bids 
they appear positive (as in the domestic) only when the target firm is operating in 
the G6 group of countries. Lastly, post-merger results subject to the level of the EER 
at the time of the M&A announcement suggest that, on average, bidders' returns are 
shaped by the power of the EER only when they acquire foreign target firms. In 
general, bidders enjoy the highest gains from foreign acquisitions in the long-run 
during periods of strong EER at the time of the deal announcement. Overall, the 
above discussion reflects the importance of market valuations, the stage of the 
home market's economy as well as the level of the EER at the time of the M&A 
announcement on the bidding firm's long-run gains determination. 
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4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter examines whether the short and long-run wealth of shareholders of UK 
bidders acquiring domestic versus foreign targets is affected by market valuation 
conditions, economic conditions and the EER of the Pound Sterling at the time of the 
M&A announcement. Several control variables supported by extant literature are 
applied, along with the pre-stated proxies, in order to provide additional 
explanations to any gains or losses detected between domestic M&A and CBA. The 
main conclusions of the chapter suggest that market valuation and economic 
conditions in the source country, and the level of the source country's EER, play a 
very important role in shaping domestic and CBA activities over time as well as 
bidders' gains both in the short and in the long-run. 
in general, the findings confirm that in the context of domestic M&A versus CBA, 
domestic acquirers enjoy higher announcement gains than acquirers of foreign 
targets, only when the deal is announced during low market valuation periods. On 
the other hand, acquirers opting to acquire foreign target firms, outperform the 
ones opting for domestic targets in the short-run, only when the deal is made during 
high market valuation periods. These findings support the main hypothesis of this 
chapter, which states that due to investors' optimism at the time of the M&A 
announcement, investors prefer bidders that acquire targets in the domestic 
(foreign) market during low (high) market valuation periods. Along similar lines, 
bidder gains in the short-run are found to be affected significantly by the economic 
conditions in the UK and the level of pound sterling's EER at the time of the M&A 
announcement. Bidders enjoy also higher announcement gains from domestic deals 
only when the bid is made during periods of high economic growth and/or during 
the peak of the business cycle. Further, domestic bidders outperform foreign ones 
only when the EER is weak at the time of the M&A announcement. Along with the 
above findings, the target status and the method of payment, as well as other firm 
and transaction-specific characteristics such the relative size of the deal, the size and 
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the growth opportunity of the bidder are also found to play a very important role in 
the determination of the gains of bidders in the short-run. 
Results also confirm that bidders' long-run performance is shaped by market 
valuations at the time of the M&A announcement. Specifically, bidders enjoy 
positive and significant gains in the post-merger period only when the M&A is 
announced during high market valuation periods. In addition, bidders enjoy the 
highest gains from the acquisitions made at times when the economic growth is high 
and the business cycle is at its peak stage. These findings suggest that the post-
merger performance to UK bidders is significantly influenced by the economic 
condition at the time of the deal announcement. Overall, the main findings that 
derived from this empirical chapter contributes to the M&A literature by presenting 
strong evidence that the market valuation and economic conditions, and the EER at 
the time of the takeover bid announcement, provide additional explanations of the 
valuation effects of bidders acquiring domestic versus foreign target firms. 
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4.9 Figures and Tables 
Figure 4:1 - Annual Distribution of M&A Activity by Country of Origin 
The figure presents the annual distribution of takeovers of UK bidding firms, acquiring both domestic 
and foreign target firms over the period 1986 and 2007. 
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Figure 4:2 - Distribution of M&A Activity by Country of Origin, Market Valuations, Economic 
Conditions, and the Level of Effective Exchange Rate at the Time of the Deal Announcement 
The figure presents the M&A activity for UK bidding firms acquiring targets operating in the UK and in 
the foreign market for corporate control during periods subject to high versus low market valuations, 
high versus low level of economic performance and strong versus weak effective exchange rate at the 
t ime of the deal announcement over the period between 1986 and 2007. 
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Figure 4:3 - The History of Merger Activity (Covers US and UK Merger Waves) 
The figure represents the history of merger activity since the early stages of the 20* century until 
recent years. 
1890 1920 1960 1970 1980 1990 20OO 2005 
Figure 4:4 - A Graphical Representation of the Low-Neutral-High Classification of the Period Based 
on the De-Trended Time Series of the (UK) FTSE All Share P/E Index 
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Figure 4:5 - A Graphical Representation of the Low-Neutral-High Classification of the Period Based 
the De-Trended Time Series of the UK Coincidence Index 
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Figure 4:6 - A Graphical Representation of the Low-Neutral-High Classification of the Period Based 
the De-Trended Time Series of the UK GNP 
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Figure 4:7 - A Graphical Representation of the Low-Neutral-High Classification of the Period Based 
the De-Trended Time Series of the UK GDP 
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Figure 4:8 - A Graphical Representation of the Low-Neutral-High Classification of the Period Based 
the UK Growth Index (Raw Data) 
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Figure 4:9 - A Graphical Representation of the Low-Neutral-High Classification of the Period Based 
the Sterling Pound's Effective Exchange Rate (Raw Data) 
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Table 4:1 - Distribution of M&A Activity by the Year of 
The table presents the annual distribution of takeovers 
and foreign target firms, over the period 1986 and 2007 
Deal and Target Firm's Domicile 
of UK bidding firms, acquiring both domestic 
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Table 4:2 - Summary Statistics of the Sample 
Table 2 presents a summary of distribution of sample by target status (panel A) and methods of 
payment (panel B) and bidder and deal features (panel C) for all, domestic and cross-border 
(including the G6 countries and the rest of the world - RoW - ones) acquisitions. 'Private' indicates 
the acquisitions conducted with privately held target firms; 'Public' indicates the acquisitions 
conducted with publicly held or listed target firms and 'Subsidiary' indicates the acquisitions 
conducted with subsidiary target firms. 'Cash' and 'shares' indicate cash and share only deals. 
'Mixed' includes all deals financed by a combination of cash and stock and/or methods classified as 
"other" in SDC. Panel C summarizes acquirer and deal features. The sample is restricted to deals over 
or equal to one million Pounds Sterling. Relative size is the ratio of deal value to market value of 
acquirer. MV is the market value of the acquirer one month prior to the acquisition and MTBV and PE 
represents the market-to-book value of equity and price to equity respectively one month prior to 
the announcement of deal. Age of the bidding firm is defined as the number of days since the firm 
was first covered by the DataStream and the acquisition's announcement day. 
All Dom CBA G6 Row 
Panel A: Distribution of Deals by Target Status 
Private 3,766 2,586 1,180 755 425 
Public 1,569 1,084 485 264 221 
Subsidiary 2,298 1,576 722 431 291 
Panel B: Distribution of Deals by Methods of Payment 
Cash 3,764 2,381 1,383 823 560 
Stock 746 599 147 78 69 
Mixed/Other 3,123 2,266 857 549 308 
Panel C: Major Features of Bidder and Deal Characteristics 
Deal Value (£ mil) 109.61 86.36 160.67 156.21 157.58 
Bidding Firm's Age S396 4978 6315 6410 6168 
MV (£ mil) 4,794.71 651.83 13,899.71 3,631.78 29,789.24 
Relative Size 0.38 0.45 0.22 0.17 0.29 
MTBV Ratio 3.34 3.17 3.71 3.68 3.77 
PE Ratio 36.07 40.58 26.28 28.17 23.21 
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Table 4:3 - Announcement Period Excess Returns of Bidders by the ISAarket P/E Ratio 
This table presents S-day [t-2, t+2] announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), in 
percentage, of sample acquirers are presented. Abnormal returns (AR) are calculated using a modified 
market-adjusted model: 
where is the return of bidder/ at t ime / a n d ^ ^ , is the market index (FT-AII Share) at t i m e / . 
Acquirers are publicly traded firms listed in the London Stock Exchange and targets are unlisted firms 
operating in the domestic and in the foreign market. The table presents gains to acquirers subject t o 
the de-trended FTSE All Share P/E Ratio. The results are presented into two dimensions; according to 
the market valuation condition (high-medium-low) and according to target firm's domicile. 
Specifically, panel (a) A shows results for the entire sample, (b) B shows results for acquisitions with 
privately, publicly, and subsidiary target firms, and (c) C shows results for acquisitions conducted with 
cash, stock, and mixed or other methods of financing/payment. The final three rows in each panel 
shows the differentials in the gains from acquisitions conducted with targets firms operating in (a) the 
domestic market and the foreign (CBA) one, (b) the domestic market and the G6 countries, (c) the 
domestic market and the Rest of the World (RoW) countries, and (d) the G6 countries and the Rest of 
the World (RoW) ones. The sample size, N, for each group is reported bellow each estimate. ** 
and * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. 
**« • * 
Panel A - Entire Sample 
All Low Neutral High HML F-Stat 
All Mean 1.32%*** 0 .61%*** 1.51%*** 1.50%*** 0.90%*** 10.89*** 
N 7633 1624 4024 1985 
Dom Mean 1.47%*** 0.88%*** 1.66%*** 1.58%*** 0.70%*** 5.24*** 
N 5246 1105 2752 1389 
CBA Mean 0.98%*** 0.05% 1.20%*** 1.32%*** 1.30%*** 6.32*** 
N 2387 519 1272 596 
G6 Mean 0.80%*** -0.38% 1.07%*** 1.24%*** 1.60%*** 6.17*** 
N 1450 315 753 382 
Row Mean 1.26%*** 0.70%* 1.39%*** 1.47%*** 0.80% 0.87 
N 937 204 519 214 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row G6 vs. Row 
All Periods 0.49%*** 0.67%*** 0.22% -0.50%* 
Low Periods 0.83%** 1.26%*** 0.18% -1.10%* 
High Periods 0.26% 0.34% 0.12% -0.20% 
Continued 
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Table 4:3 (Continued) 
Panel B - Target Status 
All Low Neutral High HML F-Stat 
Private 
All Mean 1.07%* * • 0.31% 1.16%*** 1.52%*** 1.20%*** 8.45*** 
N 3766 818 2015 933 
Dom Mean 1.27%*** 0.84%*** 1.24%*** 1.71%*** 0.90%** 3.01** 
N 2586 570 1372 644 
CBA Mean 0.62%*** -0.89%** 0.99%*** 1.10%*** 2.00%*** 8.61*** 
N 1180 248 643 289 
Ge Mean 0.52%** -1.29%** 1.02%*** 0.83%* 2.10%*** 7.13*** 
N 755 149 408 198 
Row Mean 0 .81%*** -0.29% 0.93%** 1.68%** 2.00%** 2.41* 
N 425 99 235 91 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row G6 vs. Row 
All Periods 0.65%*** 0.75%*** 0.46%* -0.30% 
Low Periods 1.73%*** 2.12%*** 1.13%** -1.00% 
High Periods 0.62% 0.89%* 0.03% -0.90% 
Public 
All Mean 2.29%*** 1.03%** 3.05%*** 1.37%*** 0.30% 8.18*** 
N 1569 274 918 377 
Dom Mean 2.55%*** 0.95% 3.54%*** 1.17%*** 0.20% 9.77*** 
N 1084 166 647 271 
CBA Mean 1.71%*** 1.16%* 1.87%*** 1.87%*** 0.70% 0.29 
N 485 108 271 106 
G6 Mean 1.58%*** 0.23% 1.99%** 2.16%** 1.90%* 1.16 
N 264 68 134 62 
Row Mean 1.88%*** 2.75%*** 1.75%** 1.47% -1.28% 0.28 
N 221 40 137 44 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row G6 vs. Row 
All Periods 0.84%* 0.97%* 0.68% -0.30% 
Low Periods -0.20% 0.72% -1.80%* -2.50%* 
High Periods -0.70% -1.00% -0.30% 0.69% 
Subsidiary 
All Mean 1.07%*** 0.86%*** 0.87%*** 1.55%*** 0.70%** 3.03** 
N 2298 532 1091 675 
Dom Mean 1.06%"* 0 . 9 1 % * " 0 . 7 7 % " * 1.63%"* 0.70%* 3.03** 
N 1576 369 733 474 
CBA Mean 1.08%*** 0.73%* 1.08%*** 1.36%*** 0.60% 0.49 
N 722 163 358 201 
G6 Mean 0.83%*** 0.58% 0.59%* 1.46%*** 0.90% 0.92 
N 431 98 211 122 
Row Mean 1.44%*** 0.95%* 1.79%*** 1.20%* 0.30% 0.51 
N 291 65 147 79 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row G6 vs. Row 
All Periods -0.02% 0.23% -0.40% -0.60% 
Low Periods 0.18% 0.33% -0.04% -0.40% 
High Periods 0.27% 0.17% 0.43% 0.25% 
Continued 
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Table 4:3 (Continued) 
Panel C - Methods of Payment 
All Low Neutral High HML F-Stat 
Cash 
All Mean 1.67%*** 1.09%*** 1.95%*** 1.56%*** 0.50%* 4.78*** 
N 3764 740 2032 992 
Dom Mean 2.06%*** 1.70%*** 2.35%*** 1.75%*** 0.05% 2.57* 
N 2381 449 1284 648 
CBA Mean 1.01%*** 0.14% 1.25%*** 1.19%*** 1.00%** 3.26** 
N 1383 291 748 344 
G6 Mean 0.89%*** -0.49% 1.12%*** 1.48%*** 2.00%*** 4.99*** 
N 823 169 435 219 
Row Mean 1.18%*** 1.03%*** 1.44%*** 0.69% 0.34% 0.66 
N 560 122 313 125 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row G6 vs. Row 
All Periods 1.06%*** 1.18%*** 0.88%*** -0.30% 
Low Periods 1.55%*** 2.19%*** 0.67% -1.50%*** 
High Periods 0.56% 0.27% 1.06%* 0.79% 
Stock 
All Mean 0.56%* -0.16% 0.43% 1.32%*** 1.50%* 1.56 
N 746 159 375 212 
Dom Mean 0.51%* -0.32% 0.39% 1.30%*** 1.60%* 1.49 
N 599 123 301 175 
CBA Mean 0.76% 0.42% 0.61% 1.39% 1.00% 0.15 
N 147 36 74 37 
G6 Mean 0.52% 1.07% 0.61% -0.16% -1.23% 0.12 
N 78 18 40 20 
Row Mean 1.03% -0.24% 0.61% 3.20%* 3.40% 0.83 
N 69 18 34 17 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row 66 vs. Row 
All Periods -0.30% -0.01% -0.50% -0.50% 
Low Periods -0.70% -1.40% -0.08% 1.31% 
High Periods -0.90% 1.46% -1.90% -3.40% 
Mixed 
All Mean 1.07%*** 0.29% 1.22%*** 1.48%*** 1.20%*** 6.52*** 
N 3123 725 1617 781 
Dom Mean 1.10%*** 0.47%* 1.22%*** 1.47%*** 1.00%*** 3.45** 
N 2266 533 1167 566 
CBA Mean 0.98%*** -0.18% 1.21%*** 1.51%*** 1.70%** 3.40** 
N 857 192 450 215 
G6 Mean 0.72%** -0.44% 1.07%*** 1.07%** 1.50%* 2.24* 
N 549 128 278 143 
Row Mean 1.44%*** 0.34% 1.45%*** 2.39%*** 2.10%* 1.37 
N 308 64 172 72 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row G6 vs. Row 
All Periods 0.13% 0.39% -0.30% -0.70%* 
Low Periods 0.65% 0.90% 0.13% -0.80% 
High Periods -0.03% 0.40% -0.90% -1.30% 
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Table 4:4 - Announcement Period Excess Returns of Bidders by the Industry P/E Ratio 
This table presents 5-day [t-2, t+2] announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), in 
percentage, of sample acquirers are presented. Abnormal returns (AR) are calculated using a modified 
market-adjusted model: 
Where R.^ is the return of bidder/ at t ime^ and7?^, is the market index (FT-AII Share) at timet. 
Acquirers are publicly traded firms listed in the London Stock Exchange and targets are unlisted firms 
operating in the domestic and in the foreign market. The table presents gains to acquirers subject to 
the de-trended 10 P/E Industry Classification Ratios. The results are presented into two dimensions; 
according to the industry valuation condition (high-medlum-low/) and according to target firm's 
domicile. Specifically, panel (a) A shows results for the entire sample, (b) B shows results for 
acquisitions with privately, publicly, and subsidiary target firms, and (c) C shows results for 
acquisitions conducted with cash, stock, and mixed or other methods of financing/payment. The final 
three rows in each panel shows the differentials in the gains from acquisitions conducted with targets 
firms operating in (a) the domestic market and the foreign (CBA) one, (b) the domestic market and 
the G6 countries, (c) the domestic market and the Rest of the World (RoW) countries, and (d) the 66 
countries and the Rest of the World (RoW) ones. The sample size, N, for each group is reported 
bellow each estimate. * * * , * * , and * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. 
Panel A - Entire Sample 
All Low Neutral High HML F-Stat 
All Mean 1.32%*** 0.79%*** 1.36%*** 1.75%*** 1.00%*** 9.18*** 
N 7633 1817 3964 1852 
Dom Mean 1.47%*** 0.97%*** 1.51%*** 1.89%*** 0.90%*** 5.67*** 
N 5246 1237 2744 1265 
CBA Mean 0.98%*** 0.40%* 1.03%*** 1.45%*** 1.10%*** 3.53** 
N 2387 580 1220 587 
G6 Mean 0.80%*** 0.25% 0.92%*** 1.13%*** 1.00%* 1.73 
N 1450 364 721 365 
Row Mean 1.26%*** 0.66%* 1.19%*** 1.98%*** 1.30%** 2.10* 
N 937 216 499 222 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row G6 vs. Row 
All Periods 0.49%*** 0.67%*** 0.22% -0.50%* 
Low Periods 0.56%* 0.72%* 0.30% -0.40% 
High Periods 0.43% 0.75%* -0.09% -0.90% 
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Table 4:4 (Continued) 
Panel B -Target Status 
All Low Neutral High HML F-Stat 
Private 
All Mean 1.07%*" 0.73%*** 0.93%*** 1.70%*** 1.00%*** 6.36*** 
N 3766 948 1905 913 
Dom Mean 1.27%*** 1.07%*** 1.03%*** 2.00%*** 0.90%* * • 5.48*** 
N 2586 665 1310 611 
CBA Mean 0.62%*** -0.06% 0.70%*** 1.09%*** 1.20%** 2.41* 
N 1180 283 595 302 
G6 Mean 0.52%** 0.02% 0.60%* 0 .81%* 0.80% 0.73 
N 755 182 376 197 
Row Mean 0 .81%** * - 0 . 2 1 % 0.87%** 1.64%** 1.90%* 2.23* 
N 425 101 219 105 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row G6 vs. Row 
All Periods 0.65%*** 0.75%* • * 0.46%* -0.30% 
Low Periods 1.13%*** 1.05%** 1.28%** 0.23% 
High Periods 0.90%* 1.19%** 0.36% -0.80% 
Public 
All Mean 2.29%*** 1.25%** 2.88%*** 1.88%*** 0.60% 3.88** 
N 1569 299 920 350 
Dom Mean 2.55%*** 1.36%** 3 .21%*** 1.68%*** 0.30% 4.48*** 
N 1084 185 655 244 
CBA Mean 1.71%*** 1.07%* 1.75%*** 2.33%*** 1.30% 0.61 
N 485 114 265 106 
G6 Mean 1.58%*** 0.57% 1.89%*** 2.15%* 1.60% 0.73 
N 264 73 137 54 
Row Mean 1.88%*** 1.95%* 1.59%** 2.52%** 0.60% 0.23 
N 221 41 128 52 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row G6 vs. Row 
All Periods 0.84%* 0.97%* 0.68% -0.30% 
Low Periods 0.30% 0.79% -0.60% -1.40% 
High Periods -0.60% -0.50% -0.80% -0.40% 
Subsidiary 
All Mean 1.07%*** 0.63%*** 0.93%*** 1.75%*** 1.10%*** 5.48*** 
N 2298 570 1139 589 
Dom Mean 1.06%*** 0.60%** 0.88%*** 1.84%*** 1.20%*** 4.82*** 
N 1576 387 779 410 
CBA Mean 1.08%*** 0.70%* 1.04%*** 1.54%*** 0.80% 0.89 
N 722 183 360 179 
G6 Mean 0.83%*** 0 . 4 1 % 0.84%** 1.22%** 0.80% 0.51 
N 431 109 208 114 
Row Mean 1.44%*** 1.14%* 1.31%*** 2.10%** 1.00% 0.52 
N 291 74 152 65 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row G6 vs. Row 
All Periods -0.02% 0.23% -0.40% -0.60% 
Low Periods -0.10% 0.19% -0.50% -0.70% 
High Periods 0.30% 0.62% -0.30% -0.90% 
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Table 4:4 (Continued) 
Panel C - Methods of Payment 
All Low Neutral High HML F-Stat 
Cash 
All Mean 1.67%*** 1.05%*** 1.85%*** 1.90%*** 0.80%*** 5.04*** 
N 3764 866 2028 870 
Dom Mean 2.06%*** 1.45%*** 2.33%*** 2.03%*** 0.60%* 3.25** 
N 2381 528 1306 547 
CBA Mean 1.01%*** 0.43% 0.98%*** 1.67%*** 1.20%*** 3.07** 
N 1383 338 722 323 
G6 Mean 0.89%*** 0.14% 1.00%*** 1.45%*** 1.30%*** 2.15* 
N 823 210 418 195 
Row Mean 1.18%*** 0.89%* 0.96%*** 2 .01%** * 1.10%* 1.39 
N 560 128 304 128 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row 66 vs. Row 
All Periods 1.06%*** 1.18%*** 0.88%*** -0.30% 
Low Periods 1.02%** 1.30%*** 0.56% -0.70% 
High Periods 0.36% 0.58% 0.02% -0.60% 
Stock 
All Mean 0.56%* 0.58% 1.16% 1.28%** 0.70% 1.23% 
N 746 168 375 203 
Dom Mean 0 . 5 1 % * 0.57% -0.05% 1.51%** 0.90% 2.09* 
N 599 137 302 160 
CBA Mean 0.76% 0.58% 1.03% 0.43% -0.16% 0.08 
N 147 31 73 43 
G6 Mean 0.52% 1.61% 0.42% -0.02% -1.63% 0.21 
N 78 16 37 25 
Row Mean 1.03% - 0 . 5 1 % 1.66% 1.04% 1.60% 0.35 
N 69 15 36 18 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row 66 vs. Row 
All Periods -0.30% -0.01% -0.50% -0.50% 
Low Periods 0.01% -1.00% 1.08% 2.12% 
High Periods 1.08% 1.53% 0.46% -1.10% 
Mixed 
All Mean 1.07%*** 0.54%** 1.02%*** 1.70%*** 1.20%*** 5.83*** 
N 3123 783 1561 779 
Dom Mean 1.10%*** 0 .61%** 0.98%*** 1.85%*** 1.20%*** 5.23*** 
N 2266 572 1136 558 
CBA Mean 0.98%*** 0.33% 1.11%*** 1.33%*** 1.00%* 1.21 
N 857 211 425 221 
G6 Mean 0.72%** 0.25% 0.86%** 0.90%* 0.70% 0.41 
N 549 138 266 145 
RoW Mean 1.44%*** 0.50% 1.52%*** 2.16%*** 1.70% 1.01 
N 308 73 159 76 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. 66 DOM vs. Row 66 vs. Row 
All Periods 0.13% 0.39% -0.30% -0.70%* 
Low Periods 0.28% 0.37% 0.11% -0.30% 
High Periods 0.52% 0.95%* -0.30% -1.30% 
228 
Chapter 4: Economic Conditions, Market Valuations, and Gains from Domestic versus CBA 
Table 4:5 - Announcement Period Excess Returns of Bidders by the Coincidence Index 
This table presents 5-day [t-2, t+2] announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), in 
percentage, of sample acquirers are presented. Abnormal returns (AR) are calculated using a modified 
market-adjusted model: 
where is the return of bidder/ at timet and /?^ , is the market index (FT-AII Share) at t i m e / . 
Acquirers are publicly traded firms listed in the London Stock Exchange and targets are unlisted firms 
operating in the domestic and in the foreign market. The table presents gains to acquirers subject t o 
the de-trended UK Coincidence Index. The results are presented into two dimensions; according to 
the economic condition (high-medium-low) and according to target firm's domicile. Specifically, panel 
(a) A shows results for the entire sample, (b) B shows results for acquisitions with privately, publicly, 
and subsidiary target firms, and (c) C shows results for acquisitions conducted with cash, stock, and 
mixed or other methods of financing/payment. The final three rows in each panel shows the 
differentials in the gains from acquisitions conducted with targets firms operating in (a) the domestic 
market and the foreign (CBA) one, (b) the domestic market and the G6 countries, (c) the domestic 
market and the Rest of the World (RoW) countries, and (d) the G6 countries and the Rest of the World 
(RoW) ones. The sample size, N, for each group is reported bellow each estimate. * * * , ** , and * 
denote significance level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. 
Panel A - Entire Sample 
All Low Neutral High HML F-Stat 
All Mean 1.32%*** 1.64%*" 1.48%*** 0.85%*** -0.80%*** 7.57*** 
N 7633 1079 4328 2226 
Dom Mean 1.47%*** 1.83%*** 1.65%*** 0.98%*** -0.85%*** 5.99*** 
N 5246 772 2890 1584 
CBA Mean 0.98%*** 1.18%*** 1.14%*** 0.53%** -0.66%* 2.25* 
N 2387 307 1438 642 
G6 Mean 0.80%*** 0.79%** 1.11%*** 0.18% - 0 . 6 1 % 2.60* 
N 1450 201 836 413 
RoW Mean 1.26%*** 1.93%*** 1.18%*** 1.15%*** -0.78% 0.58 
N 937 106 602 229 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row G6 vs. Row 
All Periods 0.49%*** 0.67%*** 0.22% -0.50%* 
Low Periods 0.64%* 1.03%** -0.10% -1.10%* 
High Periods 0.45%* 0.80%*** -0.20% -1.00%** 
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Table 4:5 (Continued) 
Panel B - Target Status 
All Low Neutral High HML F-Stat 
Private 
All Mean 1.07%*** 1 .07%"* 1.06%*" 1.07%*** 0.00% 1.01 
N 3766 464 2171 1131 
Dom Mean 1.27%*** 1 .27%*" 1.29%*" 1 .23%*" -0.05% 0.97 
N 2586 322 1461 803 
CBA Mean 0.62%*** 0.62% 0 . 5 8 % " 0 . 7 0 % " 0.08% 0.03 
N 1180 142 710 328 
G6 Mean 0.52%** 0.18% 0 .61%* 0.47% -0.30% 0.18 
N 755 97 446 212 
Row Mean 0 .81%*** 1.57%* 0.54%* 1.11%* -0.46% 0.71 
N 425 45 264 116 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row G6 vs. Row 
All Periods 0.65%*** 0.75%*** 0.46%* -0.30% 
Low Periods 0.65% 1.09%* -0.30% -1.40% 
High Periods 0.53%* 0.75%* 0.11% -0.64% 
Public 
All Mean 2.29%*** 2 . 9 2 % * " 2 . 8 8 % * " 0.22% -2.70%*** 12.48*" 
N 1569 279 940 350 
Dom Mean 2.55%*** 3 . 3 6 % * " 3 . 1 9 % * " 0.15% -3.21%*** 10.95*" 
N 1084 215 631 238 
CBA Mean 1.71%*** 1.44%* 2 . 2 6 % * " 0.35% -1.09% 2.22* 
N 485 64 309 112 
G6 Mean 1.58%*** 0.59% 2 . 8 0 % * " -0.46% -1.05% 4 . 0 5 " 
N 264 35 154 75 
Row Mean 1.88%*** 2.47%* 1 .73%" 2.00%* -0.47% 0.09 
N 221 29 155 37 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row G6 vs. Row 
All Periods 0.84%* 0.97%* 0.68% -0.30% 
Low Periods 1.92%* 2.27%** 0.89% -1.90% 
High Periods -0.20% -0.61% -1.85%* -2.50%* 
Subsidiary 
All Mean 1.07%*** 1 .38%*" 1.14%*" 0 . 8 1 % * " -0.57%* 1.21 
N 2298 336 1217 745 
Dom Mean 1.06%"* 1 .19%*" 1 .08%*" 0 . 9 8 % * " - 0 . 2 1 % 0.11 
N 1576 235 798 543 
CBA Mean 1.08%*** 1 .82%*" 1 .25%*" 0.34% -1 .47%" 2.47* 
N 722 101 419 202 
G6 Mean 0.83%*** 1 .76%" 0 . 9 7 % " 0.07% -1 .69%" 2.23* 
N 431 69 236 126 
Row Mean 1.44%*** 1.93% 1.62%*" 0.80%* -1.13% 0.62 
N 291 32 183 76 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row G6 vs. Row 
All Periods -0.02% 0.23% -0.40% -0.60% 
Low Periods -0.63% -0.57% -0.70% -0.17% 
High Periods 0.64%* 0.91%* 0.18% -0.73% 
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Table 4:5 (Continued) 
Panel C - Methods of Payment 
All Low Neutral High HML F-Stat 
Cash 
All Mean 1.67%*** 2.23%*** 1.97%*** 0.79%*** -1.44%*** 13.67*** 
N 3764 561 2134 1069 
Dom Mean 2.06%*** 2.87%*** 2.36%*** 1.02%*** -1.85%*** 12.48*** 
N 2381 378 1326 677 
CBA Mean 1.01%*** 0 .91%** 1.33%*** 0.40%* - 0 . 5 1 % 2.73* 
N 1383 183 808 392 
G6 Mean 0.89%*** 0 . 9 1 % * 1.43%*** -0.09% -1.00%* 4.44*** 
N 823 117 451 255 
Row Mean 1.18%*** 0 . 9 1 % 1.19%*** 1.30%*** 0.40% 0.08 
N 560 66 357 137 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row G6 vs. Row 
All Periods 1.06%*** 1.18%*** 0.88%*** -0.30% 
Low Periods 1.96%*** 1.96%*** 1.96%** 0.00% 
High Periods 0.62%* 1.10%*** -0.30% -1.40%*** 
Stock 
All Mean 0.56%* - 0 . 3 1 % 0.45% 1.16%** 1.50%* 1.24 
N 746 106 416 224 
Dom Mean 0.51%* -0.55% 0 . 2 1 % 1.51%*** 2.10%** 2.37** 
N 599 87 324 188 
CBA Mean 0.76% 0 . 8 1 % 1.31%* -0.68% -1.50% 0.78 
N 147 19 92 36 
G6 Mean 0.52% 0.47% 0.65% 0.18% -0.28% 0.02 
N 78 15 47 16 
Row Mean 1.03% 2.13% 2.00%* -1.38% -3.50% 1.18 
N 69 4 45 20 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row G6 vs. Row 
All Periods -0.30% -0.01% -0.50% -0.50% 
Low Periods -1.40% -1.00% -2.70% -1.70% 
High Periods 2.20%* 1.33% 2.89%* 1.56% 
Mixed 
All Mean 1.07%*** 1.35%*** 1.13%*** 0.84%*** -0.51%* 0.94 
N 3123 412 1778 933 
Dom Mean 1.10%*** 1.21%*** 1.25%*** 0.80%*** - 0 . 4 1 % 1.09 
N 2266 307 1240 719 
CBA Mean 0.98%*** 1.73%** 0.83%*** 0.96%*** -0.77% 0.69 
N 857 105 538 214 
G6 Mean 0.72%** 0.67% 0.75%* 0.66% - 0 . 0 1 % 0.01 
N 549 69 338 142 
Row Mean 1.44%*** 3.77%*** 0.97%* 1.57%*** -2.20%* 2.33* 
N 308 36 200 72 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row G6 vs. Row 
All Periods 0.13% 0.39% -0.30% -0.70%* 
Low Periods -0.52% -0.54% -2.60%** -3.10%** 
High Periods -0.16% -0.14% -0.77% -0.90% 
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Table 4:6 - Announcement Period Excess Returns of Bidders by UK's GNP 
This table presents 5-day [t-2, t+2] announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), in 
percentage, of sample acquirers are presented. Abnormal returns (AR) are calculated using a modified 
market-adjusted model: 
AR„=R„-R„,, 
Where R.^ is the return of bidder/ at t ime / and i?^ , is the market index (FT-AII Share) at t i m e / . 
Acquirers are publicly traded firms listed in the London Stock Exchange and targets are unlisted firms 
operating in the domestic and in the foreign market. The table presents gains to acquirers subject to 
the de-trended UK 6NP. The results are presented into two dimensions; according to the economic 
condition (high-medium-low) and according to target firm's domicile. Specifically, panel (a) A shows 
results for the entire sample, (b) B shows results for acquisitions with privately, publicly, and 
subsidiary target firms, and (c) C shows results for acquisitions conducted with cash, stock, and mixed 
or other methods of financing/payment. The final three rows in each panel shows the differentials in 
the gains f rom acquisitions conducted with targets firms operating in (a) the domestic market and the 
foreign (CBA) one, (b) the domestic market and the 66 countries, (c) the domestic market and the 
Rest of the World (RoW) countries, and (d) the 66 countries and the Rest of the World (RoW) ones. 
The sample size, N, for each group is reported bellow each estimate. * * * , ** , and * denote 
significance level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. 
Panel A - Entire Sample 
All Low Neutral High HML F-Stat 
All Mean 1.32%* * • 1.72%*** 0.98%*** 1.63%*** -0.08% 9.39*** 
N 7633 1177 3841 2615 
Dom Mean 1.47%*** 1.87%*** 1.11%*** 1.82%*** -0.05% 7.24*** 
N 5246 788 2652 1806 
CBA Mean 0.98%*** 1.40%*** 0.68%*** 1.22%*** -0.18% 2.35* 
N 2387 389 1189 809 
66 Mean 0.80%*** 1.38%*** 0.58%** 0 .91%** * -0.47% 1.24 
N 1450 213 755 482 
Row Mean 1.26%*** 1.43%*** 0.87%*** 1.67%*** 0.24% 1.36 
N 937 176 434 327 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. 66 DOM vs. Row 66 vs. RoW 
All Periods 0.49%*** 0.67%*** 0.22% -0.50%* 
Low Periods 0.47% 0.49% 0.45% -0.05% 
High Periods 0.61%* * 0.92%*** 0.15% -0.80%* 
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Table 4:6 (Continued) 
Panel B - Target Status 
All Low Neutral High HML F-Stat 
Private 
All Mean 1.07%*** 1.29%*** 0.92%*** 1.18%*** - 0 . 1 1 % 1.06 
N 3766 580 1909 1277 
Dom Mean 1.27%*** 1.66%*** 1.12%*** 1.32%*** -0.34% 1.18 
N 2586 383 1312 891 
CBA Mean 0.62%*** 0.56% 0.49%* 0.85%*** 0.30% 0.38 
N 1180 197 597 386 
G6 Mean 0.52%** 0.13% 0.50%* 0 . 7 1 % * 0.60% 0.31 
N 755 112 390 253 
Row Mean 0.81%*** 1.13%* 0.47% 1.12%** - 0 . 0 1 % 0.56 
N 425 85 207 133 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row G6 vs. Row 
All Periods 0.65%*** 0.75%*** 0.46%* -0.30% 
Low Periods 1.10%* * 1.53%*** 0.53% -1.00% 
High Periods 0.47% 0.61% 0.20% -0.40% 
Public 
All Mean 2.29%*** 3 .11%*** 1.33%*** 3.17%*** 0.06% 8.36*** 
N 1569 272 740 557 
Dom Mean 2.55%*** 3.17%*** 1.35%*** 3.98%*** 0.80% 9.85*** 
N 1084 186 531 367 
CBA Mean 1 .71%*** 2.99%*** 1.27%** 1.62%*** -1.37% 1.27 
N 485 86 209 190 
G6 Mean 1.58%*** 4.74%*** 1.30%* 0.006 -4.14%*** 3.70** 
N 264 42 122 100 
Row Mean 1.88%*** 1.33% 1.24% 2.76%** 0.014 0.82 
N 221 44 87 90 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row G6 vs. Row 
All Periods 0.84%* 0.97%* 0.68% -0.30% 
Low Periods 0.17% -1.60% 1.84%* 3.40%* 
High Periods 2.36%*** 3.38%*** 1.22% -2.20%* 
Subsidiary 
All Mean 1.07%*** 1.31%*** 0.86%*** 1.28%*** -0.03% 1.43 
N 2298 325 1192 781 
Dom Mean 1.06%*** 1.14%*** 0.95%*** 1.19%*** 0.05% 0.26 
N 1576 219 809 548 
CBA Mean 1.08%*** 1.67%*** 0.66%*** 1.49%*** -0.18% 2.27* 
N 722 106 383 233 
G6 Mean 0.83%*** 1.36%** 0.34% 1.52%*** -0.16% 2.24* 
N 431 59 243 129 
Row Mean 1.44%*** 2.06%** 1.23%*** 1.44%** -0.62% 0.33 
N 291 47 140 104 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row G6 vs. Row 
Low Periods 
High Periods 
-0.53% 
-0.30% 
-0.20% 
-0.33% 
-0.90% 
-0.30% 
-0.60% 
-0.70% 
-0.08% 
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Table 4:6 (Continued) 
Panel C - Methods of Payment 
All Low Neutral High HML F-Stat 
Cash 
All Mean 1.67%*** 2 . 3 1 % * " 1 .23%*" 1.98%*" -0.33% 8.26*" 
N 3764 588 1800 1376 
Dom Mean 2.06%*** 2 . 5 9 % * " 1 . 5 1 % * " 2 . 5 6 % * " 0.03% 7.55"* 
N 2381 369 1134 878 
CBA Mean 1.01%*** 1.84%*** 0 . 7 6 % * " 0 . 9 7 % " * -0.87%* 2.30* 
N 1383 219 666 498 
G6 Mean 0.89%*** 2 . 5 0 % * " 0.57%* 0.67%* -1 .84%*" 4 .42*" 
N 823 121 418 284 
Row Mean 1.18%*** 1.02%* 1.09%*" 1.37%*" -0.35% 0.15 
N 560 98 248 214 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row G6 vs. Row 
All Periods 1.06%*** 1.18%*** 0.88%*** -0.30% 
Low Periods 0.75% 0.09% 1.57%** 1.49%* 
High Periods 1.59%*** 1.90%*** 1.19%* * -0.70% 
Stock 
All Mean 0.56%* 0.85% 0.26% 0.93%* 0.08% 0.58 
N 746 111 401 234 
Dom Mean 0.51%* 0.85% 0.37% 0.59% -0.27% 0.13 
N 599 82 323 194 
CBA Mean 0.76% 0.86% - 0 . 2 1 % 2 . 5 8 % " 1.70% 1.57 
N 147 29 78 40 
G6 Mean 0.52% 0.14% 0.03% 1.93% 1.79% 0.39 
N 78 19 40 19 
Row Mean 1.03% 2.22% -0.46% 3.16%** 0.90% 0.01 
N 69 10 38 21 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row G6 vs. Row 
All Periods -0.30% -0.01% -0.50% -0.50% 
Low Periods -0.01% 0.71% -1.40% -2.10% 
High Periods -2.00%* -1.30% -2.60%* -1.20% 
Mixed 
All Mean 1.07%*** 1.19%*** 0 . 8 8 % * " 1 .32%*" 0.13% 1.36 
N 3123 478 1640 1005 
Dom Mean 1.10%*** 1.34%*" 0 . 9 4 % * " 1.26%*" -0.08% 0.77 
N 2266 337 1195 734 
CBA Mean 0.98%*** 0.83% 0 . 7 2 % " 1.47%"* 0.64% 0.96 
N 857 141 445 271 
G6 Mean 0.72%** -0.16% 0.66%* 1 .18%" 1.34% 0.95 
N 549 73 297 179 
Row Mean 1.44%*** 1 .90%" 0.85%* 2 . 0 4 % " 0.14% 0.96 
N 308 68 148 92 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row G6 vs. Row 
All Periods 0.13% 0.39% -0.30% -0.70%* 
Low Periods 0.51% 1.50%* -0.44% -2.10%* 
High Periods -0.20% 0.08% -0.80% -0.90% 
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Table 4:7 - Announcement Period Excess Returns of Bidders by UK's Growth Index 
This table presents 5-day [t-2, t+2] announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), in 
percentage, of sample acquirers are presented. Abnormal returns (AR) are calculated using a modified 
market-adjusted model: 
where R.^ is the return of bidder/ at t ime / andR^^ is the market index (FT-AII Share) at t i m e / . 
Acquirers are publicly traded firms listed in the London Stock Exchange and targets are unlisted firms 
operating in the domestic and in the foreign market. The table presents gains to acquirers subject to 
the UK 6rowth Index. The results are presented into two dimensions; according to the economic 
condition (high-medium-low) and according to target firm's domicile. Specifically, panel (a) A shows 
results for the entire sample, (b) B shows results for acquisitions wi th privately, publicly, and 
subsidiary target firms, and (c) C shows results for acquisitions conducted with cash, stock, and mixed 
or other methods of financing/payment. The final three rows in each panel shows the differentials in 
the gains from acquisitions conducted with targets firms operating in (a) the domestic market and the 
foreign (CBA) one, (b) the domestic market and the 66 countries, (c) the domestic market and the 
Rest of the World (RoW) countries, and (d) the 6 6 countries and the Rest of the World (RoW) ones. 
The sample size, N, for each group is reported bellow each estimate. * * * , * * , and * denote 
significance level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. 
Panel A-Entire Sample 
All Low Neutral High HML F-Stat 
All Mean 1.32%*** 1.73%*** 1.29%*** 0.97%*** -0.76%*** 7.45*** 
N 7633 2346 2750 2537 
Dom Mean 1.47%*** 1.97%*** 1.42%*** 1.07%*** -0.90%*** 7.17*** 
N 5246 1614 1880 1752 
CBA Mean 0.98%*** 1.19%*** 1.03%*** 0.73%*** -0.46% 0.91 
N 2387 732 870 785 
66 Mean 0.80%*** 1.06%*** 0.89%*** 0.48%* -0.58% 0.91 
N 1450 435 514 501 
Row Mean 1.26%*** 1.38%*** 1.23%*** 1.16%*** -0.22% 0.08 
N 937 297 356 284 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. 66 DOM vs. Row 66 vs. Row 
All Periods 0.49%*** 0.67%*** 0.22% -0.50%* 
Low Periods 0.78%*** 0.91%** 0.59% -0.32% 
High Periods 0.34% 0.59%* -0.09% -0.70% 
Continued 
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Table 4:7 (Continued) 
Panel B - Target Status 
All Low Neutral High HML F-Stat 
Private 
All Mean 1.07%*** 1.22%*** 0.96%*** 1.04%*** -0.18% 0.54 
N 3766 1111 1398 1257 
Dom Mean 1.27%*** 1.53%*** 1.09%*** 1.24%*** -0.29% 1.05 
N 2586 744 971 871 
CBA Mean 0.62%*** 0.60%* 0.67%** 0.58%* -0.02% 0.02 
N 1180 367 427 386 
G6 Mean 0.52%** 0.52% 0.68%* 0.33% -0.19% 0.19 
N 755 232 275 248 
Row Mean 0.81%*** 0.74% 0.64% 1.05%* - 0 . 3 1 % 0.16 
N 425 135 152 138 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row G6 vs. Row 
All Periods 0.65%*** 0.75%*** 0.46%* -0.30% 
Low Periods 0.93%** 1.01%** 0.79%* -0.22% 
High Periods 0.66%* 0.91%** 0.19% -0.71% 
Public 
All Mean 2.29%*** 3 .11%** * 2.74%*** 0.75%*** -2.36%*** 10.20*** 
N 1569 578 531 460 
Dom Mean 2.55%*** 3.66%*** 3.00%*** 0.46%*** -3.20%*** 11.93*** 
N 1084 422 360 302 
CBA Mean 1.71%*** 1.62%** 2.19%*** 1.30%** -0.32% 0.46 
N 485 156 171 158 
G6 Mean 1.58%*** 1.92%** 2.23%* 0.85% -1.07% 0.69 
N 264 74 82 108 
Row Mean 1.88%*** 1.35%* 2.14%*** 2.26%* 0.90% 0.25 
N 221 82 89 50 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row G6 vs. Row 
All Periods 0.84%* 0.97%* 0.68% -0.30% 
Low Periods 2.04%*** 1.75%* 2.31%** -0.56% 
High Periods -0.84% -0.40% -1.80%* -1.40% 
Subsidiary 
All Mean 1.07%*** 1.35%*** 0.92%*** 0.98%*** -0.37% 1.04 
N 2298 657 821 820 
Dom Mean 1.06%*** 1.10%*** 0.95%*** 1.14%*** 0.04% 0.16 
N 1576 448 549 579 
CBA Mean 1.08%*** 1.90%*** 0.88%*** 0.59%* -1.31%** 3.12** 
N 722 209 272 241 
G6 Mean 0.83%*** 1.54%*** 0.57% 0.48% -1.06%* 1.32 
N 431 129 157 145 
Row Mean 1.44%*** 2.48%*** 1.30%*** 0.75% -1.73%* 2.15* 
N 291 80 115 96 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row G6 vs. Row 
Ail Periods -0.02% 0.23% -0.40% -0.60% 
Low Periods -0.80%* -0.44% -1.40%* -0.90% 
High Periods 0.55% 0.66% 0.39% -0.30% 
Continued 
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Table 4:7 (Continued) 
Panel C - Methods of Payment 
All Low Neutral High HML F-Stat 
Cash 
All Mean 1.67%*** 2.10%*** 1.86%*** 1.05%*** -1.05%*** 8.42*** 
N 3764 1212 1335 1217 
Dom Mean 2.06%*** 2.67%*** 2.15%*** 1.34%*** -1.33%*** 7.87*** 
N 2381 785 828 768 
CBA Mean 1.01%*** 1.05%*** 1.37%*** 0.55%* -0.49% 2.10* 
N 1383 427 507 449 
G6 Mean 0.89%*** 1.11%*** 1.28%*** 0.33% -0.78%* 1.74 
N 823 244 280 299 
Row Mean 1.18%*** 0.96%* 1.48%*** 1.00%* 0.04% 0.43 
N 560 183 227 150 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row G6 vs. Row 
All Periods 1.06%*** 1.18%*** 0.88%*** -0.30% 
Low Periods 1.63%* • • 1.56%*** 1.71%*** 0.15% 
High Periods 0.79%** 1.01%** 0.34% -0.70% 
Stock 
All Mean 0.56%* 0.90%* -0.09% 0.89% 0 . 0 1 % 1.21 
N 746 226 254 266 
Dom Mean 0.51%* 0.64% -0.26% 1.13%** 0.50% 1.57 
N 599 177 206 216 
CBA Mean 0.76% 1.80%* 0.65% -0.15% -1.96% 0.72 
N 147 49 48 50 
G6 Mean 0.52% 0 .41% 0.24% 0.95% 0.54% 0.05 
N 78 30 24 24 
Row Mean 1.03% 4 . 0 1 % * * 1.06% -1.17% -5.19%** 2.30* 
N 69 19 24 26 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row G6 vs. Row 
All Periods -0.30% -0.01% -0.50% -0.50% 
Low Periods -1.20% 0.24% -3.40%* -3.60%* 
High Periods 1.29% 0.18% 2.31% 2.12% 
Mixed 
All Mean 1.07%*** 1.43%*** 0.95%*** 0.89%*** -0.54%* 1.82 
N 3123 908 1161 1054 
Dom Mean 1.10%*** 1.48%*** 1.10%*** 0.79%*** -0.69%** 1.87 
N 2266 652 846 768 
CBA Mean 0.98%*** 1.31%*** 0.54% 1.16%*** -0.16% 0.95 
N 857 256 315 286 
G6 Mean 0.72%** 1.11%** 0.45% 0.68%* -0.43% 0.39 
N 549 161 210 178 
Row Mean 1.44%*** 1.65%** 0.72% 1.94%*** 0.30% 0.82 
N 308 95 105 108 
DOM vs. CBA DOM vs. G6 DOM vs. Row G6 vs. Row 
All Periods 0.13% 0.39% -0.30% -0.70%* 
Low Periods 0.17% 0.37% -0.20% -0.50% 
High Periods -1.20% 0.11% -1.20%* -1.30%* 
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Table 4:8 - Determinants of Announcement Gains to Bidders - Cross Section Analysis 
Estimates of cross-sectional determinants of announcement period gains of acquirers are reported. 
Announcement period (5-days) excess returns of bidders are regressed against a set of explanatory 
variables. The following equation is estimated using ordinary least square and standard errors are 
corrected for heteroscedasticity. 
CAR,=a + ^X.+e. 
1=1 
The intercept (a) measures the excess return to bidders after accounting for the effects of all 
explanatory variables. The vector of explanatory variables 'X' includes acquirer's age on the day of bid 
announcement (log), acquirer's market value one month prior to the announcement of deal (log), 
deal value of the acquisitions (log), bidder's growth opportunity (ratio of market to book value of 
equity and price to earning ratio of acquirer one month prior to the acquisition announcement), 
relative size of the deal measured as the deal value divided by acquirer's market value. Dummy 
variables (intercept (panels B and C) and slope ones (panel D)) that take the value of one and zero 
otherwise are included to account for low and high market valuations, low and high economic growth 
and low and high EER. In addition, dummy variables (only intercept ones) that take the value of one 
and zero otherwise are included to represent target status (i.e. private and public) and method of 
payment (i.e. cash and stock), a, b, or c indicate significance at the 1, 5,10 percent level respectively. 
Dep. Variabte (CARI 
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Table 4:9 - Long-term Performance of Acquirers 
This table reports OLS estimates of monthly abnormal returns, measured by alpha of the following 
equation, from portfolios comprising of all acquisitions for 1- 3- 5- year post-event holding periods. 
Excess returns are estimated using calendar time regressions for each portfolio. Acquirers enter the 
portfolio on the month following the announcement and remain for 12-36-60 months. This table 
contains five panels. Specifically, Panel A represents all acquisitions remaining for 1-3-5 years in the 
portfolio, starting from the next month from the month of the acquisition's announcement. Panel B 
represents only domestic acquisitions remaining for 1-3-5 years in the portfolio, starting from the 
next month from the month of the acquisition's announcement. Panels C, D, and E represents only 
cross-border acquisitions (Entire Sample, G6 and RoW ones) remaining for 1-3-5 years in the 
portfolio, starting from the next month from the month of the acquisition's announcement. Portfolios 
are rebalanced each month to include firms that just announced a deal. The monthly abnormal 
returns are measured by intercepts in the following equation: 
(K- - ) = ^ P+Pp ^ K. - Rf.,) + ^ pSMB, + h^HML, + s^_, 
where Rp,t is the calendar time portfolio return, Rf , is the return on a one month T-bill during month t, 
SMB is the difference in returns of value weighted portfolios of small firms and big firms during 
month t, HML is the return differential of value weighted portfolios of high and low book-to-market 
firms in month t, 3p, Sp and hp are regression parameters specific to the portfolio and gp t is the error 
term. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. a, b, or c indicate significance at the 1, 5, 
10 percent level respectively. 
High MRK Low rNO High IND Low Coinc. High Coinc. Low GNP High GNP 
Valuations Valuations Index Level 
LowGnrth HighGrwth 
Index High EER 
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-0.1198" 
461.26' 
86% 
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0.1303° 
-0.1756' 
208.44* 
72% 
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70% 
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5.1 Introduction 
Recent literature shows that a large proportion of mergers and acquisition (M&A) deals 
involve unlisted targets.' As a result, a block of voluminous literature has emerged that 
concentrates on whether M&A of unlisted targets create value to shareholders of 
acquiring firms. These studies compare the announcement period and post-merger 
wealth effects of firms acquiring unlisted targets with the wealth effects of acquiring 
firms opting for listed targets. The main conclusions derived from these studies suggest 
that while bidders of unlisted targets enjoy positive and significant abnormal returns, 
bidders of listed targets either breakeven (i.e. deliver the required rate of return) or 
experience small losses in the short-run.' The majority of studies in the same field of 
research have also recognized the method of payment as one the most influential 
factors of bidders' performance in the short-run. However, in spite of the rich array of 
studies that have attempted to resolve the puzzle related to the listing effect,^ 
additional factors regarding the explanation of the sources of the positive gains to 
bidders of unlisted targets are required. Indeed, the literature falls short in fully 
explaining the behaviour of the bidding firm's stock price behaviour when they acquire 
unlisted targets. Their results are exposed to criticism for failing to include the level of 
the unlisted target firm's valuation-ambiguity/uncertainty in their analysis." 
* Faccio and Masulis (2005) showed that approximately 90% of UK (and Irish) acquisitions involve unlisted 
target firms; Draper and Paudyal (2006) reported also that approximately 87% of the UK acquisitions 
involved privately held targets. However, Moeller et al. (2007) showed that approximately 53% of US 
acquisitions involve unlisted targets. 
^ See for example Hansen and Lott, 1996; Chang, 1998; Ang and Kohers, 2001; Fuller et al. 2002; Da Silva 
Rosa et al. 2004; Moeller et al. 2004; Conn et al. 2005; Draper and Paudyal, 2006; Faccio et al. 2006. 
^ Attention has also been received by other factors that affect bidders' gain during announcement and 
post-acquisition periods. The factors include the methods of payment, the relative size of the deal, 
bidders' growth opportunities, etc. 
* Numerous of reasons and explanations that serve unlisted targets as value-ambiguous/uncertain, 
compared to listed targets are discussed extensively in section 2 of the present chapter. In addition, in 
contrast with the majority of studies in corporate takeovers that concentrate on information asymmetry 
issues, in this analysis I consider that in unlisted target firm acquisitions the lack of the availability of 
information leads to value-ambiguity issues. 
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This chapter fills this void by closely investigating the roles of ambiguities in the 
valuation of unlisted targets on the short and long-run gains of shareholders of bidding 
firms. More specifically, this chapter examines whether the gains of shareholders of 
unlisted target acquirers vary significantly with the degree of target firm's valuation-
ambiguity or with the difficulty that bidders face in correctly estimating the value of the 
unlisted target or with the quality of available information regarding the unlisted target. 
In similar respects, recent theoretical research has confirmed that if information quality 
of an asset is far from good (i.e. poor or uncertain quality), ambiguity-averse market 
participants tend to react more strongly to bad news than to good news (Epstein and 
Schneider, 2008). The same authors have also suggested that investors are ambiguity-
averse when the information quality is uncertain and that investors avoid assets 
followed by poor information quality, which is more intense when the assets' underlying 
fundamentals are volatile. Zhang (2006) have also claimed that there is a negative 
relationship between the level of information uncertainty/quality and the expected 
stock returns. As a result, bids of unlisted target firms that are subject to high levels of 
value ambiguity or they are followed by poor quality of information should generate low 
or negative returns to bidders' shareholders during the announcement period.^ Along 
with the target firm's valuation ambiguities, several other firm and transaction-specific 
characteristics, including the method of payment, the likelihood of outside blockholder 
creation, and the bargaining power of targets, are expected to affect the short-run 
bidders' gains, as suggested by the majority of studies in the same field of research. 
Earlier studies have also examined numerous factors that explain the bidders' gains 
from acquisitions of unlisted targets, in a recent study. Draper and Paudyal (2006) 
articulated three possible reasons of the superiority of unlisted target acquisition gains. 
They are: (a) the managerial motive hypothesis, (b) the illiquidity hypothesis, and (c) the 
bargaining power hypothesis. Similarly, Ang and Kohers (2001) argued that the premium 
paid for privately held targets could be higher than that for publicly traded targets, 
^ The asset pricing literature suggest that return is a compensation for bearing risk and thus attributes any 
observed profitable investment strategies to significant risk exposure involved. 
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especially due to the strong bargaining power of the privately held firms and the options 
available to them in selling the firm as they can choose how, when, and to whom to 
sell.^ Along similar lines, other studies have suggested that the information environment 
of the target firms involved in M&A deals affect, to a great extent, the bidding firm's 
announcement and post-acquisition returns. For example, in an investigation of small 
manufacturing firms, Shen and Reuer (2005) showed that in the presence of the adverse 
selection problems the acquiring firm is more likely to acquire a public target rather 
than a private one. Similarly, Officer, Poulsen, and Stegemoller (2008) have attempted 
to explain the variation of the bidding firm's announcement returns by using a number 
of accounting variables extracted from the private target firms' annual reports in order 
to proxy for asymmetric information effects. They found that acquirer returns are highly 
associated with factors that make the valuation of the target more difficult. They also 
concluded that this relationship is more intense in cases where stock-swap acquisitions 
are involved, consistent with Hansen's (1987) model.^ * ^ Ekkayokkaya, Holmes, and 
Paudyal, (2007) found that acquirers of private targets enjoy short-run gains although 
suffer a loss in the long-run, especially because of limited information related to unlisted 
targets. Lastly, consistent with the information diffusion hypothesis, Doukas, Gonenc, 
and Plantinga (2007) showed that the gains of bidders buying unlisted targets are higher 
compared to acquirers' gains of listed targets in 16 Western European countries. 
The balance of current evidence suggests also that the gains from private target 
acquisitions dependent upon the methods of payment. Draper and Paudyal (2006) 
^ On the other hand. Officer (2008) documented on average 15% - 30% acquisitions discounts for stand 
alone firms and subsidiaries of other firms relative to acquisitions of publicly traded targets. 
' In contrast with Officer et al. (2008), in this chapter I consider the issue related to unlisted target firm's 
lack of availability of information as the source of value ambiguity (see footnote 4 for further 
clarification). 
° It is very important to distinguish betw/een information asymmetry and value-ambiguity at this stage. 
Basically, issues related to information asymmetry are different to the ones of value-ambiguity given the 
availability of information received my market participants and the accuracy of the (same) information 
received. Overall, in both cases, where information is either not accurate or not available in the market, 
issues related to value-ambiguity or uncertainties are more likely to emerge. In other words, when the 
probability distribution for the expected return of a particular investment or asset is not known, investors 
behave differently than they do in cases with a known probability distribution for the expected return. 
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showed that stock financed acquisitions of unlisted targets generate the largest gains. 
Chang (1998) attributed this to the potential effective monitoring of bidder managers by 
external blockholders created through stock payment. Studies also suggest that the 
asymmetric information problem proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984) will be 
mitigated in private acquisitions as the managers-owners of private firms (a small 
number of shareholders or a family) will be very careful when they accept the bidding 
firm's stock (Chang, 1998). Therefore, while examining the effects of target firms' value-
ambiguities on bidders' gains, I also control for the potential effects of the method of 
payment. Several considerations may arise when unlisted, and value uncertain target 
firms involved in the transaction, along with the different methods of payment utilized, 
some of which stand of major importance in finance literature. For example, what 
would the optimal method of payment be in bids of unlisted and value ambiguous 
target firms? Do bidders' and targets' managers base their choice of the optimal method 
of payment on different incentives than the ones proposed by Chang (1998)? Or, how 
likely is for the optimal method of payment in bids with unlisted and value uncertain 
target firms to be selected under different incentives than the ones proposed by Chang 
(1998)? It is important to be noted here that the value uncertainty in this case is 
originated from the target firm's side, contrary to the uncertainty concerning the value 
of the bidding firm (as discussed by Myers and Majluf, 1984), which mitigated in stock 
offers (as discussed by Chang, 1998).^ In short, one may expect that the bidder and the 
target firms' managers have other incentives in engaging in acquisitions with unlisted 
and value-ambiguous target firms, or pay with common equity for these deals. 
Specifically, stock financing in acquisitions of value-ambiguous target firms might not 
necessarily generate positive and significant, or higher than other cases, gains to 
bidders' shareholders.'" To an extent, one may expect higher (lower) abnormal returns 
' Noteworthy, this is not mutually exclusive here. 
°^ Epstein and Schneider (2008) have suggested that investors are ambiguity-averse when the information 
quality is uncertain and also they dislike assets followed by poor information quality. Accordingly, bids of 
unlisted (and value ambigious) targets with stock payments are associated with bad news twice; firstly, as 
that the announcement itself is ambiguous given the poor quality of information that follows the target 
firm that involved in the deal and secondly, assuming that bidders are aware of the investors' risk/return 
246 
Chapter 5: Target Value Ambiguity and Gains from Acquisitions of Unlisted Targets 
from bids of low or zero (high) value-uncertain unlisted targets, irrespective to the 
method of payment used as the exchange ratio. However, cash or stock financing bids 
may lead to different short and long-run wealth effects to shareholders of bidders given 
both the risks shared and the incentives of the managers, between the merger 
partners." Overall, in spite of several possible explanations of the listing effect, and its 
interaction with the methods of payment, some important considerations remain 
unaddressed. 
This chapter contributes in finance literature by addressing the implications of the 
unlisted target firms' valuation-uncertainty and method of payment on the 
announcement and post-acquisition gains of UK acquiring firms. The analysis rests on 
several issues pertinent to acquisitions involving unlisted targets. Typical questions that 
deserve investigation include: (a) why do shareholders enjoy positive announcement 
period returns when unlisted targets are acquired? (b) Do short and long-run gains from 
unlisted target acquisitions vary significantly with the level of target firms' valuation-
uncertainties? (c) Are bidders of unlisted target firms that financed with stock enjoy 
always positive gains around the event? (d) What is the role of the method of payment, 
or what is the optimal method of payment, in acquisitions of unlisted targets that are 
subject to value-ambiguities? (e) What are the key determinants of the announcement 
period and post-merger share price behaviour of acquiring firms that bid for unlisted 
and value uncertain target firms? In the process, this analysis also controls for acquirer-
specific features (such as bidding firm growrth opportunities, bidding firm age, bidding 
firm size), and transaction-specific features (such as focused versus diversifying deals, 
and relative size of the deal). 
preferences in the case of poor quality of information, they should have no incentive of offering stock to 
finance the deal - it may also signal overvaluation of the bidding firm's stock. 
" In the latter case (cash financing), if the takeover market is competitive, the bidding firm will deliver the 
required rate of return to its shareholders as any additional gains will be wiped out by the higher 
premiums required due to high competition. Indeed, the sample used in this chapter includes one of the 
biggest merger waves in the history of the M&A activity and thus a very active bidding contest. 
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Within the overall context of the present chapter, the major conclusions suggest that 
short and long-run gains of shareholders of bidders acquired unlisted targets vary 
significantly with the target firm's valuations ambiguities. More specifically, evidence 
shows that target firms' characteristics that cause difficulty in valuation (such as age, 
size, intangibility of assets, and investments) can explain the variations in bidding firm's 
abnormal returns both during the announcement and the post-merger period. Acquirers 
of large (mature) unlisted targets outperform the acquirers of small (young) ones during 
the announcement period, especially in share deals. On the contrary, the examination of 
the bidding firm's gains in the post-merger period conveys that bids of small (young) 
targets generate higher gains than bids of large (mature) ones - overreaction. In 
addition, bids of unlisted target firms that have laden balance sheets of intangible assets 
are negative (positive) related to bidders' announcement (post-merger) gains. Overall, 
the results confirm that the short and long-run gains from unlisted target bids, depend 
upon the level of difficulty in valuing the targets and the method of payment utilized -
acquirers of targets that are easier to value gain the most in the short-run, especially in 
the event of share deals. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section (2) discusses the reasons 
that render unlisted target firms value ambiguous or the reasons that render unlisted 
target firms more value ambiguous than other firms (i.e. listed firms), section (3) 
discusses the effects of risk sharing between the bidding and the target firm, section (4) 
refers to the key literature that is closely associated with the main issue I examine in this 
chapter, section (5) develops the testable hypotheses, section (6) describes the data, 
summary statistics, and the methodologies I follow, and in section (7) I report the 
empirical findings and the interpretations of the results. Finally, section (8) concludes 
this empirical chapter. 
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5.2 Unlisted Target Firms and Value Ambiguity 
The main scope of this chapter is to investigate the behaviour of bidding firms' share 
price (both the short and long-run) when acquiring unlisted target firms that are subject 
to different levels of value ambiguity. In fact, in this chapter I argue that the valuation-
uncertainty concerning unlisted target firms is much more prominent, contrary to the 
one concerning listed firms, which is therefore expected to be reflected in the 
announcement and post-merger gains to bidding firms' shareholders that acquire 
unlisted targets. Accordingly, in this section I discuss and analyze a number of likely 
reasons that constitute unlisted target firms as value ambiguous, contrary to listed ones, 
and why some unlisted target firms are more value-uncertain than others. 
In practice, some firms are more forthcoming about their financial affairs than other 
firms, and the financial statements of a few firms are designed to obscure rather than 
reveal information. This is more likely to occur for unlisted firms, where their 
'informational environment' is much more complex (opaque) in comparison to that of 
listed firms.'" A considerable debate in the literature of economics and finance is 
concentrating on the different informational environments of listed versus unlisted 
firms, which mainly documents that the latter is suffering from high levels of complexity 
or value ambiguity. Indeed, several scholars conclude that although a number of 
common characteristics, as well as principles of valuation, are shared between listed 
and unlisted firms, several important differences exist that can affect, to some degree, 
the way that the value of these firms is estimated. For example, the standard techniques 
for estimating risk parameters (such as beta and standard deviation) require market 
prices for equity, an input that is missing for unlisted firms. As a result, M&A bids of 
unlisted, and overpopulated by risky assets (i.e. intangible assets, investments) targets, 
along with the issue which is associated with their opaque informational environment. 
I do discuss later on the main reasons that led to the 'informational environment' of the unlisted firms 
as 'opaque'. 
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constitute their valuation even more difficult and the risk exposure for a bidder 
acquiring these firms even more severe (due to, for example, difficulty in the estimation 
of forecast parameters accurately). 
Several other important considerations for the valuation process of listed versus 
unlisted firms emerge due to the availability of information regarding both types of 
firms. In short, the data availability with respect the valuation of unlisted firms tends to 
be much more limited, in both qualitative and quantitative terms, contrary to listed 
firms. This is more likely to occur due to the absence of (a) government regulations with 
the strict accounting and reporting standards of publicly traded firms, and (b) investors 
in financial markets that require information with respect to the business. In other 
words, listed firms are governed by a set of accounting standards that require the 
disclosure of a certain amount of information in the market, which further allow 
investors to identify, not only what each item in the financial statement includes, but 
also to compare items across firms and times. The latter is not required for unlisted 
firms, making the valuation of these firms difficult and the risk exposure by undertaking 
these firms into account much higher. Similarly, equity prices of publicly held/listed 
firms reveal collective judgments for dispersed investors (Hayek, 1945) and very credible 
information about the business. It has also been suggested that equity prices offer 
performance information that cannot be extracted from the firm's past, current or 
future accounting data/information (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993).'^ Therefore, 
regardless of the absence of pressure for information disclosure of unlisted firms, the 
only information we may have available (i.e. accounting information extracted from the 
firm's annual reports) is inadequate to provide a clear estimation of the firm's value. 
This is another indication that unlisted firms are subject to higher value ambiguity in 
comparison to listed ones as the only available information they provide (accounting 
Although, examining the accounting data of unlisted targets is the only way to figure out their 
fundamental value. Therefore, the complex environment of unlisted firms might lead to any incorrect 
value estimation, which can affect in this case, the value of the final entity (after the completion of the 
acquisition). 
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information), does not represent the actual or fair firm's value (Holmstrom and Tirole, 
1993), though it must be subject to certain characteristics."'* 
In addition, other considerations that affect the way we estimate the value of a listed 
versus an unlisted firm are related to the frequency of the data availability concerning 
these firms. Without a doubt, there is less information availability regarding unlisted 
firms, compared to listed ones, in terms of the number of years of data and the amount 
of information available each year. In short, for listed firms we may have data with 
regards the value of the firm on daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly and yearly basis. It is 
also possible to have access to intra-day data for listed firms. On the other hand, 
unlisted firms usually provide data (accounting data) only once a year, which can make it 
very difficult to estimate the actual value of the firm. For instance, in an attempt to 
calculate the "accounting beta" for an unlisted company by using the firm's accounting 
earnings would be a very difficult task due to the limited amount of observations in the 
regression model, which therefore will reduce the statistical power of the 
model/estimation. For the reasons explained above, in this chapter I argue that issues 
associated with the value ambiguity are more severe for bids of unlisted target firms, 
rather than with listed ones. 
Accordingly, in spite of the complexities discussed in the above paragraphs, in this 
chapter I restrict the sample to only bids of unlisted targets (both private and 
subsidiaries of other unlisted firms) in an attempt to examine whether the different 
informational environments (or the value ambiguous one) concerning unlisted target 
firms can yield any statistical significant wealth effects to bidding companies engaging in 
acquisitions with unlisted target firms. In other words, I intend to control for various 
proxies that can capture the value ambiguity of unlisted firms, and therefore to estimate 
their impact on the announcement and post-acquisition bidding firms' stock returns. 
Given the limited availability of data regarding the unlisted firms, as well as the 
Such characteristics can be the firm's size, the age, industry classification, profitability ratios, as well as 
the firm's market share. 
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estimation problems that distinguish the unlisted firms, I focus on the only available 
data I can obtain for these firms. Thus, I use a number of firm specific 
characteristics/items, from asset specific and cash flow ones, to the size and the age of 
the unlisted company, in an attempt to capture the value ambiguity concerned with 
unlisted companies. 
5.3 Risks Sharing Between the Bidding and Target Firms 
In this chapter I have attributed the inferior performance of acquiring firms in the case 
when the target firms' valuation is uncertain to the risk that acquiring firms' investors 
face. There are however important considerations when looking at the issue from the 
target firms' edge. While accepting overvalued stock is very unlikely due to the 
blockholder and information hypotheses (Chang, 1998), there several cases when the 
target firms still accept the bidding firm's overvalued stock. In fact, one may consider 
that when the private target firm holds (a large) amount of value uncertain assets that 
are difficult to be valued, the managers of the private firm may have an incentive to 
accept the bidding firm's overvalued stock with the incentive to immediately cash-out. 
In addition, this is more likely to occur during high valuation periods where the bidding 
firms' stock is highly likely to be overvalued and bidders are also very likely to overpay 
for target firms during those times. Indeed, recent literature on market timing and 
merger activity highlights that when the stock market valuations in the bidding firm's 
country are high (low) the takeover activity appears higher (lower) whereas the use of 
stock (cash) is expected to be higher too (Shieifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan, 2004). The period covered in this chapter is between 1997 and 2007. This 
period includes the largest M&A waves in the UK M&A history to-date. 
Unlisted target firms might also face liquidity problems, consistent with the liquidity 
hypothesis (Draper and Paudyal, 2006). The authors have admitted that the market for 
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corporate control for private target firms is illiquid thereby increases the bargaining 
power of the acquiring firm which therefore leads the bidder to acquire private or 
unlisted target firms at a discount, in the framework of the present discussion, share 
deals of difficult to value unlisted target firms may interpreted by market participants as 
a negative NPV project given that private firms face the liquidity problem ex-post. 
Moreover, there are several cases in the context of this chapter where, not only the 
bidding firm is overvalued but the target firm to be risky or overvalued too. It is highly 
likely then that the target firm will find it hard to value its own corporation and so to fail 
in securing the best possible exchange ratio in share deals. In these cases the target 
firms have greater risk in getting it wrong so acquiring firms recognize this through 
lower abnormal returns. 
5.4 Literature Review 
This section reviews the literature associated with the main scope of this empirical 
investigation, the unlisted target firm's valuation-ambiguity. I concurrently direct the 
reader to the second chapter of the thesis for more detailed literature related to 
bidders' gains from acquisitions with privately held and subsidiary target firms (i.e. 
unlisted targets). Although the main source of value ambiguity is not always information 
asymmetry or the quality of available information in the market, in this section I firstly 
review the array of studies that focus on value ambiguity issues in financial markets and 
secondly I review the studies on the impact of information asymmetry to bidders' gains. 
5.4.1 Value Ambiguity in Financial Markets 
Market participants constantly rebalance their portfolios based on the news and 
information attached to financial markets every day. In addition, the source of the same 
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information/news can be either an accurate one, or not, thereby affecting investment 
decisions to a higher degree. Along similar lines, in several occasions the necessary 
information required for valuation purposes by investors in financial markets is not 
available. Overall, in both cases, where information is either not accurate or nof 
available in the market at all, issues related to value ambiguity or uncertainties emerge. 
In other words, when the probability distribution for the expected return of a particular 
investment or asset is not known, investors behave differently than they do in cases 
with a known probability distribution for the expected return. 
The literature related to value ambiguity, or uncertainty in financial markets, dates back 
to. Knight (1921) and Keynes (1936) who argued that agents distinguish between risk 
(known probability distribution) and uncertainty (unknown probability distribution). 
Both authors have also pointed out that uncertainty is more common in economic 
decisions-making. Literature in more recent times has investigated similar research 
efforts on value ambiguity. For example, Epstein and Wang (1994) developed a model of 
asset pricing determination in which Knightian uncertainty plays a significant role in this 
framework. In similar respects, Uppal and Wang (2003) proposed a model that shows 
that when the overall degree of ambiguity is high, then a small difference in ambiguity 
about the marginal distribution of asset returns will lead to a strong bias in portfolio 
holdings. Similarly, Cagetti, Hansen, Sargent, and Williams (2002) showed that the 
dynamic evolution of the risk-return trade-off is dominated by movements in the 
growth-state probabilities and that the evolution of the dividend-price ratio is driven 
primarily by the capital technology ratio. In addition, a number of other authors in 
finance literature have attempted to explain the equity premium puzzle (high average 
returns on equity and low average risk-free rate) by appealing to ambiguity on the basis 
of a model with an ambiguity-averse representative agent. 
See for example, among others, Epstein and Wang (1994), Uppal and Wang (2003), Cagetti, Hansen, 
Sargent and Williams (2002), Maenhout (2000), Skiadas (2005), and Trojani, Leippold and Vanini (2005). 
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Along similar lines, Zhang (2006) studied the implications of information uncertainty in 
short-run price continuation anomalies and in the cross-sectional variations of stock 
returns. The major conclusions that derived from this study suggest that, whereas 
following good news, a positive relationship between the level of information 
uncertainty and the expected stock returns exists, the opposite happens in the case of 
bad news. Indeed, following bad news, a negative relationship between the level of 
information uncertainty and the expected stock returns exists. The author have also 
claimed that this phenomenon is a function of how much the level of information 
uncertainty affects the speed of incorporation of information into the stock prices. The 
author measured the level of information uncertainty by employing six variables, 
including the size of the firm, the age of the firm, the analyst coverage, the dispersion in 
analyst coverage, return volatility, and cash flow volatility. 
One of the major studies that contribute towards the design of the research in this 
chapter is the one by Epstein and Schneider (2008). The authors proposed a theoretical 
model in which they admitted that if information quality for an asset is far from good 
(i.e. poor or uncertain quality) ambiguity-averse market participants tend to react more 
strongly to bad news than to good news. In other words, Epstein and Schneider (2008) 
have suggested that investors are ambiguity-averse when the information quality is 
uncertain. They also have claimed that investors avoid assets followed by poor 
information quality whereas this is more intense when the assets' underlying 
fundamentals are volatile. Specifically, the authors proposed a model on information 
processing by ambiguity-averse agents that developed on the axiomatic foundations of 
recursive multiple-priors utility (as discussed by Epstein and Schneider, 2003). This 
model assumes that investors perceive a range of signal precisions, and take the worst-
case assessment of precision when evaluating actions. As a result, they react 
asymmetrically to signals: they discount good news, but take bad news seriously. The 
paper has also emphasized three new effects of uncertain information quality on asset 
prices. Firstly, investors require compensation for low future information quality. 
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Expected excess returns are thus higher when information quality is more uncertain, 
holding fixed the distribution of the variation of the fundamentals. Secondly, investors 
require more compensation for low information quality when fundamentals are more 
volatile. Third, investors' asymmetric responses to signals skew the distribution of 
observed returns: when there are signals of uncertain quality, which generate negative 
skewness, signals of known quality generate positive skewness. 
In summary, from the above discussion it appears that when information quality is poor, 
ambiguity-averse investors tend to react more strongly to bad news than to good news. 
Others have also suggested that there is a negative relationship between the level of 
information uncertainty and the expected stock returns. Given these observations, 
several important considerations related to the short and long-run returns of bidding 
firms may emerge when they acquire unlisted, and value ambiguous target firms, in 
short, typical questions that deserve investigation in this field of research include: how 
the gains of bidders acquiring value uncertain target firms are shaped? What is the role 
of the method of payment in takeovers of unlisted and value ambiguous target firms? 
And how one can measure the level of value ambiguity concerning unlisted target firms? 
Answers to these questions should fill several voids in finance literature whereas they 
will enhance our understanding on the corporate takeover process and their 
implications to merger partners. 
5.4.2 Information Asymmetry in Mergers and Acquisitions 
it has been extensively documented in finance literature that the concept of information 
asymmetry in takeovers may have significant implications on the likelihood of the M&A 
success, as well as on the announcement and post-merger gains to bidders' 
shareholders (Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel, 1990; Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993; and 
Coff, 1999a). Earlier research has also shown that under asymmetric information 
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conditions, firms can benefit from contingent forms of consideration such as stock 
payments (Eckbo et ai. 1990). However, more recent findings on the same field of 
research have provided additional conclusions on this very issue. For instance. Officer, 
Poulsen, and Stegemoller (2008) have investigated the question on whether the 
acquiring firm's announcement returns are mainly shaped by the information 
asymmetry that bidders face when valuing target firms. In fact, the authors have 
investigated the one side information asymmetry between the two firms involved in the 
transaction and by using only takeovers of privately held targets, for which the 
information asymmetry is more severe in contrast to takeovers of public targets, they 
found higher announcement abnormal returns to acquiring firms when, (a) they use 
shares as the currency to pay for the acquisition, (b) the target firm is small, and (c) 
when the target firms has intensive R&D or have balance sheets overloaded with 
intangible assets, which are very difficult to be valued by the bidding firm. Officer et al. 
(2008) have claimed that, in case that the bidders face high information asymmetries, 
they offer shares as a contingency pricing contract, which partly offsets any 
overpayment ex-post (further supporting the Hansen (1987) theory). Similarly, 
shareholders face a dilemma about the value of the acquiring firm, as at the time of the 
announcement the financials of the privately held targets are not disclosed. In similar 
respects, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stuiz (2004) have also concluded that the 
announcement period returns to bidding firms for cash based public and private 
acquisitions increase with idiosyncratic volatility (measure of information asymmetry). 
in addition, Shen and Reuer (2005) in their investigation of small manufacturing firms 
have compared bids of private and public targets and they concluded that, private 
targets tend to involve higher transaction costs in the presence of adverse selection 
problems than the public targets. They further concluded that bidders choose to acquire 
public targets rather than private targets when (a) acquiring young firms, and (b) when 
engaging in inter-industry transaction. The authors have further documented that 
acquirers avoid targets with significant intangible assets that have not disclosed the 
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value of these assets through other means such as collaborative agreements. Along 
similar lines, Ekkayokkaya, Holmes, and Paudyal (2007) examined the information 
quality and quantity for private versus public targets and concluded that although 
bidding firms acquiring private targets enjoy positive short-run gains, they do suffer a 
loss in the long-run. The authors have suggested that the announcement period gains 
for acquirers of privately held targets are mainly driven from the investors' over-reliance 
on the 'no news is good news' viewpoint when faced with differential information. 
Moreover, Draper and Paudyal (2008) have suggested that when high information 
asymmetry between undervalued companies and investors exists, companies announce 
takeover bids in order to attract the attention of investors and analysts, thereby to 
increase the share price through revaluation. They concluded that in the presence of 
high pre-bid information asymmetry, bidding firms gain the most from early bids while 
the gains decline with the number of takeover bids announced within three years. 
5.5 Hypotheses Development 
The main basis of this empirical chapter is that bidding firms acquiring unlisted targets 
are exposed to different levels of valuation risks due to unlisted firms' value-ambiguous 
informational environments. This may have several important implications on the 
bidding firms' value. To test for this, in this empirical investigation I examine several 
propositions that summarized below. 
5.5.1 Bidder Gains and Value Ambiguity 
It has been widely documented in finance literature that several explanatory variables, 
including the methods of payment, the relative size of the deal, the bidding firm size, 
and the growth opportunities of bidding firm, can affect the announcement and post-
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merger stock-returns of bidders.'* Further, several studies have also documented that 
the abnormal return to bidding firms buying unlisted target firms is associated with the 
level of information available about the target firm at the time of the deal 
announcement (see for example, Chang 1998; Shen and Reuer, 2005; Draper and 
Paudyal, 2006; Faccio et al. 2006; Officer et al. 2008; Ekkayokkaya et al. 2007; Draper 
and Paudyal, 2008). However, several other studies have provided a different approach 
in the informational environment of unlisted firms and they have concluded that 
unlisted firms suffer from high level of value-ambiguities due to several reasons (mainly 
due to their less known informational environment or the poor quality of information 
that follows them).'^ The level of unlisted target firms' valuation-ambiguities is also very 
likely to increase in higher levels for some firms, compared to other firms, due to (a) the 
nature of their fundamentals (i.e. intangible assets) and (b) issues related to their 
opaque informational environment in general. In short, bids with unlisted targets that 
fall in these two categories may affect differently the net gains from the M&A. 
Specifically, bids with value-ambiguous unlisted targets (i.e. with balance sheets laden 
with intangible assets) are very likely to leave the final entity of the M&A as value-
ambiguous too (with an unknown probability of expected return). In the event of 
acquisitions of unlisted targets, high levels of value-ambiguity can also arise from the 
fact that target firm managers or owners may conceal the true information, especially 
related to bad news. 
Along similar lines, related asset pricing literature has provided a different approach in 
terms of the relationship of the information uncertainty and the cross-section of stock 
returns. In fact, Zhang (2006) found that there exists a positive (negative) relationship 
between the level of information uncertainty and the expected stock returns following 
good (bad) news. In addition, Epstein and Schneider (2008) have suggested that 
" See, for instance, Chang (1998), Ang and Kohers (2001), Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002), Draper 
and Paudyal (2006), Faccio, McConnell, and Stolin (2006), Officer (2006), and Officer, Poulsen and 
Stegemoller (2008). 
For related studies, see for example: Shen and Capron (2003) and Officer, Poulsen and Steeemoller 
(2008). ^ 
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investors are ambiguity-averse when the information quality is uncertain. They have 
also admitted that investors avoid assets followed by poor information quality whereas 
this is more intense when the assets' underlying fundamentals are volatile. Following 
these two studies that, not only prompted a series of research questions but also served 
as the motivation behind this empirical chapter, I would expect that bids with difficult to 
value unlisted targets or bids with targets that followed by poor quality of information, 
to generate low positive, zero, or negative announcement returns. 
Overall, following the main arguments developed in this chapter, which focus on 
whether the level of (a) the difficulty to value unlisted target firms and (b) the risk 
exposure of the bidding firm acquiring unlisted targets that have balance sheets laden 
with risky assets (i.e. intangible assets), generate lower wealth effects to bidding firms' 
shareholders, both in the short and in the long-run. In short, in a bid of a value-
ambiguous unlisted target that is overpopulated by risky assets, any overpayment is 
likely.'* Further, the exposure of the final outcome of the M&A into higher risks, which 
increase the likelihood of wealth-destruction in the long-run, is also likely as the 
expected value of the assets is hard to be estimated. Therefore, the first testable 
hypothesis states that: 
HI: 'Bidders that buy difficult to value unlisted targets yield lower abnormal returns 
than bidders that acquire unlisted targets which are easier to value'. This should 
prevail in both the announcement period, as well as in the long-term. 
The opposite can be also possible but given that unlisted target firms have the ability to wait until they 
will receive an offer from a, at least, non-overvalued bidder, thereby this decrease the likelihood of 
underpayment. 
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5.5.2 Value Ambiguity and the Methods of Payment 
The issue described above can further interact with the methods of payment, the size 
and growth opportunities of the bidder and target, as well as the bargaining power of 
target. Alternative methods of payment signal different valuation effects of bidder, 
target, and the expected performance of the combined entity. Observations from 
previous research, such as Myers and Majluf (1984) and Travlos (1987), suggest that 
bidding companies opt for stock payments only when their stocks are overvalued. On 
the other hand, Chang (1998) have admitted that in privately acquisitions the target 
firms' managers have the power to identify the overvalued stock (due to their strong 
bargaining power or the option available to them to 'wait and sell'). However, when 
unlisted and value-ambiguous targets are involved in the transaction several important 
considerations may emerge with regards the optimal method of payment used. In short, 
one may expect that the managers of unlisted and value-uncertain targets (a) are 
prepared to accept the bidder's overvalued equity as the method of financing (due to 
several reasons that discussed throughout this section) and (b) are likely to find it hard 
to value their own corporation (i.e. due to the nature of their fundamentals) and so to 
fail in securing the best possible exchange ratio. Hence, the use of common equity or 
cash to pay for risky (or value ambiguous) assets, which to some degree renders the 
final outcome of the M&A as value ambiguous, would be expected to signal the 
following market perceptions (see figure 5:1, cases A to D): 
o Case A: The bidding firm is not overvalued and ttie unlisted target firm is not 
subject to value-ambiguity. In this case the selection of the method of payment 
(cash, stock, or combination of both cash and stock) will be decided based upon 
other firm-specific (bidder or target) and transaction-specific characteristics. 
However, the optimal method of payment for both target and bidding firm is 
expected to be stock (figure 5:1, case A). 
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~ The use of stock in that case will be in favour of both target and bidder 
for the following reasons: (a) it will signal to market participants that the 
bidding firm's stock is at least not overvalued, (b) it will increase the 
likelihood of creation of outside blockholders thereby providing more 
effective monitoring to the firm's managers in the post-merger period 
(figure 5:1, case A). Such a deal will therefore generate positive abnormal 
returns to bidding firm. 
~ On the other hand, the use of cash in a deal with a non-overvalued 
bidder and a non-value-uncertain unlisted target firm may generate 
either small positive or zero abnormal returns in the short-run, as 
recorded by numerous studies in the M&A literature. In short, following 
the limited competition hypothesis by Chang (1998) and the liquidity 
hypothesis by Draper and Paudyal (2006), the market for corporate 
control of unlisted target firms should be subject to low competition and 
also it should be illiquid. Both hypotheses suggest that bidders engaged 
in M&A with private targets are very likely to yield positive returns to 
their shareholders. On the other hand, the period covered in this 
investigation is between 1997 and 2007 which includes the largest M&A 
wave in the UK M&A history to-date. In short, this period is characterized 
as high competitive. Therefore, whereas deals with unlisted and non-
value-uncertain target firms may expected to be positive NPV projects (as 
the PV of the synergy exceeds the premium required), a highly 
competitive time period may force bidders to pay higher premiums which 
in turn may offset any gains obtained due to 'limited competition' and 
'liquidity' hypotheses (as the premiums paid may be equal to, or greater 
than, the PV of the synergy). Thus, deals of unlisted and non-value-
uncertain target firms with cash financing should generate either small 
positive or zero abnormal returns to bidders' shareholders (figure 5:1, 
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case A). Overall, the equity financing is remaining the optimal method of 
financing in this type of deals. 
~ Overall, this deal is expected to be 'good news' (good-neutral-news) for 
the bidding firm if stock (cash) is utilized to finance the deal. 
o Case B: The bidding firm is overvalued and the unlisted target firm is not subject 
to value-ambiguity. In this case the bidding firm managers should have an extra 
incentive to use their 'cheap equity' (stock) as the exchange ratio in this 
transaction (as discussed by Myers and Mjluf, 1984). On the other hand, the 
target firm managers will not have any incentive for accepting the bidding firm's 
overvalued shares (a) as they carefully assess the stock and accept it only when it 
is at least not overvalued (as discussed by Chang, 1998) and (b) as their 
fundamentals are not value ambiguous, it helps the managers of the unlisted 
firm to value their own corporation correctly thereby to secure the best 
exchange ratio. Therefore, the optimal method of payment to finance this type of 
deal is cash (figure 5:1, case B). 
~ Following the above discussion, the use of cash as the exchange ratio in 
the case when the bidders' stock is overvalued and the target firm is not 
subject to value ambiguity reflects good news and thus value creation in 
the short-run. This is consistent with several studies that examine gains 
from acquisitions of privately held targets, such as Chang (1998) due to 
'limited competition hypothesis' and in Draper and Paudyal (2006) due to 
'liquidity hypothesis' (as discussed in case A). However, the period 
analyzed in this investigation is between 1997 and 2007, covering the 
largest M&A wave in the UK M&A history to-date. In short, this period is 
characterized as high competitive which therefore force the winning 
bidder to overpay for this deal (i.e. higher premiums required). This will 
eventually offsets any gains obtained due to 'limited competition' and 
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'liquidity' hypotheses (as the premiums paid may be equal to, or greater 
than, the PV of the synergy) (figure 5:1, case B). Thus, deals of unlisted 
and non-value-uncertain target firms with cash financing should generate 
either small positive or zero abnormal returns to bidders' shareholders. 
~ The use of stock as the exchange ratio when the target is not value 
ambiguous and the bidders is overvalued is very unlikely as the target 
firm's managers have an extra incentive to identify whether the bidders' 
stock is overvalued and thus accept it only when it is, at least, not 
overvalued (as discussed by Chang, 1998) (figure 5:1, case B). Overall, the 
cash financing is remaining the optimal method of financing in this type 
of deals. 
~ Overall, this deal is expected to be 'good-neutral-news' (bad-news) for 
the bidding firm if cash (stock) is utilized to finance the deal. 
o Case C: The bidding firm is not overvalued but the unlisted target firm is subject 
to value-ambiguity, in general, deals with target firms subject to high levels of 
value ambiguity (i.e. poor quality of information) should yield lower gains to 
bidders' shareholders, compared to deals with target firms subject to low or zero 
levels of value-ambiguity, irrespective of the method of payment used to finance 
the deal, as discussed in the first hypothesis' formulation (Epstein and Schneider, 
2008). However, the cash or stock financing in this type of deals may generate 
different wealth effects to shareholders of bidders due to the considerations 
that will be discussed bellow. 
The bidding firm's managers have no obvious reason to pay in shares for an 
unlisted and value-ambiguous target firm. Thus, the best exchange ratio for the 
bidding firm in this case would be cash, thereby giving bidders the option to save 
their stock as the 'safe currenc / . 
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On the other hand, the target firm's managers are able to see that the bidding 
firm's stock is not overvalued and they may be prepared to accept it. However, 
since private firms' owners recognize the nature of their fundamentals, they 
would prefer non-equity instruments due to the following reasons: (a) they 
would prefer to minimize the likelihood to become outside blockholder for the 
combined entity as it will eventually contain during the after-bid period assets 
that will be subject to the same value uncertainty with their own ones during the 
pre-bid period, and (b) as overpayment is likely, they would prefer it in cash 
instead of stock (if stock was overvalued it could further motivate them to 
accept it only if they were intending to immediately cash out - extreme case 
which is discussed in case D). Therefore, from both perspectives - the bidder and 
the target - the optimal method of payment to finance this type of deals remains 
cash (figure 5:1, case C). 
~ Irrespective of the type of payment, bidders' shareholders are expected 
to experience low positive or negative returns due to the poor quality of 
information that follows the unlisted target firm (Epstein and Schneider, 
2008). 
~ The use of cash instruments signal neutral or bad-news due to the 
reasons discussed above. In addition to this, bids of unlisted and value-
uncertain target firms will generate ambiguous future cash flows, which 
to an extent will render the PV of the synergy ambiguous. Therefore, 
regardless the premiums required for this deal, the overall signal from an 
acquisition with an unlisted and value ambiguous target firm would be 
ambiguous. Furthermore, although the likelihood of overpayment in this 
type of transactions is high, the use of cash in this case prevents 'safe 
currency' (stock) and thus the bidding firms to exposure into additional 
risks (figure 5:1, case C). The use of cash generates zero or negative 
abnormal returns to acquiring firm's shareholders. 
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~ Similarly, the use of stock signals bad news due to (a) the additional risks 
that the bidding firm is exposed to when acquiring unlisted and value-
uncertain target firms by using its 'safe currency' and (b) the high 
likelihood of overpayment for this type of transactions (figure 5:1, case 
C). The use of stock then will generate negative abnormal returns for the 
bidding firm's acquirers. 
~ Overall, this deal is expected to be 'neutral-bad news' (bad-news) for 
the bidding firm if cash (stock) is utilized to finance the deal. 
Case D: The bidding firm's common stock is overvalued and the unlisted target 
firm is subject to value-ambiguity. As in case C, bids with target firms subject to 
high levels of value-ambiguity (i.e. poor quality of information) should generate 
low positive or negative gains to bidders' shareholders than the deals with target 
firms subject to low or zero levels of value-ambiguity, as discussed in the first 
hypothesis' formulation (Epstein and Schneider, 2008). However, in the present 
case, both the bidding and the target firm's managerial incentives in using cash 
or stock financing are different than in case C. 
In particular, in the present case (D), the managers of the bidding firm would 
have an extra incentive to use their overvalued shares as the exchange ratio and 
buy value-uncertain assets, thereby save their cash as the 'safe currency'. This is 
an attempt to use their 'cheap equity' to buy value-uncertain assets (with an 
unknown probability of expected return). However, using shares to acquire 
unlisted target firms that followed by poor quality of information, further expose 
the bidder to additional risks, which to an extent may motivate its shareholders 
to avoid its stock (Epstein and Schneider, 2008). 
On the other hand, while accepting overvalued stock is very unlikely due to the 
blockholder and information hypotheses (Chang, 1998), there several cases 
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when the target firms still accept the bidding firm's overvalued stock. In fact, 
they should have a plan to cash-out immediately. To an extent, the managers of 
the unlisted and value-ambiguous target firm, (a) knowing that the bidder's stock 
is overvalued, and (b) knowing that overpayment is likely, would be prepared to 
accept stock as the optimal method of payment, only if they are willing to 
immediately cash-out (as discussed in Schleifer and Vishny, 2003). Alternatively, 
cash payment, in this particular case, would allow unlisted target owners to 
avoid the overvalued stock and the bidders to be exposed into extra 
uncertainties by using its cash which is its 'safe currency'. Therefore, from both 
perspectives - the bidder and the target - the optimal method of payment to 
finance this type of deals remains stock (figure 5:1, case D). 
~ Irrespective of the type of payment, bidders' shareholders are expected 
to experience low positive or negative returns due to the poor quality of 
information that follows the unlisted target firm (Epstein and Schneider, 
2008). 
~ The use of stock as the exchange ratio for this type of deals will signal 
bad news due to any overpayment and the immediate cash-out during 
the after-bid period (figure 5:1, case D). The use of stock then will 
generate negative abnormal returns for the bidding firm's acquirers. 
- On the other hand, the use of cash will signal bad news due to the 
following: (a) bidders might overpay and (b) bidders face additional risks 
due to further exposure in higher uncertainties (since they use their 'safe 
currency' [cash] instead of their 'cheap equity' [stock]) (figure 5:1, case 
D). However, whether in acquisitions that involve overvalued bidders that 
use their safe-currency [cash] for bids of value-uncertain targets allow for 
zero or small positive gains to bidders, as proposed by limited 
competition hypothesis, liquidity hypothesis and bargaining power 
hypothesis, is an open question that deserves further investigation. 
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Accordingly, the bad or neutral effects discussed above should be 
reflected in the gains of bidders. Overall, the use of cash then will 
generate negative or zero abnormal returns for the bidding firm's 
acquirers. 
~ Overall, this deal is expected to be 'neutral-bad news' (bad-news) for 
the bidding firm if cash (stock) is utilized to finance the deal. 
From case C and D, although similar wealth effects to gains of bidders shareholders are 
generated, in case D they are more severe due to the fact that the uncertainties are 
originated from both the bidder and the target firms' sides. 
Insert figure 5:1 about here 
Therefore, my next testable hypothesis states that: 
H2: 'Bidding firms buying difficult to value unlisted targets and paying with shares 
yield lower abnormal returns when compared to the returns of bidders buying easier 
to value targets and paying with shares'. This effect should prevail in both the 
announcement period as well as the in the long-term. 
5.5.3 Characteristics of Target Firms and Bidders' Gains 
Size of the Target: The size of an unlisted firm may vary from a small family business to 
one that is able to compete even with large publicly traded firms. Small unlisted firms 
are less known, a fact that reduces the amount of information availability in the market 
about the same firms. This makes their valuation more difficult. Small firms may also 
have fewer customers, fewer suppliers, and fewer analysts watching them. This makes 
their information environment even more complex and ambiguous. In addition, the 
268 
Chapter 5: Target Value Ambiguity and Gains from Acquisitions of Unlisted Targets 
information acquisition cost for small firms will be higher, making them less attractive 
targets. On the other hand, smaller firms are more likely to integrate easily into the 
acquirer's business and hence are more attractive. In the UK, larger firms, even if they 
are not listed in stock exchanges, are required to disclose more information about their 
operational and financial activities than small non-listed firms. This makes their 
valuation less difficult. When larger unlisted targets are acquired with stocks, the 
likelihood of outside blockholder creation increases significantly, a fact that is more 
intense once the size of the unlisted target increases relative to the size of the bidding 
firm. I also expect the structure of the bidder to change significantly when the 
acquisition involves large targets (relative size effect). Hence, larger firms overpopuiated 
with risky assets are more likely to create higher uncertainty into the final outcome of 
the M&A. Therefore, the size of the unlisted target should be one of the important 
factors in determining the level of value-ambiguity. This leads to my next testable 
hypothesis which states that: 
H3: 'Bidding firms buying small unlisted target firms yield lower abnormal returns 
when compared to the gains of bidders buying large unlisted target firms'. This effect 
should prevail in both the announcement period as well as the in the long-term. 
I measure the size of the unlisted target firms by employing four alternative proxies, 
namely, total assets, fixed assets, number of employees, and tangible assets. 
Age of the Target: It is likely for newly established firms to exhibit higher uncertainty 
than older firms due to several reasons. In general, it has been widely documented in 
the literature that firms with long history have more information available in the market 
(Barry and Brown, 1985). Mature companies tend to be commonly known by more 
customers, more suppliers, and also they might tend to be operating within more 
mature industries. Hannan and Freeman (1989) argued that young firms are likely to 
lack reliability and accountability in their organizational routines and performance. In 
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terms of institutional constrains, young firms lack legitimacy, which occur due to the 
lack of support from relevant organization (Baum, 1989) and due to segmentation 
within the market for inter-organizational relationships (Carter and Manaster, 1990; 
Podolny, 1993). More recently, Zhang (2006) used the age of a large number of US firms 
to proxy for informational uncertainties in the business environment. In short, the 
author found a negative relationship between information uncertainties and the 
cross-section of expected returns, further suggesting that the information quality 
following firms (as measured with the age of the firm) destroy of enhance shareholder 
wealth. Hence, the valuation of older targets should be easier than the valuation of 
newly established companies. The age of the unlisted firm is measured as the difference 
between the announcement date of the acquisition and the date of the firm's 
incorporation. This leads to the next hypothesis which states that: 
H4: 'Bidding firms buying young unlisted targets yield lower abnormal returns than 
the bidders buying mature unlisted target firms'. This effect should prevail in both the 
announcement period and in the long-run. 
Investments of the Target: Investment is divided into two categories: the capital 
investment and financial investment. Capital investments include the purchase of capital 
goods, such as plant and machinery in a factory in order to produce goods for future 
consumption. The higher the level of capital investment in a company, the faster it is 
expected its growth rate to be. On the other hand, financial investment is defined as the 
purchase of assets, such as securities, bank and building society deposits, etc, with the 
primary view to their financial return, either in the form of income or capital gain. In 
general, high levels of investments may be interpreted as higher expected future cash 
flows and thus positive (or higher) NPV (assuming that M&A create value only when the 
PV of the synergy exceeds the premiums paid). 
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On the other hand, one may expect that providing information for unlisted firms are 
limited in both qualitative and quantitative terms, market participants and also bidders 
find it hard to accurately estimate the PV of the investments undertaken by unlisted 
target firms. This is very likely to minimize the accuracy of the estimation of the PV of 
the synergy, which might be considered as poor quality of information by investors 
thereby enforce rational investors to avoid the equity of the bidding firm. In spite of 
these considerations, in general, the higher amount of investments should be perceived 
as good new?s on average, which is therefore expected to be reflected in the 
announcement and post-merger gains of bidders. 
This leads to the next hypothesis which states that: 
H5: 'Bidding firms buying targets whose balance sheets are overloaded with 
investments yield higher abnormal returns than the bidders of targets with a small 
amount of investments in their balance sheets'. This effect should prevail in both the 
announcement period as well as in the long-run. 
Intangible Assets of the Target: Intangible assets include intellectual property, brand 
names, franchise, reputation, trademark, and patent rights. They are difficult to trade as 
it is difficult to assess their quality (Chi, 1994; Coff, 1999a) and therefore buyers are not 
certain as to what will be transferred due to their complex and simultaneously uncertain 
future cash flows. However, acquisitions are important means of transferring intangible 
resources that are otherwise non-marketable (Wernerfelf, 1984); this implies that 
acquisitions of unlisted target firms laden with intangible assets will further expose the 
bidding firm to higher valuation uncertainties in the future. When the target firms reveal 
information regarding their intangible assets (even if they are value-ambiguous), it is 
likely that bidders offer higher premiums, in an acquisition of an unlisted target whose 
balance sheet is laden with intangible assets, the valuation effects on the final outcome 
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of the M&A is neither known to bidding firm managers nor to the target firm owners. 
This leads to the next hypothesis which states that: 
H6: 'Bidding firms buying unlisted targets with a large proportion of intangible assets 
yield lower abnormal returns than the bidders buying the targets with a small 
proportion of intangible assets'. This effect should prevail in both the announcement 
period and in the long-run. 
5.5.4 Characteristics of Bidders and their Gains (Control Factors) 
Bidders' size: Moelier, Schlingemann, and Stuiz (2004) showed that larger acquirers earn 
about 2% less than smaller acquirers. Therefore, to allow for this effect I control for the 
size of the bidder. The size of the bidder is measured by their pre-bid market 
capitalization. 
Growth opportunities of the bidder: It has also been documented that the growth 
opportunities of bidding firms affects their gains. Sudarshanam and Mahate (2003) and 
Conn et al. (2005) showed that value acquirers (with low MTBV) outperform glamour 
bidders both in the short and a long-run. Thus, I control for growth opportunities of the 
bidding firm. I measure the growth opportunity of the bidder with their market-to-book 
value (MTBV) ratio and the price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio one month prior to the 
announcement of the deal. 
Age of the bidder: I also control for the age of the bidding firm. This is because firms 
with a long trading history have more information available in public domain (Barry and 
Brown, 1985). Mature firms are more likely to be in more mature industries, while firm's 
age may also capture the underlying volatility at the industry level. I measure the age of 
the firm with the number of days that the firm has been recorded in DataStream. 
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Relative size of the deal: Several authors have concluded that the bidding firm's 
abnormal returns within a small window surrounding the acquisition announcement's 
day increases as the target size increases relative to acquirer size (Asquith et al. 1983; 
Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989; Kang, 1993; and Fuller et al. 2002). 
This is due to the fact that the larger the target firm's size relative to the bidder, the 
more the original structure of the acquiring firm changes as a result of the acquisition. 
The relative size is measured as the ratio of the bidder's market capitalization (MV) one 
month prior to the bid announcement and the transaction value of the deal or the deal 
value (DV). 
5.6 Data and Methodology 
5.6.1 Sample Description 
The information on the announcements of deals is extracted from Securities Data 
Corporations (SDC). The sample comprises of bids announced by listed UK firms 
between 01/01/1996 and 31/12/2007. The choice of the sample period is guided by the 
availability of data in FAME which holds firm specific financial data for 10 years. SDC 
records 16,316 deals announcements by UK firms during this period. The final sample 
meets the following criteria. 
• The acquirer is a UK company traded in the London Stock Exchange (LSE). 
• The target is a private or subsidiary (unlisted) domestic firm. 
• The subsidiary's parent (if any) is an unlisted company. 
• The deal value is equal to or greater than £1 million. 
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• The market value of the acquirer is greater than £1 million (one month prior 
to the announcement of the deal). 
• The sample is restricted when the acquirer aims to obtain more than 50% of 
the target firm. 
• Acquiring firms are not involved in other bids within 5-days (-2 to + 2) around 
the announcement of the deal. 
• Data for the acquirer is available in DataStream. 
• Data for the target firm is available in FAME. 
Finally, 2,038 acquisitions meet the criteria. 
5.6.2 The Sample Features 
Figure 5:2 and table 5:1 show the annual distribution of sample deals and reveal the 
merger wave of late 1990s. The M&A activity over that period is overpopulated by 
acquisitions of unlisted target firms, covering almost 88% of deals. This pattern is 
consistent with the distribution of the sample of Faccio and Massulis (2005) and Draper 
and Paudyal (2006). The merger wave of the late 1990s can be attributed, to a large 
extent, to the sustained economic expansion, the growth of the internet and 
information dissemination in general, and the movements in stock market. Table 5:2 
summarizes the distribution of M&A activities by industry sectors of both bidders and 
targets. Table 5:2 shows that the collapse of consumer confidence in several industries, 
as well as the overcapacity in traditional sectors, caused an unexpected reduction in 
merger activity in these industries. Within the same period, the high technology, 
consumer products and services, industrials, and media and entertainment industries 
are remain most active. 
Insert figure 5:2 and tables 5:1 and 5:2 about here 
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Table 5:3 summarizes transaction, acquirer, and target specific characteristics. The 
average size (MV) of the bidders is £582 million with a median of £76 million reflecting a 
skewed distribution in bidders' size. With regards the growth opportunities of the 
bidding firms, the mean (median) MTBV ratio is 3.54 (1.89), while the P/E ratio is 36.87 
(16.00). The median value of the relative size of the deals (TV/MV) is lower than its 
mean, reflecting that a considerable number of small deals are in the sample. The table 
also shows that bidding firms are more mature than their targets (bidders' and targets' 
age). Finally, the mean (median) liquidity ratio is 2.01 (1.06), current ratio is 2.22 (1.22), 
and the gearing ratio is 288.41 (62.12). 
Insert table 5:3 about here 
5.6.3 The Methodologies 
5.6.3.1 Measurement of announcement excess returns 
For the short-run analysis in this chapter I follow the tradition event study methods as 
summarized in Brown and Warner (1985). Cumulative Average Returns (CAR) for 5-days 
[-2, to +2] surrounding the announcement day (day 0) are estimated. The abnormal 
return of acquirer is estimated using equation (1). 
(1) 
Where: 
= The abnormal return for security / in time period/; 
= The return for the security i in time period/. ; and 
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R^^ = The return for the market (the FT-Aii Share measured as the percentage 
difference of the Market Index) equally weighted index in time period t. 
Finally, equation (2) estimates the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) for the five-days 
around the announcement day (t). 
C ^ = ' f ( ^ - ^ ) , (2) 
5.6.3.2 Long Run Performance 
To assess the post-acquisition performance of bidders I estimate one, three and five 
year holding period excess returns after controlling for known risk factors identified in 
Fama and French (1996). Average monthly post-merger excess returns for 12, 36, and 60 
months are estimated under a calendar time portfolio regression (CTPR) framework. The 
CTPR accounts for the cross-sectional dependence of stock returns, particularly due to 
the inclusion of frequent acquirers, caused by the lack of independence among 
observations. This problem arises from overlapping returns and the non-random timing 
of acquisitions. For each calendar month in the period from January 1996 to December 
2005, excess returns are calculated for all sample firms that announced bids with 
unlisted target firms during the previous 12, 36 and 60 months. The calendar-time 
portfolio excess returns are estimated with equation (3): 
(3) 
In equation (3), the intercept ( a j measures the monthly average excess return of 
bidders after controlling for the effects of three risk factors. The dependent variable 
For a detailed explanation of the CTPR method see Lyon et al. (1999). 
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, - ^ / , , ) i s the monthly excess return of the calendar-time portfolio of bidders 
risk free rate; - ^ ^ , ) i s the excess return of market portfolio; SMB (Small minus 
Big) is the excess return of a portfolio of small firms (value weighted) over a portfolio of 
large firms; and HML (High minus Low) is the excess return of a portfolio of value firms 
(value weighted) over glamour firms. SMB and HML are estimated using the method 
outlined in Fama and French (1996). 
5.7 Empirical Findings 
This section reports and interprets the empirical findings following the short-run, the 
long-run, and the cross-sectional analyses of the gains to bidders of unlisted targets. 
Deals are grouped on the proxies chosen to capture the level of target's value-
ambiguity, and thus are expected to explain the bidding firm's announcement and post 
acquisition abnormal returns. Abnormal returns differentials between portfolios are also 
reported. 
5.7.1 Announcement Period Gains 
The main purpose of the announcement period analysis is to uncover differentials in 
short-run abnormal returns between acquirers engaging in takeovers with unlisted 
target firms subject to different level of value-ambiguity. Initially, the cumulative 
abnormal return (hereafter CAR) is reported for the entire sample of takeovers involving 
unlisted targets firms, measured within a small window (t-2, t+2) surrounding the 
acquisition's announcement day, t. The subsequent discussion concentrates on the 
stock market reaction, and is based on proxies that capture the target firm's valuation 
uncertainty. In each case, the sample is further divided according to the method of 
payment. 
277 
Chapter 5: Target Value Ambiguity and Gains from Acquisitions of Unlisted Targets 
5.7.1.1 Bidders' Announcement Period Gains and Bidders' Characteristics 
Table 5:4 reports the CAR for all acquisitions and proxies based on previous research, 
namely, bidder's size (MV), bidder's market-to-book value (MTBV) ratio, deal's relative 
size, and bidder's price-to-earning (P/E) ratio, divided into portfolios according to 
alternative methods of financing. Panel A reports CAR for the entire sample of acquirers 
(2,038 bids) as well as for portfolios classified according to the different means of 
payment. In this case the abnormal return for all bids is 2.18% while abnormal returns 
for the acquisitions financed with cash (equity) are 1.80% (4.01%) respectively, both 
statistically significant at a 1%. Their differences are also significant at the 1%. These 
findings are in line with the vast majority of studies in the literature of corporate and 
investment finance,"" and they reflect the market's views with regards to the bidding 
firm's valuation effects. Panel B reports the CAR after controlling for the bidding firm's 
size and the alternative means of financing. Evidently, the CAR decrease as the size of 
the bidding firm increase with the largest differential to be obtained among deals 
financed with shares (-6.10%). These findings are consistent with the majority of studies 
in the literature supporting the view that small bidders gain on average higher abnormal 
returns than large bidders (Moeller et al. 2004)."' 
Insert table 5:4 about here 
Panel D reports CAR of the bidding firms based on the relative size of the deal. It has 
been argued that the relative size of the target firm to the bidding firm is a major factor 
in explaining the bidding firm's CAR (Asquith et al. 1983, Jensen and Ruback, 1983, 
For related studies see for example, Chang (1998), Ang and Kohers (2001), Draper and Paudyal (2006) 
Officer (2006), Faccio et al. (2006), Officer et al. (2008), and Ekkayokkaya et al.(2007). 
Managerial decisions in large firms are more likely to be hubris's motivated (Roll, 1986), since managers 
in such firms are more often covered by the media, they are in general relatively more successful, and 
they tend to have a wider availability of resources when making investment decisions. 
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Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989, Kang, 1993, Fuller et al. 2002, Conn et al. 2005, and Draper 
and Paudyal, 2006).'^^ For all three sub-groups (all cases, cash, and stock) it is clear that 
the CAR of bidding companies increases as we move from the low relative size portfolio 
to high relative size deal group suggesting that the greater the structural change of the 
bidding firms (high relative size), the higher the CAR to bidding firm. In addition, the 
higher bidders' CAR in the high relative size portfolio when unlisted targets are acquired 
may be partly driven due to illiquidity discount. 
The market-to-book value (MTBV) ratio and the price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio are used to 
capture the growth opportunities of the bidding firms. The MTBV of the acquiring firm 
reflects important information about the past, and hence the potential future stock 
performance of the bidder. Among others, Rau and Vermaelen (1998), and Sudarsanam 
and Mahate (2003) have concluded that value acquirers (low MTBV) outperform 
glamour acquirers (high MTBV) around takeover announcements and after controlling 
for the mode of payment."^ In panel C, CAR decrease as MTBV increases, suggesting that 
value acquirer's gains are mainly due to their future high growth opportunities. Lastly, 
panel E reports CAR for acquirers classified according to their P/E ratio. Evidently, CAR 
increases with the P/E ratio. However, the differential for the entire sample appears 
significant in both economic and statistical terms when the sample is divided into five 
portfolios and the differential between high P/E and low P/E portfolios are examined. 
The stock market reaction to an acquisition's announcement is expected to be more intense the larger 
the target size and thus the more the original structure of the acquiring firm changes as a result of the 
acquisition. 
Glamour acquirers are those firms that are overvalued on the basis of their past stock market 
performance. Such stocks receive premium ratings in the form of high MTBV. On the other hand, firms 
with low MTBV ratings may be undervalued, but may have the potential for subsequent value gains. 
Glamour acquirers are high growth while firms, since their high market valuation reflects the expected 
high growth, or investment opportunities. 
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5.7.1.2 Announcement Period Bidder Gains by the Age of the Unlisted Target Firm 
Table 5:5 and 5:6 report gains to bidding firms by the age of the unlisted target. Table 
5:6 presents the sample that is further divided according to the size (total assets) of the 
unlisted target firm."" Table 5:5 clearly indicates that the age of the unlisted target firm 
has a significant impact on the bidding firm's CAR, although this appears to be the case 
only when stock is used to finance the deal. More specifically, when the common stock 
used to finance the deals is equal to, or higher than, 75%, the differential between the 
portfolio of mature targets and the portfolio of young targets appears to be significant 
in both economical and statistical terms (this pattern holds when the sample is divided 
into three as well as five portfolios - see table 5:5, panes B and D). These findings 
suggest that the valuation of mature companies is less difficult than the valuation of 
younger firms. It also implies that mature unlisted targets are subject to lower 
information asymmetries as they are more widely known, have a longer trading history, 
more analysts following them, and reveal more information (both qualitative and 
quantitative) to public thereby making their valuation easier. In addition, the risk 
exposure of the acquirer is relatively lower while the final outcome of the acquisition 
may be considered as less value ambiguous. Hence, the use of equity to pay for the 
acquisition of older unlisted firms reflects significant gains to bidders, contrary to the 
use of equity to pay for bids against younger, and thus more risky, unlisted targets. 
Overall, one may consider that the age of the unlisted target captures the level of target 
firm's valuation-ambiguity and explains bidders' gains, thereby support the hypothesis 4 
of this chapter. 
Insert tables 5:5 and 5:6 about here 
In table 6 the sample is Initially divided into three groups according to the target's size. Subsequently, 
the sample is further divided into three portfolios, only within the big and the small size group, according 
to the age of the unlisted target firm. This is in an attempt to further capture the level of target valuation-
uncertainty, and gain additional explanatory power for the bidder's CAR. 
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Table 5:6 shows that the target firm valuation ambiguity varies significantly with the size 
and the age of the unlisted target firm, as well as with the method of payment used. The 
findings show that when bidders use their equity to acquire small-mature unlisted 
targets, they gain on average 4.80% and 10.20% more than the bidders of small-young 
unlisted targets. Small-young unlisted firms may be subject to higher value-ambiguity 
for several reasons, including the scarce availability of information. Given the risk of 
acquiring a small-young unlisted target, it is reasonable to expect stock financing to 
generate lower CAR to bidders, in comparison with bids of small-mature firms when the 
same method of payment is used. Basically, these two portfolios fall under the small 
firms' group (small firms do not required to disclosure information). Hence, this is very 
likely to be one of the main reasons why in panel D (big unlisted firms) I do not obtain 
any significant differential between portfolios comprised by acquisitions with large-
mature versus large-young firms.^^ The findings indicate that young unlisted target firms 
suffer from higher levels of value-ambiguity once they are compared with mature ones, 
even though this is more intense when the target is a small firm, supporting further my 
general as well as more specific predictions. In fact, bidding firms buying difficult to 
value unlisted targets yield lower abnormal returns when compared to the returns of 
bidders buying less difficult to value targets, which is more severe in the case when 
stock used as the exchange ratio, thereby further supporting the hypothesis 3 and 4 of 
this chapter. 
5.7.1.3 Bidders' Announcement Period Gains by the Size of the Target 
Unlisted target firms' size may vary from a very small family firm to a very large 
company able to compete even with large listed firms. The size of unlisted firms may 
provide an important measure of the firm's information availability in the market, a fact 
" On the other hand, when big unlisted target firm are acquired it is more likely for the bidder to enjoy 
much higher gains on average (as opposite to the gains generated to in the case of acquisitions with small 
unlisted target firms) due to the higher relative size (Asquith et al. 1983). 
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that decreases the level of the firm's valuation difficulty which therefore constitutes the 
final outcome of the M&A as less ambiguous."^ In addition to the greater availability of 
information for larger firms, acquisitions with large unlisted target firms are also more 
likely to involve outside blockholders, or to change the original structure of the bidding 
firm substantially (as measured through the relative size). Unlisted target firm's total 
assets are used to capture the size of the target firms, and hence to proxy for the level 
of their valuation-uncertainty. 
Table 5:7 reports CAR for portfolios sorted according to proxies capturing the size of the 
unlisted target firms. Specifically, table 5:7 reports CAR according to the total assets and 
the age of the unlisted target firms. Panels A and B presents CAR before controlling for 
the age of the unlisted target firm. The findings indicate that stock-financed acquisitions 
of large unlisted target firms generate higher abnormal returns to bidders than bids for 
small-unlisted targets (3.60% and 4.80% on average). This is the first indication that the 
size of the target firm as measured by its total assets, along with the method of 
payment employed, reflects significant valuation effects to bidding firm.^^ Further, panel 
C and D report CAR for bidding firms buying young-unlisted target firms while panel E 
and F show CAR for acquisitions involved with mature-unlisted target firms. Clearly, for 
acquisitions conducted with common stock, bidders gain more when they buy young-
large companies than when they buy young-small ones by on average 5.30% and 10.50% 
(when the proportion of stock employed is equal to, or greater than 75% and equal to 
100% respectively). These figures imply that among young companies, bidders face 
more difficulty to value small firms because they are not required to disclose 
information with regards to their operation in the market, as opposite to big firms, 
further supporting the hypothesis 3 of this chapter. 
Indeed, large unlisted firms are required by the UK disclosure Information requirements to disclose 
more information regarding their financial and operational performance relative to smaller ones. 
The larger the unlisted target firm the higher the change of the original structure of the bidding firm 
and the higher the abnormal returns. To an extent, the outside blockholding creation following 
acquisitions with large unlisted target firms is more likely too once stock is utilized as the method of 
payment. 
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Insert tables 5:7 and 5:8 about here 
Table 5:8 reports the CAR for bids with unlisted targets firms, divided into portfolios 
according to the size of both the bidder (MV) and the unlisted target firm (total assets). 
Specifically, panels C and D reports CAR for small bidders buying targets with their size 
to vary substantially. On average, bidders that acquire small versus big unlisted target 
firms and pay with stock enjoy on average 3.80%, 5.30% and 7.40% higher CAR. Given 
that the bidding firm is a small one, the acquisition with a large unlisted target firm is 
more likely to create outside blockholders, as well as to change the original structure of 
the bidder significantly (this is a finding that further confirms the relative size 
hypothesis). Similarly, large unlisted target firms are required to disclose more 
information into the market and therefore their valuation would be an easier task, 
leaving the final outcome of the M&A less value ambiguous. 
5.7.1.4 Bidders' Announcement Period Gains by Asset (In) Tangibility of Targets 
In this section I examine the relationship between the bidders' CAR and the proportion 
of intangible assets of target."* Table 5:9 reports announcement returns of the bidding 
firms acquiring unlisted targets with intangible-laden balance sheets. 
Insert table 5:9 about here 
Table 5:9 presents the CAR, and their differentials from portfolios formed according to 
three proxies computed by using various assets from the target firms. Panels A and B 
show bidders' gains by targets intangible asset. In equity finance deals, bidders of 
I expect the intangible assets held by the unlisted target firm to reflect significant valuation effects to 
bidders due to; a) the high target valuation-uncertainty, and b) neither the bidders nor the target can 
estimate the exact value of the intangible assets as well as the final outcome of the M&A. 
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targets with low intangible assets significantly outperform the acquirers of targets with 
high intangible assets. This suggests that the level of intangible assets owned by targets 
makes their valuation more difficult. Similarly, panels C and D (E and F) report CAR for 
portfolios formed according to the ratio computed by dividing the proportion of 
intangible assets held by an unlisted target firm with its corresponding proportion of 
total assets (fixed assets). The expectation is that the higher the ratio, the lower the 
CAR, as the amount of intangible assets held by the target firm cover, among others, a 
significant proportion of the firm's assets. Thus, the higher the ratio the higher the 
target firm valuation-uncertainty. This relationship is expected to be more intense as the 
proportion of equity used to finance the deal increases too (due to the significant risk 
exposure of the bidding firm). Evidently, my findings confirm to a great extent my 
hypothesis 6, with the acquisitions under the portfolio subject to low proportion of 
intangible assets to outperforming the ones in the portfolio subject to high proportion 
of intangible assets by generating both economically and statistically significant 
differentials. Lastly, panels G and H report CAR after controlling for a ratio between the 
intangible assets and the deal value.'^ Evidently, the higher ratio generates lower bidder 
gains, indicating that the bidding firm faces more difficulty in valuing the target firm and 
hence the higher the target firm's valuation-uncertainty. 
Specifically, I measure the target firm valuation uncertainty, which is the overpopulation 
of the target firm's balance sheet with intangible assets, by computing the ratios 
between intangible assets over (a) the total assets and (b) the fixed assets of the target 
firm. Indeed, the higher the ratio between the intangible assets held with the total and 
fixed assets, the lower the CAR indicating that the bidder acquires more value uncertain 
target firms as their balance sheets are overpopulated with intangible assets. Moreover, 
the higher the ratio of intangible assets over the deal value the lower the CAR as the 
bidding firm acquires more value uncertain unlisted target firms. In other words, 
keeping the transaction value constant, the ratio (intangible assets/deal value) will 
" We assume that the more the intangible assets bought by 'keeping' the deal value constant (i.e. the 
ratio lA/DV increases too), the higher the risk exposure of the bidding firm. 
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increase as the level of intangible assets bought is increasing. The latter may have 
significant valuation effects on the bidding firm as, (a) the bidding firm exposes itself 
into higher risk as it buys more intangible assets, and (b) the target firm finds it too hard 
to value its own assets thereby it is very likely to fail in securing the best possible 
exchange ratio in a share deal. 
5.7.1.5 Bidders' Announcement Period Gains by the Investments of Targets 
This section analyzes the CAR of acquirers involved in acquisitions of targets that have 
investment-loaded balance sheets. Table 5:10 reports CAR and their differentials for 
acquisitions of unlisted target firms subject to different levels of investments. My 
findings show a positive and statistically significant relationship between the proportion 
of investments held by the unlisted target firms and the bidder's CAR. Indeed, the CAR 
increases monotonically as we move from the portfolio subject to low investment 
(1.05%) to the portfolio subject to high investment (2.85%), with a statistically 
significant differential of about 1.80%. The same relationship is evident when the 
sample is divided by the methods of payment. However, the relationship is more 
intense for bids financed with equity. When stock (cash) is used to finance 75% or more 
of the transaction, bidders experience a loss on average -1.09% (0.69%) from the 
portfolio subject to low investment, whereas they gain 7.43% (2.35%) from the portfolio 
subject to high investments, with a statistically significant differential of about 8.50% 
(1.70%) respectively. Overall, bids with target firms subject to high value ambiguity (low 
proportion of investments) generate lower gains to bidders whereas bids with target 
firms subject to low value ambiguity (high proportion of investments) generate higher 
gains to bidders. These findings suggest that the method of payment along with the 
investments held by the unlisted target firm play a significant role for the bidding firm's 
CAR determination. 
Insert table 5:10 about here 
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5.7.2 Cross-section Analysis 
Although the results from univariate analysis are revealing, they cannot account for 
simultaneous effects of multiple factors and allow for interaction between various 
determinants of acquirer's gains. To overcome such limitations, announcement period 
(5-days) excess returns of bidders are regressed against a set of explanatory variables 
that are likely to be responsible in shaping the gains of acquirers engaging in 
acquisitions with unlisted target firms. 
CAR.^a + ^X.+e. (4) 
The intercept, (a) in equation (4), measures the excess return to bidders after 
accounting for the effects of all explanatory variables, while the vector of explanatory 
variables, X , includes variables likely to explain the CAR of bidding firms. The vector 'X' 
includes the following variables: acquirer's age on the day of bid announcement (log), 
acquirer's market value one month prior to the announcement of deal (log), deal value 
of the acquisitions (log), bidder's growth opportunity (ratio of market to book value of 
equity and price to earning ratio of acquirer one month prior to the acquisition 
announcement), relative size of the deal measured as the deal value divided by 
acquirer's market value, target firm's age on the day of bid announcement (log), target 
firm's total assets (log), target firm's fixed assets (log), target firm's investment (log), 
target firm's intangible assets (log), target firm's tangible assets (log), target firm's 
number of employees (log), target firm's liquidity ratio, target firm's current ratio, target 
firm's gearing ratio. Dummy variables that take the value of one and zero otherwise, are 
included to represent cash only and stock only deals. Table 5:11 presents the results 
from my multivariate analysis. 
Insert table 5:11 about here 
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Throughout all models in the analysis, a positive and significant relationship has been 
found between CAR and the log of deal value, P /E ratio, as well as the relative size of the 
deal . The findings presented in table 5:11 are consistent with the findings of several 
other studies across the M&A literature. Specifically, with regards to the relative size of 
the deal , several scholars have proposed that the bidding firm's abnormal returns within 
a small w indows surrounding the acquisition announcement 's day increase as the target 
size increases relative to acquirer size (Asquith et al. 1983; Jensen and Ruback, 1983; 
Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989; Kang, 1993; and Fuller et al . 2002). This relationship implies 
that the larger the target firm's size relative to the bidder, the more the original 
structure of the acquiring firm changes as a result of the acquisit ion. O n the contrary, 
the chapter 's findings present a negative and statistically significant relationship 
between CAR and bidders' size, consistent with the findings of Moeiler, Schl ingemann, 
and Stuiz (2004). Further, the relationship between the CAR and the MTBV ratio appears 
to be negative, though statistically insignificant in all models. 
The unique feature of this chapter is that it concentrates not only on the bidder's site in 
the determinat ion of the bidder's CAR, but also on the under-theorized unlisted target 
firm's side. Accordingly, a number of target firm characteristics employed in order to 
explain the bidding firms' CAR in a small window surrounding the acquisition 
announcement 's day. Specifically, I find a positive and significant relationship between 
bidders' CAR and the log of target f irm's age, which is consistent with my hypothesis 4 
of this investigation. Similarly, in this study 1 find a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between proxies capturing the size of the unlisted target firm (i.e. fixed 
assets and total assets) and bidders' CAR. In fact, bidders CAR increase significantly with 
the level of total assets and fixed assets held by the target firms further supporting the 
hypothesis 3 of this study. Finally, one of the most important determinants of the 
bidding f irms' CAR is the investments held by the unlisted target firm. My est imates 
(coefficients) of the investment in all the cross-section regressions is always positive and 
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significant at a 1 and 5 percent level, implying the when bidders announce takeovers of 
unlisted target firms with their balance sheets overloaded of investment, they enjoy 
positive and significant CAR supporting the hypothesis 5 of this study. On the other 
hand, acquirers experience a significant losses when they engage into acquisitions of 
unlisted target firms with their balance sheets laden of intangible assets (the 
coefficients appear always negative and significant at either 1 or 5 percent) , further 
supporting the hypothesis 6 in this chapter. Other important variables that found to 
have an influential impact upon the explanation of unlisted target bidders' gains are the 
current ratio, the liquidity ratio and the gearing ratio of the unlisted target firm. Across 
the majority of the models examined, the coefficients of the liquidity ratio and the 
current ratio found to be negative and significant, suggesting that w h e n the acquired 
unlisted target f irms face financial distress, this affects bidders gains negatively. Thus 
controlling for these variables is essential given their deterministic power on the bidders 
gains. 
In general , the cross-sect ion approach, while confirms the majority of evidence from the 
univariate analysis, it captures several cross valuations-effects that are shared between 
the bidding and the target firm, as well as effects that are closely related to several deal 
characterist ics. Accordingly, an overall v iew of the short-run analysis conveys that the 
gains of shareholders of bidders that acquire unlisted and value-ambiguous targets are 
shaped, to a great extent, by the different levels of value-ambiguities concerning the 
unlisted targets. These findings, while supporting my main predictions and confirm the 
findings from the majority of studies in this field of research, they fill several voids in 
f inance literature regarding the valuation effects of bidder that acquire unlisted target 
firms. 
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5.7.3 Targets' Value Ambiguity and Bidders' Long-term Performance 
The findings of the short-run analysis confirm that target firm's valuation-uncertainty 
and the method of payment are significant determinants of the bidder's gains w h e n 
unlisted targets are acquired. This section aims to answer the question: do acquisitions 
of unlisted target firms that are subject to value-ambiguity influence bidders' gains in 
the long-run? Long-term excess returns are est imated by the calendar-t ime portfolio 
regression (CTPR) intercepts, the alphas. The Fama and French (1996) three factor 
model is used. 
Table 5:12, panels A, B and C shows that on average UK bidders gain positive post-
acquisition returns irrespective of the event window size.^" This pattern remains the 
s a m e when I focus on acquirers bidding for unlisted target firms using cash or stock as 
the method of payment to f inance their acquisitions. In addition, this chapter examines 
whether other transaction characteristics reported in the literature can individually 
explain post-acquisition return for acquiring firms buying unlisted targets. All three 
tables and panels reports abnormal returns sorted by the bidder's size, growth 
opportunities, and relative size. Specifically, all results indicate that for the 1-, 3-, and 5-
year post-event window smaller acquirers outperform larger ones. Within the s a m e 
framework, low-MTBV acquirers (value) outperform high-MTBV (glamour) f irms, 
irrespective of the post-event window and the method of payment utilized.'" Similarly, 
bidders subject to a high relative size ratio outperform those subject to low relative-size 
in the long run, irrespective of the post-event window. 
Insert table 5:12 about here 
Note that the intercepts from the FF 3-factor model indicate that acquirers are subject to statistically 
insignificant average monthly abnormal return of 0.81%, 0.75%, and 0.68% per month in 12-, 36-, and 60-
months respectively, starting from the next month of acquisition's announcement. 
These findings are consistent with Rau and Vermaelen (1998) and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) w/ho 
found similar results in the long-run for the US and the UK markets respectively. 
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Further table 5:12 reports FF's alphas for portfolios constructed according to proxies 
that capture the level of the unlisted target firm's value-ambiguity. Firstly, the model 
controls for the target firm's age. The findings show that FF 's alphas decrease 
monotonically moving from the portfolio of bids of young-unlisted target firms (high 
value-ambiguity) to the portfolio of bids of mature unlisted target f irms (low value-
ambiguity). Along similar lines, evidence also shows that FF's alphas decrease 
monotonically as we move from the portfolio of bids of small-unlisted target firms (high 
value-ambiguity) to the portfolio of bids of large unlisted target firms (low value-
ambiguity). These findings contradict the results of the earl ier short-run analysis, and 
thus indicate that the unlisted target's value-ambiguity plays a significant role in the 
bidding firm's CAR determination in the post-event period. Furthermore, the level of 
intangible assets held in the unlisted target 's balance sheets is used. As shown in all 
three panels, FF 's 3-factor CTRP alphas increase with the level of intangible assets. 
Finally, the level of investments held in the unlisted target firm's balance sheet plays a 
significant role as well in the explanation of the bidding firm's abnormal returns in the 
long-run. Clearly, and consistent with the earlier short-run results, FF's 3-factor CTRP 
alphas increase moving from the portfolio subject to low investment to the portfolio 
subject to high investment. 
5 .8 Conclusion 
This chapter examines the impact of the unlisted target f i rm's valuation uncertainty or 
ambiguity on the bidding firm's announcement period and post-acquisition abnormal 
returns. In the process of the analysis, bidding and target firm specific as well as 
transaction specific characteristics such as the method of payment, relative size of the 
deal , bidder's market-to-book value ratio and bidder's market capitalization have been 
controlled in the same way. The findings that derived from this chapter suggest that the 
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unlisted target firm's value-ambiguities have a significant impact upon the bidding firm's 
short and long-run share price performance. 
The findings suggest that acquirers buying unlisted targets that are subject to low value-
ambiguity enjoy higher announcement abnormal returns compared to acquirers buying 
targets subject to high value-ambiguity. This evidence is more prominent when the 
payment is made in shares and the target is young, small , and /or holds significant 
amount of intangible assets . Several proxies are employed to capture the unlisted target 
f irm's value-ambiguity, namely the f irm's (a) age, (b) size, (c) intangible assets , and (d) 
investment. Evidently, acquirers of large (mature) unlisted targets outperform the 
acquirers of small (young) ones in share deals during the announcement period. Indeed, 
takeovers of large unlisted target firms generate higher short-run abnormal returns to 
bidding firms' shareholders due to (a) their less value-ambiguity (i.e. relatively easier to 
value), and (b) the higher probability of creating outside blockholders (as shares used to 
f inance the deal) . In similar ways, takeovers of mature unlisted targets deliver higher 
short-run gains to bidders' shareholders due to their long history and thus their less-
opaque informational environment. On the contrary, the examination of the bidding 
firm's gains in the post-merger period conveys that bids of small (young) unlisted targets 
generate higher gains than bids of large (mature) targets. In addition, w h e r e a s bidders 
acquiring targets with laden balance sheets of intangible assets generate low short-run 
abnormal returns in share deals, they enjoy high long-run returns. 
The announcement period lower return is possibly due to market 's presumption that 
bidding firm faces difficulty to value the target, and is exposed to high risk when the 
transaction involves acquisition of risky targets. However , such overreaction is corrected 
in the long-run as the firm's value moving towards to its equilibrium level. Finally, the 
results suggest that the bidders encounter more difficulty in valuing targets with higher 
investments, possibly due to target limited availability of information to assess the 
investments' future expected returns. Overall , this empirical chapter contributes to the 
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M&A literature by adding significant value to our knowledge on the short and long-run 
share price behaviour of bidders engaged in takeovers of unlisted target firms. 
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5.9 Figures and Tables 
Figure 5:1 - Second Hypothesis Design 
The figure shows the design of the second hypothesis of this chapter which is based on the different levels 
of the bidding firm's overvaluation and the level of the unlisted target firm's value-ambiguity or value-
uncertainty. 
Bidding Firm's 
Stock ^ 
Target Firm's 
Valuation U 
Uncertainty 
Bidding Firm is not 
Overvalued 
Target Firm IS 
NOT 
DIFFICULT TO 
V A L U E 
(No Subject to 
Value Ambiguity 
or Good Quality 
of Information) 
Case: A 
Optimal Exchange Ratio: StocK 
DMis Financed with Stock: * AR 
• Signal no overvalualion of the bidder 
stock 
Increase the likelihood of blodcholder 
creation 
Deals Flnanc«d with Cash: Zero or small 
+AR 
• Small positive gains due to the limited 
competition hypothesis and the 
liquidity hypothesis 
• MitigaSon of these gains due to the 
competition of the period's examined 
Bidding Firm is 
Overvalued 
Optimal Excltange Ratio: Cash 
Deals Financed with Cash: Zero or small 
«AR 
• SmaB positive gains due lo the limsted 
compeiltlon hypothiesis and the 
liquidity hypothesis 
• Mitigation of these gains due to the 
competition of the period's examined 
Deals Financed with Stock: - AR 
• Very unlikely method o( payment as 
target firm's managers will be able to 
identify the bidders' overvalued 
common equity 
Target Firm IS 
DIFFICULT TO 
V A L U E 
(Subject to 
Value Ambiguity 
or Far From 
Good Quality of 
Information) 
Case: C 
Opttmal Exchange Ratio: C a ^ 
Deals Financed with Cash: Zero or - AR 
Preferable by targets as they would 
not become outside blockholders and 
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Uncertain FCF 
Deals Financed with StPcK: • AR 
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Case: D 
optimal Exchange Ratio: Stock 
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further enforce them to avoid its stock 
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for risky assets 
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preferred to be by cash by the target 
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Bklders are not exposed to even 
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Notes: B = Bidden T • 
Returns 
Target; C = C a s h ; S = Stock; B E = Break-Even; A R = Abnormal 
293 
Chapter 5: Target Value Ambiguity and Gains from Acquisitions of Unlisted Targets 
Figure 5:2 - Annual Distribution of M&A Activity by Target Status 
The figure presents the annual distribution of takeovers of both listed and unlisted target firms over the 
period between 1996 and 2007. 
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1,500 
1,200 
J2 1,000 
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Years 
• UNLISTED BUSTED 
Table 5:1 - Distribution of M&A Activity by Year of Announcement and the Target Firm Status 
The table presents the annual distribution of takeovers of unlisted target firms over the period 1996 and 
2007. Acquirers are UK firms listed on the London Stock Exchange whereas the unlisted target firms are 
both private and subsidiary of other (unlisted) firms, both operating in the UK market." 
YEAR AU PMVATE SUBSIDIARY PUBUC UNUSTEO 
1996 1,365 739 388 23S 1,127 238 
1997 1,557 858 497 202 1,355 202 
1998 1,704 912 535 257 1,447 257 
1999 1,615 895 482 238 1,377 238 
2000 1,841 1,094 562 185 1,656 185 
2001 1,257 736 398 123 1,134 123 
2002 949 524 315 110 839 110 
2003 878 430 301 147 731 147 
2004 1,080 640 329 111 969 111 
2005 1,220 775 316 129 1,091 129 
2006 1,362 855 368 139 1,223 139 
2007 1,488 966 359 163 1,325 163 
Total 
Pt) 
16,316 
(100) 
9,424 
(57.76) 
4,850 
(2973) 
2,042 
(12.52) 
14,274 
(87.48) 
2,042 
(12.52) 
" Excluded bidders with Government, Investor, Joint Venture, Mutual, Private, Subsidiary, and Unknown 
public status; targets with government. Joint Venture, Mutual, and Unknown public status. 
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Table 5:2 - Distribution of M&A Deals Based on Industry Classification 
The table presents the industry classification of both the bidding and the target firm company for a 
sample of 2,038 M&A deals over the period 1996 and 2007. Bidders are UK firms listed on the London 
Stock Exchange and targets are unlisted firms, both private and subsidiary of other (unlisted) firms, both 
operating in the UK market. 
Industry dassificatron Acquiror target 
Consumer Products and Services 335 434 
Consumer Staples 116 104 
Energy and Power 32 39 
Financials 173 141 
Healthcare 65 64 
High Technology 300 328 
Industrials 322 283 
Materials 132 105 
Media and Entertainment 275 243 
Real Estate 94 89 
Retail 145 177 
Telecommunications 48 31 
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Table 5:3 - Summary Statistics for the Sample 
The table presents summary of deal-, acquirer-, and target- specific statistics, for a sample of 2,038 
acquisitions announced by UK listed acquirers over the period 1996 and 2007. The sample is collected 
from SDC (Security Data Corporation) mergers and acquisitions database. The sample is restricted to deals 
equal to, or over one million pounds. The sample is restricted to the percentage of shares acquired; it is 
restrirted when the acquirer aims to obtain more than 50% of the target f irm. Deals where the acquirer 
has announced two or more deals within 5-day window [t-2, t+2] - where f is the acquisition 
announcement date - are excluded. Market value (MV) is the market value of the acquirer one month 
prior to the acquisition's announcement day. MTBV ratio and P/E ratio represents the market-to-book 
value of equity and the price-to-earnings ratio one month prior to the acquisition's announcement day. 
Relative size of the deal is the ratio calculated by dividing the transaction value of the deal over the 
acquirer's market value one month prior to the acquisition's announcement day (TV/MV). Age of the 
bidding firm is defined as the number of days since the firm was first covered by the DataStream and the 
acquisition's announcement day. Age of the target firm is defined as the number of days since the firm's 
registration (as obtained by the FAME company information) and the acquisition's announcement day. 
Target firm's total assets, fixed assets, tangible assets, intangible assets, investments. No of employees, 
liquidity ratio, current ratio, and gearing ratio, represent the mentioned unlisted target firm's 
proxies/variables. The data for these variables are collected from the FAME company information. 
~" Mean~-. . v M e A r f : : ' } ' ''-;StilO(swi'- t V a l i i e ^ l a P r V l t l i . 
Klin: CAR{-2,+2) 2,038 0.0218 0.0100 1 -0.2531 0.3710 0.0798 12.35 1 <.0001 
Market Value (MV) 2,038 582 76 0.34 78597 2913 9.01 1 <.0001 
MTBV Ratio 2,038 3.54 1.89 1 0.03 1073.97 27.41 5.83 <.0001 
c PE Ratio 1,465 36.87 16 0.30 3046.50 173.16 8.15 1 <.0001 
^•o Relative Size 2,038 0.2309 0.0478 0.01 25.8835 1.0356 10.07 <.0001 
Firm's Age 2,038 5172 3625 198 15660 4391 53.17 ' <.0001 
Firm's Age 2,030 4747 2754 14 38663 5919 36.13 <.0001 
Total Assets 1,859 24281 1540 ' 100 8823287 274625 3.81 ' 0.0001 
Fixed Assets 1,719 10610 367 100 5412800 140302 3.14 0.0017 
Tangible Assets 1,588 5276 249 100 1101691 41272 5.09 <.0001 
Intangible Assets 461 3987 244 100 237100 16906 5.06 <.0001 
Investments 725 12487 74 100 5178850 195617 1.72 0.0861 
No of Employees 1,270 221.22 46.00 1 1.00 18638.67 965.63 8.16 <.0001 
Uquidity Ratio 1,730 2.01 1.06 1.00 80.69 5.19 16.09 <.0001 
Current Ratio 1,731 2.22 1.22 ! 1.00 80.69 5.26 17.57 <.0001 
Gearing Ratio 1,396 288.41 62.12 1.00 8100.00 763.49 14.11 <.0001 
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Table 5:4 - Announcement Period Excess Returns of Bidders by Size, Relative Size, Growth Opportunities 
and Payment Method 
This table presents 5-day [t-2, t+2] announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), in 
percentage, of sample acquirers are presented. Abnormal returns (AR) are calculated using a modified 
market-adjusted model: 
AR„=R,,-R„, 
Where ^ is the return of bidder/' at t'met and/?^ , is the market index (FT-AII Share) at t i m e / . 
Acquirers are publicly traded firms listed in the London Stock Exchange and targets are unlisted firms 
operating in the UK. Panel A shows the gains to acquirers for the entire sample divided into three groups 
based on the method of payment utilized. 'Cash' represents the deals announced with pure cash, 'Stock' 
represents the deals announced with pure stock and 'Mixed' represents the deals financed with both cash 
and stock as well as with 'Other' methods of financing. The final column in this panel shows the difference 
in the gains from acquisitions financed with pure cash versus the ones financed with pure stock. Panel B 
shows acquirers' gains by the bidding firm's size (MV) - 3 groups - one month prior to the acquisition's 
announcement day for the entire sample and the alternative methods of payment (cash and stock). Panel 
C reports acquirers' gains by the bidding firm's growth opportunities (MTBV ratio) - 3 groups - one month 
prior to the acquisition's announcement day for the entire sample and the alterative methods of 
payment. Panel D reports acquirers' gains by the relative size of the deal (TV/MV) - 3 groups - for the 
entire sample and the alternative methods of payment. Finally, panel E shows acquirer's gains by the 
bidding firm's P/E ratio - 5 groups - one month prior to the acquisition's announcement day for the entire 
sample and the alternative methods of financing. The final column in panels from B to E shows the 
difference in the gains from acquisitions between the portfolios subject to high proportion of each proxy 
with the one subject to low proportion of the same proxy. T-statistics testing for the mean equal to zero 
versus not equal to zero are reported in parentheses below the mean. The sample size, n, for each group 
is reported bellow T-statistic. * * * , ** , and * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. 
Panel A - Entire Sample 
All 1 Cash 1 stock 1 Mixed 1 DIff: Stock vs. Cash 
Mean 2.1S%"' 1.80%«" 4 . 0 1 % " * 2.31%* 2.20%*** 
t-value (12.35) (7.31) (3.41) (9.45) 
1,054 
(2.72) 
n 2,038 875 109 
Panel B - Bidder Returns by Bidder's Size (MV) 
All 1 LowKd) Medium (2) 1 High(3) 1 HML(3-1) 
All 
Mean 2 . 1 8 % * " 3.39%* 2.03%'•* 1 .13%"* -2.26%*** 
t-value (12.35) (8.51) (7.62) (5.17) 
679 
(-4.98) 
n 2,038 679 680 
Cash 
Mean 1.80%*" 3 .17%*" 1.88%*" 0.90%* -2.27%*** 
t-value (7.31) (4.83) (4.76) (3.10) 
368 
(-3.58) 
n 875 228 279 
Stock 
Mean 4.01%*** 5 . 9 1 % * " 3.08% -0.19% -6.10%** 
t-value (3.41) (3.36) (1.53) (-0.09) 
20 
(-2.24) 
n 109 59 30 
Continued 
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Table 5:4 - Continued 
Panel C - Bidder Returns by Bidder's MTBV 
1 All 1 Low(l ) 1 Medium (2) | High (3) 1 HML(3-1) 
All 
Mean 2 . 1 8 % * " 3.27%"» 1.68%*** 1 .59%'" 
(5.91) 
680 
- 1 . 6 8 % * " 
(-3.65) 
t-value (12.35) (8.79) (6.49) 
677 n 2,038 681 
Cash 
Mean 1.80%*" 2 .62%"* 2.03%*** 0 .66%" 
(1.97) 
276 
-1 .96%"» 
(-3.20) 
t-value (7.31) (5.10) (5.24) 
292 n 875 307 
Stocl< 
Mean 4 . 0 1 % " * 6 . 1 5 % " ' 0.50% 3.15% 
(1.55) 
38 
-3.00% 
(110) 
t-value (3.41) (3.38) (0.23) 
21 n 109 50 
Panel D - Bidder Returns by Relative Size of tiie Deal 
1 All 1 Low (1) Medium (2) 1 High (3) HML(3-1) 
All 
Ivlean 2 .18%"* 1.08%* 1.35%*** 4 . 1 2 % " * 
(10.79) 
679 
3.04%* 
(6.54) 
t-value (12.35) (4.10) (5.61) 
680 n 2,038 679 
Casll 
Mean 1.80%*" 0 . 9 7 % " ' 1 .46%*" 4 .29%"* 
(6.67) 
177 
3 .30%" • 
(4.98) 
t-value (7.31) (2.85) (3.71) 
291 n 875 407 
Stock 
Mean 4 . 0 1 % * " 2.12% 2.62%* 6 .61%"* 
(3.07) 
43 
4.50%* 
(1.64) 
t-value (3.41) (1.07) (1.67) 
27 n 109 39 
Panel E - Bidder Returns by Bidder's P/E 
All 1 Low(l ) 1 Medium (3) 1 High (5) 1 HML(5- l l 
All 
Mean 1 .89%*" 1.39%**' 2.05%*'* 2 . 7 3 % " * 
(5.35) 
293 
1.30%" 
(2.05) 
t-value (10.52) (3.37) (4.93) 
287 n 1,465 296 
Cash 
Mean 1.60%"* 1.39%" 1.52%*** 1.84%"* 
(2.64) 
97 
0.40% 
(0.50) 
t-value (6.39) (2.44) (2.77) 
130 n 654 155 
Stocic 
Mean 3.33%* • 2.72% 3.94% 4.00% 
(1.34) 
23 
1.30% 
(0.35) 
t-value (2.13) (1.27) (0.94) 
10 n 53 8 
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Table 5:5 - Announcement Period Excess Returns of Bidders by Age of the Unlisted Target Firm and 
Payment Method 
This table presents 5-day [t-2, t+2] announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), in 
percentage, of sample acquirers are presented. Abnormal returns (AR) are calculated using a modified 
market-adjusted model: 
^^,.,=^.,-^.., 
Where is the return of bidder/ at t ime/ and,/?^^ is the market index (FT-AII Share) at t i m e / . 
Acquirers are publicly traded firms listed in the London Stock Exchange and targets are unlisted firms 
operating in the UK. The table is divided into four panels, based on the method of payment utilized, and 
the number of groups the sample is divided according to the unlisted target firm's age. Specifically, panels 
A and B show gains to acquirers by the unlisted target firm's age - three groups - and the alternative 
methods of financing. Panels C and D show gains to acquirers by the unlisted target firm's age - five 
groups - and the alternative methods of financing. Each panel is divided into six groups according to the 
proportion of either cash or stock used (i.e. all sample, either cash or stock is grater than zero, either cash 
or stock is greater than or equal to 25%, either cash or stock is greater than or equal to 50%, either cash 
or stock is greater than or equal to 75%, and finally either cash or stock is equal to 100%). The final row in 
each panel shows the difference in the gains from acquisitions of mature unlisted targets firms versus 
acquisitions of young unlisted targets. The sample size, N, for each group is reported bellow each 
estimate. * * * , ** , and * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. 
Panel A - Bidder Returns by Target Firm's Age 
All 1 Cash > 0% 1 Cash i 25% 1 Cash i 50% 1 Cash i 75% I Cash = 100% 
All 2 . 1 5 % ' " 2 . 0 8 % * " 2 . 0 1 % * " 1.98%*** 1.94%*** 
1,086 
1.80%'** 
875 
N 2,030 1,812 1,581 1,348 
Low (1) 1 . 9 0 % ' " 1.79%* 1.81%' 1 .86%"* 1.96%*** 
326 
2.07%* • • 
333 
1 .83%"* 
427 
1.68%*** 
270 
1.89%*** 
261 
1.83%*** 
344 
N 676 569 470 403 
2.13%*** 
430 
1.96%*** 
Medium (2) 2 . 4 1 % " * 2 . 3 4 % " ' 2 . 2 1 % " ' 
N 677 610 522 
High (3) 2 . 1 5 % " * 2 . 1 0 % " ' 1 . 9 9 % " * 
N 677 633 589 515 
HML (3-1) 0.30% 0.30% 0.20% 0.10% -0.13% 0.10% 
Panel B - Bidder Returns by Target Firm's Age 
All Stock > 0% Stock i 25% Stock i 50% Stock i 75% Stock = 100% 
All 2 . i 5 y o " * 2 . 8 8 % * " 2.94%*** 3 .19%* ' * * 2 . 8 1 % " * 
164 
3 . 4 7 % " * 
104 
N 2,030 753 458 264 
Low (1) 1 .90%"* 2 . 2 6 % " * 2 . 0 7 % " * 2 . 2 4 % * * 1.35% 
76 
3.43%** 
56 
5.21%*** 
32 
1.68% 
47 
3.68%' 
35 
6 . 9 8 % " * 
22 
N 676 267 178 110 
Medium (2) 2 .41%*** 3 . 2 9 % " * 3.81%* • • 4 . 1 4 % " * 
N 677 270 163 98 
High (3) 2 . 1 5 % * " 3 . 1 2 % " * 3 . 0 5 % * " 3 . 4 0 % » » * 
N 677 216 117 56 
HML (3-1) 0.30% 0.90% 1.00% 1.20% 3.90%* 5.30%* 
Continued 
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Table 5:5 - Continued 
Panel C - Bidder Returns by Target Firm's Age 
All I Cash > 0% 1 Cash i 25% 1 Cash i 50% 1 Cash s 75% 1 Cash = 100% 
All 2.15%*" 2.08%* *• 2.01%*** 1.98%*** 1.94%"* 1.80%*" 
875 N 2,030 1,812 1,581 1,348 1,086 
Low (1) 1.70%*" 1.72%*" 1.60%"* 1.76%*** 2.01%*" 
196 
2.00%* 
198 
2.16%*" 
1.72%*" 
165 
1.87%*** 
153 
1.97%*** 
223 
N 406 331 273 237 
Medium (3) 2.68%"* 2.58%* 2.29%* • * 2.06%*** 
N 406 368 310 254 
High (S) 2.38%*" 2.14%*" 2.01%'** 2.05%*** 
N 406 378 352 319 272 
HML (S-1) 0.70% 0.40% 0.40% 0.30% 0.10% 0.20% 
Panel 0 - Bidder Returns bv Target Firm's Aee 
All Stock > 0% Stock i 25% Stock i 50% Stock a 75% Stock = 100% 
All 2.15%*" 2.88%* *• 2.94%*** 3.28%*** • ~ 
2.81%*** 
3.47%*" 
104 N 2,030 753 456 259 164 
L o w ( l ) 1.7a%*'* 1.76%" 1.01% 1.70% 0.58% 
49 
4.32%" 
-0.17% 
32 
3.83% 
20 
8.77%"* 
17 
N 406 152 102 68 
Medium (3) 2.68%* 3.89%*** 4.97%* * • 5.82%*** 
N 406 159 96 56 33 
7.14%"' High (S) 2.38%*** 3.95%*" 4.29%* 5.39%*** 
N 406 117 71 37 24 
HML (5-1) 0.70% 2.20%" 3.30%** 3.70%** 6.60%* •• 8.90%*** 
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Table 5:6 - Announcement Period Excess Returns of Bidders by Age and the Size of the Unlisted Target 
Firm and Payment Method 
This table presents 5-day [t-2, t+2] announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), in 
percentage, of sample acquirers are presented. Abnormal returns (AR) are calculated using a modified 
market-adjusted model: 
Where i ^ , is the return of bidder/ at t imef andi?,„, is the market index (FT-AII Share) at t i m e / . 
Acquirers are publicly traded firms listed in the London Stock Exchange and targets are unlisted firms 
operating in the UK. The table presents gains to acquirers into two dimensions; by the unlisted target 
firm's size and age. The table is divided into four panels (by the size of the unlisted target f irm and the 
method of payment utilized). Specifically, panels A and B show gains to acquirers by the unlisted target 
firm's size (small targets only) and age - three groups. Panels C and D show gains to acquirers by the 
unlisted target firm's size (big targets only) and age - three groups. Each panel is divided into six groups 
according to the proportion of either cash or stock used (i.e. all sample, either cash or stock is grater than 
zero, either cash or stock is greater than or equal to 25%, either cash or stock is greater than or equal to 
50%, either cash or stock is greater than or equal to 75%, and finally either cash or stock is equal to 100%). 
The final row in each panel shows the difference in the gains from acquisitions of mature unlisted targets 
firms versus acquisitions of young unlisted targets. The sample size, N, for each group is reported bellow 
each estimate. * * * , ** , and * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. 
Panel A - Bidder Returns by Target Firm's Age (Small targets only (33.3% of the target's size)) 
All 
L o w ( l ) 
N 
Medium (2) 
N 
High (3) 
All C a s h > 0 % Cash 2 25% Cash i50% Cash i 75% Cash = 100% 
1 . 9 9 % " * 
617 
1 . 9 6 % " * 
534 
1.84%*** 
434 
1.75%*** 
364 
2.11%" 
205 
2.24%* • 
206 
1.61%*' 
206 
2 .11%*** 
158 
2.40%*** 
184 
1.42%*** 
192 
1 . 5 9 % « " 
288 
1.50%-
241 
1.84%*** 
113 
2.38%* *• 
149 
1.36%** 
172 
1.81%** 
94 
2.15%** 
129 
1.34%** 
141 
1.87%** 
73 
2 . 1 9 % " 
98 
0.92%* 
117 
1 .75%" 
65 
2.42%* 
75 
0.65% 
101 
HML(3-1) -0.49% -0.70% -0.47% -0.47% -0.95% -1.10% 
Panel B - Bidder Returns by Target Firm's Age (Small target only (33.3% of the target's size)) 
All I stock >0% I Stock a 25% | Stock £ 5 0 % | Stock a 75% | Stock = 100% 
All 
N 
1.99%*' 
617 
2.44%*** 
269 
2.39%*** 
174 
2.04%* 
88 
0.77% 
55 
-1.04% 
28 
Low (1) 
Medium (2) 
N 
High (3) 
N 
2.11%"' 
205 
2.24%* 
206 
1.61%* 
206 
2.37%** 
102 
2.46%*** 
90 
2.52%** 
77 
1.37% 
68 
3.25%** 
55 
2.81%** 
51 
-0.04% 
40 
4.18%* 
26 
3.29%* * 
22 
-0.97% 
27 
1.06% 
14 
3.84%* 
14 
-4.22%* 
13 
-1.96% 
8 
5.94%* 
7 
HML(3.1) 
Continued 
-0.49% 0.10% 1.40% 3.30%* 4.80%* 10.20%* 
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Table 5:6-Continued 
Panel C - Bidder Returns by Target Firm's Age (Big targets only (33% of the target's size)) 
All 1 C a s h > 0 % 1 Cash a 25% I Cash a 50% 1 Cash s 75% 1 r « h = inn«: 
All 2.19%*** 1.94%*** 1.86%*** 2.06%*** 2.16%*** 1.76%*** 
559 507 442 366 293 N 617 
L o w ( l ) 1.69%"* 
205 
2.68yo*** 
206 
2.18%*** 
206 
1.42%*** 
183 
2.29%*** 
186 
2.12%*** 
190 
1.60%*** 
161 
2.06%*** 
168 
1.91%*** 
178 
1.86%*** 
140 
2.10%*** 
142 
2.21%*** 
160 
2.39%*** 
111 
1.89%*'* 
116 
2.21%*** 
139 
1.79%*** 
88 
1.19%* 
88 
2.16%*** 
117 
N 
Medium (2) 
N 
High (3) 
N 
HML (3-1) 0.50% 0.70% 0.30% 0.40% -0.18% 0.40% 
Panel 0 - Bidder Retunns by Target Firm's Age (Big targets only (33% of the torKet's sizell 
All 1 Stock >0% 1 Stock a 25% | Stock a 50% | Stock a 75% | Stock = 100% 
All 2.19%»" 3.43%*" 2.98%*** 4.01%"* 4.66%*** 5 60%*** 
617 195 128 77 48 37 N 
L o w ( l ) 1.69%*** 
205 
2.68%*** 
206 
2.18%*** 
206 
1.79%* 
71 
5.34%*** 
68 
3.19%*** 
56 
0.82% 
48 
6.24%*** 
42 
2.11%*** 
38 
2.47% 
28 
7.53%*** 
26 
1.92% 
23 
2.95% 
19 
8.70%** 
14 
3.04% 
15 
4.15% 
14 
8.33%* 
12 
4.47%* 
11 
N 
Medium (2) 
N 
High (3) 
N 
HML (3-1) 0.50% 1.40% 1.30% -0.55% 0.09% 0.30% 
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Table 5:7 - Announcement Period Excess Returns of Bidders by Size and Age of the Unlisted Target Firm 
and Payment Method 
This table presents 5-day [t-2, t+2] announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), in 
percentage, of sample acquirers are presented. Abnormal returns (AR) are calculated using a modified 
market-adjusted model: 
Where R^^ is the return of bidder/ at t ime/ and/?^ , is the market index (FT-AII Share) at t i m e / . 
Acquirers are publicly traded firms listed in the London Stock Exchange and targets are unlisted firms 
operating in the UK. The table is initially divided into two panels (panels A and B), based on the method of 
payment utilized, and the unlisted target firm's size. Further, this table contains another four panels that 
present gains to acquirers into two dimensions; by the unlisted target firm's age and size (panels C - F). 
Each panel (from A to F) is divided into six groups according to the proportion of either cash or stock used 
(i.e. all sample, either cash or stock is grater than zero, either cash or stock is greater than or equal to 
25%, either cash or stock is greater than or equal to 50%, either cash or stock is greater than or equal to 
75%, and finally either cash or stock is equal to 100%). The final row in each panel shows the difference in 
the gains from acquisitions of big unlisted targets firms versus acquisitions of small unlisted targets. The 
sample size, N, for each group is reported bellow each estimate. * * * , * * , and * denote significance level 
at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. 
Panel A - Bidder Returns by Target Firm's Size (Total Assets) 
All 1 Cash>0% 1 Cash225% | Casha50% | Cash a 75% | Cash = 100% 
All 2.20%'" 2.09%"' 2.00%'" 1.98%"' 194%"' i 76%"' 
1859 1662 1443 1228 98? 7RQ N 
Low (1) 2.10%'" 
619 
2.32%'" 
620 
2.20%"' 
620 
1.99%"' 
533 
2.33%*" 
568 
1.94%*" 
561 
1.87%"' 
433 
2.25%"' 
502 
1.97%"' 
508 
1.79%"' 
363 
2.05%"' 
422 
2.07%"' 
443 
1.65%"' 
287 
1.94%"' 
328 
2.17%'" 
367 
1.50%" 
241 
2.02%"' 
255 
1.76%'" 
293 
N 
Medium (2) 
N 
High (3) 
N 
HML(3-1) 0.10% -0.05% 0.10% 0.30% 0.50% 0.30% 
Panel B - Bidder Returns by Target Firm's Size (Total As->ets) 
All 1 Stock >0% 1 Stock a 25% 1 Stocks 50% j Stock £75% 1 Stock = 100% 
All 2.20%"' 3.03%'" 2.96%'" 3.21%'" 3 22%"' 3 78%'" 
1859 707 433 248 1 4 3 Q-; N 
Low (1) 2.10%"' 
619 
2.32%'" 
620 
2.20%"' 
620 
2.63%"' 
272 
3.14%'" 
237 
3.44%'" 
198 
2.67%"' 
177 
3.34%*" 
126 
2.99%'" 
130 
2.61%" 
91 
3.12%" 
78 
4.01"* 
79 
1.38% 
54 
3.57%' 
42 
5.01%"' 
47 
0.92% 
31 
4.38% 
26 
5.71%'" 
38 
N 
Medium (2) 
N 
High (3) 
N 
HML(3-1) 0.10% 0.80% 0.30% 1.40% 3.60%' 4.80%* 
Continued 
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Table 5:7 - Continued 
Panel C - Bidder Returns by Target Firm's Size (Total Assets) - vounR tareets onlw 
All 1 Cash > 0% 1 Cash £ 25% 1 Cash i 50% 1 Cash £ 75% 1 Cash = 100% 
All 1.89%* 1.70%*" 1.66%*** 1.81%*** 1.94%*** 
289 
1.60%*** 
240 N 617 527 435 371 
Low (1) 1.99%*" 2.10%*** 1.83%*** 1.95%*** 2.18%*** 
85 
1.36%* 
92 
2.24%*** 
112 
1.70%** 
73 
1.48%* 
79 
1.64%* *• 
88 
N 205 166 123 108 
Medium (2) 1.91%* 1.77%'** 1.80%*** 1.88%*** 
123 
1.64%*** 
N 206 178 151 
High (3) 1.77%*" 1.26%'** 1.41%*** 
N 206 183 161 . 140 
HML(3-1) -0.22% -0.83% -0.43% -0.31% 0.06% -0.06% 
Panel D - Bidder Returns by Target Firm's Size (Total Assets) - vouna tarsets onlv 
All 1 Stock > 0% 1 Stock £ 25% 1 Stock i 50% 1 Stock £ 75% I Stock = 100% 
All 1.89%*** 2.25%*** 1.77%** 1.69% 1.24% 
67 
1.30% 
40 
N 617 252 167 99 
Low (1) 1.99%* 2.34%" 0.61% -0.31% -0.52% 
25 
-0.22% 
21 
4.79%* 
21 
-3.78%* 
11 
-0.59% 
14 
6.71%* 
15 
N 205 102 68 35 
Medium (2) 1.91%**« 2.26%* 3.49%* 1.96% 
35 N 206 80 48 
High (3) 1.77%'" 2.12%' 1.68% 3.80%* 
29 N 206 70 51 
HML(3-1) -0.22% -0.22% 1.10% 4.10% 5.30%* 10.50%** 
Panel l - maoer Returns by Target Firm's Size (Total Assets) - mature tareet? nnlv 
All Cash > 0% Cash 2 25% Cash i50% Cash £ 75% Cash = 100% 
All 2.14%'" 2.14%*** 2.04%"* 1.97%*** 1.83%*" 
391 
1.75%*** 
317 N 617 577 536 470 
Low (1) 1.83%*" 1.76%"* 1.78%*** 1.74%*** 1.30%** 
126 
1.78%** 
130 
2.36%*" 
135 
0.95% 
107 
2.04%** 
93 
2.24%*** 
117 
N 205 195 180 154 
Medium (2) 2.48%*** 2.44%*** 2.33%*** 1.79%*** 
N 206 193 178 159 
High (3) 2.12%*" 2.21%*** 1.99%"* 2.36%*** 
N 206 189 178 157 
HML(3-1) 0.30% 0.40% 0.20% 0.60% 1.10% 1.30%* 
Panel F - Bidder Returns by Target Firm's Size (Total Assets) - matu re targets only 
All 1 Stock > 0% 1 Stock £ 25% 1 Stock £ 50% 1 Stock £ 75% 1 Stock = 100% 
All 2.14%* 3.04%*** 2.77%*** 2.82%*** 4.11%*** 
30 
5.50%*** 
20 
N 617 194 107 52 
Low (1) 1.83%*" 2.83%"* 3.14%** 3.86%* 4.03% 
9 
6.16% 
4 
8.71%** 
6 
3.31% 
10 
N 205 74 44 15 
4.18%* 
15 
Medium (2) 2.48%*" 3.70%*" 3.76%*** 8.21%*** 
7 N 206 62 26 
High (3) 2.12%*" 2.59%*** 1.63%* 1.20% 
22 
2.11% 
14 N 206 58 37 
HML(3-1) 0.30% -0.25% -1.51% -2.66% -1.93% -2.85% 
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Table 5:8 - Announcement Period Excess Returns of Bidders by Size of both the Bidder and the Unlisted 
Target Firm and Payment Method 
This table presents 5-day [t-2, t+2] announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), in 
percentage, of sample acquirers are presented. Abnormal returns (AR) are calculated using a modified 
market-adjusted model: 
Where R^^ is the return of bidder/ at timet and/?^, is the market index (FT-AII Share) at t ime?. 
Acquirers are publicly traded firms listed in the London Stock Exchange and targets are unlisted firms 
operating in the UK. The table is initially divided into two panels (panels A and B), based on the method of 
payment utilized, and the unlisted target firm's size. Further, this table contains another four panels that 
present gains to acquirers into two dimensions; by both the unlisted target and bidding firm's size (only 
through the panels C - F). Each panel (from A to F) is divided into six groups according to the proportion 
of either cash or stock used (i.e. all sample, either cash or stock is grater than zero, either cash or stock is 
greater than or equal to 25%, either cash or stock is greater than or equal to 50%, either cash or stock is 
greater than or equal to 75%, and finally either cash or stock is equal to 100%). The final row in each panel 
shows the difference in the gains from acquisitions of big unlisted targets firms versus acquisitions of 
small unlisted targets. The sample size, W, for each group is reported bellow each estimate. * * * , ** , and * 
denote significance level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. 
Panel A - Bidder Returns by Target Firm's Size (Total Assets) 
All 1 Cash > 0% 1 Cash i 25% 1 Cash i 50% 1 Cash 2 75% 1 Cash =100% 
All 2.20%* 2.09%'*** 2.00%* 1.98%*** 1.94%*" 
982 
1.76%*** 
789 
N 1859 1662 1443 1228 
Low (1) 2.10%*" 1.99%*** 1.87%*" 1.79%*** 1.65%'*'' 
287 
1.94%"* 
328 
2.17%'** 
367 
1.50%* • 
241 
2.02%* 
255 
1.76%"* 
293 
N 619 533 433 363 
Medium (2) 2.32%* 2.33%"* 2.25%'** 2.05%* • • 
N 620 568 502 422 
High (3) 2.20%* • • 1.94%'" 1.97%'** 2.07%*** 
N 620 561 508 443 
HML(3-1) 0.10% -0.05% 0.10% 0.30% 0.50% 0.30% 
Panel B - Bidder Retums by Target Firm's Size (Total Assets) 
All Stock > 0% Stock 2 25% Stock i 50% Stock 2 75% Stock = 100% 
All 2.20%*** 3.03%'" 2.96%"* 3.21%"' 3.22%* •* 
143 
3.78%* • • 
95 N 1859 707 433 248 
Low (1) 2.10%* 2.63%*** 2.67%*** 2.61%** 1.38% 
54 
3.57%' 
42 
5.01%*** 
47 
0.92% 
31 
4.38% 
26 
5.71%*** 
38 
N 619 272 177 91 
Medium (2) 2.32%*** 3.14%*** 3.34%"* 3.12%'* 
N 620 237 126 78 
4.01*** High (3) 2.20%*" 3.44%* 2.99%**' 
N 620 198 130 79 
HML(3-1| 0.10% 0.80% 0.30% 1.40% 3.60%' 4.80%' 
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Table 5:8 - Continued 
Panel C - Bidder Returns by Target Firm's Size (Total Assets) • Small Bidders Only 
All 1 Cash > 0% 1 Cash 2 25% 1 Cash £ 50% 1 Cash £ 75% 1 Cash = 100% 
All 3.52%'** 3.26%"* 3.27%"* 3.07%*** 3.10%*** 
271 
3.06%*** 
215 N 619 521 423 349 
Low (1) 3.26%"* 2.97%"' 2.86%* •* 2.41%** 2.99%" 
78 
2.56%*** 
2.88%** 
66 
2.98%*** 
68 
3.28%*** 
81 
N 206 167 119 100 
Medium (2) 2.66%"* 3.00%"* 2.98%*** 2.80%*** 
N 207 187 159 128 95 
3.70%*** High (3) 4.63%' 3.83%"* 3.93%*** 3.91%*** 
N 206 167 145 121 98 
HML(3-1) 1.40% 0.90% 1.10% 1.50% 0.70% 0.40% 
Panel D - Bidder Returns by Target Firm's Size (Total Assets) - Small Bidders Onlv 
All 1 Stock > 0% 1 Stock £ 25% 1 Stock i 50% 1 Stock £ 75% 1 Stock = 100% 
All 3.52%"' 3.84%*** 4.03%*** 4.22%*** 4.93%*** 
81 
6.41%* •* 
51 N 619 302 200 123 
Low(l) 3.26%"' 3.08%"* 3.01%*** 3.07%* 3.23%* 4.34%* 
IS 
-1.67% 
12 
11.74%*** 
24 
N 206 112 79 41 30 
0.22% Medium (2) 2.66%" • 2.44%* • 3.56%* * 0.71% 
N 207 96 52 28 16 
High (3) 4.63%'" 6.19%*" 5.54%"* 6.91%*** 8.54%*** 
N 206 94 69 54 35 
HML(3-1) 1.40% 3.10%* 2.50%* 3.80%* 5.30%* 7.40%* 
Panel E - Bidder Returns by Target Firm's Size (Total Assets) - Big Bidders Onlv 
All Cash>0% Cash £ 25% Cash £ 50% Cash > 75% Cash = 100% 
All 1.04%*" 1.03%"* 1.03%*** 1.01%*** 0.95%*** 
400 
0.78%*** 
334 N 620 576 532 472 
Low (1) 1.02%" 0.90%" 0.98%** 0.74%* 0.19% -0.10% 
101 
0.30% 
109 
1.93%*** 
124 
JV 206 183 165 145 121 
Medium (2) 0.24% 0.34% 0.30% 0.30% 0.41% 
131 N 207 197 179 159 
High (3) 1.85%*** 1.85%"* 1.77%* •* 1.90%*** 2.04%* 
148 N 207 196 188 168 
HML(3-1) 0.80% 0.90%' 0.80% 1.20%* 1.80%*** 2.00%*** 
Panel F - Bidder Returns by Target Firm's Size (Total Assets) - Big Bidders Onlv 
All Stock > 0% Stock 2 25% Stock £ 50% Stock £ 75% Stock = 100% 
All 1.04%"* 1.47%"* 1.21% 0.58% -0.09% 
31 
-0.78% 
18 N 620 156 92 54 
Low (1) 1.02%" 2.22%*** 2.34%* 2.01% -1.26% -3.42% 
5 N 206 66 36 22 11 
Medium (2) 0.24% 0.11% -0.51% -1.20% -0.33% 
9 
-4.36% 
3 N 207 52 34 19 
High (3) 1.85%'"* 2.04%** 2.02%* 0.77% 1.27% 2.18% 
9 N 207 38 22 13 11 
HML(3-1) 0.80% -0.17% -0.32% -1.24% 2.50% 5.60% 
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Table 5:9 - Announcement Period Excess Returns of Bidders by Intangible Assets of Unlisted Target Firm 
and Payment Method 
This table presents 5-day [t-2, t+2] announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), in 
percentage, of sample acquirers are presented. Abnormal returns (AR) are calculated using a modified 
market-adjusted model: 
Where is the return of bidder/ at t imef and/?^ , is the market index (FT-AII Share) at t ime<. 
Acquirers are publicly traded firms listed in the London Stock Exchange and targets are unlisted firms 
operating in the UK. The table presents gains to acquirers into one dimension; by the unlisted target firm's 
intangible assets only (panels A and B), by the unlisted target firm's intangible divided by the unlisted 
target firm's total assets (panels C and D), by the unlisted target firm's intangible divided by the unlisted 
target firm's fixed assets (panels E and F), and by the unlisted target firm's intangible divided by the deal 
value of the transaction (panels G and H). Further, each panel is divided into six groups according to the 
proportion of either cash or stock used (i.e. cash or stock is grater than zero, cash or stock is greater than 
or equal to 25%, cash or stock is greater than or equal to 50%, cash or stock is greater than or equal to 
75%, and cash or stock is equal to 100%). The final row in each panel shows the difference in the gains 
from acquisitions of unlisted targets firms subject to high versus acquisitions of unlisted targets subject to 
low proportion of either intangible assets or the alternative proxies calculated. The sample size, N, for 
each group is reported bellow each estimate. * * * , ** , and * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, 10% 
respectively. 
Panel A - Intangible Assets 
All 1 Cash > 0% 1 Cash £ 25% 1 Cash £ 50% 1 Cash £ 75% 1 Cash =100% 
All 2.02%*** 1.78%*" 1.66%*** 1.97%*** 1.97%*** 
249 
1.94%*** 
199 N 461 416 374 320 
Low (1) 3.03%*** 2.53%*** 2.14%*** 2.41%*** 2.62%*** 
80 
1.08% 
79 
2.16%*** 
90 
3.01%*** 
59 
0.86% 
66 
2.04%*** 
74 
N 153 134 118 102 
Medium (2) 0.79% 0.73% 0.88% 1.39%** 
N 154 137 123 105 
High (3) 2.24%*** 2.08%*** 1.95%*** 2.13%*** 
N 154 145 133 113 
HML(3-1) -0.79% -0.45% -0.19% -0.28% -0.45% -0.97% 
Panel B - Intangible Assets 
All stock > 0% Stock £ 25% Stock £ 50% Stock £ 75% Stock = 100% 
All 2.02%*** 2.50%*** 3.54%*" 4.42%*** 3.80%*** 
35 
5.06% 
21 N 461 170 103 55 
Low (1) 3.03%*** 4.10%*** 6.86%*** 8.51%*** 10.28%*** 
14 
-1.36% 
12 
0.50% 
9 
12.57%** 
8 
-0.87% 
8 
2.55% 
5 
N 153 62 35 20 
Medium (2) 0.79% 0.57% 1.28% 0.63% 
N 154 57 37 19 
High (3) 2.24%*** 2.71%* 2.50% 3.81% 
N 154 51 31 16 
HML(3-1) -0.79% -1.38% -4.36%* -4.69% -9.69%* -10.01%* 
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Table 5:9 - Continued 
Panel C - Intangible AssetsAotal Assets 
All Cash>0% Cash £ 25% Cash £ 50% Cash £ 75% Cash = 100% 
All 2.02%*** 1.78%*** 1.66%*** 1.97%**' 1.97%*** 1.94%"* 
N 461 416 374 320 249 199 
Low(l) 2.89%* •• 2.44%*** 1.97%*** 2.46%* 2.46%*** 2.62%*** 
N 153 134 123 105 88 69 
Medium (2) 1.38%** 1.14%** 1.22%** 1.74%** 1.60%" 1.10% 
N 154 138 121 102 77 61 
High (3) 1.79%*** 1.78%*** 1.78%*** 1.74%*** 1.79%*** 1.99%** 
N 154 144 130 113 84 69 
HML (3-1) -1.11% -0.66% -0.19% -0.73% -0.67% -0.63% 
Panel D -Intangible Assets/Total Assets 
All Stock > 0% Stock £ 25% Stock £ 50% Stock £ 75% Stock = 100% 
All 2.02%* •* 2.50%*" 3.54%*** 4.42%*** 3.80%* 5.06% 
N 461 170 103 55 35 21 
Low(l) 2.89%*** 4.81%"* 7.27%*" 8.23%* 10.08%"* 12.39%" 
N 153 46 30 20 16 10 
Medium (2) 1.38%** 1.62% 1.85% 2.46% 1.38% 2.71% 
N 154 62 33 15 10 6 
High (3) 1.79%*** 1.66%* 2.14%* 2.07% -4.69%* -6.77%* 
N 154 62 40 20 9 5 
HML (3-1) -1.11% -3.16%* -5.13%** -6.16%** -14.77%*" -19.16%*** 
Panel E - Intangible Assets/Fixed Assets 
All Cash>0% Cash £ 25% Cash £ 50% Cash £ 75% Cash = 100% 
All 2.02%*** 1.78%*** 1.66%*** 1.97%"* 1.97%*** 1.94%*** 
M 461 416 374 320 249 199 
Low(l) 2.73%*** 2.21%*** 1.69%*** 1.99%"* 1.83%*" 1.94%* * 
N 153 137 125 109 88 72 
Medium (Z) 1.15%" 1.02%* 1.14%* 1.81%*** 2.16%*** 1.62%" 
N 154 140 124 104 86 64 
High (3) 2.18%"* 2.13%*** 2.14%*** 2.12%*** 1.90%"* 2.26%*" 
N 154 139 125 107 75 63 
HML (3-1) -0.55% -0.08% 0.50% 0.10% 0.07% 0.30% 
Panel F - Intangible Assets/Fixed Assets 
All Stock > 0% Stock £ 25% Stock £ 50% Stock £ 75% Stock = 100% 
All 2.02%"* 2.50%* 3.54%* 4.42%*** 3.80%* * 5.06% 
N 461 170 103 55 35 21 
Low(l) 2.73%*" 5.02%*** 6.96%* *• 8.57%** 10.56%* 13.80%** 
N 153 45 30 17 14 8 
Medium (2) 1.15%** 1.12% 2.12%* 3.08%* 0.94% 2.71% 
N 154 60 30 16 7 3 
High (3) 2.18%*** 2.03%* 2.15% 2.19% -1.53% -1.22% 
N 154 65 43 22 14 10 
HML (3-1) -0.55% -3.00% -4.81%* -6.38% -12.09%** -15.02%* 
Panel G Intangible Assets/Deal Value 
All Cash >0% Cash £ 25% Cash £ 50% Cash £ 75% Cash = 100% 
All 2.02%*** 1.78%*** 1.66%*** 1.97%*** 1.97%"* 1.94%*" 
M 461 416 374 320 249 199 
Low(l) 2.91%**' 2.34%*** 1.74%*** 2.33%*** 2.49%*" 2.52%*" 
N 152 133 117 100 79 58 
Medium (2) 1.61%*" 1.40%*** 1.53%*" 1.68%"* 1.33%** 1.28%* 
N 153 138 125 102 74 57 
High (3) 1.54%*" 1.61%*" 1.69%*" 1.88%*** 2.03%*** 1.98%*** 
N 153 142 129 117 96 84 
HML (3-1) -1.37%* -0.73% -0.05% -0.45% -0.46% -0.55% 
Panel H Intangible Assets/Deal Value 
All Stock > 0% Stock £ 25% Stock £ 50% Stock £ 75% Stock = 100% 
All 2.02%*** 2.50%*** 3.54%*** 4.42%*** 3.80%* 5.06% 
M 461 170 103 55 35 21 
Low(l) 2.91%*** 4.50%*" 7.42%*** 8.49%* •* 11.31%*" 14.31%" 
N 152 56 32 20 13 7 
Medium (2) 1.61%*** 1.54% 2.41% 3.39% 2.23% 6.18% 
N 153 66 42 20 11 7 
High (3) 1.54%*** 1.55% 0.90% 0.37% -3.51%* -5.31%* 
N 153 46 29 15 11 7 
HML (3-1) -1.37%* -2.95%* -6.52%* * -8.12%** -14.82%*** -19.62%*** 
308 
Chapter 5: Target Value Ambiguity and Gains from Acquisitions of Unlisted Targets 
Table 5:10 - Announcement Period Excess Returns of Bidders by investments of the Unlisted Target Firm 
and Payment Method 
This table presents 5-day [t-2, t+2] announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), in 
percentage, of sample acquirers are presented. Abnormal returns (AR) are calculated using a modified 
market-adjusted model: 
Where is the return of bidder/ at timet and/?^ , is the market index (FT-AII Share) at Umet. 
Acquirers are publicly traded firms listed in the London Stock Exchange and targets are unlisted firms 
operating in the UK. The table presents gains to acquirers into one dimension; by the unlisted target firm's 
investments only (panels A and B), by the unlisted target firm's investments divided by the unlisted target 
firm's fixed assets (panels C and D), and by the unlisted target firm's investments divided by the deal value 
of the transaction (panels E and F). Further, each panel is divided into six groups according to the 
proportion of either cash or stock used (i.e. cash or stock is grater than zero, cash or stock is greater than 
or equal to 25%, cash or stock is greater than or equal to 50%, cash or stock is greater than or equal to 
75%, and cash or stock is equal to 100%). The final row in each panel shows the difference in the gains 
from acquisitions of unlisted targets firms subject to high versus acquisitions of unlisted targets subject to 
low proportion of either investments or the alternative proxies calculated. The sample size, N, for each 
group is reported bellow each estimate. •***, * * , and * denote significance level at 1%, 5%, 10% 
respectively. 
Panel A - Investments 
All 1 Cash>0% 1 Cash a 25% | Cash a 50% | Cash s 75% | Cash = 100% 
All 2.32%*** 2.19%*** 1.97%*** 1.95%"' 1.88%*" 173%*" 
725 649 559 464 352 273 N 
Low (1) 1.05%** 
242 
3.06%*" 
241 
2.85%* 
242 
1.04%" 
221 
3.02%"* 
217 
2.54%"* 
211 
0.87%* 
187 
2.71%"* 
186 
2.33%"* 
186 
0.76% 
162 
2.68%*** 
144 
2.50%*** 
158 
0.46% 
115 
2.75%*** 
105 
2.43%*** 
132 
0.69% 
89 
2.08%*** 
81 
2.35%*** 
103 
N 
Medium (2) 
N 
High (3) 
N 
HML (3-1) 1.80%* 1.50%*' 1.50%** 1.70%** 2.00%** 1.70%* 
Panel 8 - Investments 
All 1 Stock>0% 1 Stock a 25% 1 Stock a 50% | Stock a 75% | Stock = 100% 
All 2.32%"* 3.43%'" 3.23%*** 3.11%"* 4.25%*" 4.33%" 
725 293 186 109 59 44 N 
Low (1) 1.05%** 
242 
3.06%"'' 
241 
2.85%"* 
242 
1.70%* 
96 
4.51%'** 
104 
4.01%*" 
93 
1.48% 
59 
4.48%*'* 
67 
3.54%* 
60 
0.41% 
28 
3.03%** 
37 
4.90%"* 
44 
-1.31% 
17 
5.46%*** 
16 
7.15%** 
26 
-1.09% 
13 
4.87%** 
10 
7.43%** 
21 
N 
Medium (2) 
N 
High (3) 
N 
HML (3-1) 1.80%"* 2.30%* 2.10% 4.50%* 8.50%** 8.50%* 
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Continued - Table 5:10 
Panel C - Investments/Fixed Assets 
All 1 Cash > 0% 1 Cash 2 25% 1 Cash £ 50% 1 Cash £ 75% I Cash = 100% 
All 2.32%"' 2.19%"' 1.97%'" 1.95%"' 2.01%**' 
369 
1.73%'" 
273 
N 725 649 559 464 
Low (1) 1.22%"' 1.32%"' 1.18%" 1.08%" 
173 
2.34%'" 
155 
2.61%"* 
136 
0.99% 
133 
2.56%"* 
128 
2.61%'** 
108 
0.79% 
96 
2.20%"' 
98 
2.29%"* 
79 
N 241 225 199 
Medium (2) 2.67%'" 2.48%'" 2.25%"' 
N 242 217 188 
High (3) 3.07%'" 2.83%"' 2.56%*" 
N 242 207 172 
HML (3-1) 1.90%*" 1.50%" 1.40%' 1.50%" 1.60%' 1.50%"* 
Panel D - Investments/Fixed Assets 
All 1 Stock > 0% 1 Stock £ 25% 1 Stock £ 50% 1 Stocic £ 75% 1 Stock = 100% 
All 2.32%"' 3.43%'" 3.23%"' 3.11%*" 
109 
4.33%*** 
65 
4.49%* 
39 
N 725 293 186 
Low (1) 1.22%"' 2.34%"* 1.82%" -0.95% 
21 
3.75%* 
38 
4.33%'" 
50 
-2.08% 
12 
8.13%** 
19 
4.46%** 
34 
-2.17% N 241 87 52 
Medium (2) 2.67%"' 3.70%*" 3.26%" 7 
9.92%' 
11 
3.87% 
21 
N 242 100 62 
High (3) 3.07%'" 4.07%*" 4.21%'" 
N 242 106 72 
HML (3-1) 1.90%"' 1.70% 2.40%' 5.30%'* 6.50%*' 6.00% 
Panel E - Investments/Deal Value 
All Cash>0% Cash i 25% Cash £ 50% Cash £ 75% Cash = 100% 
All 2.32%'" 2.19%"' 1.97%"' 1.95%*** 
464 
1.88%*" 
352 
1.73%"' 
273 
N 725 649 559 
Low (1) 1.05%" 1.01%" 0.80%" 0.68% 
158 
2.70%*" 
140 
2.52%"' 
164 
0.26% 
108 
2.97%"* 
105 
2.34%'** 
138 
0.25% 
78 
2.27%'" 
84 
2.39%"' 
110 
N 240 218 185 
Medium (2) 2.97%"' 2.99%"' 2.63%'" 
N 241 219 184 
High (3) 2.99%"' 2.64%'" 2.53%'" 
N 240 208 186 
HML (3-1) 1.90%'" 1.60%" 1.70%" 1.80%"* 2.10%" 2.10%" 
Panel F - Investments/Deal Value 
All 1 Stock > 0% 1 Stock i 25% 1 Stock £ 50% 1 Stock £ 75% 1 Stock = 100% 
All 2.32%"' 3.43%"' 3.23%"* 3.11%*'* 
109 
4.25%* *• 
59 
4.49%' 
39 
N 725 293 186 
Low (1) 1.05%"' 1.77%" 1.48% 0.84% 
28 
2.58%* 
38 
5.06%*** 
43 
-1.05% 
16 
6.15%"* 
17 
6.28%** 
25 
-0.94% 
10 
6.08%' 
N 240 100 63 
Medium (2) 2.97%*" 4.15%"' 3.79%'" 
N 241 105 66 
High (3) 2.99%"' 4.67%"* 4.51%*" 7 
6.45%" 
22 
N 240 86 57 
HML (3-1) 1.90%"* 2.90%" 3.00%' 4.20%"* 7.30%' 7.40% 
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Table 5:11 - Determinants of Announcement Period Gains of Bidders: A Cross Sectional Analysis 
Dep. Variable (CAR) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model(7) Model (8) Model (9) Model (10) Model (11) Model (12) 
Intercept 0.0307' 
(2.03) 
0.0278' 
(1.83) 
0.0146 
(0.95) 
0.0134 
(0.87) 
-0.0633 
(-1.03) 
-0.0156 
(-0.41) 
-0.0123 
(-0.33) 
0.0167 
(0.33) 
0.0156 
(0.31) 
-0.018 
(-0.35) 
0.0135 
(0,27) 
0.0125 
(0.25) 
Log (BAGE) 0.0019 
(0.98) 
0.0022 
(1,14) 
0.0003 
(0.18) 
0.0003 
(0.14) 
Log (MV) -0.0083' 
(-6.66) 
-0.0082* 
(-6.71) 
-0.0137" 
(-3.07) 
Lag(DV) 0.0077* 
(5.89) 
0.0077* 
(6.01) 
0.0107' 
(2.13) 
MTBV -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0008 
(-1.08) (-1.08) (-1.22) (-1.18) (0.55) 
PE 0.0002' 
(1.74) 
0.0002' 
(1.67) 
O.OOOl' 
(1.68) 
0.0002 
(1.24) 
0.0003' 
(2.44) 
RS 0.0190" 
(5.07) 
0.0190" 
(5.11) 
Log (TAGE) 0.0131' 
(2.05) 
0.0033 
(0.88) 
0.0031 
(0.83) 
0,0039 
(0,71) 
0.0040 
(0.73) 
0.0067 
(1,20) 
0.0041 
(0.75) 
0.0042 
(0.76) 
Log (Total Assets) 0.0019 
(0.42) 
0.0007 
(O.IS) 
* ' 
Log (Fixed Assets) 0.0039 
(0.83) 
0.0128' 
(2.42) 
0.0128' 
(2.42) 
o.oiis' 
(2.31) 
0.0121' 
(2.27) 
0.0121' 
(2.271 
Log (Investments) -0.0006 
(-0.31) 
0.0034* 
(3.32) 
0.0034" 
(3.28) 
0.0034' 
(2.12) 
0.0034' 
(2.12) 
0.0033' 
(2.08) 
* ' 
0.0034' 
(2.10) 
0.0034' 
(2.11) 
Log (Intangible Assets) -0.0015 
(-0.51) 
-0.0056' 
(-2.03) 
-0.0057' 
(-2.04) 
-0.0054' 
(-1.91) 
-O.00S3' 
(-1.88) 
-0.0053' 
(-1.85) 
Log (Tangible Assets) 0.0025 
(0.77) 
0.0023 
(0.68) 
Log (No of Employees) -0.0058" 
(-1.65) 
-0.0049 
(-1.33) 
-0.0209" 
(-4.05) 
-0.0207* 
(-4.03) 
-0.0170* 
(-3.3S) 
-0.0202* 
(-3.86) 
-0.0200' 
(-3.84) 
Liquidity Ratio 0.0069 
(0.81) 
0.0060 
(0.70) 
-0.0035" 
(-1.91) 
-0.0034' 
(-1.87) 
Current Ratio -0.0076 
(•0.88) 
-0.0067 
(-0.78) 
-0.0035' 
(-1.89) 
-0.0034' 
(-1.79) 
Gearing Ratio -0,0001 
(-0.90) 
-0.0001 
(-0,81) 
-0.0001 
(-0.93) 
Dummy (Cash=l) 0.0017 
(0.45) 
-0.0030 
(-0.83) 
-0.0129' 
(-1.69) 
-0.0024 
1-0,19) 
-0,0024 
(-0.20) 
— 1 —' 
-0.0173' 
(-1.62) 
Dummy (Stock=l) 0.0152' 
(1.68) 
0.0104 
(1.08) 
0.0291' 
(1.66) 
0.0206 
(0.72) 
0.0203 
(0,71) 
F-Statistlcs 9.94* 10.35" 6.33" 6.43" 2.44' 2.39' 2.34' 3.72" 3.71* 3.53" 3.80* ^ ' 
3.78' R-Squared (in K) 3.93% 4.09% 2.12% 2.16% 13.43% 4.61% 4.52% 12,40% 12.36% 12.83% 12.63% 1258% 
N 1,465 1,465 1,465 1,465 192 455 455 192 192 176 192 192 
Continued 
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Table 5:11 - Continued 
Estimates of cross-sectional determinants of announcement period gains of acquirers are reported. Announcement period (5-days) excess returns of bidders 
are regressed against a set of explanatory variables. The following equation is estimated using ordinary least square and standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity. 
CAR, =a + Y,-^\ + f 
j=i 
The intercept (a) measures the excess return to bidders after accounting for the effects of all explanatory variables. The vector of explanatory variables 'X' 
includes acquirer's age on the day of bid announcement (log), acquirer's market value one month prior to the announcement of deal (log), deal value of the 
acquisitions (log), bidder's growth opportunity (ratio of market to book value of equity and price to earning ratio of acquirer one month prior to the acquisition 
announcement), relative size of the deal measured as the deal value divided by acquirer's market value, target firm's age on the day of bid announcement 
(log), target firm's total assets (log), target firm's fixed assets (log), target firm's investment (log), target firm's intangible assets (log), target firm's tangible 
assets (log), target firm's number of employees (log), target firm's liquidity ratio, target firm's current ratio, target firm's gearing ratio. Dummy variables that 
take the value of one and zero otherwise, are included to represent cash only and stock only deals, a, b, or c indicate significance at the 1, 5,10 percent level 
respectively. 
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Table 5:12-Continued 
PEPVAA RSQ F.va1ue No of Deals jNoofObserv. 
Panel C - Entire Sample (5 Years) 
ENTIRE 
ICash>=75 
'cash=100 
Stocl(>=75 
Stoclc=100 
Bidder MV (Small) 
Bidder MV (Big) 
Bidder MTBV (Low) 
Bidder MTBV (High) 
Bidder PE (Low) 
!Bldder PE (High) 
Deal RS (Low) 
Deal RS (High) 
Bidder Age (Young) 
iBIdder Age (Mature) 
[Target Age (Young) 
Target Age(Mature) 
Target Total Assets (Small) 
Target Total Assets (Big) 
Target Fixed Assets (Small) 
Target Fixed Assets (Big) 
Target Tan. Assets (Small) 
Target Tan. Assets (Big) 
Target No of Employ (Low) 
Target No of Employ (High) 
Target Int Assets (Low) 
Target int Assets (High) 
Target investment (Low) 
Target Investment (High) 
Target Uq. Ratio (Low) 
Target Liq. Ratio (High) 
Target Cur. Ratio (Low) 
Target Cur. Ratio (High) 
Target Gear. Ratio (Low) 
Target Gear. Ratio (High) 
0.006S*** 
0.0061*** 
O.OOSS"* 
0.0102" 
0.0132" 
0.01*4" < 
0.0066'** 
0.0085*** 
0.0058* 
0.X75*** 
0.0065** 
'o.0064«" 
0.0099*** 
0.0063* 
0.0037* 
0.0089*" 
0.0061** 
0.0066** 
0.0064*** 
0.0085" 
0.0O63*** 
0.0116"* 
0.0064" 
0.0067** 
'0.0052* 
0.0045 
0.0062 
-0.0011 
0.0078*** 
0.0066* • • 
0.0073* 
0.0067*" 
0.0053 
0.0044 
0.0092*** 
1.1019*** 
1.0810*** 
1.0578*** 
0.9541*** 
1.1559*" 
0.9655*** 
1.1170"* 
I0.9177*** 
1.2098"* 
1.0289*** 
1.2375*" 
1.1154*** 
1.1048*** 
1.0969*** 
1.0717*** 
1.0304*" 
1.0397*** 
1.2268*** 
1.1330*** 
1.2094*** 
1.1355*** 
1.3297*" 
1.0571*" 
1.0321"* 
1.0601*** 
I0.9337*** 
1.2351*** 
1.2538*" 
1.0955*** 
.0725*** 
.2481*** 
.0338"* 
.2798"* 
.1125*** 
.0515*" 
'0.2766*" 
0.2459*** 
0.2245* 
0.3269*** 
0.3812** 
0.7343*" 
0.2299*" 
0.2538*** 
0.2576"* 
0.2042" 
0.3576*** 
0.2004"* 
0.4253*** 
0.3944* • • 
'o.2662*" 
0.2368"* 
0.3457*** 
0.3460*** 
0.2896"* 
0.3554"* 
0.2493*** 
0.2266** 
0.2747*** 
0.4271*" 
0.3076*" 
0.6055*" 
|0.4074*" 
0.3442*** 
.2194"< 
|0.1949*** 
.3360*** 
.1928*** 
.4300"* 
.3503*" 
.2895*** 
-0.2602"* 
-0.2109** 
'-0.1802* 
-0.3403* 
-0.7785" 
-0.3090** 
-0.2594** 
-0.0814 
-0.4758"* 
0.1454 
.-0.3353" 
-0.2569" 
-0.2475 
-0.4021** 
-0.0213 
-0.2736* 
-0.3482"* 
.0.3091* * 
-0.2065** 
-0.5141"* 
-0.2652** 
-0.3473** 
-0.2728** 
{-0.4388*** 
-0.2610* 
-0.4814" 
-0.3447 
-0.5140*" 
-0.1750 
-0.1106 
-0.3771** 
-0.1267 
-0.4115** 
•-0.3775** 
;-0.4219*** 
78.67% 
77.52% 
77.53% 
43.39% 
35.99% 
55.63% 
78.28% 
60.17% 
69.51% 
61.66% 
67.78% 
78.34% 
57.33% 
52.63% 
75.52% 
61.45% 
70.37% 
68.01% 
78.49% 
58.85% 
76.48% 
66.06% 
70.21% 
58.55% 
66.40% 
43.42% 
45.61% 
60.85% 
73.35% 
73.93% 
59.05% 
71.80% 
62.50% 
58.52% 
59.74% 
1S7.3268*** 
147.0958*** 
147.1961*** 
32.7036*" 
23.9923*** 
53.4935*** 
153.7328* *• 
,64.4468*** 
97.2628*** 
68.6286*•• 
89.7598*** 
154.3027"" 
57.3214"* 
47.3968*** 
131.6091*** 
68.0147*" 
101.3132*** 
'90.7007*** 
155.6865*** 
61.0255*" 
138.7247"* 
' 83.0279*" 
ilOO.5591*** 
'60.2758*** 
'84.3359*** 
32.7485*** 
35.7843"* 
66.3174**' 
117.4045*** 
120.9648*" 
61.5376"* 
108.6357*** 
71.1075*" 
60.1899*" 
63.3233*** 
1,200 
614 
512 
100 
59 
364 
422 
362 
462 
273 
333 
447 
348 
416 
376 
411 
405 
376 
354 
310 
355 
275 
352 
253 
247 
83 
72 
133 
154 
372 
308 
370 
300 
237 
277 
143 
143 
143 
141 
140 
141 
143 
143 
143 
143 
143 
143 
142 
143 
143 
143 
143 
142 
143 
142 
143 
142 
143 
143 
143 
141 
134 
139 
142 
143 
143 
142 
143 
143 
143 
This table reports OLS estimates of monthly abnormal returns, measured by alpha of the following equation, from portfolios 
comprising of all acquisitions for 1- 3- 5- year post-event holding periods. Excess returns are estimated using calendar time 
regressions for each portfolio. Acquirers enter the portfolio on the month following the announcement and remain for 12-36-
60 months. This table contains three panels. Specifically, Panel A represents all acquisitions of unlisted target firms (private and 
subsidiary of other unlisted firms) remaining for 1 year (12 months) in the portfolio, starting from the next month from the 
month of the acquisition's announcement. Panel B represents all acquisitions of unlisted target firms (private and subsidiary of 
other unlisted firms) remaining for 3 years (36 months) in the portfolio, starting from the next month from the month of the 
acquisition's announcement. Panel C represents all acquisitions of unlisted target firms (private and subsidiary of other 
unlisted firms) remaining for 5 years (60 months) in the portfolio, starting from the next month from the month of the 
acquisition's announcement. From all panels, the dependent variable ENTIRE represents for the entire sample of acquisitions 
(without any restriction applied), cash >=75 represents acquisitions financed with equal to, or more that, 75% with cash, 
cash=100 represents acquisitions financed with equal to 100% with cash, stock >=75 represents acquisitions financed with 
equal to, or more that, 75% with stock, stock=100 represents acquisitions financed with equal to 100% with stock, IVIV for the 
bidding firm's size (the sample is sorted according to bidding firm's size), MTBV for the bidder's market to book value ratio (the 
sample is sorted according to bidding firm's growth opportunities), P/E for the bidding firm's price to earnings ratio (the 
sample is sorted according to bidding firm's PE ratio), RS for the bidding firm's relative size (the sample is sorted according to 
bidding firm's relative size), Target Total Assets (the sample is sorted according to target firm's size), Target Age (the sample is 
sorted according to target firm's age). Target Intangible Assets (the sample is sorted according to target firm's intangible 
assets). Target Investment (the sample is sorted according to target firm's investment). Target Liquidity Ratio (the sample is 
sorted according to target firm's Liquidity Ratio), Target Current Ration (the sample is sorted according to target firm's Current 
Ratio), and Target Gearing ration (the sample is sorted according to target firm's gearing ratio). In parentheses next to each of 
the proxies, the level of the assets held by either the bidding of the target firm presented (i.e. small and big), the grovirth 
opportunities of the bidding firm (i.e. low and high), and the age of the target firm (i.e. young and mature). Portfolios are 
rebalanced each month to include firms that just announced a deal. The monthly abnormal returns are measured by intercepts 
in the following equation: 
( ^ P . - ) = «p + /^P - -R/.) + s,SMB, + h^HML, + s^, 
where Rp.t is the calendar time portfolio return, R,., is the return on a one month T-bill during month t, SIVIB is the difference in 
returns of value weighted portfolios of small firms and big firms during month t, HIVIL is the return differential of value 
weighted portfolios of high and low book-to-market firms in month t, pp, Sp and hp are regression parameters specific to the 
portfolio and Ep,, is the error term. Standard errors are correaed for heteroscedasticity. * • * , * * , or • indicate significance at 
the 1, 5 ,10 percent level respectively. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
The primary objective of this thesis is to investigate the effects of takeover bid 
announcements on the share price of bidcJers that engage in domestic and or cross-
border takeovers. Similarly, the identification of determinants of abnormal returns 
from domestic and foreign acquisitions provides another motivation for this thesis. 
In the process, I have reviewed a large number of studies that not only prompted a 
series of research questions but also served as the motivation behind the empirical 
framework adopted in the chapters 3 to 5 of this thesis. Accordingly, the sole aim of 
this concluding chapter is to provide a summary of the main findings of my empirical 
investigations and discuss the main implications of findings to (a) all stakeholders of 
firms involved in takeover deals, and (b) to policy makers. 
The findings of empirical investigations are reported and discussed in great detail 
within each empirical chapter. They form the central core of this thesis. There is 
sufficient evidence across the empirical chapters that not only add new evidence but 
also extends the literature to another stage. More specifically, the thesis fills several 
voids in finance literature related to gains of domestic and cross-border acquisitions 
(CBA) as separate divisions, whereas it provides new explanations of any differential 
detected in performance between domestic and CBA. The main focus of the 
discussion on the gains of bidders from domestic versus CBA is contained in two 
issues: (a) the impact of the legal system of the target firm's country of residence on 
the short and long-run gains of acquirers engaged in domestic versus CBA, and (b) 
the impact of market valuations and economic conditions in the source country, as 
well as the impact of the source country's currency Effective Exchange Rate (EER) 
changes, on the short and long-run gains of acquirers engaged in domestic versus 
CBA. The thesis contributes in the relevant literature by suggesting a series of 
determinants behind any observed differential on the gains of bidders acquiring 
domestic versus foreign targets. The thesis provides also additional explanations for 
any gains or losses displayed to bidders of explicitly domestic acquisitions of unlisted 
target firms. On this very issue, the main focus of the discussion is narrowed on the 
valuation effects of value-ambiguities concerning unlisted target firms on the short 
and long-run gains of acquirers targeting for unlisted targets in the domestic market. 
Overall, the main conclusions derived from this thesis enhance our understanding of 
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the corporate takeovers process and their implications to various stakeholders of 
merger partners. The rest of this chapter serves an analytical description of the 
research outcomes of this thesis while it confers on the main implication to all 
merger partners. 
To begin with, evidence reported in chapter 3 of the thesis suggests that once the 
possible effects of firm and transaction-specific features are accounted for, 
acquisitions of foreign targets generate higher announcement returns than the 
acquisitions of domestic targets. Evidence also suggests that the gains of acquirers 
are highly sensitive to the legal system of the nation in which the targets operate. On 
average, there is a tendency for markets to react more favourably to the 
announcement of acquisitions of targets operating in civil-law countries than to 
acquisitions of targets based either in the domestic market or in common-law 
countries. This is possible because the acquirers are likely to face less competition 
when bidding for targets in civil-law countries. The less severe completion, in turn, 
limits the need for payment of higher premiums and hence more gains from the 
merger are accrued to the shareholders of acquirer. However, more detailed analysis 
conveys that this is more likely to occur only around bids of listed and subsidiary 
target firms. This finding stands of major importance given the insufficient 
availability of evidence in the literature that focuses on the gains from foreign 
acquisitions of subsidiary targets (only a small number of studies has discussed the 
wealth effects that generated to bidders' shareholders when they acquire foreign 
subsidiary target firms). 
Along similar lines, one of the most important observations that derived from 
chapter 3 suggests that share deals of foreign targets outperform share deals of 
domestic targets. Further analysis to identify the source of the additional gains to 
foreign bidders confirms the better performance of foreign bidders that acquire 
targets in common-law countries. This market behaviour reflects the investors' view 
for this type of transactions (in common-law countries and stock financing) who 
consider these deals as positive NPV projects. This is possible because the traditions 
of managers, corporate governance system and legal environment in common-law 
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countries are similar with the ones in the UK. Therefore, this is very likely to 
minimize or clear any cultural gap that may exist between the bidding and the target 
firms' countries, as well as differences in corporate governance traditions and legal 
systems, thereby help in the incorporation of the target firm in the bidding firm's 
existing business environment at a minimum cost. For example, share bids of US 
private targets are likely to be positive NPV projects given the high likelihood of 
creating outside blockholders with managers under similar traditions with the UK 
ones. 
Although the impact of the legal system of the target firm's country of residence 
found to play a significant role on the determination of short-run gains of foreign 
bidders, in chapter 3 I also investigate how it affects the foreign bidders' post-
merger performance. Evidence suggests that acquirers engaged in domestic 
acquisitions outperform the bidders of foreign targets in the long-run. In addition, 
when the sample is further restricted according to the target firm's status and the 
method of payment, domestic bidders of private, public, and cash payments found 
to significantly outperform the foreign ones. In addition, the main conclusions 
derived from the long-run analysis suggest that bidding firms acquiring targets in 
common-law countries outperform the ones that opting for targets based in 
countries with civil-law traditions. The better performance of bidders acquired 
targets in common-law countries is attributed to similar considerations with the 
ones discussed earlier. Indeed, the managerial traditions, the corporate governance 
system and the legal environment of countries belonging to common-law legal group 
are similar with the ones in the UK. These similarities are very likely to minimize the 
costs of integration between the merger partners and also to further help for the 
incorporation of the target firm into the bidder's existing business environment. 
Overall, the results discussed above have clearly confirmed the influential impact of 
legal system along with other firm and transaction-specific characterises, such as the 
target status and the method of payment, on the determination of short and long-
run gains of bidders engaged in domestic versus CBA. Whereas these findings extend 
our current knowledge on the gains of acquirers that engaged in domestic versus 
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CBA, they also support evidence from recent literature in the same field of research. 
In short, my findings support the main conclusions derived by Rossi and Volpin 
(2004) in terms of the direction of cross-border deals and the methods of payment 
utilized to finance them. In addition, the cross-section analysis in chapter 3 confirms 
that the relative size of the deal plays a very important role in the determination of 
the short-run gains of foreign bidders, as suggested by the majority of studies in 
finance literature (i.e. Asquith et al. 1983; Fuller et al. 2002). However, this finding is 
against the one estimated by Cakici et al. (1996) who claimed that the 
announcement gains of bidders that acquire foreign listed targets are inversely 
related to the relative size of the deal. Lastly, the major conclusions derived from 
this chapter propose some future research questions. In fact, on the basis of the 
findings discussed above, it would be important for future research to further 
explore the valuation effects of the legal systems by including a larger number of 
countries from the bidding firm's edge. The examinations of the gains generated to 
both bidding and target firms' shareholders should therefore be examined in order 
to identify the roles of the legal systems worldwide. Several policy implications 
should be also considered, given the (possibly) different legal system of the target 
and bidding firms' countries, in the event of cross-border acquisitions. 
The empirical findings reported and discussed in chapter 4 firmly suggest that when 
bidders made acquisitions during low market valuations periods in the source 
country, they earn higher short-run returns from domestic rather than foreign target 
bids. On the contrary, if the deals are announced during periods of high market 
valuations in the source country, announcement gains of shareholders of foreign 
bidders are higher than the ones generated to shareholders of domestic bidders. 
These findings clearly confirm that the investors' view on the perceived gains from 
domestic versus CBA is affected by the source country's level of market valuations at 
the time of the takeover bid announcement. This is possible because periods of high 
(low) market valuations are very likely to correlate with high (low) levels of investor's 
sentiment, which is therefore expected to be crucial in affecting the bidders' 
announcement share price performance (Rosen, 2006). Indeed, during low (high) 
market valuation periods bidders should show a strong preference for domestic 
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(foreign) targets firms. To some extent, this will help the bidder to avoid additional 
risks by investing in the home market rather internationally during periods of low 
market valuations, whereas it will allow bidders to anticipate more risks by investing 
abroad, rather than in the home market, during periods of high market valuations 
(such risks may include political risks, exchange rate ones, economic ones, 
government policy ones, central bank policy ones, etc). 
Several further important findings are also observed. The results suggest that the 
gains of bidders in the short-run are affected by the stage of the UK economy and 
the value of Pound Sterling at the time of bid announcement. Bidders enjoy higher 
announcement gains from domestic deals, only when these deals are announced 
during periods of high economic growth and during the peak of business cycles. This 
is possible because periods of high economic growth are in general highly correlated 
with technological innovations and advancements which are therefore increase the 
PV of the synergy for bids announced during those times. The evidence also confirms 
that bidders of domestic (foreign) targets outperform bidders of foreign (domestic) 
targets when the Pound Sterling is weak (strong) at the time of the bid 
announcement. In this respect, one may expect that foreign bids during periods of 
weak EER of the home currency are more likely to offset any value creation that 
directed to shareholders of bidding firms. 
Several more explanations are offered after the cross-border sample is divided into 
two groups according to the likelihood of the co-movement of the UK market 
valuations and UK economic conditions with the ones from all the other countries 
worldwide. In short, the cross-border sample is divided into the following groups: 
the G6 (G6=G7-UK) and the rest-of-the-world one (RoW=Wold-G6). This is to further 
identify the source of any gains or losses detected to shareholders of bidders 
engaged in domestic versus CBA. Evidently, during high market valuations (the case 
where foreign bidders outperform domestic ones), there is a tendency for markets 
to react more favourably to the announcement of acquisitions of targets operating in 
the Row group countries than to acquisitions of targets based either in the domestic 
market or in the G6 countries. This is possible because the acquirers are likely to face 
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less competition when bidding for targets in the RoW countries. Indeed, during 
periods of high market valuations in the UK, the market valuations in the G6 (RoW) 
group of countries is likely to be high (low) - the UK and the G6 group of countries 
are more likely to integrate whereas the G7 countries (G7=G6+UK) are less likely to 
integrate with the RoW ones. Therefore, given that market valuations spike with 
M&A activities, the M&A activities are expected to be lower In the RoW group of 
countries than in both the UK market and in the G6 group of countries (during 
periods of high market valuations in the UK). The less severe completion in RoW 
countries limits the need for payment of higher premiums, hence more gains from 
the merger are accrued to the shareholders of acquirer. 
The results also show that bidders' long-run performance is affected by the level of 
market valuations in the source country at the time of the M&A announcement. On 
average, bidders enjoy positive and significant post-merger returns after deals that 
announced during periods of high market valuation, irrespective of the country of 
origin. The findings also suggest that the post-merger performance of UK bidders is 
significantly influenced by the source country's economic conditions at the time of 
the deal's announcement. In short, bidders enjoy the highest post-merger gains from 
takeovers made at the time of high economic growth and when the business cycle is 
at its peak stage. As in the short run analysis, this is not surprising given that periods 
of high economic growth are highly correlated with technological innovations and 
advancements. Accordingly, bidders that engage in M&A during those times increase 
the likelihood of receiving higher net gains in the post-merger period. The analysis 
depicts also the deterministic power of the EER which suggests that domestic 
bidders enjoy the highest gains in the long-run, only if the M&A is announced during 
periods of weak EER. On the other hand, post-merger gains of bidders of foreign 
targets appear relatively higher from CBA in the RoW group of countries, only if the 
deals are announce during periods of strong EER. 
Overall, a detailed analysis on the gains of bidders that engage in domestic versus 
CBA across periods of different levels of market valuations, economic conditions and 
the EER, depicts also the influential impact of target status and method of payment. 
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Other determinants that found to influence gains of domestic versus CBA include the 
size and growth opportunities of the bidder, the relative size of the deal, as well as 
the age of the bidder. Overall, the findings discussed above extend our current 
knowledge on the gains of acquirers engaged in domestic versus CBA during period 
of different levels of market valuations and economic conditions, as well as during 
periods of different levels of EER. Lastly, on the basis of the findings discussed above, 
it would be important for future research to further explore the impact of market 
valuations and economic conditions in the bidding and target firms' countries 
simultaneously on the domestic and foreign M&A activities. It would be also 
important for one to examine the effects of market valuations and economic 
conditions on both the gains of bidding and target firms' shareholders in the context 
of domestic versus cross-border acquisitions. Several policy implications should be 
also considered, given the (possibly) different levels of market valuations and 
economic conditions across different times in the target and bidding firms' countries. 
The chapter 5 develops and empirically examines the proposition that the gains to 
acquirers of unlisted targets depends upon the level of value ambiguity of targets (or 
the difficulty that bidders face in correctly estimating the value of the unlisted 
target). The main focus of the discussion concentrates on whether target firms' 
characteristics that cause difficulty in valuation (such as age, size, intangibility of 
assets, and investments) can explain the variation of short and long-run bidding 
firms' abnormal returns. On average, acquisitions of unlisted target firms subject to 
low value ambiguity yield higher announcement gains compared to acquisitions 
involving high value ambiguous unlisted target firms. The findings also show that the 
method of payment interacts with the value ambiguity of targets, transaction 
features and bidders' specific-characteristics in shaping the gains of acquirers. More 
specifically, differentials of bidders' gains between portfolios subject to high versus 
low value ambiguity are more prominent when the payment is made in shares, and 
the unlisted target is young, small, and have a significant amount of intangible assets 
in its balance sheet. 
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Evidently, acquirers of large (mature) unlisted targets outperform acquirers of small 
(young) ones in share deals during the announcement period, suggesting that less 
value ambiguity is reflected in the final outcome of the M&A. Indeed, takeovers of 
large unlisted targets are relatively easier to value, given the more information 
available for these firms due to the pressure of UK disclosure requirements to 
release more information about their business in the market. In addition, takeovers 
of large unlisted target firms engineer higher announcement abnormal returns to 
bidding firms' shareholders possibly due to the higher likelihood of creating outside 
blockhoiders. Along similar lines, mature firms are easier to value given their long 
history which enables market participants and analysts to know more about the 
business. Share deals of unlisted targets with balance sheets laden with intangible 
assets yield also low short-run abnormal returns to their shareholders, compared to 
bidders acquired unlisted targets with balance sheets free of intangible asset. This 
announcement period stock market reaction could be due to the fact that bidding 
firms and market participants faces difficulties in assessing the potential gains from 
takeovers of firms with balance sheets laden with intangible assets. On the contrary, 
the examination of the bidding firm's gains in the post-merger period conveys that 
bids of small (young) unlisted targets generate higher gains than bids of large 
(mature) targets. In addition, bidders acquiring targets with laden balance sheets of 
intangible assets generate higher post-merger gains, compared to the ones that 
acquire unlisted targets with intangible assets free of balance sheets. 
On average, the above discussion conveys that while bidders gain the most from 
acquisitions of less value-ambiguous unlisted target firms, bidders enjoy higher gains 
in the post-merger periods when the unlisted target is subject to higher levels of 
value-ambiguities at the time of the bid announcement. The announcement period 
lower return is possibly due to market's presumption that bidding firms face 
difficulty to value the targets, and that they are exposed to high levels of risks when 
the transaction involves firms overpopulated of risky targets. However, such 
overreaction is corrected in the long-run as the firm's value moves towards to its 
equilibrium level. 
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Overall, the main conclusions derived from this chapter contributes to the M&A 
literature by providing important additional explanations with regards to the 
valuation effects of the unlisted target firm's value-ambiguities on the bidder 
announcement and post-acquisition share price. Lastly, on the basis of the findings 
discussed above and the unique nature of the analysis in the present chapter, it 
would be important for future research to further explore the effects of unlisted 
target firms' value-ambiguities on the announcement and post-merger gains of 
bidders, in a theoretical framework. In similar respects, following resent theoretical 
studies in asset pricing literature on the impact of value ambiguities on asset prices 
(Epstein and Schneider, 2008), the analysis of the present chapter could be 
recognized as an empirical extension of Epstein and Schneider work. 
The findings discussed in earlier chapters and the paragraphs above have several 
implications to the stakeholders involved in domestic and cross-border takeover 
deals. Indeed, the main conclusions suggest that while making a takeover bid, 
managers should consider the potential impact of (a) the level of investor protection 
in the host country, (b) the level of market valuation in the home country, (c) the 
economic condition in the home country, (d) the level of the effective exchange rate 
of the home currency, and (e) the level of investor's sentiment in the home country. 
All these factors seem to affect the wealth of bidding firms' shareholders in the 
framework of domestic versus CBA. In addition, bidders' shareholders should be 
careful in evaluating the potential risk and returns from the acquisitions of unlisted 
targets, and the interaction between the method of payment and the level of value 
ambiguity of the target. Further, the managers of both the acquiring and the unlisted 
target firm should be more cautious when engaged in M&A, especially when the 
unlisted target is subject to high levels of value-ambiguities. More specifically, the 
managers of the unlisted target firm should be careful in valuing their own business 
and when identifying the nature of their fundamentals, thereby being able to secure 
the best exchange ratio as the method of payment in this deal. On the contrary, the 
bidding firm manager should be able to identify the nature of the target firm's 
fundamentals thereby be able to set up the right payment method whilst to foresee 
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the expected risk tolerance that the combined entity will bear during the post-
merger period. 
The findings discussed in the preceding chapters may also have several policy 
implications. Policy makers should always be careful when adjusting or setting up 
new expectations in the economy by employing the monetary and fiscal policy tools. 
Possible changes, for example, in the interest rates, may alter significantly the level 
and direction of domestic M&A activity whereas the foreign M&A activity, both the 
ingoing and the outgoing, may change dramatically. Policy makers should also be 
careful when decide what policy to apply, when to apply it, and how to apply it. 
More specifically, policy makers should take into account seriously the timing of 
attempting to apply a significant change in the economy, thereby avoid any level of 
disequilibria across the economy (including any level of disequilibria in the domestic 
and foreign M&A activities). 
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